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In the first half of the last century, Michael B. Foster argued that the initial impetus for
the development of modern science derived from the implicit or explicit Christian
convictions of a number of early scientists. More specifically, aspects of the doctrine of
creation gave these scientists confidence in the possibility and value of experimental
investigation of the natural order. This argument was developed further, notably by
Thomas F. Torrance, in two directions. First, this historical connection between natural
science and the doctrine of creation was reinterpreted as a continuing methodological
reliance of the natural sciences upon the created status of the natural order. Second,
those properties of the natural order which are prerequisites for this ongoing reliance and
which derive from its created status were identified as rationality and contingency, or the
rational contingency of the natural order. In this thesis we develop this argument further
by attempting to demonstrate the necessity of the concepts of the created status - the
createdness - and rational contingency of the natural order for the interaction of science
and theology. First, we argue that createdness is an essential aspect of Christian
theology. Second, we argue that createdness and rational contingency are either held
together or lost together in interactions between science and theology. Ultimately, we
aim to demonstrate that there can be no interaction between science and theology as
coherent disciplines in their own right except where the scientific contribution relies on
rational contingency and the theological contribution articulates the createdness of the
natural order.
We begin by developing a grammar of createdness, based on the theology of Colin E.
Gunton, to enable us to describe theologically the createdness of the natural order and
entities within it. Moreover, this allows us to identify the theological motifs that
safeguard and endanger the concept of createdness. Key motifs in support include the
divine prevenience, trinitarian divine action in the form of divine action-in-relation, and
11
a conceptualisation of the God-world relationship as a divine gifting of the world with
the personal 'space' for existing in creaturely integrity.
In the second section, we test our grammar by determining the createdness of the
evolutionary process in the theology of Pierre-Marie-Joseph Teilhard de Chardin. We
conclude that Teilhard's understanding of evolution disregards its rational contingency,
and we trace this back to a failure to safeguard the createdness of the process. For
example, Teilhard inadequately secures the divine prevenience, which leads him to
introduce an evolutionary Christology and eschatology.
In the third section, we apply our grammar to contemporary discussions of divine action
at the science-theology interface and also from within popular science. We determine
that despite the existence of some fruitful work on the inherent dynamism and potential
of the evolutionary process, the createdness and the rational contingency of evolution are
not preserved theologically or scientifically. Specifically, in both the science-theology
material and the popular science material, there is an assumption that governing divine
action is superfluous and undesirable. We finish by illustrating the importance of
rational contingency and createdness for science-theology interaction by sketching a
model of divine action in evolution that accounts for both.
I, Ian McDonald, declare that this work was researched and written by me alone and that it has
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"One cannot deny that Teilhard is a fervent believer in Teilhard and that he wonders how it is
possible that the whole world is not Teilhardist as well."
- Reijer Hooykaas
"[W]hile the young Gunton sometimes dismissed his opponents too quickly, Gunton now has
even become more dismissive and disdainful, as if he were irritated that 25 years of Gunton have
not been enough to bring his opponents round."
- Marcel Sarot
"Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."
-Mt. 5:5, RSV
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Introduction 1
Introduction: The Need for a Grammar of Createdness
(A) Defining the Relationship between Science and Theology
(i) The relationship between theology and the natural sciences has had a mixed
character throughout history, to say the least. There are notoriously difficult
moments, such as the medieval Church's treatment of Galileo, and the Scopes trial.
Indeed, the famous or possibly infamous books by White and Draper1 portrayed this
relationship almost purely in terms of conflict. Irrespective of the validity of such a
perspective (and more recent work has judged that the arguments in these two books
are somewhat partisan), the current relationship between science and theology is
more harmonious and more productive." To be more specific, although there are
many interactions at the level of specific cross-discipline issues such as divine action
and ethics, a large proportion of the scholarly work here addresses the question of
methodology. In particular, this often involves attempts to construct a series of
models for defining the relationship between science and religion, and more
importantly how these disciplines react to one another. Ian G. Barbour argues for
four models for the interaction of science and theology, namely conflict,
independence, dialogue and integration,3 The conflict model represents scientific
materialism and biblical literalism, whereas the independence model represents an
emphasis on a contrasting of theological and scientific methods and languages such
as we find in Neo-Orthodoxy and existentialist theology.4 Needless to say, the most
fruitful forms of relations between science and theology are understood to fit either
within the dialogue or integration frameworks. Dialogue represents the posing of
limit questions upon science by religion or theology, an outworking of
methodological parallels or a nature-centred spirituality. Integration represents
1 Andrew Dickson White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom
(New York: D. Appleton, 1897), and John William Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion
and Science (24th edition) (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Traubner, 1904)
2
For a brief survey of the more fruitful and creative forms of interaction in the Twentieth Century, see
Hans Schwarz, Creation (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, Ml/Cambridge, 2002), 114-162
3
Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (revised and expanded
edition) (London: SCM Press, 1998)
4 Ibid. 77-90
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natural theology, a theology of nature or systematic synthesis.5 However, the extent
to which dialogue and integration can be distinguished, and indeed science and
theology themselves can be distinguished, is a question which lies at the heart of this
thesis.
(ii) It is of course obvious that if there is to be a genuine interaction between
theology and the natural sciences, then we should avoid conflict and independence
and aim for dialogue or integration. Nonetheless, we are still left with the question of
which of the two latter options is preferable. In this thesis we are not concerned
directly with this question, but we are concerned to establish how we can tell which
is preferable. Our contention is that the most basic parameter for genuine interaction
is one in which the findings and methods of the natural sciences and theology are
given equal status in discussion. In this more general sense we claim the importance
of dialogue between these two disciplines.
(iii) The equal standing of theology is not important for the egos of theologians (at
least not primarily), nor is it a case of points scoring, and a statistical analysis of the
numbers of theologians quoted by scientists or vice versa. Instead we claim that it is
imperative because only in so doing can we preserve the theological concept of the
createdness of the natural order and those entities within it. This is because, as we
hope to demonstrate, the concept of createdness is integral to both the scientific and
theological endeavours. This is not to claim that createdness should be alluded to
explicitly within the practices of the natural sciences, per se. However, createdness is
the theological designation and explanation for those aspects of the natural order that
make the scientific enterprise possible. In order to develop this further we must first
make a diversion into the subject of the origins of modern science.
5 Ibid. 90-105
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(B) The Roots ofthe Relationship between Science and Theology
3
Since a series of seminal articles in the 1930s by Michael Foster, there has been a
growing realisation that the origination of the natural sciences in the Christian West
was by no means coincidental. This is because many of the early scientists were
implicitly or explicitly influenced by key motifs from the Christian doctrine of
creation. Our concern is to identify this conceptual dependence of the sciences on
theology with an actual dependence of the natural sciences on the createdness of the
natural order. In so doing we can provide the foundations for our argument on the
importance of createdness for a dialogue model of science-theology interaction.
(i) During the first half of the twentieth century, Michael B. Foster published a
number of articles in the journal Mind in which he contrasted the methodologies of
the natural sciences and a generalised Greek science, and sought to account for the
differences in underlying theological and philosophical presuppositions. In particular
he was concerned to find an explanation for the empiricism of the natural sciences,
because this implied a confidence in the reliability and regularity of sense
observations that Foster argued was absent in Greek science. For Foster, the heart of
the matter was that a conception of the world as created provided the impetus for this
confidence, whereas the understanding of the world and its relationship to deity
underlying Greek science could not provide this confidence. Foster sought to answer
the question of why there was this confidence in sensory observation and sensory
data, when the main alternative in the West was an a priori scientific method based
on Aristotelian and Platonic thought. The difference in approach of these two
methods is as follows;
Modern science describes natural substances instead of defining them, it
discovers their properties by observation and experiment instead of by
'intuitive induction' and demonstration, it classifies their species instead of
dividing their genera, it establishes between them the relation of cause and
effect instead of the relation of ground and consequent.6
6 Michael B. Foster, "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Science', Mind,
43/172 (1934), 446-468, (citation, 454)
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Ancient and scholastic science was a priori because the essence of a natural object
was definable, and could be deduced from reason.7 Now, the difficulty for this
position with regard to sensory experience is that definition is a rational act
"containing no element of sense, however necessary it may be that sensuous
perception should precede it."8 Furthermore, this deductive scientific methodology
was based on an underlying metaphysical ontology. An object consists of a twofold
union of intelligible form (or essence) and sensible matter. This has a negative
connotation for the sensible aspect of an object because it is seen as inherently
unreal. Although the form is only actualised in union with matter, the former alone
determines the nature of this actuality. Matter, that which is sensible, is regarded as
the source of the imperfect degree to which the form is realised.9 Here sensory
experience has a much attenuated, and certainly not evidential, role because although
form has no actual existence without sensible embodiment, it is intelligible "only
when it is conceived in complete distinction from it" in an act that contains no
sensory observation.10 Such a science is "the quest for logical rather than factual
links between things."11 Now let us examine the connections between this
metaphysics/ontology and the underlying theological perspective. Only when this has
been done can we at least make a case for a historical connection between modern
science and theology.
(ii) The theological tenets that buttress this scientific methodology involve an
incomplete distinction between the natural order and deity. In turn, these derive from
the Greek understanding of God as creative or Creator. Within Plato's philosophical
scheme we find the concept of the Demiurge, a concept that Aristotle also argued
must be the implicit assumption in any science. The Demiurge is the creative aspect
of divinity, but is not strictly speaking a Creator. He does not bring into being either









Indeed, both must be given to him and so "if God is Demiurge of the actual world,
his work is confined to the uniting of its two elements, form and matter".12 In fact we
find almost a note of opposition in that the Demiurge is confronted with the varieties
of uncreated (and so eternal) form and matter.13 Matter and form both, then, possess
a divine attribute (eternality), and we have the beginnings of an incomplete
conceptual distinction between deity and the natural world.
(iii) Greek science, then, required that the forms and matter be uncreated. Created
matter would have active properties, and a created form would be unintelligible.14
This relates back to the fact that Greek science treated the form as intelligible in
isolation from its embodied material existence. For Aristotle, this was a consequence
of the purposive (or end-directed) activity of the Demiurge. The end is that which the
Demiurge adds to matter, and alone was deducible by science. Another key aspect of
Greek theology that relates to this point is the notion of the divine will. The
Demiurge may be perceived to be acting in the uniting of form and matter with a
degree of will, but this is wholly subordinate to the end of forming natural objects.15
In fact, the presence of will in this action of deity has negative connotations for a
Greek science, because it can only lead to an imperfect realisation ofform. The form
alone, deduced in isolation from matter, is the proper object of science. As such,
anything that detracts from the perfection of its realisation is an obstacle to science.
Will is precisely such an obstacle. That aspect of an object that is not necessitated by
the idea or form is defined as contingent, and the presence of contingency implies
imperfection and so an imperfect act of realisation. Because imperfection cannot be
attributed to the Demiurge, contingency must be said to stem from the natural
object,16 and more precisely from the natural recalcitrance of matter.17 Again, the
material and sensible are excluded from science. This lack of distinction between
God and the world is also exacerbated by Plato's likening of the God-world
12




16 Ibid. 463 and Michael B. Foster, 'Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature (II.)', Mind,
45/177 (1936), 1-27, (citation, 4-5)
17
Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine ofCreation and the Rise ofModern Science', 463
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relationship to that of a father-son relationship.18 If the world were generated as an
offspring or emanation from God it would exhibit a divine nature; it would be self-
derived, necessary and divine.19 The world cannot be fully distinguished from God,
and Pantheism follows.20 Aristotle may not have subscribed to this account of the
God-world relationship, but in his science we see an equal potential for pantheistic
thinking. Hence, one of the striking elements of the rationale for Greek science is the
active resistance which matter makes against the perfect realisation of form by the
Demiurge. The divine action is not only limited to uniting, but it is confronted with
what must be interpreted as a divine power or activity within matter.21 In Aristotelian
thought this pantheistic notion is emphasised by his denial of efficient causality to
22the deity. In other words, God and the world are not confused by direct Pantheism
but by an implied ascription ofdivine causality to nature;
This is simply to conceive nature as being, in respect of the exercise of this
power, indistinguishable from God.23
According to Foster, and those authors in at least broad agreement with his proposal,
Greek science was therefore marked by a necessitarian conception of the natural
order. Where the universe is necessary, it must have the pattern and properties with
which it is imbued. Moreover, these properties cannot be understood through the
senses. There are higher principles lying behind the sensible aspect of the universe,
whether these are uncreated forms, or the ends that Aristotelian science envisaged to
be underlying the behaviour of natural objects. This leads to a deductive science in
which the nature of the universe "will be discovered by thought rather than by
experiment."24 In sharp contrast, if the world is understood to be created, then the
sciences take on an entirely different pattern.
18 Foster 'Christian Theology and Modem Science ofNature (I.)', 444
19 Ibid. 449
20
Stanley L. Jaki, God and the Cosmologists (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1989), 85
21 If inanimate and unconscious matter can resist divine activity, then the recalcitrance of matter is at
the very least suggestive of an activity comparable to that of the divine. We shall come across this
notion in Section 2 of this thesis.
22
Foster, 'Christian Theology and Modem Science ofNature (I.)', 452
23 Ibid. 454
24
Philip Luscombe, Groundwork ofScience and Religion (Peterborough: Epworth Press, 2000), 17
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(iv) Unsurprisingly, Foster's thesis has over the years generated heated debate, both
in contention and in support. Before we can go on to discuss those in support,
including those which will enable us to present the case for a contemporary
connection between science and theology, we must briefly discuss some pertinent
criticisms. First of all, it is quite possible to play down or even deny a strong
correlation between theology and the rise of the natural sciences. For instance, John
Hick forcibly argues that the rise of science represented an undermining ofEuropean
25
superstition. Whilst he does not deny that there is some connectivity between
religious beliefs and the rise of scientists, he wants to affirm that this is a minor
influence amongst many others;
Modem science is not a product of Christianity as such but of the impact on
Christian Europe of the Greek spirit of free enquiry during the vast cultural
transformation known as the Renaissance, stimulated by a rediscovery of
classical literature and thought that was rapidly spread by the new invention
of printing.26
However, quite aside from historical accuracy, about which we shall have more to
say, questions have also been raised about the internal coherence of Foster's
argument. Willem Drees argues that Foster sees a "one-to-one correspondence"
between theologies and philosophies of nature. He is guilty of simplifying an
argument for propagandist reasons at the expense of accuracy. His rather black and
white approach (which Drees argues he shares with Jaki) means that he ignores the
27
more empirical work of Archimedes and Greek astronomy. Ian Weeks and Struan
Jacobs make a similar charge of incoherence. They argue that Foster claims, without
28
providing evidence, that Greek polytheism underlies Aristotelian thought.
5 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (Basingstoke:
MacMillan Press, 1989), 327
26 Ibid. 328
27 Willem Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
78-79. Whilst it is true that Foster by his own admission has presented a generalised argument, this
does not detract from the overall accuracy of his position. Drees rightly points out the involvement of
other factors, but must rely on accusations of propaganda against those in support of Foster's general
thesis.
2X
Ian Weeks and Struan Jacobs, 'Theological and Philosophical Presuppositions of Ancient and
Modem Science: A Critical Analysis of Foster's Account', in C. Wybrow (ed.) Creation, Nature and
Political Order in the Philosophy ofMichael Foster (1903-1959): The Classic "Mind" Articles and
Others, with Modern Critical Essays (Lewiston and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 255-268,
(citation, 258)
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Moreover, because Foster argues that Greek science also uses a 'monotheistic'
principle of unity that is not derived from polytheism, then the latter is not in itself
9Q
capable of generating a science. Finally, Foster's deliberations on the theology of
the Demiurge are also self-contradictory in that he argues that this is highly
influential on Aristotelian thought but at the same time cannot be the foundation for
Aristotelian science because the Demiurge is outside of nature and can have no effect
30
on it. Again, this suggests that theology has no implication for science. In general,
Foster has "no consistent, definitive statement of which theology-cww-philosophy is
presupposed by, or related by entailment to, Aristotelian (Greek) science."31
Although this is sensitive and insightful criticism, it does seem to miss Foster's main
point, which is that it is the theological or philosophical understanding of the natural
order that is significant for the Aristotelian scientific method. Hence, to argue that
the Demiurge concept does not affect science because it is not part of the natural
order ignores the fact that this concept in and of itself suggests a very specific
understanding of the natural order itself, and hence has some consequences for a
natural philosophy. RolfGruner does not perhaps go quite so far in his criticisms of
Foster, but he also detects propagandist and revisionist tendencies in his argument. In
particular, he argues that it rather conveniently does away with those aspects of
32Christian theology that might in fact have hindered the rise of the natural sciences.
(v) Numerous commentators in this field have noted that Foster's argument,
regardless of their estimation of its value, is weakened by a lack of historical
evidence in its presentation.33 In other words, Foster provides no evidence to back up
his argument. However, in the intervening decades a great deal of evidence has been




32 For instance, the suspicion of the natural order due to the doctrine of the Fall. (Rolf Gruner,
'Science, Nature and Christianity', in Wybrow, Creation, Nature and Political Order, 213-243,
(citation, 221-22))
j3 Weeks and Jacobs, 'Theological and Philosophical Presuppositions of Ancient and Modern
Science', 268; in the same volume, Stanley L. Jaki, 'Telltale Remarks and A Tale Untold', 268-296,
(citation, 271); and also in the same volume, Francis Oakley, 'Christian Theology and the Newtonian
Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws ofNature', 179-211, (citations, 200 and 210, nl)
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aspects of Christian theology, and not least the doctrine of creation. Nonetheless, this
does not necessarily provide precise support for his argument, as we shall see.34
Edward B. Davis rightly points out that according to Foster, "the connection between
Christian theology and the presuppositions of modern science is itself logically
necessary, not historically contingent." Jaki claims that Foster should have been
more careful to suggest that early scientists were unconsciously, rather than
deliberately, using tenets from the doctrine of creation.36 John Hedley Brooke has
very carefully discussed some of the consequences of arguing for too tight a
connection between science and theology. He agrees broadly with the proposition
that there is some connectivity between the doctrine of creation and the rise of
modern science37, but for him there is "a big jump from that proposition to the more
tendentious claim that the causes of modern science are to be found in a theology of
creation."3S Brooke notes for instance that the notion of the invariance of divine ideas
might have been useful for Kepler's application of geometry to the physical world,
but certainly proved an obstacle for the acceptance of Darwinism by Richard Owen
34
Hugh Kearney argues that there were in fact three theologically influenced traditions involved in
the rise of modern science, each of which in turn was based on a form of Greek thought! (Hugh
Kearney, Science and Change 1500-1700 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971)). On this, see
also Colin A. Russell, Cross-currents: Interactions between Science and Faith (Leicester: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1985), ch. 2. There is also a wide-ranging argument for the sociocultural influence of
religion on the rise of science. The best known of these is probably the 'Merton thesis', which argues
for the importance of Puritanism on the origins of science. Peter Harrison has also recently argued that
at a more diffuse level, Protestantism itself, and the Protestant approach to Scripture helped to
demythologise or desymbolise nature. (Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of
Natural Science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5-7). For more on this see John
Dillenberger, Protestant Thought and Natural Science: A Flistorical Interpretation (London: Collins,
1961). Reijer Hooykaas is in general agreement with Foster's position, although he makes more of a
clear-cut distinction between the Platonic Demiurge and the Aristotelian organic/generative scheme.
(Reijer Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise ofModern Science (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press,
1973), 10)
35 Edward B. Davis, 'Rationalism, Voluntarism and Seventeenth-Century Science', in Jitse M. van der
Meer (ed.) Facets of Faith and Science, 3: The Role of Beliefs in the Natural Sciences (Lanham:
University Press of America; Ancaster: The Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies in Faith and Science,
1996), 135-154, (citation, 138). Davis is not unsupportive of Foster's thesis, and provides evidence in
this essay for the importance of voluntarist theology for Galileo, Descartes and Boyle.
36 Jaki, 'Telltale Remarks and A Tale Untold', 272. However, in Foster's defence, J. R. Jacobs has
argued quite convincingly that Robert Boyle consciously used his natural science as an apologetics
against Scholastic reasoning and in general against contemporary Roman Catholicism. (J. R. Jacobs,
'Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism', Social Studies ofScience, 8:2
(1978), 211-233, (especially 213-214))
37 John Hedley Brooke, 'Religious Belief and the Natural Sciences: Mapping the Historical
Landscape', in Jitse M. van der Meer (ed.) Facets ofFaith and Science, 1: Historiography and Modes
of Interaction (Lanham: University Press of America; Ancaster: The Pascal Centre for Advanced
Studies in Faith and Science, 1996), 1-26, (citation, 4)
38 Ibid. 5
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and Louis Agassiz. Furthermore, Brooke is suspicious because the doctrine of
creation does not seem to apply many limits to what can be considered as legitimate
science.39 Clarke and Leibniz were both creationists with a strong emphasis on divine
omnipotence, but they came to radically different ideas on the nature of the natural
order. Clarke argued that omnipotence and divine freedom were connected and so the
possibility of God acting in the natural order had to be maintained. Leibniz perceived
the possibility of, or need for such divine action within the natural order as a slight
upon divine foresight.40 However, Brooke's criticisms only hold ifwe are assuming a
virtually one-to-one correlation of science and any theological presuppositions. Ifwe
do not assume this to be the case (and the present author is not convinced that Foster
was making such a definitive argument) then one can still maintain a degree of
correlation between science and theology.41
(vi) We began our discussion by describing modern science as an empirical
discipline, i.e. one that is reliant upon sensory data. We are seeking to explain how
this scientific method, so radically distinct from the Greek, arose in the Christian
West. Our answer is that the prevailing Christian belief in the createdness of the
natural order gave credence to a belief that reliable information could be derived
from the natural order through sensory observation.42 This in turn was reliant on a
belief in God as Creator and in the natural world as the creation of God. Therefore,
the early founders of science "drew courage for their pioneering efforts from their
belief in a personal and rational Creator. The handiwork of such a Supreme Being
had to be rational and therefore investigable in a manner satisfying the stringent
demands of reason."43 But why would a belief in a personal and rational Creator
provoke such confidence in an empirical scientific method? The answer is that the
39 Ibid. 5
40 Ibid. 6
41 For this criticism of Brooke, see Stephen John Wykstra, 'Have Worldviews Shaped Science? A
Reply to Brooke', in Jitse M. van der Meer (ed.) Facets ofFaith and Science, 1: Historiography and
Modes ofInteraction, 91-111
42
Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Science', 453
43
Stanley L. Jaki, Science and Creation: From Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe (Edinburgh:
Scottish Academic Press, 1974), 130. C.f. Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind
(Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1985), 40. Klaaren argues that this relative consensus lasted into the 18th
century. (Eugene M. Klaaren, Religious Origins ofModern Science: Belief in Creation in Seventeenth-
Century Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 37)
Introduction 11
creation of a personal and rational Creator would possess two important qualities that
would make such a method possible; it would be (vii) contingent and (viii) rational.
(vii) The basis of our argument lies in the doctrine of creation. In the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, God creates ex nihilo. God is to be understood as radically
distinct from all aspects of the natural order; he is the Creator, and so he is "not
challenged or complemented by any force or principle."44 In affirming creation solely
by God's efficacious will, Scripture describes the sovereignty and precedence of God
over all aspects of the natural order.45 The doctrine of creation in following Scripture
affirms the divine freedom and the createdness of the world;
Creation in time is an evidence of God's absolute freedom to create.46
This becomes important in the rise of the natural sciences because it underlies the
voluntarist motif in the beliefs of early scientists.47 By this we mean that the
theological affirmation of the freedom of the divine will is of particular importance.48
Basically, because creation is a freely willed divine act, then the natural order is
created, but also contingent.49 Unlike the necessitarianism of Greek theology, in
claiming the divine freedom in creation Christian theology maintains that the world
is "altogether contingent".50 More precisely, the world has a 'double contingency', in
that God is not only free to create or not, but he need not have made this particular
world which he has made.51 In Christian theology God has no external limitations
placed upon his creative freedom, and so we cannot assume that there were no
44
Jaki, Science and Creation, 140
45 Ibid. 147
46
Stanley L. Jaki, Cosmos and Creator (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1980), 80
47
Klaaren, Religious Origins ofModern Science, 29
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As Foster puts it, this is a theology in opposition to Greek rationalism. On the Christian
understanding, the divine will is not wholly subordinate to reason. (Foster, 'Christian Theology and
Modem Science of Nature (II.)', 5, nl)
49
Jaki, Science and Creation, 356. C.f. Stanley L. Jaki, The Origin of Science and the Science of its
Origins (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1978), 1 1, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, Toward a
Theology ofNature: Essays on Science and Faith ed. Ted Peters (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John
Knox Press, 1993), 34
50
E. L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science: Some Questions in their Relations
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965), 92
51 Ibid. 93. C.f. Thomas F. Torrance, 'Divine and Contingent Order', in Arthur R. Peacocke (ed.) The
Sciences and Theology in the Twentieth Century (Stocksfield: Oriel Press, 1981), 81-97, (citation, 85)
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52alternatives open to the Creator. The consequence of this is another break with
Greek thought, in that a world that is contingent upon the divine will does not
contain a deducible pattern,53 Therefore, even if we assume that an ideal plan does
exist within the mind of God, we have no access to it through deduction. God's ways
are simply not our ways.54 If we cannot deduce, we must investigate empirically,
"through asking nature to reveal itself to us."55 However, the doctrine of creation
affirms not only the divine freedom, but in denying any sense of Pantheism, it also
affirms what Torrance refers to as the contingent freedom of the natural order. The
contingent world is dependent upon the freedom of its Creator, but this freedom of
God is not arbitrary and capricious, but rather it is rational.56 Therefore, because God
is free from fate, necessity and determinism, so the world is also contingently free
from these as well.57 This freedom is expressed in those intrinsic and autonomous
58
principles and properties that must be investigated, empirically, in their own right."
(viii) Alfred North Whitehead rightly pointed out that a belief in the contingency of
the natural order would not be enough to provide confidence in an empirical method.
This required a belief in an ordered universe and so a personal and rational
Creator.59 From this follows the belief that the world, "being the handiwork of a
supremely reasonable Person, is endowed with lawfulness and purpose."60 If there
were only contingency and no rationality, then science would be a mere cataloguing
52 John Baillie, Natural Science and the Spiritual Life (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 24
and Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Science', 462. C.f. Schwarz,
Creation, 173. This does not discount the possibility of divine self-limitation.
53
Baillie, Natural Science and the Spiritual Life, 19
54 Ibid. 23
55
Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind, 24. C.f. Donald M. Mackay, Science, Chance and
Providence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 11
56 Thomas F. Torrance, The Ground and Grammar of Theology (Belfast: Christian Journals, 1980),
57. C.f. Torrance, 'Divine and Contingent Order', 87-88 and C.f. Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and
Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 22
57
Torrance, The Ground and Grammar ofTheology, 58
58
Contingency means "the universe has no self-existence and no inherent stability of its own, but is
nevertheless endowed by the Creator with an authentic reality and an intelligible order of its own
which points beyond itself, and is as such the ground of scientific enquiry." (Thomas F. Torrance,
'Revelation, Creation and Law', Heythrop Journal, 37:3 (1996), 273-283, (citation, 274))
59 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1926), 17
60 Jaki, Science and Creation, 150
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of data, without explanatory or predictive powers.61 For Christian theology, this is
avoided because God is indeed sovereign and omnipotent, but never capricious.62
God holds, reinforces and sustains the contingent rationality of the natural order.63
God creates and sustains a cosmos, rather than a chaos, because he is bound by his
own nature.64 Nonetheless, this does not detract from the contingency of the natural
order;
It will embody regularities and patterns, since its Creator is rational, but the
particular regularities and patterns which it embodies cannot be predicted a
priori since he is free; they can only be discovered by examination.'0
Hence we need a balance between contingency and rationality: contingency without
regularity makes empirical science impossible, but regularity without contingency
makes empirical science unnecessary.66 It is this combination of contingence,
rationality, freedom and stability of the universe that makes the scientific method
necessary and possible.67 Together, this provides what Torrance refers to as a
ZjO
universe of contingent order. 1 In other words, Christian theology provided the
resources for a belief in "the full reality of matter and the rationality of the
contingent."69 Therefore, Christian theology provided early science with a
confidence in both the possibility (rationality) and necessity (contingency) of
empirical investigation. However, we are suggesting something more than a
historical relevance of Christian theology for the natural sciences. We are arguing
that the world is contingent and rational, and this is because it is created. Let us move
on to discuss the contemporary significance of contingency and rationality for the
natural sciences.
61
Mackay, Science, Chance and Providence, 11. This of course militates against the inductive (or
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Introduction 14
(ix) Thomas F. Torrance is one of the relatively few authors to discuss contingency
and rationality as not only theological concepts, but also as real attributes of the
natural order. We are in very close agreement with his position, and as further
support would point to Ian Barbour's discussion of the place of contingency within
modern cosmology. The first of these is the contingent existence of the universe
itself.70 For the natural sciences, the existence of the cosmos is not self-explanatory,
even if the findings of cosmology were to indicate that only one universe were
possible, as this would still not make this universe necessary.71 Second, we must
conceive of the boundary conditions of the universe as contingent. This is
exemplified by the theoretical Big Bang, which represents a singularity and so a
markedly contingent event. Nonetheless, even if time is understood as infinite, we
are still confronted by contingent boundary conditions in the form of an event that
provides an unexplained given. Third, and perhaps most importantly for our
purposes, Barbour identifies the contingence of the laws of nature. Theories are
always provisional and contingent because the universe itself is contingent;
Since the existence of the universe depends upon a reality beyond it, no
scientific theory, which is of course couched only in terms taken from within
the universe itself, can finally explain everything in that universe.72
Even the existence of a Grand Unified Theory or a Theory of Everything is still
contingent.73 In fact, the very regularity described by a natural law must be
considered contingent, insofar as this pattern of behaviour "represents a
repeatable sequence of events, a sequence that, being temporal, must take place a
7(1
Ian Barbour, When Science Meets Religion (London, SPCK, 2000), 54
71 Ibid. 54-5. The contingency is not explicable by the natural sciences, but we do not wish to put this
forward as a rationale for natural theology. We see precisely this usage in an earlier version of the
argument by Aubrey L. Moore;
"If a science of nature is possible, nature must be intelligible, and if intelligible, then
rational. And we are at least carried on with irresistible force to the conclusion, that
its ultimate explanation must be spiritual, not material." (Aubrey L. Moore, Science
and the Faith: Essays on Apologetic Subjects (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Triibner, 1898), 84)
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Bruce A. Hedman, 'Cantor's Concept of Infinity: Implications of Infinity for Contingence', PSCF,
45:1 (1993), 8-16, (citation, 13)
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first time before it is repeated and becomes a regular sequence."74 Fourth and finally,
Barbour and Pannenberg both affirm the contingency of events within the cosmos.
For both authors, this entails taking a historical perspective of world processes and
regularities, as opposed to the general functioning of lawlike behaviour.75 Together
these contingent features of the cosmos are reflected in the empirical method of the
natural sciences, but also in the provisional nature of scientific theory and
hypothesis.
(x) Finally, if we wish to argue for a contemporary relevance of Christian theology
for contemporary science, we have to account for the absence of any theistic
reference within the methods of natural science. The answer to this lies in the
contingent freedom or independence that Torrance identifies as a property of a
created order in radical distinction (but not isolation) from its Creator.76 It is this
property with which the natural sciences interact;
Natural science, of course, is concerned to explore and account for on-going
processes in nature in their autonomous structures, that is, in their contingent
rationality as utterly different from the transcendent Reality ofGod.77
If God is the Creator of heaven and earth, then paradoxically it is to be expected that
descriptions of the behaviour of the created order are to be constructed without
explicit reference to God.7x But how can science function in the face of this paradox?
Because the natural sciences must rely upon, but cannot account for, the contingency
and rationality which the world displays;
74
Pannenberg, Toward a Theology ofNature, 21
78
Barbour, When Science Meets Religion, 55. Pannenberg points out that a genuine acceptance of
contingency within scientific methodology actually provides a critique of determinism because
general regularities can be considered as a chain of events that is irreversible in time. (Pannenberg,
Toward a Theology ofNature, 22)
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Contingency is not the category of scientific explanation, but it is not
excluded by it; indeed it is presupposed by it. For the contingent is what
explanation seeks to render necessary.79
What we are trying to say is that the contingent rationality of the natural order
"derives, of course, from its createdness", and so we are justified in arguing that the
natural order is the created order.80 The point that is being made here is that there is
always a connection between science, or at least a philosophy of nature, and
theology. This is because "there can be no doctrine of God which does not at the
same time contain or imply a doctrine of the world."81 However, the opposite is also
true, in that our views of nature "are inextricably bound up with doctrines of God."
This might seem dubious to scientists who have no involvement in metaphysics in
their daily work, but the point is that the very fact that they are carrying out research
in the natural sciences means that they have the same implicit or explicit assumptions
about the rationality and contingency of the natural order as the early scientists. This
is the same as saying that science always rests on a particular understanding of the
world, and in turn this always has a theological basis, irrespective of the fact that
83modern science leaves aside the question of God.
(C) Claiming the Significance ofCreatedness
The premise of this thesis is that the enterprise of natural science is only possible
because of the rational contingency of the natural order, which is in turn a reflection
of its createdness. As such, rational contingency and createdness are two sides of the
same coin. It is therefore essential that any theological contribution to the interface
must firmly adhere to, and clearly express the createdness of the natural order,
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because without this rational contingency is also obscured or ignored, and so both
theology and science suffer. This, then, begs the question of how we would ensure
that our theological language does protect createdness, especially when interacting
with another discipline such as the natural sciences. This requires nothing more than
the basic tenets of trinitarian theology although their interconnectedness must be
viewed in a certain manner. Moreover, in identifying the forms of theological
language that protect createdness, we can also go some way towards identifying
theological language which does not. This is also important because it allows us to
begin a constructive and dialogical theological contribution to the interface in which
createdness is taken seriously. In the light of these three comments our thesis breaks
down as follows.
(1) In the first part of this thesis, we shall develop a tool that we call a theological
grammar of createdness. This grammar represents an 'identikit' of the resources of
Christian theology which secure the createdness of the natural order, and is derived
from an exposition and critique of the theology of the British theologian Colin E.
Gunton. We have chosen his theology because his work presents a particular concern
for the doctrine of creation, and the theological description of creatures and
createdness, but also because in his work we can find insights into how to recognise
theological motifs which are hazardous to createdness.
(2) If we are to demonstrate the effectiveness of our grammar of createdness, and
Christian trinitarian theology more generally, for protecting createdness, then we also
need to test it. To do this we must examine the effects of ignoring or altering the
motifs from our grammar. To this end, we present in our second section a study of
the evolutionary Christology of Pierre-Marie-Joseph Teilhard de Chardin. Teilhard's
theology represents a comprehensive mystical perspective on evolution, eschatology
and Christology, which is both moving and problematic. We shall argue that the
difficulties stem precisely from those points at which Teilhard either omits essential
elements from our grammar, or utilises motifs that the grammar identifies as
hazardous.
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(3) Finally, it is not enough simply to point out what we regard as a potential hazard
within theology. Rather, we must ensure that we are engaged in constructive
criticism. Therefore, in our third and last section we shall briefly discuss some
contemporary theological treatments of evolution at the interface, as well as some
treatments of evolution within popular science. What we will find here is that there is
a potential in this theological material for endangering the createdness of evolution.
We shall claim that this is due to a tendency to reduce the scope and efficacy of
divine action in evolution, and in particular to argue that sovereign and prevenient
divine action is both unnecessary and in some respects undesirable. Through the
similar conclusions reached by the popular science material, we shall argue that in
both there is a metaphysical - rather than a theological or scientific - warrant for this
position on divine action. We close our third section with a discussion of the
createdness of evolution in the form of an outline model of divine action in evolution
that secures and fully emphasises the intrinsic reality of the natural order and the
prevenience of God which is the basis of this intrinsic reality.
(4) We shall conclude in this thesis that if the arguments at the science-theology
interface that we have discussed are in any sense representative, then there must be a
serious re-consideration of the methodology of this interaction and not just on the
subject of evolution. The failure to concentrate implicitly and explicitly on
createdness and rational contingency has led Teilhard and contemporary thinkers to
discuss evolution and the natural order in a manner which goes beyond the findings
of the natural sciences and the theological enterprise. This in turn supports our
contention that createdness and so rational contingency are essential for theology,
especially when dialoguing with the natural sciences.
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Section 1: Deriving the Grammar of Createdness: The
Theology of Colin E. Gunton
Introduction: The Relevance of Gunton's Theology
(i) In this first section of our thesis we must develop our grammar of createdness.
This involves identifying those theological motifs which protect createdness and
wherever possible identifying those motifs which threaten createdness. We refer to
this interlocking network of theological motifs as a grammar of createdness,
following Kathryn Tanner's argument that the internal coherence of Christian
discourse relies upon the "ruled relations among traditional forms of theological
statements".1 To this end, we have chosen to study the theology of Colin E. Gunton,
who until his recent death was Professor of Christian Doctrine at King's College,
London. As we examine and critique Gunton's theology, we hope to demonstrate
that his thought can provide the ruled relations for our grammar of createdness.
(ii) But why have we chosen to study the work of Gunton? Gunton's theology
consists of a wide and varied corpus, spread over some thirty years of theological
writing and reflection." However, throughout this time, Gunton's work consistently
reveals a concern with the theological description of the world as created, and a
concern to interpret other theological doctrines with this strong emphasis in mind.
The choice of Gunton's work is therefore a pragmatic choice; his work is by no
means unique in its concern to elucidate the doctrine of creation or to secure the
createdness of the natural order in other areas of theology.4 However, the consistency
'
Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford/New
York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 5
2
For a short autobiography of Gunton's theological education, see Colin E. Gunton, 'Theology in
Communion', in Darren C. Marks (ed.) Shaping a Theological Mind: Theological Context and
Methodology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 31-37
3 For an outstanding bibliography, so far complete to 2001, the reader is referred to
http://www.deepsight.org/goscul/fbiblio.htm
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Indeed, Gunton's theology has few radically distinctive characteristics, but the interdependence of
these characteristics or motifs is very distinctive.
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and clarity of Gunton's position makes his work amenable to such a discussion, and
therefore the manner in which the motifs in Gunton's theology interrelate is easier to
elucidate. Nonetheless, there are pros and cons. The very fact that Gunton
emphasises the concept of the creature and creation to such an extent, means that we
must often make a rather arbitrary distinction between the doctrine of creation and
other doctrines. Moreover, it is well documented that Gunton's treatment of
alternative positions to his own is not always as judicious as we might wish. Despite
these potential difficulties, Gunton's theology is an ideal (but not a unique candidate)
for a grammar of createdness. As we examine the recurring motifs which he argues
are essential for createdness and examine the connections he makes between them in
different areas of doctrine, then we obtain both the statements and Riled interactions
which Tanner argues are indicative of theological grammar. We have divided
Gunton's work into the four following subjects or areas:
Chapter 1: The doctrines ofGod and the God-world relationship
Chapter 2: The doctrine of Creation
Chapter 3: The doctrines of Christology, Soteriology and Pneumatology
Chapter 4: The doctrines of Ecclesiology and Providence
The extent to which the findings of each of these chapters contributes to our later
discussion is of course variable. Indeed, apart from our discussion of Gunton's
doctrine of Providence, the details of our final two chapters of this section are often
peripheral to our concerns. However, it is important to provide the relevant aspects of
these in the wider context of Gunton's theology, because the createdness of the
natural order is consistently integral to Gunton's thought, and so the reader will
hopefully have a more rounded perspective on those features which we will focus on
and utilise later.
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Chapter 1: The Doctrines of God and the God-world Relationship
Introduction
We have already pointed out that the importance of Gunton's theology does not
necessarily lie in the novel areas of his thought, but rather in how he applies these
directly and indirectly to the question of the status of the natural order in relation to
God. We see this most clearly in his understanding of trinitarian theology that is
quite traditional except for one or two issues, but the whole of which Gunton insists
is essential to the true identity of the natural order. To be precise, to truly identify the
natural order is to see it as the created order in a relationship with the Creator, and
this only occurs when we perceive God's true identity as the triune Creator. It is this
constant identifying of the world as created through its relationship with God and the
consequences of this relationship for the natural order which is symptomatic of
Gunton's theology. In this first chapter then we need to examine (A) how Gunton
conceives of the triune nature of God and (B) how God relates to the world.
(A) The Doctrine ofGod
(i) The key to Gunton's trinitarian doctrine, is the manner in which he conceives of
the distinction between the divine ousia (the being of God) and hypostaseis (sing.
hypostasis - the divine Persons of Father, Son and Spirit). Here he relies heavily on
the Cappadocian Fathers, who are generally recognised to have secured this
distinction. This distinction is an essential contribution to the theological perception
of the being of God, because these terms - which were originally held to be
synonymous, referring to being or substance - allowed for a conception of
simultaneous unity and plurality in the being of God.' For Gunton, this breakthrough
then resulted in a momentous revising of conceptions of the divine being. In this
scheme;
'
PTT, 9. We will see how this distinction and its interpretation affect many aspects of Gunton's
theology throughout this essay.
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God is no more than what Father, Son and Spirit give to and receive from
each other in the inseparable communion that is the outcome of their love.
Communion is the meaning of the word: there is no 'being' of God other
than this dynamic of persons in relation.2
In both Eastern and Western trinitarian theology, Gunton sees an imbalance at
precisely this point. For him, the theological dictum that Western thought moves
from the unity of the divine being to the threeness of the divine Persons, and that the
East moves in the opposite direction, contains a grain of truth. This truth is that either
the Persons or the being of God can be overemphasised, and so artificially separated
from each other.1 As we shall see, Gunton's own method involves affirming instead a
fundamental simultaneity - God's being is the communion of the divine Persons, and
vice versa.4 Gunton finds the roots of this conception of simultaneity in the work of
the Cappadocians, and so we need to discuss Gunton's interpretation of their work in
more detail.
(ii) Gunton seeks to contextualise the Cappadocian contribution to trinitarian
theology in its historical setting. He argues that their work uses the Nicene
formulation of homoousion as a launch pad. This asserted the consubstantiality or
identity in being of the Father and Son, and in turn suggested a new ontological
principle wherein "there can be in God a sharing in being which does not subvert his
unity."5 This involves, according to Gunton, a radical divorce with the Greek
philosophy from which the concept is derived. For Greek ontology, "to be is either to
be universal or to be individual: that is, being is defined either by virtue of
participation in universal form or by virtue of material separation from other
beings."6 The breakthrough, which stems from insisting that God is Son as well as
2 Ibid. 10. "[G]od is only in the free communion of distinct persons". (Colin E. Gunton, 'The Spirit as
Lord: Christianity, Modernity and Freedom', in Andrew Walker (ed.) Different Gospels (London:
Hoddcrand Stoughton, 1988), 169-182, (citation, 180)
3 As Green has pointed out, although Gunton claims that Augustine moves from the oneness to the
threeness of God, he refuses to accept this as a general distinction ofWestern trinitarian theology, nor
does he see the opposite movement as characteristic of Eastern theology. (Bradley G. Green, 'Colin
Gunton and the Failure of Augustine: An Exposition and Analysis of the Theology of Colin Gunton in
Light of Augustine's De Trinitate\ (PhD Thesis, Baylor University, 2000), 100-101)
4
For an important articulation of this simultaneity see Christoph Schwobel, 'God is Love: The Model
of Love and the Trinity', NZSTh, 40:3 (1998), 307-328, (citation, 324). As such, Paul D. Molnar is
incorrect to argue that Gunton is trying to affirm that person is more basic than substance. (Paul D.
Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and
Contemporary Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Continuum, 2002), 329)
4 Colin E. Gunton, 'The Trinity in Modern Theology', in Peter Byrne and J. L. Houlden (eds.)
Companion Encyclopaedia of Theology (London: Routledge, 1995), 937-957, (citation, 938)
6 Ibid. 938
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Father, is the introduction of relationality into the concept of the being of God. In
short "[Gjod's being is defined as a being in relation."7 The Cappadocians then
o
developed a relational concept into a tnnitarian one. This is where the distinction
between ousia and hypostasis comes into play. The Cappadocians can be seen to be
"enriching the concept of relationality with one of communion."9 God's being is
understood to be "a being in communion."10 Therefore, in the specifically
Cappadocian contribution to theology Gunton finds the key to simultaneously
affirming the distinct Persons of the Trinity, and yet affirming their essential unity;
In a doctrine of God as communion, according to which the three persons by
their inter-relationship make up or constitute the being of God, there is no
final competition between unity and trinity, because a revised understanding
of what it is to be allows it to be realized that God's unity, far from being
endangered by his threeness, in point of fact consists in the relational
threeness of the particular persons."
This conceptualisation is only possible because "in a relational conception such as
this, unity and plurality are understood as complementaries, rather than having to be
in some way reconciled."12
(iii) Gunton's relational concept of the divine being also involves a relational concept
of the divine Persons. This is a vital aspect of our discussion, because it is through
this relational concept of being and person that Gunton conceptualises a God-world
relationship wherein the createdness of the natural order is secured. The concept of
the person is of massive significance for contemporary theology.13 Gunton's position
on this issue is again indebted to Zizioulas and the Cappadocians. For him, the
essence of the concept of person is that it is distinct from the concept of 'individual',
7 Ibid. 938
8 Colin E. Gunton, The Spirit in the Trinity', in Alasdair I. C. Heron (ed.) The Forgotten Trinity, 3: A
Selection ofPapers Presented to the BCC Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today (London:
BCC/CCBI, 1991), 123-135, (citation, 133)
9
Gunton, 'The Trinity in Modem Theology', 939
10 Ibid. 939. The latter part of this quotation refers of course to the famous dictum of Basil of
Caesarea.
" Ibid. 939. C.f. Colin Gunton, 'Being and Person: T. F. Torrance's Doctrine of God', in Elmer M.
Colyer (ed.) The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 115-137, (citation, 126)
12
Gunton, 'The Trinity in Modem Theology', 940
13 For some interesting and non-technical introductory material on recent trends in thought on this
concept see the chapter on Zizioulas' theology in Patricia A. Fox, God as Communion: John
Zizioulas, Elizabeth Johnson, and the Retrieval of the Symbol of the Triune God (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 2001), especially 25-32.
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in that "the latter is defined in terms of separation from other individuals, the person
in terms of relations with other persons."14 In this way, God is personal "as being
three persons in relation, of having his being in what Father, Son and Holy Spirit
give to and receive from each other in the freedom of their unknowable eternity."15
Personality is not a matter of individual consciousness, but "to be one whose being
consists in relations of mutual constitution with other persons."16 However, Gunton
makes a break with the Eastern Church when it comes to a treatment of the inner-
trinitarian personal relationships. Zizioulas (rightly) interprets the Cappadocians as
arguing that the unity resides in the Person of the Father. Gunton replies that
although this preserves the priority of the Father in the Godhead17, it is insufficient
for safeguarding the mutual constitution in which, as we have seen already, the unity
of the three Persons resides. Gunton describes such mutual constitution in the
following tenns;
Thus, the three persons are distinguished from one another by their different
relations to one another - as, respectively, begetter, begotten and proceeding
- and these relations constitute their ways of being who they distinctively
are.18
Therefore, unlike Zizioulas, Gunton does not see the divine unity as stemming from
the Person of the Father.19 Nonetheless, this unity does not reside purely in the
homogeneity or singularity of the divine being. It resides in the divine being, but as a
being-in-communion.
14
PTT, 10-11. This avoids the suggestion that "there is something logically or - more importantly -





A point which Gunton recently reaffirmed. (FSH, 73-74)
18
BB2, 227-228. C.f. PTT, 165
19 Zizioulas is insistent on this, and sees a substantialist position as the only alternative. (John D.
Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood', in Christoph Schwobel and
Colin E. Gunton (eds.) Persons, Divine and Human: King's College Essays on Theological
Anthropology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 33-46, (citation, 40, nl3). For a Catholic perspective
on Zizioulas' argument, and a comparison of his thought with a more Western view, see Ralph Del
Colle, 'Person and Being in John Zizioulas' Trinitarian Theology: Conversations with Thomas
Torrance and Thomas Aquinas', SJOT, 54:1 (2001), 70-86
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(B) The Doctrine ofthe God-World Relationship
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In this subsection we will see the beginnings not only ofGunton's recurring reliance
on trinitarian concepts, but also of the recurring significance of the God-world
relationship for his wider theology. Here these two emphases meet, because Gunton
argues that the God-world relationship involves a gifting of a metaphorical
ontological 'space' to the world, and that this reflects the mutual gifting of 'space' in
the inner-trinitarian relationships. Here we also find the first of Gunton's discussions
of the theological motifs we must avoid if we are to maintain the createdness of the
natural order.
(i) To begin with, let us ask with Gunton, "What flows from the conception of God
20
as three persons in communion, related but distinct?" The most important
consequence is that we have "a conception of personal space: the space in which
three persons are for and from each other in their otherness."21 The keys here are
space and otherness; the inner-trinitarian relationships entail the giving of space in
which there can be an other. Thus Gunton can say of the Persons that;
They thus confer particularity upon and receive it from one another. That
giving of particularity is very important: it is a matter of space to be. Father,
Son and Spirit through the shape - the taxis - of their inseparable relatedness
confer particularity and freedom on each other. That is their personal
being."
Gunton then extrapolates this giving of space within a personal relationship to the
God-world relationship. The God-world relationship is therefore seen as "the giving
of being to the other, and that includes the giving of space to be: to be other and
23
particular". Therefore the two elements of space and otherness in Gunton's
trinitarian theology are also pivotal motifs in his understanding of the God-world
relationship. Here we must conceive of a space in which there can be a world, i.e.
2»
p-p-p j 13 p0jnt [lere js that Gunton's doctrine of creation is based on his trinitarian theology.
As Bavinck puts it, "If God were not triune, creation would not be possible." (Hermann Bavinck, In
the Beginning: Foundations ofCreation Theology (ed. John Bolt, tr. John Vriend) (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Books, 1999), 39)
21 Ibid. 113. To see Gunton's reliance on Barth for this see Colin E. Gunton, 'The Triune God and the
Freedom of the Creature', in S. W. Sykes (ed.) Karl Barth: Centenary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), (citation, 48)
22
PTT, 113
22 Ibid. 113. My italics. C.f. Gunton, 'The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature', 59 and TCF,
5
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that which is other than God, because "the world's otherness from God is part of its
space to be itself, to be finite and not divine."24 This secures the Creator-creature
distinction, and is integral to the concept of a natural order possessing contingent
rationality.
(ii) We should also notice that for Gunton the God-world relationship secures the
otherness of the natural order, but this relationship is ongoing. This prevents the
distinction between God and the world from decaying into mere separation, i.e.
Deism. Nonetheless, because this ongoing relationship does ensure this distinction, it
also avoids Pantheism, or an identification of the world with God. For Gunton
'otherness' entails a sense of reality, of concrete existence. The world is other than
God and yet it is not illusory or unreal, because it has an authentic relative freedom
(.Selbstandigkeit) through this ongoing relationship with God.25 The point of
understanding this freedom as relative is that we must understand this freedom to be
dependent upon God's prior freedom. Moreover, God's giving of freedom to the
natural order is in no way seen to impinge upon God's own personal space', it
96
involves no external limitation. The world is not a threat to God's reality, or vice
versa.
(iii) What are the alternatives to an understanding of the God-world relationship in
which the otherness and relationality of God and the world are affirmed? Gunton
perceives only two live options - Deism and Pantheism. However, Gunton regards
these as false opposites, and argues that both in fact have the same effect within
theological discussion, in that they remove any notion of the createdness of the
natural order. In other words, Deism, like Pantheism, confuses the creaturely and
24
PTT, 114. C.f. TCF, 11 and 47. This is of course not a negative judgement; indeed, as Schwarz
argues, there is nothing inherently divine in the natural order, but "therein consists its actual dignity."
(Schwarz, Creation, 169)
2' Colin E. Gunton, 'Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert W. Jenson: An Encounter and
a Convergence', in Colin E. Gunton, (ed.) Trinity, Time, and Church: A Response to the Theology of
Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 2000), 80-93, (citation, 90). C.f. TTC, 101, 124,
and 145. The use of the term 'relative' is vital here. The world is distinct from the divine being, but it
has no independent existence. (Bavinck, In the Beginning, 230) A creature by definition is "a
completely dependent being: that which does not exist o/itself and cannot for a moment exist by itself
either." (Ibid. 245)
26
However, Gunton argues that it is appropriate to call creation a self-giving, "in which out of the
free, overflowing goodness of his life he gives reality and form to something that is other than he,
simply for its own sake." (TAA, 149) The act of creation is also logically a self-limitation in the sense
in which having become Creator, God can no longer be the One who has never created.
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divine realities. To understand Gunton's position here, let us look at his brief
treatment of the notably deistic position of Newtonianism.27 This is epitomised in the
pre-eminence of the metaphor of the machine to describe the nature of the universe,
wherein we find "a conception which excluded meaningful divine action
altogether."28 Gunton acknowledges that this apparently supports the concept of the
world's createdness, because it does prevent Pantheism. However, on such an
understanding God is pushed to the margins and is effectively redundant. Therefore,
there is no room for a discussion of divine action, which for Gunton is different from
not mentioning any divine action within the natural order; it is rather to transfer the
language of divine action to the natural order. Consequently, Newtonianism led to "a
9Q
new pantheism, in which the machine serves effectively as the deity." Let us take a
closer look at what Gunton perceives to be going on here.
(iv) This conceptual divinisation of the world can be understood more clearly in the
context of the doctrine of creation. In Christian theology, God is Creator. Only God
can be so. To deny this is to say that the world is seZ/'-created. It is not to ignore the
question; it is to say that the world is God, or at least displays this divine attribute.
Therefore, the underlying issue for Gunton is whether "the universe is in some way
divine, in the sense that it accounts of itself', or is it the creature of God?30 Because
Christian theology affirms that God is Creator, creation is attributed "not to chance
..31
or mechanism but to some form of intentional action." The alternative is to elevate
chance or mechanism to divine status. Gunton identifies another example of such
divinisation in popular science. He singles out genetic determinism as a case in point.
For him 'the selfish gene' is much more than a metaphor for the influence of genetic
factors on biological development and behaviour. It is a form of anthropomorphism,
a Pantheism where the world itself seems to be imbued with "divine or creative
powers."32 Mary Midgley sees this as an animistic personification of the gene as "a
27 Colin E. Gunton, 'The Doctrine of Creation', in Colin E. Gunton (ed.) The Cambridge Companion
to Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 141-157, (citation, 151)
2S 'The Doctrine of Creation', 152. C.f. TTC, 128 and David A. Pailin, 'Truth in a Heresy? 2. Deism',




jl Colin E. Gunton, 'The End of Causality? The Reformers and their Predecessors', in Colin E.
Gunton (ed.) The Doctrine ofCreation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy (Edinburgh: T.
& T. Clark, 1997), 63-82, (citation, 63)
32
TTC, 37. C.f. TCF, 27. He asks "[w]hat else is the widespread proclamation of the gospel of the
hegemony of the genes but a return to the view that impersonal fate directs our lives?" (Colin E.
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malign and all-powerful agent." The language of personal agency is not jettisoned,
but is rather transferred to the creation itself34 Crucially, Gunton also sees this at
work in treatments of evolution, whereby the process is virtually deified;
Thus the words 'nature' and 'evolution' are often hypostasised - and,
indeed, capitalised - almost as if they are agents that achieve ends, and thus
clearly operate as secularised versions of the doctrine of providence, which
they displace.35
Gunton, 'Trinity and Trustworthiness', in Paul Helm and Carl R. Trueman (eds.) The Trustworthiness
of God: Perspectives on the Nature of Scripture (Grand Rapids, Ml/Cambridge, Eerdmans, 2002),
275-284, (citation, 276) In Deism and Pantheism, "secondary causes infringe on the immediacy of
God's being and power." (David S. Clark, 'Theology and Evolution', Princeton Theological Review,
23 (1925), 193-212, (citation, 196)
It is interesting to note that a geneticist can describe genes as 'gods' because of their functions and
spheres of influence which are usually associated with deity, with his tongue only slightly in his
cheek. (John C. Avise, The Genetic Gods: Evolution and Belief in Human Affairs (Cambridge, MA;
London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 3)
33
Mary Midgley, Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears (London: Methuen,
1985), 123. For a fuller account of this criticism, c.f. idem. 'Gene-juggling', Philosophy, 54/210
(1979), 439-458. Here we find the following wonderful sentence; "Genes cannot be selfish or
unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological." (Ibid. 439)
For a more temperate discussion see idem. 'Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism', Philosophy, 58/225
(1983), 365-377. C.f. Simon Conway Morris, Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely
Universe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 323 for more references. He argues that
the arguments of the ultra-Darwinists such as Dawkins involve "the misuse of metaphor, and more
importantly a distortion of metaphysics in support of an evolutionary programme." (Ibid. 314).
Michael Poole argues that even if Dawkins is being merely rhetorical or metaphorical then he is still
inconsistent. There is an illegitimate use of language if "a creating God is denied while a creating
chance (+ natural selection) is affirmed." (Michael Poole, 'A Critique of Aspects of the Philosophy
and Theology of Richard Dawkins', S&CB, 6:1 (1994), 41-59, (citation, 54)). Even Henry Ward
Beecher, with his extraordinarily optimistic social Darwinism recognised this point, when he argued
that to deny the operation of divine intelligence and work in matter "would be giving miscellaneous
matter the attributes which we denied to a personal God." (Henry Ward Beecher, Evolution and
Religion Part 1: Eight Sermons, Discussing the Bearing of Evolutionary Philosophy on the
Fundamental Doctrines of Evangelical Christianity (London: James Clarke; New York: Fords,
Howard and Hulbert, 1885), 1 12) For a partial defence of metaphor in evolutionary description see
John R. Durant, 'Evolution, Ideology and World View: Darwinian Religion in the Twentieth Century,
in James R. Moore (ed.) History, Humanity and Evolution: Essays for John C. Greene (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 355 - 373, (citation, 360)
34
TTC, 38
35 Ibid. 38. C.f. Ibid. 185-187; TCF, 26; Donald M. MacKay, The Clockwork Image: A Christian
Perspective on Science (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1997), 52 and Stephen Jay Gould, Hen's Teeth
and Horse's Toes (London: Penguin, 1984), 160. "Evolution has to do with the how and not the why,
of phenomena. Evolution is a method not an agent." (George Park Fisher, The Ground ofTheistic and
Christian Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1902), 49). Darwin's theory of evolution "concerns
the order and not the cause, the how and not the why of the phenomena". (Asa Gray, 'Natural
Selection not Inconsistent with Natural Theology', in Darwinia: Essays and Reviews Pertaining to
Darwinism ed. A. Hunter Dupree (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1963), 72-145, (citation, 122)). George Gaylord Simpson makes the classic case for such evolution-
based Deism. He argues that adaptation "turns out to be basically materialistic, with no signs of
purpose as a working variable in life history, and with any possible Purposer pushed back to the
incomprehensible position of First Cause." (George Gaylord Simpson, The Meaning ofEvolution: A
Study of the History of Life and of its Significance for Man (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1951), 230)
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This is a conflation of the natural sciences with theology. The natural sciences are by
their very nature unable to discuss the existence or otherwise of God.36 However, we
have a misappropriation of theological constructs and their application to the natural
order. When this happens the createdness (and so the rational contingency!) of the
natural order is lost from view. This is Deism, but it has an equivalent effect to a
pantheistic identification of God and the world. Science cannot find God within an
equation but the attempt specifically to exclude the triune God results in bad science,
just as surely as the attempt to identify the triune God with the equation does.37
Without an implicit awareness of the creaturely nature of the natural order (i.e. a
respect for its rational contingency) then empirical science must import theological
motifs into its reasoning. As Kathryn Tanner points out, Deism is a theological
38
judgement, not an empirical one.
(v) It is important to remember that for Gunton, the 'space' afforded to the world
through an ongoing relationship with its Creator is to be understood as a metaphor.
When this is not clearly the case, he discerns another potential hazard for our
understanding of this relationship. His concern centres upon the idea of space as
denoting a fixed or quantitative space, which he argues leads to an interpretation of
the God-world relationship in terms of relative quantities for both the world and God.
For Gunton, a symptom of this is the inability simultaneously to affirm divine
immanence and divine transcendence, and he identifies Spinoza and Descartes as
prime culprits. Spinoza explicitly uses spatial motifs but cannot utilise them in a
manner that can protect the nature of the created order as created. For Gunton,
Spinoza's spatial understanding of the God - world relationship is almost purely
spatial and thus competitive; i.e. for Spinoza God as infinite must exclude the finite;
36 Michael Poole, 'Response to Richard Dawkins' Reply', S&CB, 7:1 (1995), 51-58, (citation, 52)
37 On this, see the alarming article by Vern Sheridan Poythress, 'Why Scientists Must Believe in God:
Divine Attributes of Scientific Law', JETS, 46:1 (2003), 111-123, where, amongst other things,
natural laws can be described as omnipresent, eternal (Ibid. 114), omnipotent and universal (Ibid.
115)!
38
Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 89. This deism has such radical influences on our
thinking because it distorts the Creator-creature distinction, which is as Abraham Kuyper pointed out
the most central and "distinctly marked" boundary is that between Creator and creature. (Abraham
Kuyper, 'Pantheism's Destruction of Boundaries Part One', Methodist Review, (1893), 520-535,
[Online document] http://www.ucalgarv.ca/~nurelweb/papers/other/panth-2.html). C.f. Bavinck, In
the Beginning, 23
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So it is with Spinoza's God: either he must be finite, because limited
(spatially) by something else, and so not God at all; or infinite at the expense
of the independent reality of every thing else39
In this tradition, "transcendence and immanence tend to be mutually exclusive"
because spatial terms lead to associations of quantity.40 The mechanistic philosophy
of Descartes is only apparently in opposition to Spinoza's reasoning. Whilst it is true
that Descartes himself wanted to affirm a constant divine immanence in the world,
others emphasised the mechanistic nature of the world as he conceived it, and
realised that therein God's functions would be limited. The initial use of the
problematic machine metaphor to describe the world has transferred agential
language to the natural order, and so "either God is the machine (Spinoza) or he is
totally transcendent at its beginning."41 There is no room - or 'space' - for both a
genuine Creator and a genuine creature. In fact, we might say there is only one space,
a fixed degree of reality to be apportioned between God and the natural order.
Furthermore, God and the world occupy this one space in the same manner and so
"[G]od becomes one being among others within a single order."42 On a spatial or
quantitative understanding of the God - world relationship, Pantheism is
unavoidable, as it occurs overtly or reflexively as Deism.43 Therefore, Pantheism and
Deism are only apparent opposites; in neither can the world be seen as the world.
The world loses its reality and is identified with God, either because it gains reality at
God's expense or because it has no independent existence due to a precise
identification with God. For Gunton, an adequate doctrine of creation affirms that
God creates a natural order that is other than, but not opposed to himself.44
(vi) In some instances, the concept of space as a quantitative measure is identified
with space-time itself. This is the position known as Panentheism. Process thought
comes in for some criticism from Gunton on this issue because he deems it to be
39 Colin E. Gunton, 'Transcendence, Metaphor, and the Knowability of God', JTS, 31:2 (1980), 501 -
516, (citation, 506)
40 Ibid. 507
41 Ibid. 507. C.f. E. C. Dewick, The Indwelling God: A Historical Study of the Christian Conception of
Divine Immanence and Incarnation, with Special Reference to Indian Thought (London: H. Milford;
Oxford University Press, Indian Branch, 1938), 274-275
42
Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 45. For an excellent description of this
competitive understanding of the God-world relationship as a consequence of deism, see Bavinck, In
the Beginning, 242. Similarly, he understands pantheism as either an idealist swallowing up of the
world in God, or a materialist swallowing up ofGod in the world. (Ibid. 237)
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utilising a competitive understanding of immanence and transcendence, such that
"here immanence is primary, and transcendence picks up such crumbs as fall from
the rich man's table."47 On a literally spatial, or a spatial/static interpretation of the
God-world relationship, such as Panentheism, one cannot affirm the reality of one
without the reality of the other being imperilled.46 The difficulty of such positions is
that there is an implicit assumption that the externality of God to the created order
(which is more or less the aim of the transcendence motif) must come at the cost of
the divine immanence or presence within the world. Gunton, on the other hand,
argues that "it is possible to conceive a created world that is external to God and
which does not yet exclude interrelationship and omnipresence." 7 For Gunton,
Panentheism cannot avoid Pantheism, as it does not allow the natural order the space
to be itself, which the notion of an external creation preserves. Furthermore,
Panentheism usually works on the idea of whole and parts, which implies ontological
continuity,48 Gunton's treatment of Panentheism is a little brisk to say the least, so let
us briefly discuss one contemporary panentheistic theology in order to highlight what
the potential strengths and weaknesses of this position might be.
(vii) In order to examine Panentheism we shall discuss the work of noted philosopher
and contributor to the science-theology interface, Philip Clayton. For Clayton,
Panentheism is necessary in order to address the difficulties with an 'externalist' (i.e.
creation as an external act of God) view of the God-world relationship, which he
deems to have been highlighted by contemporary science. On the externalist account,
divine action must be interventionist and this would wreak havoc on natural
regularities, as God would have to set aside his own laws in order to act.
Furthermore, the externalist view of God perceives him to be a being so different that
we can have little understanding of his nature, his relationship to the world, and his
45
Gunton, 'Transcendence, Metaphor and the Knowability of God', 508-509. C.f. Ibid. 510.
Moreover, A. P. F. Sell argues that Process Theology cannot prevent this immanentism from
degrading into pantheism. (A. P. F. Sell, 'Autonomy, Immanence and the Loss of Authority',
Churchman, 96:2 (1982), 123-141, (citation, 129))
46
y-pQ 140. Gunton has in mind in particular Moltmann's doctrine of the zimsum or spatial self-
withdrawal of God to make room for the creation. (Ibid. 141) For more on Gunton's refusal to accept
such a kenotic doctrine of creation, see CAC, 85
47TTC, 141
Ibid. 142. Gunton argues that the panentheistic model of the world as God's body leads to
Pantheism;
"If the world is God's body, it is not Finite and contingent, for it participates in
divinity rather than being truly itself." (FSH, 21, n4)
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agency.49 In short there is a need to rethink divine agency for a world in which
"direct physical causality [by God] in the natural world as we have come to
understand it is massively more difficult".50 The difficulty inherent in conceiving of
divine agency on an externalist understanding is that it must be interventionist."1
52Where this is the case, Clayton argues that a God-of-the-gaps strategy is in use.
Moreover, whatever dwindling prospects for divine action can be found within such
a scheme are scuppered by the findings of natural sciences, which perceive the world
to be closed thermodynamically (i.e. the conservation of energy).53 Finally,
interventionist understandings of divine action imply that God's actions are
essentially repairs to an otherwise functioning system in which God cannot act
except through intervention.54
If an externalist view of divine action is unacceptable, then the search is on for an
'internalist' and non-interventionist view. To avoid any suggestion of intervention
requires us to view even inner-worldly causality as a manifestation of divine
agency.55 This is of course the aim of Panentheism. Flowever, this leaves us with the
need to search for an analogy of the God-world relationship that describes divine
action in such a manner.56 The panentheistic or internalist alternative sees God's
agency and relationship with the world as analogous to that of the mind-body
relationship.57 Put briefly, Clayton is advocating a form of emergent monism or a
non-dualistic understanding of the mind-body relationship, and this in turn provides
58the basis for the analogy with the God-world relationship. Panentheism therefore
does away with any suggestion of intervention;
49
Philip Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism: Living within the Presence of the Trinitarian God',
dialog, 40:3 (2001), 208-215, (citation, 211)
50
Philip Clayton, 'On the Value of the Panentheistic Analogy: A Response to Willem Drees', Zygon,
35:3 (2002), 699-704, (citation, 701). However, as we shall see in our third section, the rationale for
this supposed difficulty is never thoroughly explored at the interface.
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Philip Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism', dialog, 37:3 (1998), 201-208, (citation, 206)
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Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 208
53
Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 209 and Philip Clayton, 'Neuroscience, the Person, and God:
An Emergentist Account', in NTP, 181-214, (citation, 209)
34
Philip D. Clayton, God and Contemporary Science (hereafter GCS) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1997), 100
33




Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 212; GCS, 101; Clayton, 'On the Value of the Panentheistic
Analogy'; 702 and Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism', 205
38 See GCS, 248 and passim and Clayton, 'Neuroscience, the Person, and God', 209
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It suggests a model not of God "breaking into" the world from outside but of
God being organically related to the world as we are organically related to
our own bodies.59
The reason for this is that divine agency is now somewhat redefined. If the universe
is analogous to the body ofGod, then it is "the focal point of his agency."60 God does
not need to intervene because all natural processes are in fact God at work.61 Every
worldly act is therefore a divine act.62 Indeed, the regularities of natural law are then
descriptions of the regularity of divine actions.63 Clayton likens this to the regularity
of autonomic, unconscious bodily functions, although he is not consistent as to the
unconscious nature of such action.64 Regardless of this, he does consistently maintain
that God does act in discrete and conscious acts.65
If we are to be able to make this quite radical identification of divine and creaturely
processes, then in terms of the God-world relationship we must as far as possible
remove the ontological gap between God and natural processes whilst maintaining
the concept of God as Creator.66 For Clayton, this intensified intimacy within the
God-world relationship, coupled with his panentheistic/internalist emphasis leads to
an affirmation of the identity of space with the divine omnipresence.67 He argues that
we must think of space and time in such a way that "their origin within God becomes
clear."6* In short, theologically speaking, "space must be understood also as an
attribute of God, and hence as part of God."69 Therefore, space and the natural order
are not outside God; rather, by definition, they are within God.70 Space must be
understood in a manner similar to that of absolute space in Newton's thought - i.e.
that of a sensorium of God. Space is therefore "a framework imposed by God on
what he perceives in so far as he perceives it as not identical with himself."71
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Clayton, 'On the Value of the Panentheistic Analogy', 703
60
Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Pancnthcism', 205-206
61
Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 209
62 Ibid. 212
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GCS, 101. C.f. Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism', 206
64 GCS 101. C.f. Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism', 206 and Clayton, 'Panentheism
Internalism', 212
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Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism', 206 and Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 212









The suggestion that space and divine omnipresence are one and the same may smack
of Pantheism, a danger that Clayton is well aware of.72 To safeguard against such a
danger, he advocates an understanding of the God-world relationship, based not on
the externality of God to his creation, but on the traditional theological distinctions of
"finite versus infinite, contingent versus necessary, imperfect versus perfect -
created versus Creator."73 With these and an insistence on the love and perfection of
God74, we can affirm that we are distinct from God because we are "different in our
fundamental nature from God."75 If this is the case, then the question of our location
is no longer of issue; even if we perceive ourselves to be within the divine presence,
or even the divine being, we are still creatures. In this way, we can think of God as
coextensive with the world, such that all spatial points are within God, and still
maintain that all such spatial points are created and contingent. God is absolute and
can contain within himself all of finite space without the world becoming identical
with himself.76
This understanding of the God-world relationship also involves a greater emphasis
on the passivity or passibility of God, especially as it is discussed particularly in
Process Thought. An external God might remain unaffected by his creation, but a
God who in some sense holds the world within himself cannot view it without
dispassionately. However, Panentheism also rejects any conception that reduces God
to his responses, because this would threaten the contingency of the world and God's
necessary existence.77 In other words, God is responsive, but he is more than his
responsiveness. In Process terms, worldly events and activity do not affect the
perfection or essential nature of God, but they do contribute to the responsive nature
of God, i.e. "that "part" of God that emerges out of God's response to the universe
and to humanity."78 The contribution made by this insight is the realisation that a
responsive God is more fully God than a dispassionate God.'9 Panentheism enables
us to conceive of God as necessary, the world as contingent, but also that there is
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provides the resources for a more compassionate, even self-sacrificing understanding
of God. For example, Clayton wants to advocate a self-limitation of divine self-
omniscience, and Panentheism is the key to this. He argues that such a self-limitation
is necessary in order for God to relate more fully to finite creatures. However, it is
also integral to Clayton's Panentheism, as such self-limitation is necessary if we are
81
to understand divine action as analogous to human agency.
If we turn now to critique Clayton's Panentheism, the first point must be the inherent
difficulties that lie within the Panentheistic Analogy (PA) of the mind-body relation.
The difficulty here is simply that if the mind-body relationship is perceived to be
strictly non-dualistic (e.g. emergentist), then this is to advocate a direct Pantheism as
the God-world relationship.82 Maintaining our focus on the corporeal aspects of the
PA, we find there is a difficulty in Clayton's inconsistent description of worldly
regularities as analogous to autonomic bodily functions. As with the mind-body
analogy, Clayton has stark choices to make. If worldly regularities are autonomic,
then they are not only unconscious, they are unwilled, leading to the question as to
whether they are in fact beyond God's control.83 On the other hand, if these
processes are conscious and intentional divine acts84, then they are no longer
autonomous, and the necessity for a bodily analogy is somewhat attenuated.
Second, Clayton's important emphasis on the reality of the natural order and the
processes and entities within it seems to rely occasionally on a competitive God-
world. Robert W. Jenson has argued recently that it is insufficient to rely on the
classical pairings, as Clayton does. He gives the example ofwill, and shows that, for
example, the concept of an infinite will is self-contradictory, as will involves
choosing one set of conditions over another, and thus a degree of self-limitation.
Furthermore, the eternal/temporal distinction leads rather too easily into a
competitive understanding, because time and eternity here become merely opposites,
85and are as such construed to be on one equal ontological plane.
81
Clayton, 'Panentheism Internalism', 211
82 Owen C. Thomas, 'Not Yet a Case for Christian Panentheism', dialog, 38:4 (1999), 285-287,
(citation, 287)
83 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Case Remains Unproven', dialog, 38:4 (1999), 281-285, (citation, 283)
84
Clayton, 'The Panentheistic Turn in Christian Theology', 290
85 Robert W. Jenson, 'Creator and Creature', IJOST, 4:2 (2002), 216-221, (citation, 217)
Chapter 1 36
Clayton also attempts to highlight the Creator-creature distinction by noting some
disanalogies within the PA. The first of these is that God is 'more' than the world, in
O/-
that his consciousness and awareness are greater than the world. Second, God pre¬
exists the universe and will outlast it, "even if the divine experience becomes richer
87
through the course of cosmic evolution." As such, he can liken the God-world
relationship to that between an ecosystem and its components, with the proviso that
this system precedes its components.88 This notion of the divine 'more than' is rather
problematic. It appears to function as an equivalent to divine transcendence, but
seems incapable of warding off Pantheism, because the world is identified with that
aspect of God which is not 'more than' the world. As Robert W. Jenson has pointed
out, such a notion of transcendence means a transcend/Ag of the world; a way of
89
understanding how God makes himself distinct from the world. Therefore,
Clayton's caveats are potentially self-contradictory; one affirms the divine pre-
existence and the other lacks the motifs (especially divine transcendence) to support
this. Here we see how vital the motif of transcendence is, because in the light of this,
God does not need to act to transcend the world, "since he does not start from it."90
This is not to deny divine immanence, but to affirm transcendence and immanence
simultaneously.
In Clayton's thought, there seems to be a diminution, or even abandonment, of any
sense of mediation in the God-world relationship, and this seems to affect his ability
to maintain transcendence and immanence. Clayton can go so far as to describe the
God-world relationship as "a participation of the created order in God in a manner
than is at least analogous to the co-participation of Father, Son and Spirit in the one
Godhead."91 In conjunction with Clayton's explicit identification of space and divine
omnipresence,92 there is a strong sense here that time and space are divinised.
Moreover, Clayton argues that Panentheism reinterprets the sensus divinitatis, the
sense of the divine within individual humans in such a way that we are not only
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within God, but metaphorically speaking, we are God.93 The difficulty here is that as
Jenson puts it, the Greator-creature distinction "is not patient of analogy"; even
metaphorically we are not the Creator and nor is God a creature.94 It is worth noting
at this juncture that Gunton seemingly appreciates the emphasis on the idea of
internalism providing that the Creator-creature distinction can be preserved.
However, this is creation "within Christ", not within God "simpliciter,"95 This is
based on Colossians 1:16, wherein Gunton finds that the God-world relationship is
best understood in the person of him who is "the externalization in the world of the
one who mediates all the Father's creating and redeeming action."96 In other words,
in the one who is the paradigmatic and determinative form of the relation between
God and the world.97
(viii) The strength of Panentheism lies in its powerful depiction of the intimacy and
immanence involved in the God-world relationship. However, we noted that this
scheme could not balance this against the transcendence of God, and so engendered a
competitive understanding of God and the world. In short, transcendence and
immanence could not be simultaneously maintained, because space is understood in
quantitative terms. With this in mind, let us now examine a position in which this
quantitative apportioning of'space' is weighted in favour of creaturely reality.
As with Clayton, Maurice Wiles also perceives a difficulty in articulating the reality
of divine action for our modern culture. In this scientific era of observed physical
regularity in nature, we face the difficulty of explicating "how and where that action
is to be located or identified within the world of human experience."98 For Wiles, the
beginnings of a solution are to be found in highlighting the reality of creaturely
action;
Why should it not be the case that God has bestowed on created realities not
only their natural capacities for action but also the power to move
themselves to action independently of specific divine agency in each case?"
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This is not to be seen as something that confronts and limits the divine reality.
Instead, God has freely chosen to create a world in which his power is deliberately
restrained."10 This creaturely freedom must also be accompanied by a modified
understanding of what we understand to be the nature of a divine act. A divine 'act'
is to be seen as a unifying and unitary occurrence, and should be understood "in
relation to the world as a whole rather than to particular occurrences within it."101
The whole, continuing process of bringing the world into being is this one action of
God.102 Wiles recognises that such a conception has far-reaching consequences.
Because we are speaking of one unitary divine act, we can longer individuate this act
relative to specific occurrences in the physical world;
It is therefore a questionable enterprise to try to speak of God's agency in
relation to particular physical occurrences, as if that were something that
could be done in even relative separation from the question of their
contribution to the one act that constitutes the world as a whole."13
Wiles is advocating a radical view of creaturely independence from specific divine
activity; he uses the analogy of improvised drama, in which the actors are merely
provided with general characters and a general setting in which to interact.104 There
is a further suggestion of competitiveness, in that Wiles also perceives the need for a
reinterpretation of divine omniscience and omnipotence, especially as for him
foreknowledge implies predetermination.I(b Although Wiles does not expand on this
much further, the inference is clear; God has freely created a world in which his
omniscience is limited. However, creaturely freedom also inhibits divine
omnipotence further than this. Miracles, or direct divine intervention, are also
logically under the rubric of God's free self-limitation.106 Hence in terms of personal
Providence, we must also be careful to avoid talk of specific and interventionist
actions.
It is obvious that Wiles' is not intending to be deist. There is a unitary divine action,









relationship. From what we have seen so far, we would argue that this relationship is
being conceived of in spatial and static terms, and as evidence for this we would cite
his examination of two major models of God and divine action. The first model is the
personal model, where God is Creator, Lord, Father, but where it is difficult to
describe divine agency. The second model is the pervasive model, where God is
Spirit, an immanent power in the world. This model allows one to talk of universal
and effective presence, but agency language becomes "forced and inappropriate."107
What makes Wiles' discussion of these issues revealing is that these two models are
understood to be somehow mutually exclusive. To the extent that God is knowable,
and presumably therefore immanent, God is incapable of action. On the other hand,
to the extent that God is active, this action is so transcendent and divorced from the
natural order that it can reveal nothing about the divine actor. In contrasting
transcendence and immanence, Wiles reveals a competitive understanding of the
God-world relationship in which his emphasis on divine transcendence and
creaturely efficacy virtually drains away any sense of divine action and involvement,
and certainly removes the sense of specific divine acts. The problem with this is that
this makes the concept of divine action to be vacuous, because if God wills or acts
uniformly in every event, then every event can just as easily be defined without
reference to divine action.10lS As such, it is effectively denying the reality of divine
action.109 Wiles chooses to affirm the divine transcendence and accepts an attenuated
form of divine action, such that it becomes effectively a subjective notion.110
(C) Critique
Gunton's specifically trinitarian theology has probably provoked a more
comprehensive and prolonged criticism than any other aspect of his thought. This is
due in part to his interpretation of the work of the Cappadocian Fathers, and also
because of his treatment of what he sees as the weaknesses of the Western tradition,
which leads to his allegiance to the Cappadocians. Before we can even begin to
Maurice Wiles, 'Providence', Epworth Review, 21 (1994), 76-83, (citation, 83)
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discuss these issues in any depth we must make mention of what we might call a
methodological criticism ofGunton.
(i) A recurring line of attack on Gunton's thought has centred on some of his
treatment of those thinkers with whose work he interacts - especially with those he
disagrees with. Gunton's tendencies are perhaps best summed up by Fergus Kerr in a
recent review.1" He claims that Gunton "seems unable to elaborate the correct view
- his own - except by constantly rubbishing the supposedly utterly unacceptable
112*alternative". This tendency of Gunton must be kept in mind as it is the source of a
number of potentially difficult treatments of other authors.
(ii) Gunton's relational trinitarian theology has also received some criticism from
Keith Ward. He advocates a conception of God in which we must acknowledge that
God has "a given nature, which is not chosen, but which God possesses of
113
necessity." Ward argues that God cannot choose all aspects of this nature in
complete freedom, because there must logically be a nature, which is the source of
choice. Ward's criticisms are aimed at the thought of Zizioulas, but because of the
close connectivity between his work and that of Gunton, there is some significance in
this criticism for our purposes. Ward attacks Zizioulas' contention that with the
concept of the (trinitarian) person, we find a concept that denotes freedom from
'ontological necessity'.114 Ward argues that this claim is incoherent in that "if the
person is a cause, then it must have properties in virtue of which it is a cause.. .So the
person must have a nature, which it does not freely choose."115
This is not strictly speaking a question which Gunton addresses one way or another.
However, Ward does seem to be equating the necessity of the divine ousici and
whatever properties can therefore be attributed to the divine being with an explicitly
substantialist understanding of the divine ousia. For Ward, the divine being is
111
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ontologically and/or logically prior to the Persons, insofar as it is the source of the
attributes of the divine Persons. Gunton would of course differ from Ward at this
point, because he argues for what we have referred to as a simultaneity of ousia and
hypostasis, denoted by the motif of being-as-communion.116 This does not
necessarily contradict Ward's argument as to the givenness of divine attributes.
There is also a crucial difference between Gunton and Zizioulas that militates against
the effectiveness of Ward's criticism if it is levelled against the former. The
difference is that Gunton, unlike Zizioulas, does not find the unity of the triune being
in the Person of the Father."7 Unity and particularity are found together in the divine
perichoretic being-as-communion, perfected by the Spirit.
(iii) One of the rare thoroughgoing critiques of Gunton's work is an article by
Richard M. Fermer, which challenges Gunton's theology as it pertains to the
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interpretation and appropriation of the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers. Here
Fermer critiques what he sees as a general Trinitarian methodology' for theology,
and in particular the work of its two leading proponents, Gunton and Zizioulas.
Fermer has a three-pronged attack upon:
(a) the patristic sources used by Zizioulas and Gunton
(b) the move from the ontology of God to general ontology, and the
conditions of the trinitarian analogy
(c) the appropriateness of the trinitarian analogy between divine and
human persons."9
We can address the first two of these challenges in this chapter, and reserve the last
for chapter 3. Fermer's threefold scheme here is his breakdown of the arguments of
authors such as Gunton and Zizioulas. First, there is the move from revelation to the
116 C.f. John D. Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian
Contribution', in Christoph Schwobel (ed.) Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and
Act (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995), 45-60, (citation, 48) and idem, 'On Being a Person', 41
117 This difference is highly significant. John G. F. Wilks has set out a number of problems associated
with Zizioulas' argument on this subject, attributing it to a desire to obviate the need to acknowledge
the divine ousia altogether. (John G. F. Wilks, 'The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizoulas', Vox
Evangelica, 25 (1995), 63-88) Wilks acknowledges that Gunton's argument differs markedly at this
point, and exonerates Gunton from this charge. (Ibid. 79)




doctrine of the Trinity.120 Second, this doctrine is augmented by the 'revolutionary'
insights from the Cappadocians.121 Third, there is a move from trinitarian theology to
a general ontology of creation, in which it is understood that "for anything to be is
for it to be-in-relation (to the triune God)."122 The conclusion to this process is the
legitimisation of a movement to the doctrine of creation and ultimately to a trinitarian
or relational theology.
(a) Fermer's first step then is to examine the appropriation of Cappadocian thought
by Gunton and Zizioulas. Fermer argues that both authors clearly believe that there is
such a thing as a Cappadocian theology, and that they also select certain key
concepts (koinonia and schesis) from the trinitarian thought of the Cappadocians
without explanation.124 However, of particular concern to us, is Fermer's argument
125that Gunton and Zizioulas reduce the concept of ousia to koinonia. The
significance of this for us, is that it implies an emptying of ontological content from
the concept of communion;
As a result of this reduction of ousia to koinonia, the concept of ousia seems
subsequently to be absent from Gunton's/Zizioulas' trinitarian theology.126
Fermer explicitly equates Gunton's disavowal of an understanding of ousia as
substantia with a disavowal of the Cappadocian stress on ousia as general divine
essence. He asks;
Why can it not be held that there is one God, and that certain attributes are
shared in common between the three hypostaseis of that one God, yet not
purely as a result of their relationality, but because of their common ousia,
which provides the grammar of unity?127
In conjunction with this, Fermer claims that there is an unwarranted prioritising of
the particular over the universal. Fermer sees this as a contradiction of the










God, the unity and distinctness" in their anti-Sabellian and anti-Eunomian work.128 It
seems that Fermer views Gunton's project as a threat to this balance, in that it lacks a
unifying element that a concept of ousia provides.
This provides three questions we must pose to Gunton. (1) does his work lack a
conception of ousia, (2) does it reduce ousia to koinonia and (3) does it actually
threaten the Cappadocian balance between unity and distinctness? We would respond
in the negative to all three of these questions. First, we would argue that Gunton is
not disputing the Cappadocian usage of ousia to explicate the divine unity; instead,
he is reinterpreting what ousia means. The divine being is being-as-communion. For
Fermer, this involves a reduction of being to communion. In response to this
assertion, we should remember Gunton's interpretation of the Cappadocian argument
in which it is claimed that there is no more to the being of God than his being-as-
communion. However, the same is true of the divine koinonia. Inasmuch as this tells
us nothing of the nature of God except that he is a being-in-communion, then being
and communion are not conflated.129 Fermer seems to think that Gunton is trying to
tell us something of the 'what' of the divine ousia,130 but this is simply not the case.
Lastly, Gunton locates the unitary nature of the divine being in the simultaneity of
ousia and koinonia,131 and affirms that this is reliant upon a relational conception
where "unity and plurality are understood as complementaries, rather than having to
be in some way reconciled."132 From this we deduce that Fermer is mistaken in
arguing that Gunton has failed to appreciate the balancing role of the Cappadocian
adherence to the concept of ousia.
(b) Fermer then moves on to discuss the validity of the move to general ontology that
is made by Gunton and Zizioulas. The question that applies to both authors is what is
the condition of the analogy whereby one moves from trinitarian to general
ontology?133 Fermer argues that Gunton's thought impairs the mystery of the divine
being.134 He acknowledges that Gunton upholds the doctrine of the Immanent
128 Ibid. 166-167
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Trinity, but claims that Gunton has failed to grasp that this entails that God's
presence in the economy of salvation is equally true to his transcendence and
mystery. Fermer argues that the explicit identification of the divine ousia as the
communion of the three Persons is verging on the kataphatic - we simply are not in a
position to say this;
There is a fine distinction to be drawn between saying that God exists as
Father, Son and Floly Spirit, and saying that God's essence is the
communion of the trinitarian hypostaseisu~
This criticism is not specific to Gunton. It is an example of a wider disquiet aimed
towards so-called social doctrines of the Trinity, in which relationality is emphasised.
One of the main criticisms levelled at these is that such doctrines are used explicitly
or implicitly to advocate a certain understanding of human society or politics. Karen
Kilby rightly describes such a manoeuvre as simple projection, whereby "the claim
that God though three is yet one becomes a source of metaphysical insight and a
resource for combating individualism, patriarchy and oppressive forms of political
1
and ecclesiastical organization." She specifically identifies Gunton amongst the
culprits, but quite correctly notes, just as Fermer does, that he uses such derived
concepts for metaphysical rather than political purposes.137 Indeed, Gunton notes
precisely this danger, arguing that we cannot affirm, "on the basis of a doctrine of the
immanent or ontological Trinity, causes the theologian believes, for whatever reason,
to be worthy ones."13x Fermer has identified a very real danger, but it would appear
to be misdirected accusation with regard to Gunton.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have set the scene for Gunton's doctrine of creation proper, and
his treatments of other traditional areas of dogmatic theology, such as Christology
and Soteriology. These cannot be understood outside of a preliminary study of
Gunton's doctrine of God, and his theology of the God-world relationship. As far as
a grammar of createdness is concerned, the key words are Trinity and space. God is
135 Ibid. 175
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triune and within this triune communion is a space for the personal divine other.
However, space is also a metaphor for describing the freedom and intrinsic reality of
the creature, which the natural order enjoys through its ongoing relationship with the
Triune God. Through the concept of space, we learn something of the nature of this
relationship between God and the world, and in particular the manner in which we
must and can avoid Deism, Panentheism and Pantheism. The assorted critiques of
Gunton's theology that we have so far examined demonstrate that already there are
some deep underlying tensions within Gunton's theology. From a purely pragmatic
point of view, the greatest of these is a tendency to blast any perceived opposition
without adequately explaining the reasoning for this at the very least. Hence, his very
real blind spot concerning the theology of Augustine, and Aquinas to a lesser extent.
As we have seen so far, this has led him to miss out on a number of potentially very
fruitful encounters with these thinkers. Nonetheless, this does not imply that his
alternative, based on the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers, is without merit.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2: The Doctrine of Creation
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Introduction
In the previous chapter we opened our discussion of Gunton's theology with the
doctrinal linchpin of the Trinity, and then moved on to discuss the God-world
relation and the consequences of God's trinitarian nature for this and the nature of
the relationship between Creator and creature. We also made reference to the fact
that for Gunton these two important sets of motifs are also significant for all other
aspects of his work, because the created order and created entities are never
discussed out with the context of their relationship to God. This will become
apparent in the present chapter as we move on to discuss the traditional heart of the
doctrine of creation, namely creation out of nothing and the characteristics of created
entities. In particular, to understand Gunton's position on creation out of nothing we
need first to elaborate on how it is that God can and does provide a 'space' for the
natural order. Moreover, Gunton's discussion of the nature of created entities and the
created order itself is a somewhat controversial scheme in which the very fact that
the world is created by, and exists only within an ongoing relationship with God
imposes certain characteristics upon the natural order.
(A) Creation ex nihilo
In the previous chapter, we left our discussion of Gunton's understanding of the
God-world relationship with his discussion of the intrinsic weaknesses and strengths
ofDeism, Panentheism and Pantheism. Now we can move on to discuss the details of
his alternatives to these positions. The basic weakness in all three of these positions
is an underlying assumption that God and the world are in some sense within one
ontological plane or 'space'. We described the resultant conceptions of the God-
world relationship as the static and/or spatial co-ordinations of two competing
entities. Unsurprisingly then, Gunton's solution involves not only a reinterpretation
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of the nature of this 'space', but also a reinterpretation of transcendence and
immanence.
(i) The first stage of Gunton's solution is his redefinition of transcendence and
immanence as otherness, and relation, respectively. God is transcendent, utterly
different from the world, and yet is immanently related towards and in the world.
Transcendence and immanence are not in competition - indeed, the divine
immanence is itself founded on the divine transcendence. Gunton wishes to affirm a
dynamic and not a spatial understanding of divine transcendence;
Transcendence on this account will not be something God possesses in
greater or less quantity, at the expense of his immanence, but something he
is and does.1
The evidence for this lies in the awesome divine immanence of the Incarnation of the
Son of God. Here we have a freedom of revelation and of dynamic immanence. God
reveals himself in the man Jesus Christ and yet remains free.2 Following Barth,
Gunton argues that God is radically transcendent, and so radically free "in order to
be radically immanent."3 God's otherness guarantees his relatedness with the world.4
(ii) An adequate conception of createdness must eschew Deism and Pantheism, but it
must emphasise the truths which underlie both of these positions - i.e. the distinction
and relation between God and the world, respectively.5 However, it is not enough
1
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simply to affirm that the God-world relationship consists of otherness-in-relation.6
We need to grasp more clearly how divine action fits into this scheme. On a deistic
understanding of the God-world relationship, divine action is occasional and
interventionist. More to the point, it rapidly becomes irrelevant and unnecessary, as
we saw in the thought of Maurice Wiles. On a pantheistic or panentheistic
understanding, divine action cannot be readily distinguished from creaturely action.
It is certainly the case that divine action cannot be identified in terms of discrete acts,
hence Clayton's problematic references to autonomic functions. In either case, divine
action becomes difficult to conceptualise and we are left with an otiose God or the
world as an emanation of God. The grammar of createdness requires divine action, as
well as otherness-in-relation. Gunton tackles this head-on, by arguing that the God-
world relationship itself is manifested as divine action;
The relation of God to the creation, which is expressed in creation,
reconciliation and redemption, is grounded in the other-related love of the
Father, Son and Spirit in eternity.7
The point to be made here is that a discussion of the God-world relationship requires
a language of involvement, action and enabling - i.e. free relatedness and action.
Only thus do we understand the intrinsic reality of the created order because such
Q
enabling demonstrates that the world is "not simply a tool or an extension of deity."
We shall refer to this aspect of Gunton's theology as action-in-relation? Therefore
the God-world relationship, and thus the Creator-creature distinction is the
continuing result of a divine act of relating, and of continuing divine acts through the
divine relationality.10 Finally, there is the implication that something specific and
indeed purposeful is brought about, as we shall see in more detail later on.
with Special Reference to Gunton's Trinitarian Theology of Creation' (MA Thesis, Trinity
International University, 2000), 137
6 Gunton also uses the terms relation in otherness (PTT, 147), and duality-in-relation (TCF, 11), but





For further evidence of this see Ibid. 84; OTM, 159 and FSH, 31
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Although referring to an act of divine relating may seem to make us a hostage to philosophical or
theological criticism, we are attempting to convey the freedom of God within the God-world
relationship. Although Gunton argues that it is natural for God to be in relation to the world, this must
still remain a free action ofGod, otherwise it is also a necessary relationship.
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(iii) In the God-world relationship there is otherness-in-relation, but this is not
otherness as the opposition of equals. It is God's otherness that guarantees the
otherness, the authentic created reality, of the natural order." This reveals what is
perhaps the most fundamental and yet least articulated motif of the God-world
relationship. This is the priorness or prevenience of God, which underlies everything
that we have said on the God-world relationship and createdness.12 God is before the
world, God creates the world and God holds the world in being. To be a creature is to
be affirmed, not threatened by this God who is 'before' all things, because God's
transcendence or otherness is "the otherness that enables God to be free of envy of
the autonomy of the creature."13 In other words, it is God's prior freedom that
guarantees creaturely freedom.14 The doctrine of creation does imply a relative
creaturely independence and human freedom, but these rest on the otherness-in-
relation found in the Creator-creature relationship.15
(iv) How do we relate abstract concepts such as transcendence and immanence to
what is a personal and specific relationship between God and the world? This is the
function of the doctrine of the Immanent Trinity. This doctrine is the attempt to
safeguard the reality of the trinitarian revelation of God, by arguing that the threefold
divine action in salvation history (the Economic Trinity) reveals that God is Trinity
(Immanent Trinity). The alternative is modalism, wherein God is only apparently
Trinity, as each 'Person' active in salvation history is a mask or character of the
unitary divine being. The doctrine of the Immanent Trinity has two important
consequences for a discussion of the God-world relationship.
1 "The closer the world is tied up with the immanence of God, the more it loses its otherness and
therefore its autonomy and freedom to be itself." (Gunton, 'The Spirit as Lord', 181) Gunton has an
extended discussion of this subject through his identification of God's otherness with his holiness.
(TCF, 49, 55 and 190)
12
However, Gunton does clearly affirm a doctrine of divine sovereignty. For instance see BB2, 236
13 Colin E. Gunton, 'Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom', Theology Today, 43:3 (1986), 316-330,
(citation, 327)
14 See on this issue, EAA, 96
15IAA, 160. C.f. PTT, 146
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First, it affirms the divine freedom. In this doctrine we are able to affirm that
"because God is 'before' creation took place, already a being-in-relation, there is no
need for him to create what is other than himself. He does not need to create, because
he is already a taxis, order, of loving relations."16 As we have seen already, this
divine freedom alone is the guarantee of the freedom of the creature, in that "[o]nly if
God has freedom of action do we also."17 Second, the doctrine articulates the non¬
competitive relationship between transcendence and immanence. For Gunton, the
divine transcendence guarantees the divine immanence, and more importantly for our
discussion here, his immanence does not exhaust his transcendence. The point of the
doctrine is to affirm that what we say of the being of God (the Immanent Trinity)
must be governed by God's self-revelation (the Economic Trinity), whilst not going
so far as to say that "God is only the economy."18 For instance, we need to say that
God is eternal and yet he acts in time. To perceive God as nothing other than the one
who acts in time is to ignore the divine eternity, and so lose the distinction between
God and the world.19 Here direct Pantheism threatens.20 As Gunton puts it, without
21the Immanent Trinity, we have relation without otherness. Overall, the doctrine
22
enables us to account for the personal space between God and the world.
We can see how the doctrine of the Immanent Trinity functions in this way by
focusing on the issue of divine-human relationality. Gunton argues that Catherine
LaCugna's explicit dismissal of the Immanent Trinity runs the risk of transforming
16 PTT 147. C.f. TCF, 187. In denying or at least degrading the distinction between the Immanent and
the Economic Trinity, Catherine LaCugna cannot affirm this divine freedom. Hence, she confuses the
necessary (innertrinitarian) divine relationality with that divine relationality ad extra. As such, "God is
constituted as God by having a real relation to creation." (Catherine LaCugna, 'The Relational God:
Aquinas and Beyond', Theological Studies, 46 (1985), 647-663, (citation, 661)
17IAA, 103. C.f. PTT 147
ls
IAA, 103. C.f. Paul D. Molnar, 'Some Dogmatic Implications of Barth's Understanding of Ebionite
and Docetic Christology', IJOST, 2:2 (2000), 151-174, (citation, 152)) and Paul D. Molnar, 'The
Function of the Immanent Trinity in the Theology of Karl Barth: Implications for Today', SJOT, 42:3





21 Colin E. Gunton, Review of Ted Peters, GOD as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine
Life, in Theology Today, 51:1 (1994), 174-176, (citation, 176)
22
IAA, 103. Paul D. Molnar rightly argues that unless we have a distinction between the Immanent
and the Economic Trinity then we have two theological difficulties, "1) the idea that creation arises
from God's nature, and 2) the idea that God needs the world." (Paul D. Molnar, Experience and
Knowledge of the Trinity in the Theology of Ted Peters: Occasion for Clarity or Confusion?', Irish
Theological Quarterly, 64:3 (1999), 217-243, (citation, 229)) Both of these are inimical to a concept
of the createdness of the world.
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divine-human relationality into one (and so one ontological) communion.23 Joy Anne
McDougall argues that Gunton circumvents this difficulty not by explicitly invoking
the doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, but by stressing the analogical content of
human personhood in its relation to the divine.24 Therefore, Keith Ward's dismissal
of the doctrine as "internal goings-on within a wholly self-contained and self-
25sufficient Godhead." misses the point. The doctrine of the Immanent Trinity
affirms the freedom of God to be the one who is actively involved in the world
without his being pantheistically reduced to this activity.
(v) We have already noted that for Gunton, the freedom of the creature is based on
the freedom and transcendence of God.26 If this is so then certain understandings of
immanence (for instance and perhaps most obviously, a pantheistic immanence such
as we find in Spinoza) may be detrimental to our understanding of creaturely
freedom. Gunton has in mind the common tendency to correlate immanence with the
presence and work of the Spirit, especially in the form of Spirit-Christologies, such
as that of Lampe.27 This leads Gunton to suggest that we must distinguish broadly
between christological immanence and pneumatological transcendence. To be more
specific, in Christ, we see a free and sovereign identification of God with a part of
his world. The Spirit, however, is to be seen as freedom over against and in relation
to creation.28 This enables us to avoid a pantheistic understanding of divine action or
the God-world relationship. Creation is through the Son "who is the mediator of
God's self-relatedness to that which is not himself', but it is also in the Spirit, "which
means by God's relation to it in otherness."29 However, these distinctions must not





Joy Anne McDougall, 'La_t sicli die Praktische Bedeutung der Trinitatslehre Wiedergewinnen?
Neue Horizonte in der Anglo-Amerikanischen Diskussion', Evangelische Theologie, 58:3 (1998),
231-242, (citation, 240). C.f. 241
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Ward, Religion and Creation, 328
26 For more on this see Gunton, 'The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature', 61
27 Ibid. 62
jq C.f. Gunton, 'Barth, the Trinity, and Human Freedom', 328; TTT, 113 and 122; TTC, 170;
IAI, 6; AAB, 77-78 and Ben Engelbrecht, 'The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Part II: A Contemporary




But even as immanent, the incarnate Word, as the one who confronts us, is
also transcendent, as our atoning Other; and, by a corresponding logic, by his
involvement in the redemption of matter, the Spirit is, in a manner of
speaking, immanent.. .30
In Gunton's thought this is an essential pair of motifs, because for him it is essential
to see Jesus Christ as God immanent, made flesh, in the world without this detracting
from his true humanity. This is possible through the work of the Spirit, who
maintains otherness within the intimate relationality of God and humanity in the
Incarnation and so prevents any suggestion of Pantheism.3' This transcendence of the
Spirit has a broader significance for the God-world relationship as a whole. We
require the balance of pneumatological transcendence if we are not to allow our
conception of christological immanence to make the world "too much a function of
God's presence to it, too little its own autonomous reality."
(vi) With these underlying accounts of transcendence and immanence behind us, we
can now move on to Gunton's doctrine of creation proper. At the start, we should
note Gunton's explicit and implicit indebtedness to Irenaeus, in particular with
regard to the shape and structure of his argumentation against a competitive God-
world relationship. The heart of the doctrine of creation for Gunton is summed up by
Irenaeus in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. This means that God does not create
using a pre-existent nothingness, but rather that God requires nothing but his Word
and Spirit to create. This is the divine freedom; there is nothing prior to creation
except God, and so there are no external constraints upon God.33 Anything that did
impose such constraints would "conflict with his freedom and omnipotence".34
Irenaeus' point is that if there were any constraints, such as pre-existing matter, then
this would be a rival for God, and would be "in point of fact God."35 This is what we
saw in our discussion of the God-world relationship. Anything that constrains God
30 J19 c.f. John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the








35 Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 3. C.f. TCF, 17
Chapter 2 53
(or carries out an activity which is normally attributed to God) is on the same
ontological plane, and must be assumed to be divine. The doctrine of creation ex
nihilo thus gives us the classic Christian ontology of creation wherein "there are no
degrees of being but two realities, God and everything else that he has made, the
created order."36 This is dualism, but it is non-competitive dualism; it is instead the
case that there are two realities each with their own space.37 They are not within one
ontological framework or space.
(vii) God creates ex nihilo, in sovereign freedom. How does this correlate with the
God-world relationship that is initiated by this creative act? Gunton again finds the
answer to this in the thought of Irenaeus. According to Irenaeus, God the Father
creates, relates to and works in and towards his creation by his two 'hands', the Son
and Spirit. God needs no intermediaries for creation or action-in-relation, because he
works thus through his Son and Spirit. Rather, God himself "by means of the
energies of his Son and Spirit" crosses the space between God and the world,
therefore "allowing and enabling the world to be itself."38 Moreover, because these
two hands are God in person, there is no sense in which economic subordination
decays into essential subordination. This is the power of the metaphor of the 'two
hands'; to use one's hands is to do something oneself.39 For Irenaeus, "[b]ecause God
is lord of his creation, he does not need intermediates because mediation is achieved






39 Ibid. 181. C.f. Colin E. Gunton, 'The Holy Spirit who with The Father and the Son Together is
Worshipped and Glorified', Lecture presented to the Heidelberger Okumenisches Forum 'The Trinity,
the Church and The Christian Ethos', 12.5.2000-13.5.2000 [Online document]
http://www.theologie.uni-hd.de/oek/institut/forum/vortragl.htm. The doctrine of the two hands of God
"is itself the expression of the doctrine of an immediately present and active God." (John Lawson, The
Biblical Theology ofSaint Irenaeus (London: Epworth Press, 1948), 122). C.f. Eric Osborn, Irenaeus
ofLyons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 73
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TTC, 62-63. As Boris Bobrinskoy puts it, "the Word and the Spirit constitute the two
intermediaries, the mediators of the revelation of the love and of communion with the Father." (Boris
Bobrinskoy, The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and
Patristic Tradition (tr. Anthony P. Gythiel) (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1999),
204) In essence, Gunton is attempting to describe how it is that there is no pantheistic divinisation of
the creature; there are no semi-divine created intermediaries between God and the world, whether
these are selfish genes or evolution itself. C.f. Osbom, Irenaeus ofLyons, 65
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or otherness between God and the world. We see this in the Incarnation, which is "an
instance and paradigm of a form of mediated action that requires no
intermediaries."4I Therefore if our understanding of the God-world relationship is
not based on the Incarnation (mediated trinitarian action-in-relation), then "some
logical or ontological - and hence necessitarian - link tends to be made between God
and the world."42 This becomes not only a threat to divine freedom, but also to that
of the created order, because it is "stable and reliable because it is upheld in being by
Christ, through whom creation has its being."43
(viii) God is free in the act of creation because he requires nothing except his two
hands in order to do so. To say this is to claim that creation is an act of will. To be
more precise it is an act ofpersonal will and agency.44 To describe this personal will
of God, Gunton follows Athanasius and argues for a distinction between the divine
will and the divine being. If we distinguish these, then we can argue that God is
eternal but his willing of creation does not need to be. The natural order can therefore
be contingent as the result of a free act of creation.45 Moreover, because the world is
the result of this divine act of willing so distinguished, its source lies in this
contingent divine willing and not in the necessary divine being. Creation is therefore
a free, intentional andpurposeful act ofGod46
41
Gunton, 'The End ofCausality?', 78
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TTC, 95. For instance, it has been argued that Newton's Arian theology, in conjunction with his
notion of uncreated space and time, lead him to view space and time in an almost christological and so
mediatorial role. (Martin Tamny, 'Newton, Creation, and Perception', Is is, 70:1 (1979), 48-58; Simon
Oliver, 'Motion According to Aquinas and Newton', Modem Theology, 17:2 (2001), 163-199 and
Christopher B. Kaiser, Creation and the History of Science (London: Marshall Pickering; Grand
Rapids, MA: Eerdmans, 1991),passim.
43 Ibid. 79. C.f. TAA, 151
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(B) The Nature ofCreated Reality
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The second major subsection of this chapter represents the created side of the God-
world relationship. We have seen that the world exists in its own 'space'; its own
gifted freedom in its relationship with God. But what does this signify about the
nature of the world itself? What characteristics does this particular understanding of
the God-world relationship and the doctrine of creation suggest for the natural
world? That is the burden of our study now.
(i) What we have seen so far describes the act of creation from the Godward side.
What we have said of the world itself has been restricted essentially to its intrinsic
reality, its otherness from God. But this is not all we can say about the world. The
first point to make about the world itself, and again Gunton derives this from
Irenaeus, is that it is intrinsically good. This is to be found explicitly in the first
chapter of Genesis but also has a christological basis, in that if the Son of God takes
flesh, then nothing created is unreal, less real, or intrinsically evil.47 From this we can
see the development of the idea of the worth and reality of the created order, both as
an intrinsic quality, and through the divine action in and towards the world. The
significance of intrinsic worth is that this reflects the relative independence of the
created order from God.
(ii) The created order is the result of ongoing divine action-in-relation. It therefore
has an intrinsic goodness manifested both by God's positive evaluation of it and by
the evidence of the divine action which sustains it. Gunton, following Irenaeus, links
these ideas by arguing that this divine action-in-relation is also purposive. This is so
because the creation is an act of love - it is a project,48 In other words, "creation is
47 Ibid. 52
4X Gunton sees a suggestion of this in the description of the act of creation over six days in the first
chapter ofGenesis. (TCF, 7)
Chapter 2 56
not only ex nihilo but in progress."49 Hence, for Irenaeus, the creation is relatively
perfect;
The creation is, we might say, perfect in that it is destined for perfection.30
Jurgen Moltmann defines this as creatio mutabilis, whereby the world "is perfectible,
not perfect, for it is open for the history of both disaster and salvation, for both
destruction and consummation."51 Because creation is a project, Gunton argues that
createdness has three tenses. In the past tense we have the doctrine of creation - free
(ex nihilo) creation by God. In the present tense we have ontological dependence - "a
continuing relationship of dependence upon a personal God."52 The third tense is the
53
projected nature of creation - it is "destined for perfection, completedness." As
with its intrinsic goodness, the eschatological perfection of the created order implies
the value of the created order in its own right;
The fact that the act of creation is directed to the establishment of things
whose rationale is their shaping as beings in time and space demonstrates the
importance of the created world in and for itself.34
Furthermore, this also demonstrates the significance of time and space. In Christ,
God is involved in time and space and so these must be good. The work of the Spirit,
which is the perfecting of the created order through time, also shows that time is
intrinsically good.53 We have seen that the projective view of creation interprets the
created order as purposive, and in so doing affirms its reality. We see now that this
involves affirming those creatures, space and time, which are naturally integral to
such divine action.
49
Douglas Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia: On the Significance of the Doctrine of the Ascension for
Ecclesiology and Christian Cosmology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999), 50
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(iii) Connected with the issue of the importance of creaturely temporality and
spatiality, is the question of divine temporality or spatiality. For him, the divine
eternity must be neither identified with nor opposed to (creaturely) temporality.
Gunton argues that Augustine is correct in refusing to attribute time to God, but goes
too far in arguing that God is timeless.56 It is of course correct to distinguish God
from the created temporal order.57 However, the timelessness of God leads to a view
that all of God's acts are timeless (including creation), which also implies that time
and space cannot be taken seriously.58 Ifwe attend instead to the divine involvement
in time, we can see this is not the case. Here we see the divine patience, a giving of
time and space to the creature in which it can be itself;
God's eternity means that, being secure in his own being, he is able to confer
on the creation its own security and integrity as his creation, the world he
loves in and through time.59
Gunton argues that much the same can be said of those authors who describe creation
as an ontological dependence of the world upon God, at the expense of a firm
doctrine of the establishment of creation in the past. Whilst the doctrine is concerned
with such a dependence, "it is also concerned with the true temporality of that which





-p-pc, g3 perhaps we can add that the problem is that time and space are not taken seriously as
creatures. Bavinck makes the important point that eternity and temporality are not to be contrasted, as
we find in an atemporal view of divine eternity. Rather "eternity and time differ essentially."
(Bavinck, In the Beginning, 39) If time and eternity are contrasted, then they are in a sense
competitive, and so on one ontological plane.
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TCF, 56. Douglas Farrow argues that the Ascension also demonstrates that creaturely temporality
and divine eternity cannot be understood as opposed, because here it is seen that "the eternal is
something to which the temporal may aspire without abandoning its temporality." (Farrow, Ascension
and Ecclesia, 50)
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TTC, 91. For instance, the noted science-theology contributor Robert J. Russell argues that a loss of
t—0 (i.e. the Big Bang) would equal a loss of creation ex nihilo, and consequently affirms a doctrine of
ontological dependence. (Robert J. Russell, 'Is Nature Creation? Philosophical and Theological
Implications of Physics and Cosmology from a Trinitarian Perspective', Studies in Science and
Theology, 3 (1995) 94-124, (citation, 105-108), and Robert J. Russell, 'Finite Creation without a
Beginning: The Doctrine of Creation in Relation to Big Bang and Quantum Cosmologies', in QCLN,
291-325, passim). This not only threatens the temporality of the natural order, but also conflates
theology and cosmology.
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This is a point recognised by Paul Helm, who argues for a timeless view of God.
However, this view causes some difficulties for both the doctrine of creation and the
doctrine of Providence. First, for Helm, creation is the bringing into being of the
whole temporal order, "not a creation of the universe by One who is already subject
to time."61 The concept of a temporal first moment of creation is unnecessary, "and
so the universe need not have begun (temporally) to exist, for from the divine
standpoint the universe is eternal, even though it exists contingently."62 Even if there
is a first moment of creation, we can then still argue that God did not exist before the
creation, because "if there was a first moment of creation, then there was no time
prior to the first moment during which God might exist."63 The God-world
relationship is therefore contingent, in that God need not have had it, but it is
nonetheless eternal.64 God exists before the created order only in a logical or
hierarchical sense.65 Second, although Helm wants to affirm the specificity of divine
acts, he in fact finds it difficult to explain or describe how this can be the case. Such
discreet acts cannot be serial, as this would imply temporality.66 However, although
we can say that God acts, "there is no moment at which he acts. If he is timelessly
eternal how can there be such a moment?" Therefore, the universe is only
apparently a continuous (serial) creation. From God's point of view "what is created
is one temporally extended or ordered view."68 Rather worryingly, as Helm admits,
this makes it difficult to distinguish the act of creation from preservation, such that
the God-world relationship is reduced to one of dependence.69 Again Helm implies
this difficulty when he states that the distinct acts (which normally would comprise
Special Providence) are to be seen as nothing other than the pattern of Providence at
61 Paul Helm, 'Divine Timeless Eternity', in Gregory E. Ganssle (ed.) God and Time: Four Views
(Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 2001), 28-60, (citation, 33). Although Helm's position is
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6S Paul Helm, 'Eternal Creation: The Doctrine of the Two Standpoints', in Colin E. Gunton (ed.) The
Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1997), 29-46, (citation, 35)
69 Paul Helm, The Providence ofGod, (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993), 81
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that moment.1" Divine activity is only apparently serial in nature. Although Helm
rightly emphasises the contingency of the natural order, there is still a potential for
emanationism and Pantheism in his argument. The God-world relationship is eternal
and has no 'contours' in that there are no discreet acts. This seems to remove the
action from action-in-relation, and threatens a Pantheism or emanationism in which
the world is nothing other than the result of a timeless overflowing of divine
creativity and/or being.
(iv) Creaturely temporality and spatiality must be safeguarded by distinguishing
them from, but not opposing them to the being of God. The same is true of those
entities or processes that occur through space and time. An essential aspect of this for
Gunton is ensuring that there is no conflation of natural processes (such as evolution
or entropy) with the project of creation. This would be to confuse cosmic
eschatology with the divine perfecting of the world.71 For Gunton, it is essential that
a doctrine of creation says that "it has a destiny other than a continuing, if finite,
progression to entropy and increasing complexity: the destiny of being enabled,
through Jesus' offering of a perfect humanity to the Father, to praise its creator and
return to him perfected."72 As Douglas Farrow puts it;
Creation may indeed be a process, and the kingdom of God on the way, so to
speak; but it is not on the way along our way.73
To confuse cosmic and divine eschatology is to deny the third tense of the doctrine of
creation, either by assuming that the universe is purposeless, or by arguing that if it
has a purposeful goal, it can reach this without divine action-in-relation. For
Irenaeus, and indeed for Gunton, that which perfects creation and brings humanity
and God closer together is due to the power of God and not an innate human or
cosmic potential.74 However, to say that this eschatological perfection has a divine
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words, cosmic eschatology and the dynamic of the Spirit cannot neither be identified
nor contrasted, because "the latter is oriented to the one crucified in the midst of that
very dynamic of energies of which we are speaking."75
(v) Gunton's refusal to either identify or oppose God and the world is reflected in his
understanding of the actual characteristics of the world as created. Indeed Gunton on
numerous occasions develops his account of the manner in which the created order
'reflects' certain aspects of the divine being, relationality and activity.76 These
features are what Gunton refers to as "open transcendentals", and two of them,
77
perichoresis and substantiality, are of interest in this context. These two concepts
enable Gunton to link an ontological understanding of relationality (in the Godhead,
between God and the world and in this instance within the created order) with an
assertion of the concrete or particular nature of creatures. Both of these will be seen
to be essential aspects of Gunton's safeguarding of the reality of the created order.
Gunton can say that the ontological character of the universe is "a perichoresis of
interrelated dynamic systems"78 whereby "the whole universe becomes conceivable
as a dynamic structure of fields of force in mutually constitutive relations."79 Gunton
links this dynamism with an insistence on temporal irreversibility. Of course, the
cosmological eschatology derived from this must not be confused with theological
eschatology.80 The distinction can be maintained by focussing on the action of the
Spirit as "the divine energy releasing the energies of the world, enabling the world to
por more resources on distinguishing cosmological and theological eschatology see John
Jefferson Davis, 'Cosmic Endgame: Theological Reflections on Recent Scientific Speculations on the
Ultimate Fate of the Universe', S&CB, 11:1 (1999), 15-27
76 These are discussed predominantly in OTM and also in PTT. There are at least three for Gunton;
perichoresis, substantiality and relationality.
77 As Christoph Schwobel argues "[Gjunton asks in what way the doctrine of the Trinity generates
transcendentals which allow us to grasp the structure of created being by attempting to make its
relations to the being of the triune creator transparent." (Christoph Schwobel, 'Radical Monotheism
and the Trinity', NZSTh, 43:1 (2001), 54-74, (citation, 72). It is this practical use of the
transcendentals that appears to have been grasped in some recent material from the science-theology
interface; c.f. P. Barrett, 'Beauty in Physics and Theology', JTSA, 94 (1996), 65-78, and William R.
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realise its dynamic interrelatedness." The universe is inherently dynamic, but this
dynamism cannot by its own accord direct itself towards eschatological perfection.
The world is a perichoretic order, "summoned into being and directed towards its
perfection by the free creativity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit."82 However, Gunton
is insistent that we do not lose sight of the intrinsic reality, the "particular being", of
the natural order which this prevenient divine order secures.83 This particularity is
84
studied through another transcendental, substantiality. This is Gunton's way of
describing what it is that is actually perfected through time by the action of the Spirit,
and the answer is "the material particular". The created order is a universe of
particular entities. Reality is to be understood as that which is held in being by God
and other things in particular space-time configurations in which its being is
8 f\
constituted - i.e. createdness. As such, these specific, individual and yet
relationally constituted creatures exist, are real.
(C) Critique
In this chapter we have addressed Gunton's theology from two perspectives; the
doctrine of creation and the nature of the creature. Most of the criticisms of Gunton's
theology have been addressed towards the second perspective and, in particular, his
concept of the transcendentals. Accordingly, this will be the major focus of this
subsection. However, there are other potential difficulties which we must at least flag
up for further study, some ofwhich we shall be attempting in this thesis.
(i) The heart of Gunton's doctrine of creation per se is relatively uncontroversial,
insofar as it treats of established subjects such as creation ex nihilo and the doctrine
of the Immanent Trinity. The latter is of course still a matter of some heated
81 Ibid. 158
82






controversy, but the principle behind, basically that of protecting the contingency of
the natural order by affirming the freedom of the divine creative act, is not. There is
one aspect of this part of Gunton's theology that must be addressed here, and that is
his discussion of the difference in transcendence and immanence of the two hands of
the Father. Gunton's insistence on the transcendence of the Spirit is unusual, but by
no means unique, and articulates something of a reaction to the more common
emphasis on the immanence of the Spirit.87 The strength of this position is that it
informs our understanding of what transcendence and immanence actually entails,
but there is room for confusion, especially with regard to Gunton's fruitful
reinterpretation of transcendence and immanence as otherness and relation. To be
specific the difficulty lies in Gunton's paralleling of christological immanence with
identity. If transcendence represents the divine otherness, then immanence
understood as identity (as it is here) would be in contrast to divine transcendence.
This goes against the grain of his theology of the God-world relationship, wherein
immanence is possible because of the divine transcendence, and so represents a
major difficulty. We can hypothesise that here Gunton has inadvertently reverted to
answering the question of transcendence and immanence in the same but opposite
manner to those with whom he is in conversation. In other words, if there is a
tendency to identify immanence with the Spirit, then Gunton has simply turned this
argument on its head rather than reinterpreting the discussion in terms of otherness
and relation. Without attempting to resolve this issue, it is worth clarifying Gunton's
intent; for him, the action-in-relation of the Spirit represents an emphasis on the
divine otherness-'m-xeXaXion with the world, whereas the Incarnation, the
identification (without Pantheism) of the Son with an aspect of the created order,
represents equally an emphasis on the otherness-in-re/at/077 between God and the
natural order.
87 For an example of the latter, the reader is referred to the powerful and evocative treatment of the
Shekinah in the theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, especially at is presented in God in Creation: An
Ecological Doctrine ofCreation (tr. Margaret Kohl) (London: SCM, 1985)
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(ii) Gunton's development of the concept of transcendentals has generated a good
deal of interest (indeed, it has been the impetus for the all too rare serious treatments
oo
of Gunton's theology) but it has also generated some criticism. Stephen N.
Williams links Gunton's argument on this issue with his occasionally problematic
methodology. He can go so far as to say that Gunton is creating a philosophia
christiania, as "an attempt on theological premises to give a philosophical
SO . . .
description of the created order". Williams argues that in Gunton's work there is a
theologically unjustifiable intellectualism90, which is undesirable because;
What matters in the realms of humanity and sociality, to which Gunton
applies his thought, is getting people to care for each particular other. People
do not do so by getting straight on the ontology of relations.91
We are willing to grant that Gunton's methodology can occasionally appear to be
abstract and artificial in its construction, especially in OTM to which Williams is
referring in particular, and also in his doctrine of Providence. However, Williams'
criticism is a little unfair in that Gunton's argument is geared towards showing, as we
are arguing, that such apparently abstract concepts as createdness have genuinely
concrete ramifications. This is because, as Douglas Knight has pointed out, to
attempt to conceptualise the nature of God is to be able to begin to understand the
world;
God both distinguishes himself from his work, and identifies his work with
himself. Making this distinction and identification is his work, and our
knowledge of it is his own work too.92
This is not to imply that the excellent study by Bradley Green to which we have already made
mention is not a serious endeavour; nonetheless, it is not designed as a treatment of Gunton's wider
theology.
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Stephen N. Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation: Windows on Modernity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 166. C.f. David S. Cunningham, These Three are One: The
Practice ofTrinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 39-41
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Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation, 172
91 Ibid. 171-2
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Douglas Knight, 'From Metaphor to Mediation: Colin Gunton and the Concept of Mediation',
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Indeed, it is worth pointing out that in his early work especially, Gunton has made
precisely the same criticism about Process Thought as Williams makes about him.93
He goes so far as to describe Process Theology as a form of Gnosticism, insofar as
true reality is that which can only be grasped by the intellectually able, rather than by
those to whom truth can be mediated by divine action.94
(iii) Fermer also makes a similar criticism to Williams in his treatment of Gunton's
transcendentals. He feels that there is a danger in Gunton's thought (insofar as it
mirrors that of Zizioulas in this respect) of reducing God to the subject of
metaphysics and in so doing threatening "a collapse of the distinction between God
and the world".93 Fermer concedes that this threat is somewhat attenuated in
Gunton's thought in that he does not treat the Trinity as a transcendental (the analogy
is based on God as Creator, not God's being) and his affirmation of apophaticism.
Fermer advocates that we distinguish the verbal noun 'being' from the past
participle; and so "the being of God is constituted by communion, but the being of
created entities is shaped, in some way, by God as creator or source of all being."96
Fermer's argument is very interesting, but again he seems curiously able to disregard
those aspects of Gunton's theology in which he affirms the distinction between God
and the world. In our present chapter, we have seen that the theological significance
of the transcendentals lies in their use as a way of holding together the similarity-in-
distinction between divine and creaturely realities. If we were to claim identity
between these realities, then we would of course be carrying out a pantheistic
programme. However, to deny any similarity, is to suggest that these aspects of the
world are unreal, and so not genuine creaturely aspects of the natural order. To do
this has a further consequence. Downplaying the reality of time and space does not
just endanger their own reality as creatures. The reality of that which occurs in space-
time is also threatened, as appears to be the case in the thought of Robert J. Russell,
93 OTM, 199, n29
94 Colin E. Gunton, 'The Knowledge of God According to Two Process Theologians: A Twentieth-
Century Gnosticism', Religious Studies, 1 1 (1975), 87-96, (citation, 95)
95
Fermer, 'The Limits of Trinitarian Theology', 173
96 Ibid. 174
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on the question of the Special Theory of Relativity. Here there is a potentially
difficult ontologising of spatial and temporal relationships between events in space-
time, rather than locating ontology in relational particularities in space-time.97 We
would point to his argument for the non-reality of the present moment for further
evidence.98 Russell must safeguard the ontological content of particularities in space-
time, and the creaturely status of space-time, or his whole project is threatened.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have addressed the very heart of our grammar of createdness - the
doctrine of creation itself. For the reader of Gunton's theology, this is not a cut and
dried affair; it requires an effort of reconstruction and further reading from most of
his major works and a number of subsidiary essays and articles. Hopefully, it is clear
that this is not due to an unsystematic approach to theology on Gunton's part, but
rather because the doctrine finds echoes and anticipations throughout his work. It is
especially to be hoped that the dependence of this doctrine on the concept of the
divine prevenience and triune freedom has been made clear. This demonstrates that
the createdness of the natural order is preserved in Christian theology not by a
diminution of the divine being or divine action-in-relation with respect to the natural
order, but actually through an affirmation of God's triune lordship.
Although Gunton never attempts a deliberately abstract rendering of the God-world
relationship and the nature of the created order, his work has certainly been
interpreted in this manner. This is because the transcendentals produce a very real
tension in Gunton's thought. They represent something of a theology of nature (i.e.
argument to design) rather than a natural theology (an argument from design). As
such, their function is to explicate the nature of the world in the light of the divine
self-revelation of God in Christ. On the other hand, and this is a point which is not
really brought out in extant criticisms, they are an unresolved difficulty for a doctrine
97 Robert J. Russell, 'Time in Eternity: Special Relativity and Eschatology', dialog, 39:1 (2000), 46-
55 (citation, 52-53)
98
Russell, 'Is Nature Creation?', 95-100
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of creation. Are they to be understood as a circumventing of the mediated nature of
the God-world relationship, and the doctrine of the Immanent Trinity? Perhaps more
seriously still, if these features of the natural order reflect the nature of the Creator
God, then must the world have these properties? Is God free to create a world
without these characteristics? If not, then they are not contingent features of the
natural order. The answer is unclear, especially as the transcendentals are a
theological interpretation of the properties of the world which are open to empirical
investigation. Nonetheless, once again we must make clear that because Gunton
wishes to deny the semi-divine status of any aspect of the natural order, then it seems
apparent that for him the transcendentals must be a contingent part of the created
order.
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Chapter 3: Divine Action-in-Relation (I) - The Work of the Son and the
Spirit
Introduction
In the last two chapters of our discussion of Gunton's theology, we have a great deal
of ground to cover. We have to discuss his treatment of Christology, Soteriology
Pneumatology, the community of the redeemed (the Church) and Providence. The
first four of these doctrines might seem surprising emphases for a theology that is to
be used in dialogue with science, but the importance of all of these lies in their
continuity with Gunton's concern for createdness, especially as this represents the
identity of the natural order. As in the previous chapters, the identity of the natural
order as the created order is something that must be maintained. The natural order
has an intrinsic reality, but this is still dependent upon the divine prevenience. In this
chapter we find more details on how divine action-in-relation maintains the identity
of the natural order as an eschatological project being directed towards perfection,
and the manner in which redemption and sanctification represent the safeguards of
this eschatological destiny.
(A) God's Work in Jesus Christ: Christology and Soteriology
The Christian faith is based on the belief that God encounters and defeats sin through
the life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ. Such a belief raises a
number of questions that are relevant to our study. What is the relationship between
sin and createdness? How is sin defeated through Jesus Christ? What is redemption
and how can it influence the whole of the created order? For Gunton, this discussion
is governed by a central motif of the rigorous connection between redemption and
creation.1 In particular, we can trace the effect of the motif of the project of creation




(i) As we have seen, the created order must be perceived as good, as indeed perfect,
insofar as it is a project directed towards a future perfection and fulfilment. The
converse of these motifs is that anything that threatens the project of creation is not
good and indeed distorts createdness. For Gunton, this is exactly the nature and
consequence of human sin.2 The consequence of sin is a disjointing, a disruption of
the project of creation. For Gunton, then, the redemption wrought through Jesus
Christ must be seen as the restoration ofthis project;
What is achieved in Jesus' ministry is accordingly the work of the one
through whom the creation was made returning to his realm in human
actuality, in such a way that by means of his action and passion, and what
God achieves through them, the project of creation is redirected towards its
proper end - the at-one-ment of all things with God.3
It is important to note that in Gunton's thought sin does not remove all directedness
from the project of creation. Instead he uses a motif wherein sin introduces a false
eschatology, almost a dead end into the natural order. Here, for example, death is
transformed from part of the natural and good limitation of created life into an alien
destiny, "the death which is not fulfilment but subjection to futility."4 The
redemptive activity of God in Christ supervenes upon this alien, 'negative',
eschatology and restores the direction of creation.5 We must take the nature of sin
and its consequences very seriously. Without the restoration that the Atonement
brings, "we are shaped and destined for death."6 The life, death and resurrection of
Christ shows us that we cannot be perfected without transformation.7 Hence Gunton
can say that "redemption is not merely a removal of disorder but a redirection and a
2
TCF, 60. Sin is the disruption of the human relation to God, which at the human level takes on the
form of idolatry. (AAB, 73)
3 Colin E. Gunton, 'Atonement and the Project of Creation: An Interpretation of Colossians 1:15-23',
dialog, 35:1 (1996), 35-41, (citation, 37-38). C.f. TCF, 67 and CAC, 91
4
FSH, 111. As such, we must distinguish between mortality and death. (TCF, 139). "Creation in the
beginning is a beginning. It is the start of history, and that history is a movement from a garden to a
city. But the fall has occurred, and that means, for the biblical perspective, that there is an antithesis
within history, two historical movements and two cities." (Bradley J. Walsh, 'Theology of Hope and
the Doctrine of Creation: An Appraisal of Jiirgen Moltmann', Evangelical Quarterly, 59 (1987),
53-76, (citation, 67)
3 Colin E. Gunton, 'Dogmatic Theses on Eschatology', in David Fergusson & Marcel Sarot (eds.) The
Future as God's Gift: Explorations in Christian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2000), 139-143,





liberation: it is a resurrection."8 Therefore, in and through Jesus Christ, the identity
and createdness of the natural order are restored, in that redemptive divine action
enables the created order to be what it was intended to be. Ultimately, we see that
creation and redemption cannot be divorced because God's action that "takes the
form of both creating what is and redeeming what has failed to become what it is
called to be."9
(ii) Gunton is careful to position these concepts of sin and redemption within his
wider scheme of trinitarian action-in-relation. We must avoid seeing the atoning life
of Christ as an intervention into the natural order, otherwise Deism threatens.10
Instead we must realise that "it is the mediator ofcreation who comes to ensure that
the original purposes of God do not founder in futility."11 In the Incarnation, the
ongoing relationship between the Word of God and the world is fulfilled uniquely in
the form of personal presence}" Therefore, in line with his insistence on a non-
contrastive understanding of the God-world relationship, Gunton refuses to see
kenosis as involving a limiting or diminution of the divine being. It is in fact a
concentration of God's reality.13 In sum, then, the life of Jesus Christ is not an
irruption "but is continuous with the love that operates throughout the creation."14
8
TAA, 149. C.f. Gunton, 'Atonement and the Project of Creation', 36 and 'The God of Jesus Christ',
330
9 Colin E. Gunton, 'Christ, the Wisdom of God: A Study in Divine and Human Action', in Stephen C.
Barton (ed.) Where Shall Wisdom Be Found? Wisdom in the Bible, the Church and the Contemporary
World (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999), 249-261, (citation, 256). C.f. TCF, 79
1(1
TAA, 145. This fails to account for the continuing dependence of the world upon God. As Gorringe
admirably puts it, intervention speaks "as if there were a world without God into which God
sometimes stepped." (T. J. Gorringe, God's Theatre: A Theology ofProvidence (London: SCM Press,
1991), 32) C.f. Benjamin W. Farley, The Providence of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House,
1988), 214
"
TAA, 146. My italics. C.f. Gunton, 'Atonement and the Project of Creation', 39
12
TCF, 98. In an early work, Gunton relates this to "the self-differentiation of the divine
omnispatiality." (YAT, 118)
13 Ibid. 94. C.f. TCF, 114 and CAC, 83-84
14 Colin E. Gunton, 'Time, Eternity and the Doctrine of the Incarnation', dialog, 21:4 (1982), 263-268,
(citation, 266). C.f. TAA, 146
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(iii) The connections between creation and redemption in Gunton's thought are not
solely to be found in his treatment of the redemptive restoration of the direction of
creation. For Gunton, the Incarnation is itself integral to the project. The creation is
in but also for Christ.15 This end of creation lies in the prevenient divine purpose, and
is prior to the Fall and can encompass it. Rather than being seen as a form of repair
for the broken creation, the Incarnation is itself integral to its perfection.16 Gunton
describes this with a motif he derives from Scotus and Irving and argues that there
would have been an Incarnation, even with the absence of sin in the world, but it
would not have this shape}1 If creation leads to redemption in this way, "then the
1 R
latter must be its maturity and perfection." This does not imply a 'felix culpa'
doctrine except insofar as the Incarnation is perceived as a fulfilment of the creation
and not a mere repair job. Indeed, the Incarnation is the crown ofcreation}9
(iv) However, we must not lose sight of the fact that although the Incarnation has this
connectivity with the project of creation, it is still a divine initiative. In other words,
we must again ensure that cosmic eschatology is not conflated with eschatological
history. In this instance, we are referring to any suggestion that the Incarnation arises
naturally out of evolutionary or cosmological history. For Gunton, any such
conception is negated by the doctrine of anhypostasia, which teaches that the
hypostasis and person of Christ "does not have its basis in the way that ours do in the





TAA, 151. C.f. CAC, 96 and TCF, 67. For more on the concept of the Incarnation as integral to the
perfecting of creation, and so occurring without the presence of sin in the world, see Jiirgen
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God (tr. Margaret Kohl) (London:
SCM Press, 1981), 115-116
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21reductionism that would base the significance of Christ in cosmic history. Worse,
this would represent a deification of the evolutionary process "so that it rather than
the free and transcendent God takes the initiative in what happens."22 There is here
an explicit connection between createdness and the natural sciences; if evolution is
perceived as salvific, it is divinised and so loses "any other intrinsic rationality. We
are then back to a prescientific view of the divinity of the cosmos."23
Another difficulty with evolutionary christologies lies in the absence of particularity
that they generate. For Gunton, we must never lose sight of the particularity of the
atoning life of Christ, despite the full, universal Atonement that he advocates as part
of the eschatological goal of creation. In contrast, when evolution and eschatological
destiny are equated, Gunton perceives that the Incarnation becomes effectively a
world principle. Such an understanding leads to a Cosmic Christ, but not this
particular Christ and this atoning life and death.24 Note that the emphasis is on
human particularity and the particularity of divine action;
The depth of the need demonstrates that the adoption of a good man,
independently thrown up by evolution or history, was not enough; we are not
saved by the cosmos or by history, but by their sovereign lord and disposer,
God in person.2'1
An evolutionary Christology assumes that the Incarnation occurs or arises at some
midpoint within cosmic history. But this is to disregard Irenaeus' insight that cosmic
history represents a distorted view of the true eschatological nature of the world,
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such, according to Irenaeus, the Son of God comes "to offer his summing up just
where it is necessary for history to begin all over again."27 Evolutionary christologies
make the mistake of assuming continuity between cosmic and divine eschatologies
and histories. The Ascension demonstrates that on the contrary, there is a
fundamental discontinuity, which is overcome in the Incarnation and in the present
through the Eucharist.28
(v) In his understanding of the Incarnation and Atonement, Gunton also emphasises
the entirety of Christ's earthly ministry as an Atonement for sin. This is due to
29Gunton's emphasis on the Incarnation as a microcosm of human life.
Unsurprisingly, he explicitly claims that his doctrine of the Incarnation, like that of
Irenaeus, is one of recapitulation;
"In Jesus, God recapitulates the human story, achieving the redemption of
the lost creation by doing in triumph what Adam failed to do in defeat."311
The Atonement reinaugurates the project of creation, because the recapitulation of
human life by Jesus is "the means of perfection in the senses of both restoration and
of completion."31 For Gunton, the divine action-in-relation in Christ is appropriate to
our createdness and our fallenness/2 In particular, it is appropriate to the
spatiotemporal nature of the created order.3"1 Redemption must have a spatiotemporal
pattern.34 Again, explicitly following Irenaeus, Gunton argues that redemption "takes
account both of the intended destiny of the creature and the way by which it fell from
27 Ibid. 77
2S Ibid. 78. C.f. FSH, 156. Gunton also acknowledges this discontinuity through affirming the
prevenient divine action in the Virgin Birth. (TCF, 100). It should be noted that this affirmation of
particularity and divine initiative does not preclude an emphasis on the true and so evolutionary
humanity of Jesus Christ. Indeed, the eternal Son of God can be said to become, like us, "an ape-in-
the-image-of-God". (Graeme Finlay, 'Homo Divinus: The Ape that Bears God's Image', S&CB, 15:1
(2003), 17-40, (citation, 38)
29
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its destiny."35 Sin and evil occur within temporal and spatial dimensions, and so must
salvation.36
(vi) So far we have seen that Gunton is insistent on the particularity of the
Incarnation. Nonetheless, he is also insistent on the universal effect and extent of the
Atonement.37 Universality and particularity are combined in Gunton's thought
because this universal restoration does not occur en masse, but in the restoration of
humanity through Christ. This rests upon a unique feature of the human race; we are
38created in the image of God, which for Gunton is to be identified with personhood.
The connection is that in Gunton's thought, 'person' means "to be constituted in
particularity and freedom - to be given space to be - by others in community."39
Therefore, a network of human and cosmic relatedness constitutes the person or
human particularity.40 The essential element of Gunton's thought on personhood is
this marrying of the person as particular - as hypostatic - and as relational. It is
imperative that both of these are grasped together.41 Understood in theological terms,
personhood involves a double orientation.42 On the one hand to be a person, as a
creature, involves being in a right (and hence redeemed) relationship with God.43
Personhood also involves a horizontal aspect, a relationality primarily with humans
and then with the rest of the created order.44 Together, this means that the image of
God is eschatological and ontological.45
35
TCF, 64. C.f. Ibid. 87
36 Ibid. 63
37
TAA, 169. C.f. Colin E. Gunton, 'The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices: From Metaphor to
Transcendental?', in Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr., (eds.) Trinity, Incarnation, and
Atonement (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 210-229, 210-229, (citation, 221 -
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(vii) It is a Christian conviction that through human sin the image of God is at the
very least distorted. This distortion affects the whole of the created order not just
because of the continuity between humanity and all other creatures but also because
the non-human (and thus non-personal) creation "is unable to realise its destiny, the
praise of its creator, apart from persons."46 The image of God therefore involves a
specific role in the perfecting of the created order;
To be in the image of God is therefore to be called to represent God to the
creation and the creation to God, so enabling it to reach its perfection.47
Because the image of God is relational (and in this way ontological) it does not
involve any radical distinction between the human and non-human creation.48
However, human sin, insofar as it is a distortion of creaturely relationality, does set
humanity and non-human nature against each other.49 Therefore, the restoration of
the image of God in humanity brings about the restoration of the entire created
order.50 This adds further detail to Gunton's conception of the life of Christ as a
microcosm of all human life. Christ restores the image of God through a life of free
obedience to God, and in so doing recapitulates and perfects the human story, and
that of all creation.51 Only Christ, who lives an authentic human life, can be the
image of God. Hence, Gunton argues that we see Christ's Atonement as
substitutionary; it is a representative sample of perfected humanity, and as such is the
image of God.52
46
PTT, 114. C.f. R. J. Berry, God's Book ofWorks: The Nature and Theology ofNature (London/New
York: T. & T. Clark, 2003), 232. The consequence of Gunton's argument is that we must
acknowledge a definite hierarchy of the human over the non-human, (TCF, 41 and PTT, 118) without
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(viii) The Atonement is universal in extent and effect but also throughout time. To
understand this, we need to learn more ofGunton's understanding offreedom, which
is a distinguishing mark of the human aspect of the created order.53 The non-human
creation lacks personal freedom and exhibits only the contingency that it holds in
common with the created human order.54 Human freedom is qualified and lost
through sin, because sin is a distortion of relationships, primarily with God, but also
within the created order. The action of the Word and Spirit restores freedom. Our
freedom is restored in Christ, by his restoration of the relationships that enable
human freedom. However, there is again the question of how a free historical act can
restore our freedom in the present day. This is grace, and it is the work of the Spirit55;
In relation to God, human freedom comes from the divine action that
graciously creates, upholds and redeems the creature who has preferred
slavery to freedom. To be free is to be set free by the Spirit of the Father
who is the Spirit of freedom. That is to say, true freedom is realized in
communion with God, for unfreedom is, essentially, the loss of a right
relationship to God.56
There are two important points to note here. First, human freedom is genuine, but is
not achieved in competition to the divine freedom. The latter guarantees the former.
Second, this divine action is trinitarian and mediated.57 Hence, whilst it is true that
we find our true humanity through Christ's life and death, this occurs through the
58
Spirit, whose work is "GoJ creating authentic human reality in the here and now.'
This is achieved as the Spirit relates us to Christ and makes his genuine humanity
possible for us. This authentic humanity is authentic communal existence where the
Spirit "makes possible individuality without individualism and community without
53IAA, 177. C.f. TCF, 44
54
PTT, 153. C.f. TTC, 112 and Gunton, 'The End of Causality?', 70 and 73. Gunton criticises Process
Thought for not maintaining this distinction. (PTT, 153)
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IAA, 182 and 185. C.f. EAA, 93 and CAC, 55
56 AAB, 105
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see AAB, 139-142) His main concern with this motif is of course to avoid any sense of modalism. For
an excellent statement of this point see Robert W. Jenson, 'The Christian Doctrine of God', in
Geoffrey Wainwright (ed.) Keeping the Faith: Essays to Mark the Centenary of Lux Mundi




authoritarianism."59 This is an eschatological reality, which exists proleptically as the
Church.60
(B) The Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and Perfection
Gunton's thought on the action-in-relation of the Spirit is both very specific and very
wide-ranging. It is specific in that for Gunton all the works of the Spirit can be
understood in terms of one supervening motif; eschatological action, that "achieves
anticipations of the reconciliation of all things in Christ."61 To do this, the action of
the Spirit is particularising and perfecting action. At a cosmic level, and a personal
level, the Spirit maintains and strengthens particularity - "relation in otherness" - not
homogenisation.62 The Spirit enables ways of acting in and towards the world.63 We
find this in all aspects ofGunton's Pneumatology.
(i) Gunton uses this concept of particularity to describe the Spirit as the perfecter of
God. He views the Spirit as a "focus of the distinctiveness of Father and Son - of
their unique particularity", as the force of the particularisation of the hypostases.64
Thus Gunton can say that the "substantiality of God resides not in his abstract being,
but in the concrete particulars that we call the divine persons and in the relations by
which they mutually constitute one another."65 For Gunton this is again one of the
strengths of the Cappadocian distinction between ousia and hypostasis, in that they
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(ii) The Spirit also perfects God by perfecting the divine love.67 Gunton insists that
we see this as something more than the Spirit's perfecting of the Father-Son
relationship, because this love is then reduced to a closed circle. We must think
more in terms of Richard of St. Victor where "love limited to any two persons is
intrinsically incomplete."69 Therefore Gunton can say that it is the work of the Spirit
to perfect the love of the Father and Son, by moving this love outward and involving
the created order in the life of the Trinity.70 This is because, according to Gunton, the
very being of the Spirit is distinctively orientated towards otherness and so love for
the other is therefore intrinsic to the perfection of the divine love and being.71 God is
love because he is both orientated towards the other within his eternal being, but also
because his inner drive or orientation is for this love to move outwards and create a
72world which he loves and wishes to be in relation with. In the Immanent Trinity
there is a double focus on "the orientation to otherness and the perfection of
particularity."73
(iii) So far we have seen that the Spirit perfects by particularising, as exemplified in
Gunton's emphasis on the twofold perfection of the created order by the Spirit. First
the Spirit "the Lord and Giver of Life, gives reality to the world by relating it to the
Father who originates through the Son that which is genuinely other and yet, because
it is through the Son, the one who was to become incarnate, it is not what it is outside
a continuing relation to God."74 The world is particularised, and in a sense then
perfected, by the securing and delimiting of its creaturely reality. Second, there is the
eschatological action "according to which the creation is finally brought to its
perfection, its completedness, in the fullness of time."75 Again, this involves no loss
of particularity, of created otherness, but is instead its ultimate realisation. Such a
67 Ibid. 190
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scheme "will allow us to particularise the creation much more: to give more stress
both to its particular reality as this universe, the one created by God for a purpose,
and to the being of the particular things and persons of which it is constituted."76 The
perfection of the created order therefore involves an inherent asymmetry - the end is
different to the beginning - and so reinforces our understanding of the purposive
nature (and so reality) of the created order.
(iv) Finally, we can move to Gunton's discussion of the relationship between
pneumatological action-in-relation and the Incarnation. Gunton argues that the
Incarnation can be considered to be non-interventionist on pneumatological as well
as christological grounds.77 The parallelism lies in the integrity of createdness that
the Spirit maintains through particularising action-in-relation. Specifically, the Spirit
here maintains the createdness of the flesh of Christ, and so secures the humanity of
his actions, which is integral to Christology.78 Gunton consistently argues that we
need "an incarnational Christology which will yet do full justice to the historical
particularity of Jesus and the detailed lineaments of his life."79 Controversially, for
on
Gunton this involves insisting that the flesh of Christ is fallen. However, this is not
to deny the unique sinlessness of Christ, because genuine humanity involves
fallibility and contingency, but not sinfulness.81 The point of Gunton's Pneumatology
is precisely to explain how the sinlessness of Christ and the fallenness of his flesh
can be maintained simultaneously. The point of this is to see that "the saving activity
76IAA, 105. C.f. Gunton, 'The End of Causality?', 81. For a succinct statement of this point, based in
part on Gunton's argument see Iain R. Torrance, 'The Trinity in Relation to Creation and Incarnation',
NZSTh, 38:1 (1996), 29-37, (citation, 37)
77
TTT, 118
78 Colin E. Gunton, 'Two Dogmas Revisited: Edward Irving's Christology', SJOT, 41:3 (1988), 359-
376, (citation, 364-365)
79 Ibid. 361. C.f. TTT, 86, 114-115 and 163; PTT, 69 and CAC, 56-57. For an excellent introduction
to this aspect of Irving's thought, see Graham W. P. McFarlane, Christ and the Spirit: The Doctrine of
the Incarnation According to Edward Irving (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1996)
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TCF, 101, based on Romans 8:3 and 2 Corinthians 5:21. C.f. Gunton, 'Two Dogmas Revisited', 366
and Harry Johnson, The Humanity of the Saviour: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Human
Nature ofChrist in Relation to Original Sin, with Special Reference to its Soteriological Significance
(London: Epworth Press, 1962), 194. For a recent treatment on the vagueness of the term 'fallen' with
respect to the flesh of Christ, see Kelly M. Kapic, 'The Son's Assumption of a Human Nature: A Call




of Jesus is accomplished humanly in time.'" The Spirit enables Christ to have an
active sinlessness. The Spirit "maintains and empowers the human activity" of
Jesus.84
(v) Gunton ties this pneumatological action into his understanding of transcendence
and immanence. From Edward Irving, he develops a transcendent and personal
conception of the Spirit, wherein Christ's sinlessness is a free personal response to a
personal other, as opposed to a "programmed outcome of an immanent
oc
directionality." The Spirit's action here is also a particularising action, and so
8<S
paradigmatic of the Spirit's work throughout the cosmos. Jesus Christ is not simply
87the Word made flesh, but made this particular flesh. The life of Christ is a
particular life, "enabled by the (transcendent) Spirit rather than determined by the
(immanent) word."88 The point of all this is to affirm that Christ becomes perfect,
becomes sinless, through the whole of his ministry.89 In other words, the work of the
Spirit guarantees that Christ's is a real human (and so personal) existence.90 To
understand this, Gunton uses the metaphor of space with which he describes the
reality afforded to the created order in its relationship with the triune God. Therefore
to talk of the genuine humanity (and fallenness) of Christ's human nature, is to talk
of the "space" needed for the "freedom, particularity and contingency" of the
82
CAC, 50. My italics. C.f. TTT, 115
83
1AA, 106. C.f. TTT, 161 and CAC, 53, nl3 and 57. As such, there is obviously a connection with
the doctrine of Atonement as a recapitulation. (Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992), 41)
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88
Gunton, 'Two Dogmas Revisited', 369-370. My italics. There is more on Irving's pneumatological
transcendence and christological immanence on 374. C.f. PTT, 68 and OTM, 182
86
CAC, 59. C. f. TAA, 167
87 Colin E. Gunton, 'Salvation', in John Webster (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 143-158, (citation, 153). C.f. TCF, 100; PTT, 69 and
TTT, 114
88
PTT, 70. CAC, 52
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TCF, 103 and 105. The alternative position is obviously to attempt to hold to both the sinlessness
and true humanity of Christ. For a thoughtful version of this argument, with some criticisms of
Irving's argument, see Donald MacLeod, 'The Doctrine of the Incarnation in Scottish Theology:
Edward Irving', Scottish Bulletin ofEvangelical Theology, 9:1 (1991), 40-50 and idem. The Person of
Christ (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1998). Gunton describes such a position as one in which Jesus
Christ "can only be the redeemer if his perfection is guaranteed in advance, only, that is, if his flesh is
in effect that of unfallen Adam." (CAC, 51)
90
For an example of the thorough connection Gunton makes between Pneumatology and Christology,
see IAA, 80
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humanity of Jesus.91 Finally, this pneumatological emphasis within Christology
contributes to Gunton's understanding of the universality of the Atonement. The
Floly Spirit is "the source of Jesus' self-giving humanity, and that same spirit which
enables believers to share in the one reordering sacrifice."92 As we shall see in the
next chapter, the work of the Spirit is the applying of the benefits of Christ to the
believer in terms of Ecclesiology93 (creation of the community which is the Church)
and Providence.
(C) Critique
(i) There is one particular aspect of Gunton's close connecting of Christology and
Pneumatology that has raised difficulties, and this is the fact that present tense divine
action is seen almost exclusively in pneumatological terms. Paul D. Molnar has made
this complaint with regard to Gunton's understanding of the Incarnation.94 For
Molnar, Gunton's theology is not so much redressing a balance between
christological and pneumatological action (which is how Gunton perceives his own
argument) as forcing an imbalance in favour of Pneumatology. Molnar has two
distinct issues with Gunton's thought; "(1) he argues that Jesus' significance derives
equally from his humanity; and (2) he argues that the Spirit rather than the Word is
the source of Jesus' authentic humanity."95 Gunton is in danger of over-emphasising
the humanity of Christ at the cost of his nature as the Word incarnate, and in so
91
PTT, 70. My italics. C.f. Gunton, 'The End of Causality?', 79. In the same way we see Gunton
praising the thoroughly trinitarian framework which he is adopting from Irving. (Gunton, 'Two
Dogmas Revisited', 362-364) As Jim Purves puts it, Irving sees Jesus Christ as "the predicate of the
Triune God's dynamic involvement with humankind in and through the Incarnation, as Father, Son
and Holy Spirit." (Jim Purves, 'The Interaction of Christology and Pneumatology in the Soteriology
of Edward Irving', Pneuma, 14:1 (1992), 81-90, (citation, 83)). C.f. I. McFarland, 'Christ, Spirit and
Atonement', MOST, 3:1 (2001), 83-93, (citation, 87). C.f. Ibid. 93. Thomas G. Weinandy makes a
similar argument on the enabling of Christ by the Spirit, but without discussing the nature of this
enabling. (Thomas G. Weinandy, In the Likeness ofSinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity ofChrist
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993), 150)
92 Colin E. Gunton, 'Christ the Sacrifice: Aspects of the Language and Imagery of the Bible', in L. D.
Hurst and N. T. Wright (eds.) The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in Christology in
Memory ofGeorge Bradford Caird (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 229-238, (citation, 238)
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Gunton, 'The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices', 22
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95 Ibid. 282
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doing, he runs the risk of separating the action of the Word and Spirit both in his
Christology and in other aspects of his theology.96
Gunton understands the obedient life of Jesus to be something he humanly achieved
through his enabling by the Spirit as the transcendent other. Molnar perceives this
obedience on such an understanding then to be something only traceable to the Spirit
and the humanity of Christ, to the extent that the Spirit and Word are being played
against each other.97 Following Barth, Molnar argues that the Incarnation is always
an action of the Word, who remains the subject of the Incarnation; for him this is a
point that Gunton constantly omits or at least plays down.98 For instance, he asks
why must the work of the Word, when seen outside of a pneumatological framework,
be understood as a divine programming? Why can we not instead acknowledge the
enabling action of the Spirit without resorting to an explanation of how this can be
the case?99
In Gunton's defence, the present author is by no means certain that Gunton ever
attempts to answer the question of how this is the case, either. The solution is to
realise whose enabled human activity we perceive in the Incarnation. For Gunton, in
Christ there is one personal action, which is simultaneously that of the Word and of
the human nature of Jesus.100 The work of the Spirit therefore is to enable "the
human activity of the Incarnate Son.,,m Nonetheless, it is certainly true that this
point is not adequately emphasised, as a cursory glance at our treatment of his
Pneumatology in this chapter will make clear. In the same way, it is this inadequate
emphasis that leads Molnar to his criticisms of Gunton's Soteriology. In particular,
Molnar again seems to think that Gunton underplays the significance of the action of
the Son in the atoning death of Christ;
96 Ibid. 282
97 Ibid. 282
9S Ibid. 284. He quotes Barth on this point, from CD, 1/2, 134, on 285
99 Ibid. 285
100
95^ nl32, based on an argument of P. T. Forsyth
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Is it because of Jesus' free obedience, even as enabled by the Spirit, that
redemption is achieved? Or is it because the offering he made to the Father
was an offering made by the Son of God himself in the flesh?'"2
The answer is, of course, both. Whereas, for Molnar, Gunton has "to a certain extent"
overplayed the enabled human action and downplayed the divine action we perceive
in Christ, such that Jesus becomes "a passive object who does little more than
illustrate for us certain human features that are attributed to the action of the Spirit
rather than the Word."103 This criticism does not hold water when this human action
is understood to be that ofthe Word made flesh.
(ii) So far, we have seen that Fermer's critique of Gunton and Zizioulas has moved
from trinitarian theology per se, to its wider application to the theology of creation.
However, Fermer is also deeply concerned with the implications of their theologies
for the theological understanding of personhood. Fermer argues that the Cappadocian
concept of hypostasis is precise and useful in its simplicity, but it is doubtful as to
whether this term can be translated as person.104 Hence Gunton's/Zizioulas' attempt
to rebaptise the term person as hypostasis, must come under scrutiny. Is the term firm
enough to avoid an influx of ideologies (Mackey), and is it sufficient for a definition
of human personhood?105 Fermer wishes to be more precise and distinguishes
between the terms 'person' and 'personal', and so propounds a theological formula
"one being, three personal subsistences."106 Why should one use the term personal?
Because it allows one to refer to "the ability to have intentional mental states, to be
able to relate to another person or personal existence in a dialogical manner, but
without reverting to the language of consciousness."107 This is essential because "not
all the psychological properties of human persons can be transposed to the divine
nature" and yet God is personal, especially in that he can enter into relationships with
persons.108 For Fermer, to be a person is to be corporeal.109 The question then, is the
1(12
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extent to which Gunton's (and Zizioulas') conception of personhood is viable with
regard to humans. Fermer isolates two distinct motifs in the theologies of personhood
as put forward by Gunton/Zizioulas. These are "(i) that a person is a hypostasis, a
unique, particular existence; and (ii) that persons are constituted by their
relations."110
On this first motif, Fermer is clear as to the difficulties in Gunton's scheme. He
argues that Gunton uses the transcendental of "substantiality" as equivalent to
hypostasis, except that the former has some non-trinitarian applications.111 Fermer's
criticism is quite simply that talk of uniqueness is uninformative and tells us very
little about the human person."2 In terms of human personhood, the properties of
uniqueness, distinctness and particularity "appears deeply impersonal", indeed,
Fermer asks what it is that distinguishes the hypostasis of the person from the
hypostasis of a stone?113
Fermer moves on to discuss the concept of personhood as relational, and queries
whether this also can be expressed meaningfully. Fermer rightly points out that
certain relational concepts of personhood can be inherently circular whereupon it
becomes difficult to determine who or what is doing the relating. Here, the issue is
how these relationships can arise in the first place.114 Moreover, Fermer is concerned
to elucidate the contributions of our specifically human nature to personhood as
understood by Gunton and Zizioulas.115 He asks "what is it about relationality which
confers personhood, as opposed to the status of an animal or inanimate object which
are also relational entities?"116 In short, Fermer is concerned with the implications of
Gunton's/Zizioulas' scheme for anthropology, in that he perceives "a downgrading
of the common human capacities and nature which is part of the "what" and "who"
which allows one to enter into relationships in the first place. Are not our common
Ibid. 179, n86
110 Ibid. 179







human nature and capacities, although not a sufficient definition of the concept of
personhood, vital constituents?"117
The first brief response we must make is on this question of uniqueness and
hypostatic nature. It is clear that Gunton does in fact affirm creaturely particularities,
and utilises at least two transcendentals (particularity and substantiality) in his
discussion. What is particular and unique therefore is each individual (and yet
relational!) person. But is this really so vague and uninformative? Zizioulas has
argued somewhat convincingly that this is not the case, and with some reservations
that we shall adumbrate, his argument is very similar to that of Gunton. On a
relational and particular understanding of personhood, the particular emerges as
being itself, and does not depend for its identity on common qualities, but solely
through a relationship that constitutes it as an ontological ingredient. This results in a
communal existence in which each particular is affirmed as unique and irreplaceable
118
through relationships with other personal particulars. The point here is quite
simply that personhood is about uniqueness.119 To make this argument appropriate to
Gunton's thought and our purposes, we have to make a distinction (which Zizioulas
is apparently less concerned with) between the person as particular and unique, and
the person as a relational entity. The person as a hypostatic result of being-through-
communion is distinguished as unique apart from all classifiable properties. This is
because "what matters ontologically is not 'what' one is but the very fact that he or
she is and not someone else,"120 However, and this brings us on to Fermer's second
objection, as personal and relational, Gunton makes it clear that relationality does
involve classifiable and common properties and qualities.
To move onto Fermer's second point therefore, he is correct to insist that a concept
of human personhood involves what we might refer to as empirically verifiable
human attributes. Indeed, Gunton appreciates this and states explicitly a degree of
parallelism between inanimate and human hypostasis, which parallelism is the result
117 Ibid. 182
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of, for instance, similar spatiotemporal, physical, (bio)chemical processes. This
informs our understanding of what Gunton calls the horizontal relationality of
creatures, and of course in the case of humans, uniquely human capacities will
inform our understanding of horizontal human relationality.121 Human uniqueness,
and this seems to be lacking in Fermer's critique, centres on the imago Dei, and is
founded and maintained "by virtue of the creating and redeeming agency of the
triune God."122 In other words, it is due to a unique form of vertical relationality that
uses creaturely horizontal relationality, as we can see by the fact that the image is
eschatological and directed by divine action towards perfection.12,
(iii) Gunton's concept of the created order as a project undergoing perfection through
the action of the two hands of God is central to his theology. However, it is not
without difficulties. In the next chapter we will find that he regards the enabling of
the creature to praise the Creator to be an example of proleptic perfection.
Nonetheless, Gunton is somewhat vague as to what perfection is, and how it is being
achieved in the present. Many readers will also have difficulty with his universalism,
which represents an optimism with regard to human activity, which might be
perceived to downplay the seriousness of sin and its consequences. However, it is
really Gunton's understanding of the present consequences of sin which are
particularly significant. He himself admits to a potentially Pelagian view of human
sin and perfecting124, and it is certainly the case that his theology takes little account
of how our ongoing sinfulness can affect the reinaugurated eschatology of the natural
order. Moreover, he not only lacks a thorough treatment of moral evil, but this is also
the case for physical evil. What is the connection between suffering and the final
destiny of the natural order? He has fleetingly intimated that suffering and disorder
may be due in part to the unfinished nature of the project of creation, but this does
121
However, Edward Russell has argued, with some justification, that Gunton's theology does not
adequately treat of these horizontal contributions to human personhood. (Edward Russell,
'Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assessment of John Zizioulas' Theological
Anthropology', IJOST, 5:2 (2003), 168-186, (citation, 184)
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not clarify whether or not suffering has a place within the ongoing perfecting of the
created order, as it does within Irenaeus' understanding of the project of creation.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have covered a great deal of theological ground, much of what at
least in its detailed lineaments is not immediately applicable to a dialogue with
science. What is applicable however, are the suggestions Gunton provides for how to
envisage the work of the two hands of the Father as guaranteeing but also in a sense
restoring the createdness (and so the true identity) of the natural order. The world is
characterised theologically as a created project with an eschatological destiny. This
projective nature is very much essential to its created identity, because it signifies the
world's intrinsic purpose and reality, and provides the context for the divine action-
in-relation that through Atonement and sanctification/perfection restores the world to
its eschatological orientation, and fulfils that orientation in ultimate perfection. A
second important aspect of Gunton's discussion is the naturalness of divine action-
in-relation here. The two hands model illustrates beautifully the continuing and
active nature of the God-world relationship, mediated by the Son and Spirit of God.
We have already seen that this thwarts Deism and Pantheism, but we now see that
the gratuity of the act of creation does not mean that the act is somehow alien to God,
or that it involves some form of kenosis or self-limitation. Moreover, it does not
threaten but again confirms the intrinsic identity of the natural order. The naturalness
of the Incarnation, as an element within the perfection of the world and not just its
redemption or repair, and the perfecting of the divine love by the Spirit as a
'naturalising' of action-in-relation, demonstrates that all divine action contributes to
the world's perfecting and so maintains and upholds the createdness of the world.
There is no competitiveness or contrasting within the God-world relationship
because the world finds its intrinsic reality - its createdness - guaranteed and guided
towards perfection through the work of the two hands. Through this work there is a
'space' for the world, with its own contingent reality that can be explored through the
natural sciences.
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Chapter 4: Divine Action-in-Relation (II) - The Doctrine of the Church
and the Doctrine of Providence
Introduction
In this final chapter on Gunton's theology we come to his discussions of concrete
divine action-in-relation. His Ecclesiology and doctrine of Providence take forward
much of what we examined in the previous chapter, and in particular the thoroughly
trinitarian framework of christological and pneumatological action and his
characteristic emphasis on securing the createdness of the natural order. A discussion
of Gunton's doctrine of the Church enables us to go into the perfecting work of the
Spirit in more detail, both as an eschatological and a proleptic action. We also find
more detail on how the action of the Word and Spirit hold together. On the other
hand, his doctrine of Providence provides an opportunity for us to discuss the more
technical theological and philosophical aspects of divine action, especially with
regard to the natural order as the divine project.
(A) Human Being-as—Communion: The Church as the Work ofGod
It might seem surprising to include a treatment of Gunton's Ecclesiology in a thesis
that is ostensibly orientated to an issue at the science-theology interface. However,
we would argue that it is in fact of vital significance. This is because in Gunton's
theology the doctrine of the Church contains his most extensive treatment of the
conditions of the eschatological perfection of the created order. The Church, because
of its nature as a community of persons and the human culture it enacts, exists in
those conditions of perfection for the whole of creation. It is where we find the
context for the restored image of God - a dynamic of life and worship.1 However, all
of this is due to trinitarian action-in-relation, and in Gunton's theology the Church is




doctrine of the Church is important because it provides the greatest context for
understanding the relationship between divine action and createdness.
(i) The Church is the context in which the universality of the Atonement is
particularised through the action of the Holy Spirit.2 In other words, "we attribute to
the Holy Spirit the distinctive action of not so much a general "applying" of the
benefits of Christ as a "particularising" in the present of the blessings, mediated
through Christ, of the world to come."3 We are dealing in fact with a perfecting of
the work of Christ through "its realisation in time by the work of the Spirit who
brings particular people into the community of the reconciled."4 In short, Gunton is
arguing for a present tense divine action-in-relation, at a concrete locus. It is this
emphasis on concreteness that allows Gunton to argue that the work of the Spirit is
not 'otherworldly'; on the contrary, he argues that the Spirit "reproduces the
movement of God into not out of time."5
(ii) The action of the Spirit is to enable aspects of the present created order to
prefigure the world to come, and so to become what they are intended to be. This
finds a concrete locus in the worshipping action, and the relational existence of the
Church community. In terms of worship, Gunton is specifically, but not exclusively,
referring to the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, the latter being
described as the gift ofperfected creation.6 The Church is therefore "the place where
the goodness of the creator and the creation are faithfully celebrated."7 The
sacraments are eschatological acts "whereby the whole created order is taken up, by
anticipation, into the praise of the creator."8 For Gunton, any human activity, any
form of culture, is at least potentially capable of worshipping God, and so finding a
2TAA, 170
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Gunton, 'The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices', 223-224. Gunton can also refer to this as a perfecting of
the work ofChrist, where perfecting equates to particularising. (TCF, 164)
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proleptic perfection. As such, the worship of the Church, another aspect of human
culture, is not unique.9 Moreover, as human culture, this human agency is enabled by
the Spirit. This is the point of the term inspiration,10 The same is true of the
communal nature of ecclesial life. This is an eschatological existence in which there
is authentic freedom as a gift of the Spirit." This is achieved by the reorientation of
creation to created otherness-in-relation, through the formation of communities in
which human particulars (persons) can exist as "distinctively and particularly
themselves."12 Therefore Gunton can say that the "Church is a community, not a
collective."13 In other words, the Church exhibits in anticipatory form the nature
which human being-in-relation is intended to be.
(iii) For Gunton, the nature of the Church must be seen as something that is
historically conditioned but also only realised in the here and now. If the Church is
merely an institution, then it is a threat to human freedom.14 True freedom is found in
community, in the free relatedness of persons, whereas an institution exists
independently of and "logically prior to the persons who become part of it."15 We
must then focus on the present tense action of the Spirit, who as the transcendent
Lord creates community by bringing men and women to the Father through Jesus
Christ.16 Because this is the action of the transcendent Lord, we see the prevenience
of the Spirit. Because this is the act of the transcendent Lord, there is no danger of
identifying the Church with the Spirit. The alternative is to see the Spirit as the
9 Ibid. 50. In worship (and in culture, suitably enabled by God), we find "creation's eschatological
orientation restored." (FSH, 122). We might also note that Gunton is here affirming the divine
prevenience and so the sovereignty of divine action. He makes this especially clear when he argues
that culture (and so we might imagine the rest of the created order) is never outside the over-ruling
power of God, and is in fact allowed to a potentially destructive course. (Ibid. 121)
10 Colin E. Gunton, 'Pneumatology', in Paul Barry Clarke and Andrew Linzey (eds.) Dictionary of
Ethics, Theology and Society (London: Routledge, 1996), 644-677, (citation, 647). C.f. TCF, 51.
Gunton can therefore speak positively of religious and non-religious human culture insofar as it can
worship God through the activity of the Spirit. Gunton can go so far as to say that it would not be













motive power for an already extant institution.17 This is not to deny that Church is an
institution, insofar as it is a reality historically founded by the Son of God.18
However, just as the Son institutes the Church and gives it "immanent historical
existence", so in the present the Spirit constitutes it.19 More precisely, the Spirit
achieves this by enabling our acts of worship;
The Spirit is the institution's transcendent Lord, reconstituting the Church by
calling into it new members and constituting it anew in each act of
worship.20
As such, the Church is the eschatological community through the performing of these
acts of worship, because here we are "positioned in the realm of the eschatological
kingdom while we live in created time and space."21 This duality of divine action in
Ecclesiology is characteristic of all divine action for Gunton. For him, all
pneumatological action can be understood as constitutive, whereas christological
action is institutionary,22 Hence, Gunton can say of pneumatological action that it is
an action "which is over and above the past action of the Son, though it is oriented to
17 Ibid. 13. C.f. Gunton, 'The Spirit in the Trinity', 127
18TTL, 12
19 Ibid. 13
20 Ibid. 17. C. f. Ibid. 15-16 and PTT, 82-83
21 Colin E. Gunton, "Until He Comes': Towards an Eschatology of Church Membership', IJOST, 3:2
(2001), 187-200, (citation, 198). C.f. TCF, 122
22 The reference to the past action of the Word indicates one of the main problems with Gunton's
doctrine of divine action, which we have already briefly discussed in the previous chapter. There is a
definite blind spot in Gunton's theology with regard to present tense action of the Word.
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there is definite continuity with Gunton's concept of the image of God.
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(B) God in Action: The Doctrine ofProvidence
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Our discussion of Gunton's Ecclesiology demonstrates that divine action-in-relation
must always be discussed as trinitarian - as the action of Word and Spirit. Divine
action-in-relation again must always be discussed in its eschatological nature, as that
which perfects the natural order and so confirms its createdness. Therefore, although
the Church cannot exist without the work of the two hands of the Father, it does not
represent the annihilation of human existence. On the contrary, because it is an
eschatological (anticipatory) community of redeemed human existence then
createdness is actually in a sense fulfilled. What remains now is to explore in more
detail how Gunton understands divine action-in-relation and created action to be
related, such that createdness is secured and fulfilled.
(i) The context of a discussion of Providence or divine action for Gunton involves
two motifs we have already encountered. First, we must keep in mind the God-world
relationship, because the world can only become what it is meant to be by God's
creating, reconciling and perfecting actions. Second, we must also keep in mind the
space that Gunton argues is a part of this relationship, because God acts to enable the
world to be itself. Divine action therefore is centred on the God-world relationship
and all that it entails, and hence we refer to it as action-in-relation.24 The relevance of
this for Gunton is seen in a very early treatment of Process Theology, in which the
action aspect of action-in-relation is perceived to be missing. Here he argues that for
the God of Process, initiative "can only be secondary to God's essentially passive
role as a cosmic memory. And there is reason to believe that the logic of the concept
actually precludes the taking of initiatives by God."25 This is because, strictly
speaking, it is only the abstract pole of God that acts as such. Thus Gunton can say of
Hartshorne's understanding of divine activity that;
24IAA, 133
25 Colin E. Gunton, 'Process Theology's Concept of God: An Outline and Assessment', Expository
Times, 84 (1973), 292-296, (citation, 294)
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Instead of the unmoved mover, he has achieved the conception of an equally
ineffective deity: the moved unmover.26
Process theology rightly affirms the divine relationality, but as we have had reason to
point out already, this can be reduced to emanationism if there is not divine activity
as well.
(ii) Gunton is also insistent on the traditional motif of a distinction between creation
and Providence. Creation and Providence are distinguished because they represent
two different tenses of divine action. For Gunton, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo
refers to the past tense of createdness. What delimits this is the (present tense)
continuing action of God in upholding, directing and completing what was once
begun.27 Providential divine action is the divine action that acts towards the destiny
of the project of creation28; as such, it is not precisely the same action that creates.
There is no longer any creation ex nihilo, and so what is left is "simply what creator
and creature alike and together make of what has been made."29 We have seen
already that Gunton refuses to equate the concept of creation with an ongoing
dependence of the world upon God. He reiterates the point in particular if creation is
identified with Providence.30 As such, Gunton queries the need for a doctrine of
'continuous creation', suggesting that we should rather use concepts of Providence or
conservation.31 Here we do not see a continuation of the act of creation, but rather
"the continuation of God's creation through his disposing and ordering presence
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(iii) Creation and Providence are not to be identified, but neither are they to be
radically distinguished. For Gunton, this latter point seems to be based on both the
identity of the agent, and the purpose behind the action. We have already
encountered this in Gunton's insistence that the Incarnation and the work of the
Spirit are not to be understood as interventions into created order. Moreover, because
the created order is a project, or God's work of art, we know that all divine action is
orientated towards its perfection. In principle, therefore, Providence involves no new
concepts.33 There is continuity between the divine action in the Incarnation and in
General Providence.34 Therefore, we can also talk of the Spirit as the "upholder of
the everyday", whilst maintaining that he is the eschatological agent of perfection.35
The Spirit "thus both shapes the interacting fields of force that are the universe and is
the one who realises those particular surges of divine activity which call created
•5/r
beings back from destruction and on to their course to perfection."
(iv) For Gunton, the action of Christ - in obedience to the Father and in the power the
Spirit makes actual in him - is providence in constitutive and definitive action. The
created order is a world that can only achieve its final perfection through the death of
the mediator of creation upon the cross. Christ is the exemplar of all divine action
then "as those acts which enable the world to become itself by action within, and
over against, its fallen structures." God's providence limits evil, and the cross is the
climax of God's providence/9 However, at the same time, Gunton affirms the divine
sovereignty40 and omnipotence41 as expressed through the act of creation. How are
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The solution lies in understanding who is acting, and who is powerful. Creation is
not an act of unbridled power, it is the power of the God and Father of Jesus Christ,
and as such is power exercised in mediation, through the two hands of the Father.42
This is exemplified in the Incarnation. Here, the Son of God in the power of the
Spirit demonstrates a capacity to enter into the world and interact with it, "perfecting
rather than constraining, or rather constraining its structures from within, according
to their particular being."43 For Gunton, this is power as freedom, powerful enough
to conform itself to the needs of the object for its own sake and that of the Creator.44
The divine freedom and sovereignty are distinguished because God's creative act
arises out of love, from the love that God is eternally, and then that same love
moving out of itself to make creatures which are valuable and good for their own
sake.45
Connected with this point is Gunton's discussion of the divine attributes of
impassibility and immutability. Divine impassibility does not preclude divine
suffering, but it precludes what Gunton perceives as divine passivity in the event of
the Cross.46 So whilst Gunton affirms that the Father does suffer the giving up, the
sacrifice of his Son, this is voluntary suffering 47 The Son also suffers, but even here
the Son is not passive. The Cross is something achieved, it is "the Father's relentless
action in shaping history to his reconciling will."48 If this is not the case, then the
cross is not a saving action of God, but is instead something that happens to him.49 In
the same way, to understand the divine self-limitation (kenosis) that occurs in the
Incarnation we must turn to the divine immutability. What happens in Christ must be
seen in terms of the divine faithfulness and trustworthiness. If the Incarnation and in
particular the event of the Cross, are seen as limitations or impositions upon the
divine being, then as Irenaeus pointed out, these are themselves to be seen as
42 Ibid. 18
43 Ibid. 18-19
44 Ibid. 18-19. The kenosis involved in the Incarnation is that represented in Phil 2: 6-11, rather than a
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49 Ibid. 88
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divine.50 Where this is the case, the human flesh of Christ, or those human historical
events that led up to the Crucifixion lose their creaturely reality.
(v) Our understanding of divine action-in-relation must maintain a concept of
prevenience and avoid a competitive co-ordination of divine and creaturely reality.
This is impossible for Deism and Pantheism, because "[i]n the former there are no
longer any causes and in the latter any secondary causes."51 For Pantheism,
secondary causes are at best "opportunities and passive instruments for the workings
of God."52 For Deism, the primary cause is restricted entirely to the act of creation,
and "totally excluded in the case of the "willing" (yelle) and the doing (/hcere)".53
The solution is to argue that, just as the God-world relationship does not divide up
reality between God and the world, so activity is not divided up between God and
creaturely causality. Therefore "the same effect is totally the effect of the primary
cause as well as totally the effect of the proximate cause."54 There is only creaturely
reality and causality because of the prevenience of divine action-in-relation. Gunton,
however, is unhappy with the language of primary and secondary causality. He
acknowledges that the concept is intended to express the reality and efficacy of
creaturely action, and so to avoid the perception of providential divine action as
necessitarian. In other words, its function is to avoid the assumption that the only
reality and action is divine. However, Gunton seems to feel that secondary causation
is symptomatic of a loss of mediation within the concept of divine action. For him, it
reveals an underlying competitive understanding; therefore it can be too strong and
so deistic, or too weak, and so pantheistic.55 This is of course a competitive co¬
ordination of the action of God and the world. This is not the case if we focus on the
prevenience of divine action-in-relation as the two hands of God. In and through
divine action-in-relation, the world is granted space for its own activity, the space
between God and the world being bridged by the two hands ofGod.
50
CAC, 87, nl5. For more on the trinitarian structuring of divine immutability in Gunton's thought,
see 'Trinity and Trustworthiness', 281-2
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(vi) Divine action-in-relation constantly enables and supports creaturely action, but it
also brings the world towards its eschatological perfection. Therefore, we must be
open to the possibility of divine action occasionally supervening on lawlike
creaturely action in order to make provision for the ultimate destiny of things, and
some of these will be miracles.56 Nonetheless, Gunton is adamant that miracles in
particular are not to be understood as interventionist. To make this point, Gunton
relies on three related ideas. The first of these is the prevenience of divine action-in-
relation. All patterns of creaturely energy flow from the giving of divine energy, and
so "who is to rule out surges of energy which anticipate the eschatological perfection
of the creation in a way which usual patterns of causality cannot achieve?"57 The
second principle is to see all divine action-in-relation, including miracles, in a
perfecting role. This enables the world to be what it was created to be, and so
t 58
realising the creator's purposes in advance. Third and finally, we must see
creaturely action and reality from its own eschatological perspective, because this
reinterprets how we define the normal functioning of the world. A miracle is a form
of compelling, because it is an anticipatory perfection of the world, but "it takes
place in order to overcome creation's bondage, not to force its normal reality out of
place."59 Only evil is violated on such an understanding. This is why Providence is to
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(vii) Gunton is trying to find a balance within the doctrine of Providence that "allows
for both the orderedness and even determination of things 'from above' and their
granting of a proper reality which enables themselves to be truly themselves."61
Using a concept from John Ireland, Gunton finds an analogy to this relationship in
that of a poet to his or her own poetry or a composer's to a piece of music.62
Therefore, the kind of model we require is that of playwright or poet, because "a
great playwright will 'create' characters which then to an extent create themselves.
They take on their own life within the imagination of the author."63 Moreover, they
do it in the present tense. Gunton also finds this analogy conducive to describing the
divine awareness of future events. This is to be understood in the sense of a poet
holding simultaneously in his mind the temporally structured poem which he has
been presented with by the muse. In this way we may still speak of the world
throughout its history being simultaneously present to God, without resorting to the
additional motif of divine atemporality.64
(viii) One of the most difficult aspects of a discussion of divine action, is that of the
divine awareness or otherwise of future events. The main difficulty here is that of
divine foreknowledge and creaturely freedom, in that the former is difficult to
dissociate from the notion of determinism. The image that the idea produces is that of
an all seeing eye, looking over all things from above. This is a far cry from the
suggested closeness and mediation of the two hands of God.65 However, and this is a
very revealing comment, for Gunton some such scheme cannot be avoided if we are
not to read temporality directly back into God, which as we have already seen is
unacceptable.66 How then do we avoid determinism if we are to maintain a sense of
the divine omniscience? For Gunton, the solution lies in emphasising once again the
purposive nature of Providence. In other words, "we should consider providence not
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in its meaning of seeing in advance but as providing for."67 This of course finds
parallels in Gunton's treatment of Election, in which he attempts to get away from
the idea of a divine determinism by focusing on the present tense nature of electing
/TO
divine action.
(ix) One alternative is to accept Gunton's point on the affinity between the concept
of foreknowledge and determinism, and to advocate a divine temporality
accordingly. For J. R. Lucas, only divine temporality can guarantee human freedom.
The alternative is a "theological determinism", wherein divine omniscience is
understood to involve a complete and infallible knowledge inclusive of future
events.69 This is incompatible with human freedom70, because if God knows what we
are going to do, we cannot help doing it.71 This is not to be coupled necessarily with
a divine predetermination of all events, because the concept of foreknowledge is
72
enough to show that our actions are necessitated. Therefore, for the divine
temporality, as with creaturely temporality, only the present instant is present to God,
and therefore God's omniscience excludes future contingents "which are not yet
there, so to speak, to be known".73 God knows all that can be known of temporal
reality.74 To this end, Lucas is concerned to show that human freedom may be causal
in what happens to us, but it is also a question of favourable circumstances.75 This
means we can talk causally of human decisiveness whilst also ascribing other causes
to these actions, including God.76
67 Ibid. 191
68 30 gee note 22 of this chapter. Gunton himself makes this connection explicitly when he
argues that God's actions in history are involvements with particular individuals. (Ibid. 29)
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70 Ibid. 74
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Lucas, The Future, 220. This qualifier is important, because what can be known is not the same as
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reality at a given instant. (Lucas, 'The Temporality ofGod', 239)
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76 Ibid. 7
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Lucas claims no difficulty whatsoever in ascribing to God the kind of divine action
which we might call General Providence - i.e. the creation of a rational order, the
sending of rain, etc. God must certainly be seen to be active in his creation.77
Nonetheless, although Lucas does not rule out divine intervention and episodes of
divine guidance, there is certainly the tendency to see such activity as almost
unnecessary,78 This would again appear to be under the rubric of General
Providence. Lucas can thus say that we can get a manifestation of divine goodness
without a detailed divine ordering of the situation, because of the innate properties of
the created order.79 Lucas also argues that God limits his own omnipotence and
omniscience "in order that his creatures may have room to make their own
decisions".80 Thus, regardless of the question of whether God as a temporal being
can have complete foreknowledge (which might not be regarded as a self-limitation,
81 ....but as a necessary one ), we have the moral argument for a limited divine
knowledge. God has only "fallible belief'82 about our actions, and so divine action
must always be responsive to free creaturely action.S3 Moreover, there is a moral
argument for a limited divine omnipotence; genuine human freedom entails that God
restrains himself from a detailed ordering of events. The divine action is the action
of "a deeply compromised God."85 As Lucas puts it, in creating God sacrifices the
o/r
absolute supremacy of the divine being; "To create is to abrogate."
The strength of Lucas' position on divine temporality is identical with that of Paul
Helm on divine atemporality. Both of them make an explicit claim about the divine
(a)temporality, and so can make a direct connection with the divine perception of
temporal events. Lucas' position, however, does make divine and creaturely freedom
contrastive. With this in mind, it is very tempting to argue that Lucas' discussion of
divine temporality is symptomatic of this contrastive approach. A temporal
77 Ibid. 9
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79 Ibid. 230
80
Lucas, Freedom and Grace, 37. My italics
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82 Ibid. 222
83 Divine action can only be responsive ifGod is temporal. (Lucas, 'The Temporality ofGod', 236)
84 Ibid. 229
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interpretation of divine eternity assumes that the divine eternity and creaturely
temporality are on the same ontological plane, just as with a more explicitly deistic
o7
scheme. Gunton's approach is more traditional, in that he affirms creaturely
freedom in and through divine freedom, and so God and the creature are neither
identified nor opposed. The established freedom of the creature "is based upon that
oo
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partnership which God has instituted." The problem with Lucas' position and
similar ones is quite simple;
The sad upshot is that those who laud man's autonomy cannot do justice to
God's freedom, to man's condition and need, to God's provision in Christ.89
To argue for divine temporality is to argue for too close a connection between time
and eternity, and as a consequence to affirm a competitive understanding of the God-
world relationship.
(x) Gunton's position on the issue of divine eternity does not advocate an
identification or contrast of eternity and temporality, nor does it devise an
understanding of the divine perception of time that is derived from one of these
positions. What Gunton's model cannot tell us is whether Gunton wishes to assert
that the future exists already for us. In other words, do we advocate space-time
ontological heterogeneity, and claim that only the present exists, or do we advocate
space-time ontological homogeneity, and claim that the past and present actually
exist, although we cannot perceive them? The evidence in Gunton's work is scanty,
but he seems to affirm the former. We argue in this way because of his connection
between foreknowledge and determinism;
87 Indeed for Irenaeus, divine omniscience must be maintained, because anything hidden from God
would represent a realm which is independent of Him, and therefore the realm of a second God. (Peter
Robert Forster, 'God and the World in Saint Irenaeus: Theological Reflections' (PhD Thesis,
University of Edinburgh, 1986), 44, quoting Adversus Haereses, IV. 19.3). This is especially the case
with regard to foreknowledge (Ibid.)
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The advantage of a conception of providence centring on act rather than
knowledge is that an action can be understood to leave room for the free
'space' between one thing and another. There are many ways of making
something happen without forcing it to do so.90
If this is the case, then Gunton is arguing for a divine perception of time that is in
contrast to the actual nature of creaturely temporality. However, this is not
problematic when we grasp that although God and creaturely temporality are neither
to be contrasted nor conflated, God is not within space-time. This seems to be a point
often overlooked at the science-theology interface, whereupon the divine perception
of space-time must be in accord with its actual physical nature. On such an
understanding, the divine perception of time as discussed by Gunton is more akin to
a 'block universe' or atemporal view of the created order. However, if the world is
understood to be temporal, and the divine knowledge is truthful knowledge of the
world, then "the divine knowledge must itself be atemporal."91 It is common enough
in the science - theology literature to find a temporal view of creation linked to a
divine self-limitation upon foreknowledge. This is certainly the case for John
Polkinghorne, who can argue typically in this fashion;
The future is brought into being as time evolves and it would seem that God,
knowing all that can be known, would nevertheless not yet know the
unformed future.92
Although this argument carefully avoids contrasting creaturely temporality with
divine eternity, it does seem to imply some form of identification, because it is
otherwise difficult to know why the divine perception must be restricted to current
physical understandings of temporality. Although Gunton only leaves us with
pointers towards his own understanding, it is clear that this tendency towards
identification is eliminated.
90TTC, 183-184




(xi) Our tentative interpretation ofGunton's understanding of the temporal process is
in accord with the notion of contingency; the non-necessity of given patterns of
world events. As such, we have "divine action which enables something to move
from an uncompleted or unsatisfactory present to a completion that is destined, but
not fully determined, in advance."93 This of course correlates with the nature of
divine action as it is revealed in the Incarnation.94 Gunton wants to argue that the
work of the Son and the Spirit in the person and life of Jesus demonstrates the
existence of true contingency but not chance within the created order. He explicitly
and unsurprisingly argues that there is nothing outside the divine ordering of the
world, but that this does not equate with determinism. Rather, the action of the Spirit
determines what kind of order there is or can be, because the Spirit's action is to
enable things to be themselves.95 We must think in terms of "the Son as the giver of
structure, and the Holy Spirit as the one who gives the world space to become within
but not apart from that structuring."96 The creature can then find the 'space' to be a
genuine, contingent, creature within and not apart from this divine economy.
(C) Critique
(i) Gunton's tendency towards a rather peremptory dismissal of opposing positions is
also problematic within his doctrine of Providence, and in particular within his
discussion of the issue of secondary causation. His concern here, as ever, is to ensure
that divine and creaturely realities are not treated competitively. This occurs when
the God-world relationship, and as a consequence divine action, is perceived to be
unmediated. Unfortunately, Gunton does not discuss in any detail who might be
guilty of this, and his solution is equally hurried. To make more sense of this, we can
very briefly address some criticisms made by Barth of the traditional doctrine of







For Barth, the difficultly for the doctrine of Providence does not lie in the usage of
the language of first and second causes, but in the wider tendency to treat the
doctrine in isolation from other aspects of theology;
In its whole doctrine of providence it spoke abstractly not only of the general
control of God over and with the creature, but of the control of a general and
in some sense neutral and featureless God, an Absolute. It spoke abstractly
of a neutral and featureless creature. It separated between world history and
salvation history.97
In other words, the doctrine lacks specifically Christian features, and it is in
discussing these that Barth can perhaps shed some light on Gunton's concerns.98
Barth argues that if the language of first and second cause is to be appropriate, then it
must avoid four great dangers, all of which it appears have to do with some form of
equalising of these causes. First, neither must be identified with natural causation.
Second, neither must be seen as analysable 'things' to be manipulated.99 Third,
'cause' must not be understood as a master-concept or common denominator
applicable to both God and creature. The divine and creaturely are utterly unlike as
acting subjects.100 Therefore there can be no analogia causae m Fourth, and this is
the consequence of these other three points, theology must not become a philosophy
in its discussion of 'cause'. Barth's alternative to these brings us to the heart of the
current problem; if we are to use the concept of cause at all, "its content and
interpretation must be determined by the fact that what it describes is the operation of
the Father of Jesus Christ in relation to that of the creature."102 Therefore,
concurrence must be seen in the wider light of the covenant of grace fulfilled in
Christ.103 Gunton argues that the concept of secondary causation lacked a notion of
mediation, but for Barth it is the more general issue of lacking a notion of the
mediator, Jesus Christ.
97 Barlh, CD, III/l, 100
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(ii) Gunton's understanding of divine action in Process Theology has been criticised
by David A. Pailin. He argues that Gunton's interpretation of divine action, based as
it is on a treatment of the thought of Charles Hartshorne, has fundamentally
misinterpreted Hartshorne's views on this subject.104 What makes this critique
important is not so much what it tells us about Gunton's thought, but what it tells us
about some of the tensions within Process Theology itself. Essentially, Pailin is
arguing that we must account for the abstract nature of God and the particular
concrete instantiation of some possible subset of this abstract nature. In Process
Theology "the nature of the divine existence does not entail that the divine actuality
must have the same formal properties."105 As a consequence of this "some actuality
must exemplify God's existence in some appropriate form."106 This means that God
is in principle omnipotent, unchanging, etc, in practice the actualisation of the divine
reality "is relative and changing according to what is the appropriate form of the
107divine for the present state of the processes of reality." God is therefore both active
and passive, and so on. Gunton has failed to take into account this dipolar theism,
and so assumes that the divine passivity, (i.e. the concretion of the abstract nature of
God which is both active and passive), is all there is to be said on the subject of
divine action.108 However, in Gunton's defence, Pailin then goes on to argue that the
concrete passivity of the divine being is not a particular instantiation of a divine
being which could be active. It follows from the logic of Pailin's argument that there
is no principle of unexercised, divine control! Norman Pittenger makes it clear that in
Process thought God "cannot, literally cannot, violate the freedom of the world,
although he can and does mould the world by the lure and enticement of his love to
the true and right fulfillment of its possibilities."109 The attenuated nature of divine
action in Process Thought is therefore not merely a particular instantiation of an
abstract nature that encompasses both activity and passivity. It is endemic, if we can
use this term non-pejoratively, to Process Thought as a whole.
1,14 David A. Pailin, God and the Processes of Reality: Foundations of a Credible Theism
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(iii) In the previous chapter we mentioned Molnar's critique of Gunton's
Christology, and noted his concerns for a real imbalance between Christology and
Pneumatology. Although we did not find his arguments persuasive with regard to
Christology, the same cannot be said for Gunton's wider conception of divine action,
and so we need to address this difficulty. Gunton's insistence on distinguishing roles
for the two hands of God has the benefit of preventing the roles of the Son and Spirit
from becoming merely arbitrary and potentially modalistic attributions, but this
becomes a double-edged sword when this can be (incorrectly, but understandably)
interpreted as divorcing these roles. As we have already noted, more effort than is
perhaps desired is required of a reader to grasp clearly that in his Christology Gunton
never divorces the action of the Word and the Spirit, and that he does not over-
privilege pneumatological action. This becomes even more pressing in other aspects
of his theology. For Gunton, revelation is a triune act, a function of the whole divine
economy.110 This is because it is a result of God making himself known through a
personal relationship with certain individuals at certain times, and also an enabling of
certain authors to describe these events in such a way that their writings (Scripture)
can become revelation for future generations.111 As such, Christ is uniquely
revelatory of God's action-in-relation; he is revelation.112 Scripture, on the other
hand, is made to be revelatory. This requires a genuinely eschatological
pneumatological action. For Gunton, the traditional understanding of the role of the
Spirit in revelation is simply to make revelation (whether as Christ or mediated
through Scripture) present. The Spirit becomes "the agent of the historicity of
revelation."113 Instead, if we are to properly appreciate the eschatological action of
the Spirit, we need to understand revelation to be the result of the Spirit's perfecting
action.114 This of course refers not only to the enabling of the authors of Scripture to
actually produce revelatory material, but also to the enabling of Scripture to be
revelatory in the present. Now we can hardly accuse Gunton's position of being
insufficiently pneumatological, but is it sufficiently christological? The aim of





112 Ibid. 53 and BTR, 112
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BTR, 118
114 Ibid. 120 and TCF, 53
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Scripture, and perhaps the humanity of Christ, such that both can be revelatory and
yet still creatures. However, Gunton's proposal does not distinguish between making
these revelatory and making them revelation. The latter is the case only through the
action-in-relation of the Word of God.
In response we might point to recent work by Douglas Farrow where he comes to a
number of the same conclusions as Gunton, but carefully demonstrates how the
doctrine of the Ascension is a necessary cornerstone for these arguments. Farrow
argues that unless we acknowledge the disturbing absence of Christ which the
Ascension represents then we cannot but fail to due justice to the person of Jesus and
the work of the Holy Spirit. The first difficulty comes from failing to perceive the
change that the Ascension represents for Christ. If we assume, with Barth, that
Christ's lordship is established in the Resurrection rather than in the Ascension, then
there is a real danger of Docetism.115 To make sense of the Ascension of Christ to the
right hand of the Father, we need a pneumatological emphasis.116 To understand
present tense divine action-in-relation, we must look to the Holy Spirit "who does not
in fact present himself but the absent /eras...This is the Spirit who through Word
and sacrament also unites us to the absent Jesus, so that it is we who are grasped or
seized, ,"117
Conclusion
This is possibly the most difficult chapter in our treatment of Gunton's theology. We
have had to massively compact his Ecclesiology, and his doctrine of Providence has
required even more reconstruction than the details of his view of the Last Things.
Nonetheless, this is not to say that Gunton is incoherent or inconsistent. It is rather
the fact that his Ecclesiology, like his doctrine of creation, is scattered over a large
area of his corpus, and his doctrine of Providence only receives extended treatment
115
Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia, 248. As Farrow points out, Gunton has criticised Barth on
precisely this point, and provides references for these criticisms.
116 Ibid. 249
117 Ibid. My italics
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in The Triune Creator and The Christian Faith. His Ecclesiology is perhaps most
interesting for tracing the influence of the projective view of creation, and also his
strong (and sometimes overly so) Pneumatology. His views on the nature of worship
and the sacraments are particularly significant due to his understanding of the nature
of human culture. Gunton's doctrine of Providence makes for rather difficult and
technical reading, especially as he explicitly or implicitly engages with philosophical
issues. However, his work here is never abstract in the way which Barth rightly
criticised certain formulations of this doctrine. This comes out loud and clear in his
strongly christological treatment of divine sovereignty and passibility. This doctrine
also makes for occasionally frustrating reading as we engage with the questions that
Gunton refuses to give concrete answers to, such as the temporal or otherwise nature
of the divine eternity. Nonetheless, for the present author at least, this modus
operandi does have the peculiar strength of giving Gunton's own treatment a
flexibility we do not find accompanying more ready answers.
The weaknesses here, apart from the need to reconstruct in large measure Gunton's
own views on certain issues, stem in part from the bugbears of his theology;
Pneumatology and his sometimes offhand treatment of alternative views. The former
comes out loud and clear in his understanding of the Church; the Spirit seems to be
almost totally responsible for present tense divine action in this respect. Now,
Gunton does make it clear that christological and pneumatological action are
involved, but the details of the action of the Son are scanty, except to argue that the
Church is formed around and by the Word. This is the same pattern we found in his
treatment of revelation; the Spirit does indeed unite us to Christ, but his theology on
the work of Christ in this and as a result of this need reconstruction. Gunton's
occasionally peremptory manner also comes out in this chapter; why for instance
reject the concept of secondary causality, when it can be interpreted as meaning
much the same as his own theology? Furthermore, as much as his theology of
Election is a welcome and constructive treatment of a difficult issue, the whole tenor
of his argument does seem to imply that his is the only alternative he recognises (or
is even aware of) to Double Predestination.
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Summary: Createdness in the Theology of Colin E. Gunton
The point of our exposition and critique of Gunton's theology is to derive a set of
inter-related theological motifs that are essential to the concept of the createdness of
the natural order. As we pointed out at the beginning, we are not suggesting that all
of these are somehow unique to Gunton's thought, but rather that his characteristic
development of some areas of theology (such as Irenaeus' idea of the creation as a
project) and the manner in which motifs are related to one another, is particularly
suited to our aims. In this summary we need to briefly identify these motifs, how
they relate to one another, and to determine which need further work in the final
section of this thesis ifwe are to be able to use them in the remainder of this thesis.
(i) The createdness or intrinsic reality of the natural order is ultimately dependent on
the nature of God. Only the God revealed in the Scriptures as the triune Creator can
create, redeem and perfect the natural order. Therefore, at the heart of Gunton's
scheme is the doctrine of the Trinity, understood as being-as-communion. Within this
Gunton argues that the personal relationships between the divine Persons entails a
giving ofspace to one another. From this in turn develops the motifs of the personal
relationship between God and the world and the personal space this entails. This
understanding of space is a description of the otherness between God and the world,
and is as such the basis of the intrinsic reality or createdness of the natural order.
This is only to be affirmed in and through an ongoing personal relationship between
God and the world. We need therefore to avoid Pantheism, understood directly or
reflexively via Deism. Moreover, although the concept of space is important, we must
avoid seeing the God-world relationship as a static co-ordination of two opposed
entities. Therefore, transcendence and immanence must not be understood to be
competitive. Gunton's solution is to see these as dynamic, and so to reinterpret them
as otherness and relation. Note the importance of divine freedom here; God's
transcendent freedom guarantees the space for creaturely freedom. We need also to
do justice to Gunton's problematic but ultimately helpful distinction between
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transcendence and immanence for the Son and Spirit. This is helpful not as a rigorous
distinction between the relationships of the Son and Spirit with the natural order, but
rather as a way of preventing immanence from becoming a general principle.
Immanence is most associated with Christ, whose presence in the natural order is
divinely initiated, and the Spirit is to be predominantly associated with the otherness
of God acting towards the natural order. Therefore, Gunton's discussion of divine
action is framed within the motif of action-in-relation. How do we maintain a
dynamic and personal understanding of the God-world relationship whilst
maintaining an adequate conception of personal space? The answer lies in two
motifs; the mediated nature of the God-world relationship and the model of the two
hands of God. This relationship is not pantheistic, because there is space between
God and the world, but neither does this space lapse into deistic separation, because
it is mediated by the two hands of God, who are themselves truly God. Without a
mediated view of the God-world relationship we cannot affirm createdness, because
either the world will be God or some aspect of the natural order (whether it be genes
or evolution or Newtonian space and time) will 'rise' to fill the void and effectively
take on a mediatorial role. Finally, because underlying all we have said so far is the
divine prevenience, we need to maintain an adequate conception of the divine
freedom through the doctrine ofthe Immanent Trinity.
(ii) The connection between divine freedom and createdness is expressed most
clearly in the doctrine of creation out ofnothing. Because this is not to be understood
in a deistic sense, Gunton sees this as the first tense in the God-world relationship,
leading on to the doctrine of Providence (the ongoing dependence of the world upon
God) and finally the eschatological perfection of the natural world. That brings us to
the heart of Gunton's doctrine of creation; the world as a perfectible project.
Although this has great implications for other aspects of Gunton's theology, the
immediate consequence is to bolster our understanding of the reality of the created
order by seeing it as intrinsically purposive. This is also secured through Gunton's
careful discussion of creation as an act ofpersonal will. Because there is an ongoing
relationship through space and time between God and the world, this makes a claim
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for the reality of certain creatures such as space and time. This intrinsic reality is at
the heart of Gunton's deliberately apophatic treatment of time, where he disavows
both an explicit identity and opposition between created temporality and divine
eternity. Identity or opposition would both assume that eternity and temporality are
contrastive and occupying the same ontological plane. In denying both of these,
Gunton affirms the divine prevenience and the integrity of created time and space.
He also refuses to conflate divine action-in-relation with those created events within
space-time. As such, he refuses to identify evolution or cosmological eschatology
with the divine perfecting of the natural order. As we move on to discuss the nature
of the created order itself, it becomes obvious that Gunton says very little about the
specific nature of created reality, except insofar as the transcendentals echo the
divine nature. There is however, one particular point of contact here with science.
This is the question of attempting to explain a relational ontology in scientific terms.
This may seem to hint at a natural theology, but it is rather to do with the extent to
which we can locate ontology within entities in spacetime, within spacetime relations
or opt for a different metaphysic altogether such as Process thought. Gunton
advocates the first of these, and it is our contention that this view will be most
conducive to our work at the interface, insofar as we will argue that only such a view
can guarantee the reality and activity of created particulars. As Fermer rightly
pointed out, we must make a distinction between different types of created
particulars, and the most profound distinction is between the personal and non-
personal aspects of the created order. However, all creatures share certain
characteristics, because to be a creature means to be in a relationship shaped by the
Son and Spirit. All creatures, as relational entities, exist in and through vertical and
horizontal relationalities, and it is the variances within these that allow us to discuss
the characteristics of non-personal and personal particulars. Hence we find the
distinction between freedom and contingency. All creatures are contingent, which
because of the connection between contingency and createdness, means that they are
intrinsically real and also free from false determinism. However, there is a unique
pattern {grace) to the divine action-in-relation (i.e. vertical relationality) with regard
to the human creature.
Section 1 Summary 111
(iii) Within Gunton's scheme, sin represents a disruption of the true eschatology of
the project of creation. The atoning life of Christ is understood on a recapitulation
model as a reinaugurating and reorientating of the project. In other words, the
Atonement involves the whole life ofChrist, empowered by the Spirit as the personal
transcendent other. Hence, we find a close and consistent relationship between
creation and redemption in Gunton's theology. Importantly, Gunton insists that
because Christ is the mediator of Creation incarnate, then the Incarnation is non-
interventionist. In fact, for Gunton there would have been an Incarnation without the
presence of sin within the world, because it represents the fulfilment of the natural
order. The non-interventionist nature of the Incarnation is reflected in the
maintenance of a modified view of divine impassibility and immutability. Here,
kenosis and divine suffering can be accepted, but as something actively and
sovereignly achieved by God. Hence, Gunton insists that the Incarnation must not be
understood as an evolutionary product, in the same way that the final destiny of the
natural order cannot be understood as the result of cosmic eschatology, whether
through evolution or entropy. Gunton's Pneumatology can be summarised through
the two motifs ofperfection and particularisation. The Spirit perfects and renders the
God-world relationship as dynamic by perfecting the innertrinitarian life of love and
by moving this love outwards towards the created other. In both instances, this
perfection arises through a particularisation, whether of the innertrinitarian
relationships, or a particularisation and delimiting of the natural order (i.e. relation-
in-othemess) within its own spatiotemporal parameters.
(iv) Our final set of motifs stem from Gunton's doctrines of Ecclesiology and
Providence. From both we derive greater detail in particular on his understanding of
divine action. First, let us reiterate that divine action-in-relation, whether
christological or pneumatological, is orientated towards the perfecting of the natural
order. Moreover, this perfecting is an aspect of createdness and so that which
contributes to perfection does not diminish but in fact fulfils createdness. As such,
the divine action that enables anticipatory fulfilments of the natural order still
respects createdness. This is true even when the natural order achieves something or
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exists in a manner of which it is incapable unaided. This of course refers to the
existence of a redeemed human community, inspired human culture (and the
consequent enabling of the non-human creation to praise the Creator) and ultimately
miracles. Ecclesiology is then the study of Providence of one specific form or one
specific locus. It is trinitarian, present tense, orientated towards the perfection of the
natural order and the guarantee of createdness.
Gunton's view of Ecclesiology therefore contributes to our picture of Gunton's
technical discussions of Providence. First, we have the qualified distinction between
the act of creation and Providence. Hence 'continuous creation' is undesirable in
Gunton's scheme. Gunton's model of the playwright or poet, for understanding
divine action is similar to many motifs at the science-theology interface. For Gunton,
the essence of the model is that it allows creaturely freedom, whilst allowing the
simultaneous presence of the whole created order to God. This is a useful motif in
that it avoids a kenotic divine self-limitation in terms of knowledge of future events,
and does not require us to affirm a 'block universe' view of space-time. This motif
also tackles the determinism usually associated with it, by highlighting
pneumatological divine action, which enables the created order to achieve a destined
completion.
In Gunton's thought, all divine action-in-relation is prevenient and yet guarantees the
integrity of the created order. Hence, Providence (including Election) is not to be
equated with determinism, because rather than mere foreknowledge, Providence
invites the question of what divine action-in-relation is for, and the answer is always
the perfection of the created order rather than a destructive determinism. This is why
miracles are not a threat to createdness in Gunton's thought1 The 'space' in which
the world exists is not a vacuum - it is a result of ongoing divine action-in-relation.
In principle, then, all divine action, miracles included, supports rather than negates
created integrity. Moreover, as miracles are exemplars of action-in-relation, they are
orientated towards the perfecting of the natural order, which as we have said is
1
As such, miracles do not threaten the rational contingency on which science depends.
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integral to the identity of the created order and to its restoration. All divine
action—in-relation is to be understood in terms of trinitarian mediation. The Son is
the giver of structure, and the Spirit enables the created order to have space to be
within that structuring. Or as Gunton also puts it christological action institutes and
pneumatological action constitutes orparticularises.
Not all of these motifs will be consistently applicable in the rest of this thesis, and
some will be of overwhelming significance. Moreover, there are some conspicuous
lacunae within the grammar as it stands, where Gunton does not provide the kind of
answers that we require. For example, if his understanding of christological action is
almost solely past tense, then how are we to maintain what we have learnt from
Gunton, and yet repair this defect? Flow do we discuss present tense christological
action? Furthermore, Gunton's position on the relationship of divine and created
action is very thorough and helpful as far as it goes, but we require a more detailed
position on the nature of the enabling of created action by the work of the two hands
of God. Speaking more generally, how do we conceive of the 'space' or integrity of
the natural order as a product of divine action-in-relation, as opposed to a
panentheistic and ultimately pantheistic space? We must face all of these questions in
the last section as we discuss the createdness of evolution.
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Section 2: Testing the Grammar of Createdness: Evolution in
the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin
Introduction: Teilhard's Evolutionary and Mystic Vision
(i) In the first section of this thesis we introduced the theology of Colin E. Gunton, in
order to identify the rules and motifs within his theology that secure createdness as
an integral aspect of his thought. A consideration of the 'ruled relations' between
these provided us with our grammar of createdness. Now we can move on to test this
grammar by examining the treatment of evolution in the theology of French Jesuit
and Palaeontologist Pierre-Marie-Joseph Teilhard de Chardin. Using our grammar,
we hope to demonstrate that Teilhard cannot maintain the createdness of evolution
within his overall vision. Furthermore, and more precisely, we hope to demonstrate
that this failure is due to infringements of the rules of our grammar. If we are able to
identify the difficulties in Teilhard's theology, we will then be in a stronger position
to analyse and critique modern science-theology interactions on the subject of
evolution and to make our own contribution.
(ii) Teilhard's theology represents a significant and fascinating shift in methodology
from that of Gunton. We have already pointed out that the Gunton corpus is
extensive, and yet relatively consistent in its use of theological motifs. The Teilhard
coipus is rather more extensive, written over a longer period of time and much more
fluid in nature. Teilhard's expression can be frustratingly oblique, due to a mystical
perspective and approach to theology itself. Moreover, it has been noted that
Teilhard's work suffers due to a lack of scholarly critique and interaction during his
lifetime, due to an extensive period of time spent as a palaeontologist in China and
consequently in relative isolation from other theological perspectives.1 This also adds
1 John Habgood argues that Teilhard gives the impression of a sensitive and intelligent thinker,
"forced to thrash around in the circle of his own ideas, without the benefit of serious criticism, and
hence without making real contact with either the science or the theology he cared about so deeply."
(John Habgood, Review of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Man's Place in Nature, in Theology 70/563
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to a sense of inconsistency and variation in his thought. Consequently, his work is
exhilarating and frustrating in equal measure, as evinced by the tremendous volume
ofmaterial that has been and continues to be written on his thought. Our intention of
course is not to contribute directly to this theological endeavour. Instead, our overall
aim is to demonstrate the relevance of createdness for theological contributions to the
science-theology interface, and within this wider goal, our treatment of Teilhard's
theology serves as a test case for our grammar of createdness.
(1967), 231-2, (citation, 231-232) For details on why Teilhard was prompted to leave Paris for China
see Abbe Paul Grenet, Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Theories (tr. R. A. Rudorff) (London:
Souvenir Press, 1965), 21-22, and Claude Cuenot, Teilhard de Chardin: A Biographical Study (tr.
Vincent Colimer. Translation ed. Rene Hague) (London: Burns & Oates, 1965), Chs. 4 and 5.
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Chapter 5: The Nature of Evolution in the Thought of Teilhard de
Chardin
Introduction
Teilhard's perspective on evolution is important for our purposes, because of the
intrinsic significance that he affords to the process. Whereas Gunton's few references
to evolution see it as a relatively unimportant created entity, for Teilhard evolution is
much more than a mere neo-Darwinist process. Evolution is much more than
biology. It is an all-embracing phenomenon that applies throughout the cosmos and
at all times. The cosmos as a whole is in a state of evolution, as are all elements
within it, from a single quantum of energy to Homo sapiens. The process of
evolution is evinced by greater arrangements of material complexity over time,
ranging from non-living entities through to the human brain as the most complex
empirically verifiable biological fruit of evolution. However, not only is the arrow of
evolutionary history an arrow of increasing complexity, it is also an arrow of
convergence. The evolutionary process, and those entities which are in the process of
evolution, are converging on a summit or point, which is the apex of evolution. For
Teilhard, it is the return of Christ, the Parousia, which is the culmination of the
process. However, for Teilhard, this cannot be deduced from the scientific evidence.
Therefore in this chapter we must concentrate on what can be deduced from a
scientific investigation of evolutionary history. We will find that Teilhard can deduce
the existence, and many of the properties, of the end-point of evolution (which he
calls Omega Point) including some divine properties, but he does not go so far as to
identify this evolutionary apex. In this chapter we make a threefold division of this
vision of evolution, roughly past, present and future, in terms of matter, man and
Omega.
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(i) If evolution is an all-embracing concept, and is applicable to all entities, then all
such entities must have common properties in order to evolve. In turn these must be
properties common to the most fundamental particles of matter itself. Matter has
three such important properties; plurality, unity and energy. The first of these is the
atomicity, or particulate nature of the universe.1 The second common feature is the
essential unity underlying this; a unity of similarity (such as the identical masses of
atoms of the same elements), a unity of homogeneity whereby particles can only be
identified through their sum set of interactions, and finally a collective unity in that
there is a sphere beyond all of these centres which envelops them.2 The third
important aspect ofmatter is energy, which is indestructible and provides an essential
foundation for all that derives from it;
From this point of view, the universe would find its stability and final unity
at the end of its decomposition. It would be held togetherfrom below?
However, as Teilhard goes on to discuss in greater depth, we must be aware that the
universe and all that is within it is in fact held together from above, from the future
apex of the evolutionary process. What we find therefore in an examination of the
universe is total matter, the divisibility of the universe is in fact a misapprehension.
Instead we have an indivisible totality, which at the opposite end of the spectrum of
matter is concentrated in and as thought.4 The universe is a whole "by reason of the
unimpeachable wholeness of its whole, a system, a totum and a quantum: a system by




2 Ibid. 45-6. C.f. MD, 33 and LT, 32. In his early work, Teilhard also argued for a unity through the




5 Ibid. 48. In total, Bruno de Solages detects six types of matter in Teilhard's scheme! (Bruno de
Solages, Teilhard de Chardin: Temoignage et Etude sur le Developpement de la Pensee (Toulouse: E.
Privat, 1967), 284)
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(ii) Ifwe are to be able to perceive all matter to be in evolution, it is also important to
incorporate a temporal perspective into our physics. A point in spacetime is a section
through an indefinite number of temporal fibres, rather than a frozen portrait of
particles.6 The totality of the universe therefore reveals itself to be in cosmogenesis,
and matter from the very earliest perspective has been in a state of genesis.7 This
means that the components of the universe are far from randomly organised; instead
"they form a natural series in which their order ofappearance coincides essentially
with their order of complication." This has occurred through two processes; a
primordial granulation which refers to the formation of atoms (i.e. matter formed
from the energetic substratum), and after this a process of growing complexity.9 This
can of course be understood in terms of thermodynamics, or the laws of the
conservation and dissipation of energy.10 In contemporary language we might also
refer to non-dissipative systems. Teilhard is in full agreement with this, except that
this is only one side of the picture. If we are to understand how increases in
complexity are directly proportional to the extent of evolutionary time we must look
beyond known thermodynamics. This is the Without ofmatter, and we must account
for the Within.11
(iii) The Within ofmatter is a qualitative term whereas the Without is quantitative.12
It is a discussion of the presence of consciousness in different organisms and to
different extents.13 Teilhard advocates a panpyschism, wherein consciousness cannot















Since the stuff of the universe has an inner aspect at one point of itself, there
is necessarily a double aspect to its structure, that is to say in every region of
space and time - in the same way, for instance, as it is granular: co-extensive
with their Without, there is a Within to things.14
This within is of course present to some extent in all matter. For Teilhard, this means
that there must be a continuum of many different properties at all levels of cosmic
evolution. Therefore, life, which is usually defined in terms of the attainment of an
evolutionary threshold, is in fact always present, but as a more primordial 'pre-life'.15
Stretching our gaze backwards in time we will see consciousness always present but
in differing shades.16 But why is it that consciousness and life can be found at all
levels? The answer is because of the involutive nature of evolution; along this
perceived axis of increasing complexity, "everything around us happens as though
the stuff of the universe were distilled into a rising series of continually more perfect
centres."17
(iv) To understand the evolutionary process at work is to see it as an increase in
complexity, in consciousness, in centredness. Prelife represents the presence of only
1 8
fragmentary centredness. Centredness (or consciousness) therefore increases as
complexity increases.19 Teilhard argues throughout his career that there is a universal
physical law at work here. He can argue that "a richer and better organised structure
will correspond to the more developed consciousness."20 The centricity of
consciousness, and structural complexity are but two sides of the same
phenomenon.21 This is the law of complexity and consciousness 22 As he puts it
himself;











21 Ibid. 66. This notion of the centre and centrification is integral to Teilhard's work, even in its early
formulations. (WW, 19) In terms of evolution, this makes the process both convergent and
irreversible. (HM, 86)
22
PH, 67. C.f. AE, 30 and AE, 86
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The fact of evolution comes to remind us that the principal movement of
reality is a synthesis, in the course of which plurality manifests itself in
increasingly complex and organic forms, each further degree of unification
being accompanied by a growth of inner consciousness and freedom.2 '
So far we have seen that there is a within which accompanies the without of all
things. Teilhard now reveals that this Within is in fact a form of energy.24 How is this
to be related to the energy comprehended by physics? The solution lies in seeing all
energy as psychic, but divided into two components, "a tangential energy which
links the element with all others of the same order (that is to say, of the same
complexity and the same centricity) as itself in the universe; and a radial energy
which draws it towards even greater complexity and centricity - in other words
forwards." This is an essential point; tangential energy is that form of energy that
lies in the purview of thermodynamics, whereas radial energy is the propulsion for
evolution. This latter property of radial energy will be shown to be integral to
Teilhard's thought. The relationship between these two energies is inversely
proportional; the smaller the quantity of radial energy, the more the effects of the
26
tangential (mechanical) energy can proscribe the behaviour of an entity, and a
decrease in tangential energy can result in an increase in radial energy and a
subsequent increase in internal complexity.27 One can derive massive radial energy
with a low tangential energy. Nonetheless, one can have the strange position of
complex organisms apparently contravening thermodynamics by increasing their
complexity and tangential energy.28 The question then is what propels this direction
of increased complexity, and does radial energy have an upper limit? The answer to
23
HE, 56. C.f. AM, 139
24
PH, 70
2> Ibid. 70. For Teilhard, then, life not matter is fundamental. The history of life is "ultimately nothing
but an immense psychic exercise; the slow but progressive attaining of a diffused consciousness - a
gradual escape from the 'material' conditions which, secondarily, veil it in an initial state of extreme
plurality." (HE, 23) As such, there is neither spirit, nor matter, only "spirit-matter(Ibid. 57-8)
26
PH, 70, n5
27 Ibid. 71. Living matter is different in that it is no longer merely at the mercy of chance; it can work
with the fruits of chance. Life moves radially. (AE, 107)
25
PH, 71. This is due to the functioning of for instance human bodies as non-dissipative structures.
There is in fact a net increase in entropy due to heat loss and the export of energy from organisms.
Overall there is an increase in entropy. Teilhard would perceive this as an increase in radial energy
and a decrease in tangential energy. Complexification is comparable to negentropy. It is an
irreversible, energetic process, going in the opposite direction to entropy. (TF, 169)
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both of these questions lies in a later discussion of the summit of evolution -
29
Omega.
(v) Let us now shift focus and talk of a specific evolution, that of planet Earth itself,
and the specific biological evolution that arises on this planet. In discussing this
planetary evolution, Teilhard finally makes absolutely clear that everything that
arises at an evolutionary threshold is in fact always present at least primordially. In
this instance it means that we must not distinguish inorganic and organic chemistry,
as they are all part of one operation. In other words, as the Earth undergoes its own
inorganic cooling and other tectonic processes, we must see this in conjunction with
the polymerising envelope of organic compounds around these. This envelope is in
effect a sort ofWithin of the Earth.30 The Earth, as a young planet, will have its own
discreet quantum of pre-life, making the whole planet to be "the incredibly complex
germ we are seeking"31 As the planet condenses, so does its pre-life, which is the
radial energy increasing in proportion to complexity. This involves the spontaneous
development of a series of internal freedoms within this organic envelope.32 This
envelope grows due to a dual involution; both the planet and all its constituent atoms
curl up upon themselves; the primordial consciousness of/the Earth is more than a
net, it is a correlated mass;
By the very mechanism of its birth, the film in which the 'within' of the
earth was concentrated and deepened emerges under our eyes in the form of
an organic whole in which no element can any longer be separated from
those surrounding it.33
This, the first layer of the Earth, is the pre-biosphere.34 Therefore, life has no
temporal absolute zero, although the biologists' preferential evolutionary threshold








35 Ibid. 85-6. C.f. AE, 33
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penultimate layer upon the planet, the biosphere, formed by the proliferation of life
on Earth at this threshold.36
(vi) Life, Teilhard argues, begins with the cell; it is the natural granule of life.37 But
of course we must not overlook the continuity between abiotic chemistry and the
cell; the cell, looking backwards, converges on the molecule. Therefore primitive
microorganisms have a great affinity with the megamolecular.38 This brings Teilhard
back to the idea of temporal fibres over particulate nature. Just as in this light a
phylum cannot be understood outside of the context of those organisms that precede
it, so the megamolecular world is the forerunner of biology, of simple life.39 Life, in
the form of the cell, is therefore matter displaying its properties, but with an
increased level of complexity, and as a consequence, of consciousness.40 But the
affinity with pre-Iife cannot be overstressed; organic life shows the same properties
as pre-life, especially in its complexity, and its fundamental unity.41 Life is a
complex, diffuse superorganism, a cohesive biological whole, not only "a foam of
lives", but also "a livingfilm."42
To describe the onset of this 'threshold' of life, Teilhard emphasises what we might
call the contingency of evolution. He cites the preponderance of one stereoisomer of
each amino acid, the similarity of identical biomolecules in diverse organisms, and
concludes that the biosphere (and so its particular form) is not a necessary
evolutionary development, it is simply the victor amongst less fortunate candidates.43
Coupled with this is his argument as to the singular threshold of pre-life to life
(irrespective of the number of protoorganisms that were involved).44 This did not
need to occur only once, and yet it appears that it did; as such this is more than mere












planet.46 We have a curve, not a cycle; a curve where the contingent46 presence of
this biosphere, has prevented the formation of another. The cellular revolution is
therefore a form of germination.47 Life upon the Earth is "a solitary pulsation."48
(vii) Once life begins to propagate, Teilhard argues it utilises a number of processes
in its continuing expansion. These are reproduction, multiplication, renovation,
conjugation (i.e. sexual reproduction), association (the congregation of cells into
multicellular organisms) and controlled additivity (the addition of reproductions to
one another in a controlled manner.)49 The artifices by which life propagates are then
threefold; first, profusion, whereby life succeeds by the law of large numbers. Life
fights against chance by sheer volume (the level at which natural selection works.) In
a groping manner, as many artifices as possible are attempted in order to achieve any
successful results.50 This contingent, apparently undirected aspect of the evolutionary
process will reappear later. Second, there is ingenuity, the attempt to improve the
design of the living machine, to make it more successful and better.51 Third, we have
indifference. This appears to refer to the advent of multicellular life.52 For what we
have here is the sacrifice of the individuality or individual existence of an
organism/cell for the greater good of a unit.53 Teilhard argues that there is a fourth
heading to be considered here, namely global solidarity; organisms never lose their
solidarity. Ifwe skip a few millennia and discuss the whole evolutionary scheme as it
presents itself to us, then we are still confronted by this fundamental unity. The tree
of life consists of phyla arranged in overlapping fans,54 and therefore in the final








50 Ibid. 121. C.f. TF, 170
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PH, 122
52 Or for example the endosymbiont theory. It is conjectured, with some degree of likelihood, that
certain cellular organelles (chloroplasts in plant cells and mitochondria in animal cells) were at one






single gigantic biota, rooted perhaps, like a simple stem, in some verticil steeped in
the depths of the mega-molecular world. Life would thus be a simple branch based
on something else."55
(B) The Evolution ofMan
(i) So far, Teilhard's picture of evolution has had relatively little to say about
direction. We have noted that evolution is converging through unity, and
complexity/consciousness increases proportionally to evolutionary time. However,
this situation changes rapidly when Teilhard begins to discuss Homo sapiens and
some of our more recent predecessors in PH. In fact the whole discussion of
humanity is framed within the larger question as to whether evolution has a
direction.56 Now, evolutionary biology customarily refers to evolution not in terms of
advance but in an atemporal category of variations in relative gene frequencies. As
we have seen already, Teilhard is insistent that evolutionary theory forces us to a
temporal perspective of the cosmos.57 This leads him to a concern for understanding
the path from molecule to megamolecule to cell and beyond; this is orthogenesis.58
Teilhard's conception of orthogenesis is problematic to say the least. This is because
he can hold two contradictory positions on evolutionary development. On the one
hand, he argues categorically that evolution is a blind, groping process working by
random variation. On the other hand he can claim that there is no incompatibility
between this factor and orthogenesis, a fundamental evolutionary orientation.59 Now,
on one level this is obvious; mutagenesis is contingent upon the state of the genome
in which it is taking place. This means that only certain mutations are possible in any
genome at any given time. But this is a limitation upon the extent of possible
mutation (and so gene frequencies), not directedness. Teilhard seems to be
comfortable with this interpretation of orthogenesis, in that he can refer to it as a
53 Ibid. 153-4
56 Ibid. 156
57 As Benz points out, Teilhard's whole purpose is to link evolution with history and especially the
history of salvation. (Ernst Benz, Man's Concept of the Future from the Early Fathers to Teilhard de






purely vectorial quality, defining the trends of evolution, without reference to finality
or monophyletism.60 On the other hand, Teilhard can argue that evolution is only
apparently divergent, this being due to the groping nature of the process.61 Evolution
actually has a precise orientation and a privileged axis, which corresponds to the
proportional increase of complexity over time;
Evolution does not exactly correspond, as Spencer maintained, to a transition
from the homogenous to the heterogenous-but to a transition from a
dispersed heterogenous (lacking unity) to an organic (unified) heterogenous -
or, to put it still more clearly, to a transition from a lower to a higher state of
centro-complexity.62
In other words, the direction of evolution is measured by the increase in radial
energy.63 This orientation is very important for Teilhard. He argues on more than one
occasion that it is the vital and missing ingredient in the neo-Darwinist theory of
evolution. For him, the phrase "survival of the fittest" is simply insufficient in that it
fails to account for the sense of advance and exuberance within the evolutionary
process. We must speak instead of survival of the most complex.64
(ii) Bearing in mind Teilhard's proposed law of complexity-consciousness, it comes
as no surprise that he identifies a selective criterion whereby we can detect positive
variations in psychic content. This is the nervous system.65 Teilhard then goes on to
attempt, in his own words, a classification in the form of degrees of 'cerebralisation'.
For him, the directedness of evolution has been proven by the differentiation of
j • 66
nervous tissue,
60 Ibid. 215, nl
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AE, 124 and WW, 158. This is the nub of the problem. It does not make sense to argue that
evolution moves via large numbers and groping, whilst simultaneously referring to as directed.
(Donald R. Gentner, 'The Scientific Basis of some Concepts of Teilhard de Chardin', Zygon, 3:4
(1968), 432-441, (citation, 436). As Dodson has pointed out, Teilhard's own attempt at cutting the
Gordian knot is to see groping as directed chance, as "the organism trying everything in order to find
something specific." (Edward O. Dodson, The Phenomenon ofMan Revisited (New York: Columbia











Since, in its totality and throughout the length of each stem, the natural
history of living creatures amounts on the exterior to the gradual
establishment of a vast nervous system, it therefore corresponds on the
interior to the installation of a psychic state coextensive with the earth. On
the surface, we find the nerve fibres and ganglions; deep down,
consciousness.67
Of course this has been most prominent amongst the primate phylum. Here the
process of cerebralisation has been predominant and somatic evolution has
effectively been superceded by the evolution of the brain68;
Nature has succeeded in making a Man; she can go no further; Organic
Evolution has done its work.69
Then, as Teilhard puts it in his wonderfully lyrical language, in one outpost of the
mammals the growing warmth of consciousness becomes red hot, and at one singular
point becomes incandescent, a flame bursts forth and "Thought is born."70 Homo
sapiens has arisen. With man, there is a new threshold. A centred surface becomes a
centre. A tiny tangential increase results in a massive increase in radial energy, which
turns back on itself and makes a giant leap forward.71 There is no question here of the
entirely naturalistic derivation of the human species. For Teilhard, the origin of
humanity is no indication of its potential. There is something about man that gives
him a breakthrough, but he is "originally no more than just one of the cosmic stuffs
innumerable attempts to involute upon itself'.72 The difference between humanity
and the non-self-conscious portion of the primates is no more than some cerebral
mutation.73 This mirrors the entirely naturalistic and contingent advent of both the
biosphere and the noosphere.74 The advent of humanity is due merely to some
67 Ibid. 162-3. Cerebration is the manifestation of complexity/consciousness at the biotic level. (AM,
139). C.f. Ibid. 220; SC, 155; HM, 37 and AE, 88 and 31
68
PH, 176. C.f. AM, 221
69
Henry Drummond, The Ascent ofMan (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1894), 126
70
PH, 176. For an equally charming theological interpretation of this stage of evolution, but with
rather more emphasis on the requisite divine action, see John W. Conley, Evolution and Man: Here
and Hereafter (Manchester: James Robinson, 1902), 43
71 Ibid. 187. C.f. AM, 227
72
TF, 173. Teilhard is willing to admit that this threshold shift, in line with for instance Catholic
orthodoxy, might be accompanied, or determined, by a specific divine action; the creation of the soul.
(PH, 187, n4). C.f. Bernard Delfgaauw, Evolution: The Theory of Teilhard de Chardin (tr. Hubert






undisclosed selective advantage possessed by prehuman ancestry.75 Hence, Teilhard
argues, we should not be surprised at the high degree of physical homology amongst
the mammals.76 We also exhibit other similar properties; consciousness, complexity
77
and large numbers.
(iii) The process of the formation of the distinctly human component to the biosphere
is called hominisation.78 Moreover, this is not just the advent of the human, it is still
occurring. It is "the progressive phyletic spiritualization in human civilisation of all
the forces contained in the animal world."79 What occurs now in the evolution of
humanity represents the continuation of all that has gone before;
A cosmic movement (or cosmogenesis). Which takes the more exact form
of an organic movement (or biogenesis). And is itself completed in a
reflective movement (or anthropogenesis).80
It is a reorientation of the whole world; man is the fruit of psychogenesis, but what
man does now effaces this process as the mind of man develops. We have
81
noogenesis, and the final layer of the Earth, the noosphere. Through hominisation,
the Earth gains a new skin, or perhaps even finds its soul.82 As Teilhard's language
suggests, this is the final outpouring of the processes Teilhard identifies to be at work
throughout all stages of the arrangement ofmatter;
The greatest revelation open to science today is to perceive that everything
precious, active and progressive originally contained in that cosmic fragment












AE, 271. C.f. CE, 141. The evolution of humanity does not indicate a discontinuity with what has
gone before, but merely the adoption of "a new method." (Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Religion of




83 Ibid. 203. C.f. WW, 36
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Teilhard therefore argues that "ultimately matter, for all its admirable powers,
04
realizes itself only in us". Humanity is "le plus grande evenement tellurique et
or
biologique de notre planete." This is because of the fact that "by the capital event
of hominization, the most advanced portion of the cosmos has become
or
personalized." Evolution has produced in us, via a critical threshold, a personal
87
molecule. As Teilhard's language suggests, evolution has surpassed its "anatomical
modalities" to move into individual and collective psychic spontaneity. The brain is
about as complex as it can get. Teilhard argues that from this point on evolution must
take a new form, whilst maintaining the connectivity with the evolutionary process
that he perceives at other apparent thresholds. What he advocates is a form of
cultural evolution - collectivisation.88 Evolution now takes the form of the
collectivisation of humanity.89 In other words there is something new on the horizon;
no longer simply man, but now mankind.90 Mankind is itself entering a phyletic
phase of collectivisation,91 and its success is to be measured in degrees of
unanimity.92 Our relationships are becoming bonds93; cooperation is now
incorporation into a new and living reality.94
(iv) Teilhard does not wish to argue that this new stage of evolution is somehow
alien to what has gone before. There is no question that neo-Darwinist evolutionary
forces are no longer at work. Natural selection is still at work at present, but it is now
subordinate to mind95 What is happening here is found in all species with
sufficiently advanced cerebralisation. Teilhard argues that at such levels we can
84
LT, 32. The arrival of humanity demonstrates the innate bias of life within the evolutionary process







AM, 126. Teilhard argues that in the human sphere there is simply another stage of evolution;








98 Ibid. 17-18. As Teilhard himself puts it in a very early comment, "[w]hat advance could there be
upon thought?" (MM, 166). C.f. Drummond, The Ascent ofMan, 147
Chapter 5 129
detect increasing degrees of radial control over tangential energy. In other words, we
have a psychical (Lamarckian) control over chance (Darwinian) variations.96 As with
a classic Lamarckian position, traits are developed after the disposition for them is
acquired.97 The point of this is that there is another threshold limit for this faculty in
man.98 As humanity we contribute to our own evolution; it is an auto-evolution, "a
consciously andpassionately willed deliberate actThis makes thought itself to be
an integral aspect of the evolutionary process;
Thus we see not only thought as participating in evolution as an anomaly or
as an epiphenomenona; but evolution as so reducible to and identifiable with
a progress towards thought that the movement of our souls expresses and
measures the very stages of progress of evolution itself.100
Quoting Julian Huxley, Teilhard states that we are evolution conscious of itself.101
As Teilhard puts it, we are the direct link with the unconscious natural order.102
There is a great responsibility with this knowledge. Teilhard argues explicitly that
man must contribute to his evolution; indeed, man cannot be truly himself "unless he
becomes practically conscious of the "cosmic" process ofwhich he is a part and even
the responsible apex."103
(v) The new dimension in evolution lies in the fact that not only has man been able to
discover the fact of evolution, but also he has "been enabled thereby to give it sense
and direction."104 This means of course that human unification is at the heart of our
96






AE, 292. C.f. AM, 254; CE, 221 and TF, 181. This is spiritualization; the growing predominance of
reflection uvei instinct. (TF, 183)
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PH, 243
101 Ibid. 243. "Man finds himself in a crucial phase of his history. He realizes for the first time that he
is situated within an evolution and is himself evolving. He has to acquire confidence in the further





104 Walter Bruggeman, 'The Cosmic Christ: Some Recent Interpretations', Indian Journal of
Theology, 15 (1966), 130-142, (citation, 133)
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continuity with evolution, and indeed for Teilhard our societal nature is the
culmination and not the attenuation of biological evolution;105
The story of Evolution therefore is the history of the struggle of being to
assert the qualitative dominance of interiority, spontaneity and psyche, in
and through material unification and ordered organisation.106
Man exhibits this unity of process, and also a unity of mechanism; we too survive
through a groping and inventive process.107 However most importantly, there is a
unity ofmovement,
Man is not the centre of the universe as once we thought in our simplicity,
but something much more wonderful - the arrow pointing the way to the
final unification of the world in terms of life. Man alone constitutes the last-
born, the freshest, the most complicated, the most subtle of all the successive
layers of life.108
This means, in conjunction with the directedness of evolution, that "[m]an is not an
epiphenomenon of evolution, a chance by-product, but constitutive of the process
itself and that as its culmination and crown. In other words evolution cannot be
understood without its end-product - Man...Man is the end-point which gives
meaning to everything that went before."109 Global human interaction is then a
process of additivity,110 and life must reach on for a new threshold of super-life. To
reach this "we have only to think and to walk always further in the direction in which
105
PH, 246. Gabriel Dussault sums this reasoning up nicely;
"The place of man in nature, according to Teilhard, is to be the arrowhead of
evolution...We are evolution and we are it to the extent that nothing will continue
anymore if we leave the gaming table." (Gabriel Dussault, 'Le Dieu que Notre
Siecle Attend: Essai sur le "Pantheisme" Teilhardien', in Gabriel Dussault, Louis
Gendron, Andre Haguette, Pantheisme, Action, Omega Chez Teilhard de Chardin
(Bruges/Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1967), 13-67, (citation, 47-8))
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Mervyn Fernando, 'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: An Outline of his Thought on the History and
Future of Humankind', in Leo Zonneveld and Robert Muller (eds.) The Desire to Be Human: A
Global Reconnaissance of Human Perspectives in an Age of Transformation Written in Honour of
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the lines passed by evolution take on their maximum coherence."1" Teilhard refers
to this super life on occasion in terms of the 'ultra-human', who or which is the
hypothesised future curve of the process of humanization or hominization.112
Nonetheless, even here there will be no loss of continuity. Teilhard insists that
although human evolution will now lead us towards the superhuman, this is not to be
understood as the extinction of what we would recognise as Homo sapiens.113 Ultra-
hominisation is the completion of humanity.114 Man, "the crowning product of the
ages past, will be the supreme factor in the ages that are yet to come."115
The spring and secret of hominisation is therefore the imposition of unification
through the psychical curvature of the mind.116 If we ask after the impetus for this
drive to unity, then Teilhard provides a simple formula;
Evolution = Rise of consciousness
Rise of consciousness = Effect of union."7
Human unification is then simply the natural culmination of the biological process -
psychobiological unification - the final megasynthesis.118 But precisely because this









Conley, Evolution andMan, 50
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PH, 267. Teilhard's language of present and future human evolution is fairly optimistic to say the
least. Indeed, he is so optimistic that he can actually advocate war as a force of evolution as it
promotes universalisation via nationalism. (AE, 15) It is therefore the very form of the expression of
evolution. (AE, 16) As such;
"Mankind in armed conflict with itself is a Mankind in process of solidification."
(HM, 184)
For more on this see chapter 5, "The Organization of Spiritualized Energy: (a) Beyond Aggressive
War to Conquest by Research", of Joseph A. Grau, Morality and the Human Future in the Thought of
Teilhard de Chardin: A Critical Study (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London:
Associated University Presses, 1981). For references to war as uniting see Ibid. 185, n5 and 187, n9
1,7
PH, 267
"s Ibid. 267. This idea finds its roots in Teilhard's earliest works, where he can argue for a distinctive
unity of all living things, an idea which finds a reflection in his notion of the primitive existence of
properties that appear to arise at evolutionary thresholds. For him, all livings are united in their
common matter and their common destiny along the path of increasing consciousness. (WW, 23) In
his mature work see for example AE, 30.
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consequently "a leap forward of the radial energies along the principal axis of
evolution: ever more complexity and thus ever more consciousness."119 This is only
120
to be achieved by a collective human effort, through an interior totalisation of the
world upon itself, "in the unanimous construction of a spirit ofthe earth."m
(C) Evolution and Omega
In Teilhard's mystical vision of evolution, there is a distinct and final peak of
convergence. This is a megasynthesis of human unification. Teilhard is by no means
unaware of the difficulties posed by such a view, not least the relationship between
such an optimistic eschatology and the rather more pessimistic views ofCosmology?
Teilhard's solution is to say there is no need for a reconciliation of these two
contradictory predictions. Quite simply, Teilhard discounts the idea of human (and so
cosmic) evolution ending in futility. There cannot be Heat Death or a Big Crunch. To
think in these terms is to miss the true significance of the personal and the process of
122
personalisation. The value of these is such that the conclusion of cosmic evolution
must preserve these. To understand how and why this can be the case we need to
look further at Teilhard's vision of the end of evolution.
(i) This conclusion of cosmic evolution is perhaps the greatest expression of
Teilhard's mystical and scientific interpretation of evolutionary history. In the far
future, evolution is perceived to converge on the ultimate union of persons and
personhood - the "personal-universal".123 More precisely, we must conceive of an




121 Ibid. 278. C.f. AE, 40. Teilhard is able to ask "how can we fail to see the process of convergence
from which we emerged, body and soul, is continuing to envelop us more closely than ever, to grip us,






In other words the cosmos - in - evolution has a convergent structure; earlier
divergences converging together at a latter and higher point like longitudinal
lines divergent at the Equator, meeting at the poles.124
Somewhere ahead, the layers and radii meet at point Omega. Omega, if we
extrapolate forwards, is the point of final concentration of the noosphere.125 Point
Omega in this perspective is the cosmic conclusion of evolution, and so personhood.
19f\
The cosmos and the personal culminate in the same direction and each other. We
cannot, of course, directly describe Omega, and this is why we must resort to
extrapolation. Indeed, the very existence of Omega, at least from the
phenomenological perspective (i.e. that of hyperphysics), can be detected only as a
shadow. It is defined and delimited by the convergence of centred elements upon it
127like a wave. To be more specific, it is the very possibility of this convergence that
provides evidence. There must be a centre at or within Omega that somehow enables
the evolutionary drive towards increasing complexity.128 At this point we can see
Teilhard straying into metaphysics if not into theology, insofar as it is clear that
Omega must be more than the mere endpoint of a material process. The nature of
evolution itself and the value of consciousness and personhood demand it, in that
"the universe cannot be thought of as fully meeting the requirements, both extrinsic
and intrinsic, ofanthropogenesis unless it takes on the form of a convergent psychic
129milieu." Omega is an entity in its own right. We can go further; Teilhard attributes
a number of properties to Omega, which, eventually, will demonstrate the actual
identity between Omega and the Christian God. This is not to say that Teilhard's
hyperphysics can deduce the existence of the Christian God; nonetheless, they are
sufficient to deduce the divinity ofOmega.
124












(ii) The first of the deducible properties of Omega is that it must be personal or
hyperpersonal.130 If consciousness and personhood are not to be extinguished at the
culmination of evolution, then Omega must itself exemplify personality; this is
131because a mere collective cannot be personal. The convergence of personal centres
requires in turn a cosmic centre, but if there is to be no dissolution of these
personalities, this cosmic centre must be distinct from them and itself personal.132
Omega possesses its own ego.133 The evolutionary process must proceed until it joins
up with "a supremely personal, supremely personalizing, being."134 Omega must
therefore represent a conservation and perfection of each and every consciousness
135that has gone before. This is because "Omega is not a cosmic monster which
absorbs and annihilates the individual personality. Rather it is the community of love
in which individuals find their personality".136
The second property of Omega follows on closely from the first. If Omega is to be
personal, and a conserver of persons, then it is must be more than a centre born of a
fusion of personal elements. It must be a distinct core at the heart of the system.131
The reason for this is related to the ultimate evolutionary destiny of evolved
humanity. As we have seen already, it is imperative that humanity and human
consciousness survives in the cosmos. So far our evolution has involved a
simultaneous terrestrial evolution. In other words, our noogenesis has occurred in
lj0
PH, 286. C. f. HE, 45. The personal (human being) cannot become suprapersonal; this requires a
"special centre", in order to ensure that human persons can remain themselves. (Ibid. p46)
131





AE, 112. Teilhard writes;
"I believe that faith in Humanity can find its final expression and its ultimate
assurance only in a consciousness superior to ours, in which the individual




PH, 287. For Teilhard there is a principle at work here in that "a single particle of consciousness
present in the Universe makes it physically necessary that the Universe should become all-conscient
eventually, at the end of the transformation; and what finally is Consciousness, if not Personality?"
(LT, 149)
136 Francisco Bravo, Christ in the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin (Notre Dame/London: University





concert with terrestrial evolution, with geogenesis. However, rather
anthropocentrically, Teilhard argues that Man is the only essential aspect of the
scheme - only humanity must survive and reach the cosmic goal.139 The distinct
reality of Omega is important here in several respects. First, our species must and
will eventually become dissociated from a dead and exhausted earth. Then the planet
will be abandoned, and mankind will shift its centre "to the transcendent centre of its
increasing concentration."140 Mind will become detached from its material matrix,
and will rest upon Omega.141 This is only possible if Omega is a distinct centre in its
own right.142 Second, our current evolution requires the reality of Omega. Because
hominisation is primarily social and interiorising, it is in a sense vulnerable to
adverse impressions. It requires hope. Life can only function if it recognises itself as
irreversible, and as vitally important;
Life - and so reflection - and so foresight - and so the demand for super-life.143
We have to be able to believe we may survive the death of our star.144 Hope stems
then from faith in Omega.145 At this point we should mention how it is that Teilhard
envisions the current evolutionary action upon human perceptions. Omega influences
humanity through the same energy as that which powers human unification - love.




141 Ibid. 317. C.f. AE, 44. Teilhard refers to this as the end of spiritual evolution. (HE, 47) This shift
from a terrestrial to a transcendent matrix is also the reason for the importance of the personal for





144 Ibid. 43. C.f. TF, 186. As de Solages argues, "a conscious world can only work for an Absolute."
(de Solages, Teilhard de Chardin, 282) This again adds greater contingency to evolutionary history, as
it is dependent upon our fragile self-evolution. (R. B. Smith, 'God and Evolutive Creation', in
Anthony Hanson (ed.) Teilhard Reassessed: A Symposium of Critical Studies in the Thought ofPere
Teilhard de Chardin Attempting an Evaluation of his Place in Contemporary Christian Thinking
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1970), 41-58)
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AE, 50. Teilhard also sometimes seems to suggest that Omega has a property of irreversibility.
This relates to the function of hope and the human perception of the irreversibility of evolution. (AM,
271). C.f. Christopher F. Mooney, S.J., Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (London:
Collins, 1976), 54
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humanity towards unity with Omega.146 But what precisely is love? The short answer
is that it appears to be equivalent to radial energy. It is certainly the primal and
psychic energy.147 We may argue this way because Teilhard posits it as the
alternative to the energy normally encountered by physicists. Only two energies
exist; an interior (radial) energy always more amorised and an exterior (tangential)
energy always more calorised.148 The other reason for identifying love as radial
energy is Teilhard's insistence that it is a mundane aspect of the world. It is the
energy proper to cosmogenesis.149 Love is a direct trace marked on elements by "the
psychical convergence of the universe upon itself."150 It is the energy that draws and
unites the elements of the world through their centres. As with all patterns ofmaterial
behaviour, it occurs in all living centres, no matter how primitive.151 In primitive
152forms of life, love is hard to distinguish from molecular forces. In man, love is
1 r-i
exemplified in hominised form. Man can love to a hitherto unperceived extent in
evolutionary history, and as such he is eminently capable of unity, of synthesis
through his loving.154 Omega is important here because the energetic process of
amorisation, especially within the human phylum, cannot be fuelled from within the
growing human collective. Human love must find individualised heart, an
individualised face."155 This face and this heart are of course the distinct centre
Omega.
(iii) The third feature of Omega is that, if it is to have its proper power and function,
then Omega must radiate its effect as a present reality.156 Omega could not function
without being loving and lovable at this moment;
146
HE, 145
147 Ibid. 33. Mooney argues explicitly that we can identify radial energy with love. (Mooney, Teilhard
de Chardin, 52). As he puts it, at the human level, "the law of complexity-consciousness has been



















A present and real noosphere goes with a real and present centre. To be
supremely attractive, Omega must be supremely present.b7
If evolution has no centre, evolution is merely valorised. If there is a centre, it is
1 S8
amorised. " But what precisely is it that Omega does and how? Omega is in a sense
salvific; it ensures that something escapes from entropy - as such it is the Prime
Mover ahead}59 Omega collects and conserves persons.160 That which is unified
through evolution is therefore "subject to a pull."161 The function of Omega is unity
through itself, the apex of evolution.162 For Teilhard the extent to which an entity is
affected is a measure of its psychical content.163 Of course, this means that although
Omega is most effective in its action upon the most centred entities, humans, it is
also effective upon all other forms ofmatter, precisely because all energy is psychic
energy.164 Omega acts now, not just as the point of convergence, but also reciprocally
as that from which all things radiate.165 However, we should not stress this active
side to Omega to too great an extent. Teilhard can also describe the activity of
Omega as passive, as in no wise "any sort of interference, but a resonance."166 This is
consonant with the role of Omega as that which is the impetus for love or radial
energy.
The fourth and final property of Omega is that of independence and autonomy. If
personhood is to be the final answer of the universe, then Omega must be
independent of the final extinction of the universe, regardless of its form.167 Omega
is the summit of the series, but is also outside the series, and so partially independent
of evolution.168 Omega is then "an ultimate and self-subsistent pole of consciousness,
so involved in the world as to be able to gather into itself, by union, the cosmic
157 Ibid. 295. C.f. AM, 273 and LF, 108
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AE, 146. Dodson is therefore wrong when he argues that Teilhard advocates orthogenesis without
providing a motive or directive force; it is Omega. (Dodson, The Phenomenon ofMan Revisited, 150)
162 Ibid. 222
163 Ibid. 146
",4 Ibid. 121, nlO. Hence Teilhard can argue that "ifmatter is defined as 'something with no vestige of










elements that have been brought by technical arrangement to the extreme limit of
their centration - and yet, by reason of its supra-evolutive (that is to say,
transcendent) nature, enabled to be immune from that fatal regression which is,
structurally, a threat to every edifice whose stuff exists in space and time."169 Omega
crowns and closes the series. Of course, Omega appears, from the phenomenological
viewpoint, to be the peak of the evolutionary process, "as the centre which is defined
by the final concentration upon itself of the noosphere."170 Omega appears to be
purely immanent. But it must be more than this; if it is to hold together, then we must
speak of something more. We must speak theologically, and perceive that Omega
must contain "a transcendent - a divine - nucleus."171 In Omega, "everything climbs
as to a focus of immanence. But everything also descends from it as from a peak of
transcendence."172 Omega is the bridge between transcendence and immanence, and
"is not born from the confluence of human 'egos', but emerges from their organic
totality, like a spark that leaps the gap between the transcendent side of Omega...and
the 'point' of a perfectly centred universe: centrum super centra.1,173 Radial energy,
then, gravitates towards a divine focus.174
(D) Critique
Now that we have performed a brief exposition of Teilhard's hyperphysics, we can
move on to provide some scientific critique and some preliminary theological
observations about his work. We must provide both forms of criticism because as
Teilhard himself admitted, his hyperphysics is not intended to be a purely scientific
scheme. This is most apparent in the capacity for hyperphysics to determine the
divinity of Omega, but it is also implicit in some of the features of Teilhard's vision




171 Ibid. 145. Teilhard argues that evolution is as such a 'cantilevered' process; this is because "the
world is without support at one end (when we look back, that is), since at that end it emerges from
essential fragmentation. It is only through their forward impetus that things hold firm." (WW, 160.
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critique because, as we argued in the introduction to this thesis, theology and science
are connected due to the createdness of the natural order. Where there is a theological
difficulty with createdness, then the rational contingency of the natural order is also
under threat and vice versa. Before we can discuss theology, we must first carry out a
scientific critique of hyperphysics, and we need to do this in two ways. First, is
Teilhard's hyperphysics itself a scientific method? Second, are the features of
evolution and the natural order derived through hyperphysics compatible with
scientific findings? It is important to pose these two questions separately, because
amongst Teilhard's supporters, there is a tendency to do the opposite. In other words,
when Teilhard's phenomenological 'seeing' of the world is congruent with a
scientific description of the world, this is taken by his supporters as evidence that his
methodology as a whole, and so the general findings of hyperphysics, must also be
congruent with science. This is not necessarily a legitimate inference, as it is possible
to arrive at a successful conclusion without having a correct premise.175
(i) Teilhard's hyperphysics has provoked strong emotions amongst his friends and
foes. Representing the former, Flenri de Lubac can claim without equivocation that
the findings of The Phenomenon ofMan are "built up on the jealously preserved
ground of objective scientific observation."176 Peter Medewar on the other hand,
describes this work as "nonsense, tricked out by a variety of tedious metaphysical
conceits".177 We find a slightly more informative critique from a commentator who
both praises and criticises Teilhard judiciously. Olivier Rabut argues that in
Teilhard's hyperphysics there is a tendency to equate a conception of reality with
178
reality itself. The problem then is that Teilhard is assuming both the existence of
God "and the author's own knowledge of the plans of creation."179 At the very least,
17:1
As Edward O. Dodson points out with respect to some of Teilhard's conclusions, "[s]uch
speculations may be necessary and important; they may even be correct; but they cannot be
scientific". (Dodson, The Phenomenon ofMan Revisited, xvii. C.f. 22)
176 de Lubac, The Religion ofTeilhard de Chardin, 71
177 P. B. Medawar, 'Critical Notice', review of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon ofMan,
in Mind, ns 70/277 (1961), 99-106, (citation, 99). C.f. Sir Alister Hardy, The Living Stream: A
Restatement ofEvolution Theory and its Relation to the Spirit ofMan (London: Collins, 1965), 18




this rather more gentle criticism suggests that Teilhard's vision of evolution is not
based entirely on rational contingency.
We can demonstrate the potential danger for rational contingency in Teilhard's
hyperphysics by pointing out the fact that empirical evidence is not always given
adequate influence over aspects of Teilhard's scheme. The deductive has too great a
role and the inductive an insufficient one. This means that Teilhard's work is often
provisional because of Teilhard's constant adaptation of his scheme, rather than
because his findings are provisional on the garnering of new data. This is of course
somewhat hazardous for what is purportedly a scientific endeavour. As Hooykaas
has commented, the method of modern empirical science involves framing
hypotheses (usually but not always) on the basis of observation and experiment, and
the refining or rebuttal of hypotheses through further observation and experiment. In
this way, "[t]he decision as to the truth of a scientific theory should be founded in the
1 Rft
data and not in what seems logical or plausible to human thinking." The
alternative is to be rationalist, and argue that reality must conform to the content and
result of human reason. This is how Hooykaas views Teilhard's hyperphysics.181 For
instance, Teilhard argues that the concept of the Within of things is absolutely
necessary to explain the state of the cosmos. However, quite apart from the scientific
value of this concept, Teilhard's point is that the Within is in fact acceptable to
reason, which is not the same as saying conformable to reality, unless one is a
rationalist.182 Moreover, he goes on to illustrate the fact that the concept of the
Within cannot be derived from, or tested by empirical method;
One wonders how we know "from experience" and from "phenomena", a
second face that is usually hidden,183
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R. Hooykaas, 'Teilhardism, a Pseudo-Scientific Delusion', Free University Quarterly 9:1 (1963),





Hooykaas and others are also troubled by Teilhard's use of analogy.184 For instance,
Teilhard's concept of centrification, the formation of progressively more distinct and
centred nodes of consciousness is illustrated by analogy to the granular or
185
corpuscular nature of matter. However, whilst the latter can be demonstrated, the
former cannot. The same can also be said of his concept of love as energy, in that "it
is a mystification to apply the term "love", a human experience, to the cause which
holds atoms together in a molecule."186
Teilhard's concept of energy is not only potentially non-scientific because of the role
of analogy, but also due to the fact that Teilhard insists that tangential and radial
energy must be forms of one single psychic/spiritual energy. But why must this be
i on
the case? This does not respect the contingency of energy. Moreover, because
Teilhard argues that all energy is in essence one form of energy, then we have left
empirically verifiable phenomena behind and we are dealing with the essence of
being, which is again the domain of rationalism.188 Hooykaas is also critical of the
concept of continuity that is integral to Teilhard's position on evolution. Teilhard is
insistent that consciousness and life are present in rudimentary degrees in all forms
of matter. However, this is not a hypothesis, posited for example as an alternative to
divine intervention as an explanation for these phenomena. Instead, Teilhard again
takes a rationalist position and argues that there must be continuity in mind and
1 RQ
life. Hooykaas points out how this affects the contingency of the natural order;
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Medawar, 'Critical Notice', 101. C.f. Hardy, The Living Stream, 18-19 and Vernon Blackmore and
Andrew Page, Evolution the Great Debate (Oxford: Lion Publishing, 1989), 169. On a more positive
interpretation, John O'Manique argues that Teilhard is steering an opposite course to modern science
in that instead of any form of reductionism, "uses what is evident in the activities of higher organisms
to shed light on the activities of the lower levels of development, thereby placing the emphasis on
psychic activities." (John O'Manique, Energy in Evolution (London, Garnstone Press, 1969), 45-6)
Note that even this sympathetic interpretation still tacitly admits that hyperphysics does not fit a
classic empirical mould.
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189 With respect to the concept of the Within, Teilhard is going beyond the purview of the natural
sciences, "since the general supposition at which he arrives is no longer empirically determinable but
can be judged only by its ability to give a unified picture of phenomena." (Pannenberg, Towards a
Theology of Nature, 139) Teilhard's methodology then is "a massive extrapolation in which the
subjection of consciousness to the presence of the central nervous system is disregarded in favor of a
more general relationship between gradations of consciousness and gradations of complexity of
organization." (Ibid.)
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It is a purely rationalistic distortion of the situation, when Teilhard says that
on the experimental and phenomenological level a "given" universe and
each of its parts can only have the same duration. The given-ness of the
universe denies us every right to make pronouncements about what can be in
the universe."190
Finally, there is the place of evolution itself within hyperphysics. For Teilhard,
evolution is much more than a transformational process. It is instead a governing
hermeneutic. But why is this the case?191 Quoting Teilhard himself, the answer is for
"invincible reasons of homogeneity and coherence".192 In other words, this is derived
neither from empiricism or observation, but from philosophy.193 This is not to
suggest that the empirical plays no role in Teilhard's scheme, but rather to point out
that the empirical does not hold sufficient sway. For D. Gareth Jones this means that
Teilhard's phenomenological hyperphysics is not based on the scientific method
itself, but does rely on "an awareness of the physical and of that which is observable
in nature."194 It is a synthetic, not an analytical science.195 It adds no new
information, but merely elucidates what is already there. Instead of providing
hypotheses as possible explanations of certain phenomena, it provides positive
statements for all phenomena. It is transexperimental.196 However, if the findings of
hyperphysics lie beyond empirical investigation, then what is to stop them from
contradicting the findings of empirical investigation for the sake of satisfying human
rationality or spirituality? As Carol Jean Vale puts it, "beneath many of Teilhard's
ostensibly scientific arguments and elucidations, the metaphysical struggles to be
freed from its prison of overt empiricism."197
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Hooykaas, 'Teilhardism, a Pseudo-Scientific Delusion', 19
191 Ibid. 33
192 Ibid. 34, quoting from PM, (London, 1959), 220
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197 Carol Jean Vale, S.S.J. 'Teilhard de Chardin: Ontogenesis vs. Ontology', Theological Studies, 53
(1992), 313-337, (citation, 313). For further discussion of the metaphysics underlying Teilhard's
hyperphysics, and its conflict with empirical science, see J. J. Duyvene de Wit, 'Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin', in Philip E. Hughes (ed.) Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology: A Guidebook to the
Principal Teachings of Karl Barth, G. C. Berkouwer, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, Oscar
Cullman, James Denney, C. H. Dodd, Herman Dooyeweerd, P. T. Forsyth, Charles Gore, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Paul Tillich (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1966), 407-450,
(citation, 438-439)
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(ii) We have seen so far that Teilhard's hyperphysics is a blend of scientific findings
and metaphysics. His methodology here is not that of the empirical sciences, as
evinced by those features and properties of the natural order that must exist or have
precisely the values that Teilhard insists they have. There is no reliance on the
rational contingency of the natural order here, insofar as Teilhard has determined
what the answer is in advance, prior to investigation. This is an a priori and not an a
posteriori method. Nonetheless, we must not give the impression that all of the
conclusions of Teilhard's hyperphysics must also therefore be non-scientific.198 We
must examine the scientific values of Teilhard's conclusions on their scientific
merits, although if there are features that are not scientific, then we must take note of
what these particular findings imply about the rational contingency of the natural
world.
Teilhard's view of evolution is somewhat confusing because he advocates a conic
model of the process, which implies a linear (and orthogenetic) process, whilst
simultaneously maintaining that the process involves extinction, evolutionary dead
ends, 'groping' and chance (contingency). The orthogenetic aspect of his
evolutionary model is not without scientific difficulties. It is not controversial to
claim that increasing complexity marks the "arrow" of evolutionary time, because
this reduces to the truism that we find examples of increased complexity over time.
Nonetheless, for Teilhard, complexity is a qualitative as well as a quantitative
measure. Increased complexity represents progress, and this is not a scientific
concept.199 Science may be able to recognise degrees of complexity, but this cannot
198 Balance is required here. Although it would be injudicious to cast Teilhard's concepts aside as non-
scientific without a fair hearing, it is equally possible to overestimate their value, and arrive at rather
strained and perhaps even desperate comparisons. Lodovici Galleni argues that the biosphere is
analogous to the concept of Gaia, in that both are "evolving towards complexity." (Lodovici Galleni,
'How Does the Teilhardian Vision of Evolution Compare with Contemporary Theories?', Zygon, 30:1
(1995), 25-45, (citation, 32-33)) The problem with this is that the concept of Gaia is by no means an
established scientific hypothesis. The same is true for Galleni's suggestion that Teilhard's focus on
continuity is analogous to the notion of emergent properties. (Ibid. 31)
199
Delfgaauw, Evolution, 75. Despite these difficulties, it is possible to argue with hindsight that
Teilhard may have been correct. With respect to complexity/consciousness, Michael Heller argues that
the law of complexity is perhaps analogous to the concept of non-dissipative systems, whilst
nonetheless remaining a premature suggestion. (Michael Heller, 'Teilhard's Vision of the World and
Modern Cosmology', Zygon, 30:1 (1995), 11-23, (citation, 20))
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be equated with higher or lower forms of existence.200 Teilhard of course defines
evolutionary progress not just with complexity itself, but also fundamentally with an
increase in psychic complexity and consciousness, through the process of
cerebration. However, this too has dubious scientific value because it suggests that
"the single aim of evolution is to produce bigger and better brains."201 Finally, not
only is the connection between increasing complexity and consciousness true at only
a very gross level202, but Teilhard's method of gathering evidence for his law is also
somewhat arbitrary. In order to focus wholly on the nervous system, he must omit
references to all plant life, insects, all micro-organisms, and all life forms that have in
fact specialised by losing complexity.203 It is one thing to disregard discrepancies in
data as anomalous results, and an entirely different thing to ignore potentially valid
data simply because it threatens to contradict an overall hypothesis.
To understand how Teilhard maintains the rather more contingent aspect of
evolutionary history, we must now move to the scientifically difficult concept of the
Within. We have already noted that this concept is unscientific, in that it remains
untestable, and so is unsupportable through empirical science. This is not to deny that
the behavioural sciences cannot detect the capacity for learning and even degrees of
self-awareness in animals. This, however, is a far cry from arguing for even an
infinitesimal degree of consciousness in all matter, and seems to owe more to
metaphysical necessity than science.204 However, the real difficulties with
panpsychism stem from its perceived influence upon evolutionary history. First of
all, the very existence of panpsychism is important for an orthogenetic perspective on
evolution, because it suggests that human consciousness has been prefigured from
20(1 Medawar argues that it is a metaphysical conceit to correlate concepts of higher and lower with
consciousness, when complexity represents fundamentally an increase in the complexity of genetic
instructions. (Medawar, 'Critical Notice', 103)
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Riggan, 'Testing the Teilhardian Foundations', 292. Rabut argues that Teilhard's insistence on an
evolutionary 'cerebrating' direction is simple anthropomorphism. (Rabut, Dialogue, 53)
202
Jones, Teilhard de Chardin, 42. It is also a form of circular reasoning, in that "the importance of
the nervous system confirms the importance of consciousness and hence of the within throughout
evolution." (Ibid 21)
2(13
Riggan, 'Testing the Teilhardian Foundations', 293. Teilhard's rather abrupt dismissal of the
question of complexity and consciousness in insects is described as "a certain shuffling of the feet..."
by Medawar. (Medawar, 'Critical Notice', 103)
204 Dodson argues that for Teilhard, coherence, or the principle of continuity "requires that life (or
pre-life) characterize every material particle." (Dodson, The Phenomenon ofMan Revisited, 28. My
italics. C.f. Ibid. 29)
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the very origin of the process. To maintain any sense of contingency, it is perhaps
better to speak in terms of a preparation for human consciousness (i.e. as a
contingent probability or potential), as we could affirm that the evolutionary
precursors which prepare the way for consciousness do not have to be conscious
205themselves. Second, panpsychism is the motive power behind conic evolution,
because radial energy drives evolution towards Omega.206 Consequently, evolution is
characterised by both Darwinian and Lamarckian motifs. Evolution involves
Darwinian natural selection and mutation, but it also involves a form of Lamarckian
207
psychic selection. This is non-Darwinian in that adaptation is not dependent upon
characteristics acquired through inheritance. Instead;
The novelty produced by the chance mutation is, according to Teilhard,
psychically selected by an inner urge, which finds its source in the within.208
For Lamarck, an individual organism initiated the development of new capacities or
organs in response to specific evolutionary pressures or changes, and from the new
behaviour that these factors prompted. Teilhard takes this non-scientific concept one
stage further and applies it not just to individuals but also to phylogenesis.209
Teilhard is Lamarckian because cerebration is the result of psychic selection and
evolution, rather than being its cause,210 Therefore, he does not deny the existence of
chance mutation or change, but psychic selection, like natural selection, is anti-
211chance. There is of course some confusion here in that Teilhard wants to affirm
continuity between natural and psychic selection. But, natural selection does not
promote orthogenesis, whereas psychic selection does, because at least in its 'higher'
forms, psychic selection is conditioned by the lure of Omega. But is psychic
selection in opposition to natural selection? It has been argued that this contradiction
explains the vagueness of Teilhard's orthogenetic perspective, in that whilst random
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O'Manique, Energy in Evolution, 74
209 Ibid. 74
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Hooykaas, 'Teilhardism, a Pseudo-Scientific Delusion', 26
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O'Manique, Energy in Evolution, 75-76. However, Teilhard does, wrongly, seem to identify Neo-
Darwinism with an affirmation of chance. (Riggan, 'Testing the Teilhardian Foundations', 287-8)
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produce the groping (contingent) aspect of evolution, psychic selection (not
recognised by the sciences) produces the conic (non-contingent if not apparently
necessary) aspect of evolution.212 On the other hand, psychic selection has been
identified as part of natural selection, and so therefore not in contradiction.213
However, the most articulate interpretation reinforces the quantitative nature of
panpsychism, and correlates orthogenesis and groping accordingly.214 Evolution only
has a groping pattern at its lowest (and earliest) levels, where consciousness is the
least influential. Here, natural selection and mutation can have the greatest influence
on evolutionary progress, and therefore "it is the very random nature of these
processes, the uncertainties of mutation and the "luck" of selection, operating on
large numbers of organisms, which cause the groping."215 Irrespective of how we
relate the groping and orthogenetic elements within Teilhard's scheme, we are
confronted by an evolutionary mechanism that has no scientific basis. We have no
evidence for 'spiritual energy' or 'radial energy' as one manifestation of it.216
Moreover, the suggestion that there is such a conscious Lamarckian drive is a non-
scientific vitalism.217
Lastly, we should point out the status of Teilhard's consistent emphasis on continuity
within evolution and between the nature of evolutionary products. One distinct
advantage to Teilhard's emphasis is that it removes any suggestion of a scientific
creationist or Intelligent Design stance. Divine action within evolution is not to be
perceived as interventionist, although as we shall see the exact extent of divine action
might be somewhat difficult to ascertain. Unfortunately for Teilhard, his emphasis on
continuity can provide him with some difficulties, and not just with concepts such as
the Within or pre-life. One of the real problems is his simultaneous insistence on the
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singularity and uniqueness of the onset of human self-consciousness.218 A similar
difficulty is encountered in his insistence that human evolution will represent a
continuation of what has gone before, although this suggestion is perhaps refutable
by future evidence. There are certainly difficulties in his vision of future evolution in
the form of a unifying, quasi-organic, social phenomenon.219
(iii) We have come to the conclusion that Teilhard's hyperphysics is not wholly
scientific in method or content. His vision of an evolving cosmos seems to be
ambiguous with respect to the significance of contingency, not only in the sense of
rational contingency, but also in the sense of the antithesis to orthogenesis. Overall,
his vision is more deductive than inductive. There also seems to be a difficulty with
the rationality of the natural order, as exemplified by the degrees of personalism
found within all matter. The Within ofmatter implies fundamentally that all matter is
capable of acting wilfully to some extent. If this is the case, what guarantee is there
for the lawful regularity of the natural order? So Teilhard's hyperphysics cannot
protect the rational contingency of the natural order. Can we find reflections of this
failure through an endangerment of createdness in his theology? Let us begin with
the theological ramifications of his vision of the created order as he derives it from
his hyperphysics.
Although much more extensive and detailed, Teilhard's basic vision of the nature of
matter as particulate (a quantum), indivisible (a totum) and dynamic (cosmogenic) is
very much in accord with Gunton's argument based on his use of transcendentals. Of
course, as we shall note later on, this comparable use of motifs of dynamism has
parallel functions for both Teilhard and Gunton. This is manifested in their common
emphasis on Eschatology, which for both authors informs their understandings of
2IS
Hooykaas, 'Teilhardism, a Pseudo-Scientific Delusion', 21. Rabut argues that at this point Teilhard
clearly oversteps the scientific evidence in favour of guesswork. (Rabut, Dialogue, 96, nl)
219 Ibid. 99-100. It is worth noting that Dodson, although a firm and careful advocate of Teilhard's
position, does acknowledge that there are scientific difficulties with the concept of the Within, the
notion of future human development as a biological collective, and Omega itself. (Dodson, The
Phenomenon ofMan Revisited, 226). These are the areas in which empirical evidence has the least
influence, and as we shall see later on, they are also the areas in which we find the most urgent
theological difficulties.
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doctrine, from Creation and Providence to Christology and Ecclesiology. However,
there is here one fundamental difference; Gunton relates this creaturely dynamism to
220the work of the Spirit , and this (along with any extensive reference to
Pneumatology) is absent in Teilhard's scheme. Instead of focusing on the work of the
Spirit, Teilhard's solution is to concentrate on the Within of things, and so to explain
the dynamism of the natural order in terms of the effects of radial energy. The Within
is of course reminiscent of the consciousness of all matter as understood in Process
thought, which Gunton rejects as a conflation of freedom with creaturely
contingency. For Gunton, Process thought achieves the same reflexive Pantheism as
is evinced in Dawkins' selfish gene concept, in that the diminution of divine agency
results in the unwarranted expansion of creaturely agency. Is it the case that Teilhard
also produces a reflexively pantheistic scheme? It is certainly the case that Teilhard's
concept of psychic selection implies that the perfection of the natural order, which is
achieved after all through evolutionary eschatology, is driven by creaturely
consciousness. Teilhard does argue that there is divine action involved in this,
because Omega acts as a lure towards further evolutionary progress, but the onus is
definitely on creaturely ability.221 Indeed, orthogenetic evolution represents the
liberation of this creaturely capacity from the bonds of those internal and external
unconscious forces that render evolution a contingent and groping process. However,
as we shall see in later chapters, Teilhard does not argue that all consciousness will
strive towards convergence, and so perhaps even that which can progress
orthogenetically does not always do so.222 The capacity ofmatter for striving towards
220
Perhaps overly so as our critique ofGunton pointed out.
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Pannenberg argues that this reflects an inherent ambiguity in Teilhard's thought, "the ambiguity of
what finally sets in motion the evolutionary process: point Omega or the evolving entities
themselves." (Pannenberg, Toward a Theology ofNature, 131) For Pannenberg, the difficulty lies
predominantly with the concept of the Within. Because this is the driving energy of evolution, and
because Teilhard locates this (radial) energy within creaturely entities, then it follows that the dynamic
of evolution must lie with these same creaturely entities. This then reduces Omega and its agency to
"a mere extrapolation of tendencies inherent in the evolutionary process or, more precisely, in the
evolving animals themselves." (Ibid.) However, Teilhard of course wishes to say more of the agency
and reality of Omega for evolution and does so "by describing evolution as the work of a unified spirit
who transcends the individual entities and is finally identical with God Omega who creatively and
progressively unifies his world." (Ibid. 131-2)
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For Teilhard, evolution is the advance of radial energy over tangential energy; it is the liberation of
Spirit from Spirit-matter, from its organic/material matrix. Evolution is the manner in which the
natural order reaches the Eschaton. There is a suspicion here of a Gnostic devaluing of matter, which
is not in any way relieved when we note that Teilhard regards the endpoint of evolution as a
discarding of materiality by (human) consciousness, rather than as a perfection of the whole natural
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the Eschaton is of course most clearly seen in human evolution, although Teilhard's
emphasis on continuity means that human cultural evolution is only a newer and
clearer version of what has gone before. The concept of cultural evolution is not
unique to Teilhard, and it is seen for instance in Hefner's notion of the 'Created co-
creator'. Teilhard's own version of this is particularly reminiscent of evolutionary
religious humanism, which is of course why Sir Julian Huxley could write so warmly
of Teilhard's vision in the introduction to The Phenomenon ofMan. Apart from the
difficulties in personalising impersonal matter, psychic selection leaves us with a
Pelagianism in which the future perfection of the world, achieved through evolution,
is a human endeavour. Spirit-matter, especially in its most conscious and complex
form at present, is the driving force towards the Eschaton, and not divine action.
There is at least one clear instance in which Teilhard's difficulties with rational
contingency can be seen to be based on theological concepts. His insistence that
evolution will not fail is a faith claim and not a scientific hypothesis. It disregards
contingency, and relies instead on Omega. In turn this suggests that Omega is a
theological and not a scientific construct, which impression is highlighted by the
features of Omega which Teilhard claims are necessarily the case. Although his
hyperphysics cannot identify Omega, Teilhard can deduce that Omega is
transcendent and so divine. Teilhard, like Gunton, rightly uses the transcendence of
God/Omega as the foundation of the other deducible properties of Omega. For
instance, the divine immanence by which Omega is present at the Eschaton is
dependent upon this divine transcendence. Furthermore, he attempts to avoid
Pantheism by arguing for the present reality and consciousness of Omega, and both
of these are again motifs dependent upon the prevenience and so transcendence of
Omega. Finally, he is insistent on the divine impassibility (God survives the end of
the universe) and this is again due to the divine transcendence. Nonetheless, there are
some troubling characteristics of Omega. First, because Omega is concerned with the
preservation of consciousnesses, then the value ofmatter seems drastically reduced.
Second, our evolutionary progress (and so the eschatological perfection of the natural
order. The same is true here with regard to evolutionary progress. Spirit arises from matter, and only
when Spirit gains the upper hand can there be progress. That which is unconscious, matter discussed
apart from Spirit, is an impediment to evolution and so to the eschatological progress of the world.
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order) seems dependent solely upon our faith in Omega. Omega seems exemplary
rather than active. To this end, the action or 'pull' of Omega seems to be as
attenuated and easily disregarded as the 'lure' of the God of Process. It is interesting
that at this point Teilhard notes that love/radial energy has a weaker effect in more
primitive organisms, just as consciousness is weakened and less effective in more
primitive entities in Process thought. Therefore, for both Teilhard and Process
thought, more primitive organisms and entities are less responsive to God, and so
God has less effect on these.
Conclusion
In this first chapter of our discussion of Teilhard's thought, we have kept away from
theological concerns as far as possible, but even so there is some deliberate and
accidental overlap between science and theology in his hyperphysics. We say both
deliberate and accidental because only the divinity of Omega is intended to be an
explicitly theological issue. All else in hyperphysics is in principle a development of
purely scientific interests. However, as we have seen, some of the scientific
difficulties with Teilhard's findings have also demonstrated a theological
significance, as they are relevant for the createdness of the natural order and
evolution in particular. These scientific cum theological concerns centre so far on the
direction and directedness of evolution. An orthogenetic or progressive view of
evolution is not a scientific interpretation of the evidence, but it is of theological
interest because it is an eschatological commitment. Spirit-matter (or more precisely
Spirit, as matter is ultimately left behind) is perfected through evolution towards
Omega. Moreover, this perfection must occur. The concept of Omega itself is
evidently a non-scientific and theological concept.223 The same is true of the Within,
insofar as it risks anthropomorphising inanimate and unconscious matter. These non-
scientific aspects of hyperphysics all have theological implications, but is it the case
that all of them have implications for createdness? The indications so far would
suggest so. The concept of panpsychism has already been flagged up within our
223
It is really a form of natural theology.
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grammar of createdness, as a functional equivalent to the anthropomorphism of (for
example) the selfish gene that arises from an unmediated deistic understanding of the
God-world relationship. Moreover, although it is only suggested so far, Teilhard does
seem to equate the path of evolutionary history with eschatology. This again has
been discussed within our grammar as a divinising of created capacities, at the
expense of divine action. Whilst we cannot be certain as to an exact relationship, this
does tally with the inspirational rather than directly active nature of Omega that we
have encountered so far. Finally, our grammar affirms, along with the Christian
tradition, that the natural order is good, but this cannot be said for the proposed
abandonment ofmatter at the eschaton.
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Chapter 6: Evolution and Theology (I) - Metaphysics, and the
Incarnation
Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed Teilhard's evolutionary thought purely from the
perspective of what he refers to as hyperphysics, or a phenomenological approach to
science. In the same vein we were able to provide a brief scientific and theological
critique of Teilhard's vision. We were able to conclude that despite spirited support
for Teilhard from some quarters, the general tenor of his thought in this regard is
incompatible with mainstream evolutionary science. We also came to the tentative
conclusion that at least in the instances we encountered, the explicitly non-scientific
aspects of hyperphysics also had theological consequences, and in particular for
createdness. This gives some initial support to our contention that the relationship
between science and theology ought to be based on this dual aspect of rational
contingency and createdness. We can now move on in the next two chapters to
discuss Teilhard's theology itself, and although we can discuss the createdness or
otherwise of other aspects of the natural order in his thought, in our critique we will
concentrate on the createdness or otherwise of evolution.
Even a cursory examination of Teilhard's thought demonstrates that to understand
his theological perspective on evolution, we must frame our discussion in terms of
his Christology. This is because, as we noted at the beginning of our treatment of
Teilhard, Omega is to be identified with Jesus Christ.1 For Teilhard, the specifically
Christian contribution to a phenomenological interpretation of evolution is to see that
"the world's history bears the form of a vast cosmogenesis, in the course of which all
the threads of reality converge without fusing in a Christ who is at the same time
personal and universal."2 Fernando describes this well;
1
HM, 92. C.f. CE, 87
2
HE, 155. Teilhard makes clear that for him Christ-Omega is never a threat to the historical reality
and significance of the historical Christ. (TF, 99) The very nature of his theology is predicated upon
the historical reality of the Incarnation and the resurrection. C.f. Terrence P. Charlton S.J., The
Incarnation in the Thought ofPierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J. (PhD thesis, Boston College, 1986), 61
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Evolutionary science and speculation postulate the Omega - point, and
indicate its properties. But it remains unidentified. When the light of
Christian Faith is brought to bear on this reality, it takes on the figure, form
and face of Jesus Christ/
To be more precise, Teilhard identifies Omega with the return of Christ, the
Parousia. However, Teilhard is far from saying that Christ is divorced from the
cosmos and its evolutionary history until the second coming. He very closely links
the Incarnation, and a continuing presence and action of Christ in evolution with the
Parousia. In this chapter we will deal with the first of these issues, but only after we
have addressed an aspect of Teilhard's theology that provides the link between his
hyperphysics and his theology. This is his metaphysics of creation.
(A) Evolution andMetaphysics
(i) Teilhard's understanding of the nature of matter and being is very much a
development of his Thomist training. Through his own development of Thomist
metaphysics, Teilhard discusses God's being as the most perfect example of being,
and can then discuss creaturely being relative to this. As might be expected,
however, Teilhard's thinking has some divergences. In particular, unlike in Thomist
thought, God's being is not to be understood as esse, or the act of being itself.
Instead, God's being is to be understood as unire, the act of unifying or being
unified.4 To be is to be united.5 Being is not a final notion; it is defined by a
particular movement that is associated with it - union. Therefore "to be = to unite
oneself, or to unite others (the active form)" and "to be = to be united and unified by
another (the passive form)".6 All of this comes under the rubric of creative union;
3
Fernando, 'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin', 37. "The Omega of science and the Christ of the Bible are
two centers of convergence, true heads which polarize and rule the world." (Bravo, Christ in the
Thought of Teilhard de Chardin, 42-43) They are one and the same because Teilhard argues that the
universe cannot have two heads. (Ibid. 43)
4 This is a metaphysics of unire. (e.g. CE, 227). C.f. Emile Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin: A Guide to





Creative union is the theory that accepts this proposition: in the present
evolutionary phase of the cosmos (the only phase known to us), everything
happens as though the One were formed by successive unifications of the
Multiple - and as though the One were more perfect, the more perfectly it
centralised under itself a larger Multiple.7
This leads Teilhard to describe being in terms reminiscent of Process Theology. For
instance, his metaphysics of unity enables him to say that every being has two poles,
a lower pole from which it emerges, and a higher pole towards which it ascends.8
Below every entity exhibiting unity there is an expanse of the multiple which has
been united as this entity and within it. Therefore, the multiple (that which is less
united) does not cease to exist within a higher unity, because the process of
convergence is the same process which actually renders each lower level entity
discrete.9
(ii) But how does this metaphysics tie in with Christian theology? The answer lies in
the God-world relationship and God's act of creation. For this metaphysics we must
first assume the existence of a First Being, Omega.10 This being must also be
understood to be triune. God exists by uniting himself, by rendering himself triune,
via the process of Trinitization." This enables the doctrine of creation to be seen as
much more than an act of efficient causation. In a very real sense creation is the fruit
of a reflection of God, the pleromisation or realisation of participated being through
arrangement and totalisation. It emerges as a sort of echo or symmetrical response to
12Trinitization. Teilhard can refer to this twofold process as theogenesis;
7
SC, 45. This concept is found in some of Teilhard's earliest published letters, suggesting this




TF, 54. For a similar perspective see C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and
Norgate, 1923), 11-12)
10 Ibid. 193




In the first, God posits himself in his Trinitarian structure ('fontah being
reflecting itself, self-sufficient, upon itself): 'Trinitization'. In the second
phase, he envelops himself in participated being, by evolutive unification of
pure multiple ('positive non-being') born (in a state of absolute potency) by
antithesis to pre-posited trinitarian unity: Creation.13
One of the very interesting and alarming features of this understanding of creation is
Teilhard's identification of the non-united, the multiple, with the non-existent. All
being, by its very nature is in constant drive towards unity, and a greater degree of
reality or being. All matter is animate.14 Moreover, this drive towards greater unity is
synonymous with a drive towards greater centricity, by the law of
complexity/consciousness. The uncentred is equivalent to the multiple, and has the
same ontological value;
Complete exteriority or total 'transience', like absolute multiplicity, is
synonymous with nothingness.15
In this context we also learn a little of how to understand divine action. If the
multiple is non-existent, then for God to create is to unite, and so we have the pattern
of convergent evolution.16 The act of creation is a "transition from a state of initial
dispersion to one of ultimate harmony."17 Moreover, the non-existence of the
multiple means that God's evolutive creativity, whereby union is achieved for
18
aspects of the multiple, is genuinely creative because it results in more being. At
the risk of pre-empting our later discussion, we can now see why it is that God
creates. There is one state of unity even higher than that of God's own being; and
that is "the uniting with God of that which is reduced to a state of union from a state
of pure multiplicity."19 The universe is committed to a pattern of becoming, a
direction towards Spirit, and of course Omega.20
13
CE, 178, n4. C.f. Smith, 'God and Evolutive Creation', 42
14
SC, 46. The propulsion of the multiple or disunited towards unity is to be understood in mundane
terms. It is a principle of matter, due to radial energy. We must of course also remember the work of
Omega Point as an attractive force for this energy. Smith, therefore, is quite wrong to attempt to









Smith, 'God and Evolutive Creation', 44
19
Lyons, The Cosmic Christ. 178. As Vale puts it;
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(iii) The concept of creative union also has a number of significant consequences for
the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, which we have argued is integral to createdness.
For Teilhard, this doctrine no longer refers to a primordial isolation of God,
signifying the creation with time of an essential dualism between God and the
created order. Instead, it means for Teilhard that God and the multiple are in fact two
poles of being, wherein God is alone precisely and only because the multiple is non¬
existent.21 And so, "it is not the notion of non-being that has to be replaced by that
of the multiple or the unifiable: it is the notion of the pure unifiable or the pure
multiple that has to be identified with that of nothingness."22 God's act of self-
unification stimulates a type of opposition, at the very opposite pole from himself.
God cannot exist without an associated multiple.23 This opposite pole, although it is
pure potentiality for being, the "creatable nil...'" is therefore a necessary
consequence.24 Unfortunately, this means that the multiple does not, strictly
speaking, arise ex nihilo. The multiple is as it were on the same evolutionary series
as being; it is merely present as absolute disunity.25 Teilhard himself argues
explicitly against an initial moment of creation. The act of creation must be
understood in terms of a creative transformation. This is the formation of new being
from pre-existent being?6 An act of origination of the multiple is inconceivable;
However far back we look into the past, we see the waves of the Multiple
breaking into foam as though they emerged from a negative pole of being.27
"The Divine unification becomes the prototype for creation, which, according to the
Teilhardian theory of creative union, comes into existence and complexifies through
a process of unification. The created becomes an essential part of the ongoing,















SC, 78. This is a consistent aspect of Teilhard's thought, as we can see from an entry to his journal,
dated 9.10.16;
"Union, like all forms of action, is a recurrence which seems to throw itself back to
infinity. Union has to unite something." {Journal, entry 9.10.16, 224)
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Whilst it is probably accurate to regard the multiple in Teilhard's thought as a limit-
concept, derived dialectically from that of unity,28 it appears that the multiple is
nonetheless both necessary and eternal in Teilhard's theology.
For Teilhard this gives a very specific form to divine action. Because the multiple is
apparently eternal, there is no moment when divine creativity ceases and secondary
causality takes over. Divine action is therefore conceived as a single, conserving,
9Q
divine action. New being arises solely through secondary causes. In language
reminiscent ofKingsley's evolutionary interpretation of Providence, Teilhard argues;
The First Cause is not involved in effects; it acts upon individual natures and
on the movement of the whole. Properly speaking, God does not make: He
makes things make themselves.30
Moreover, God cannot create wholes spontaneously; God must gradually create
increasingly complex participated being which is in turn increasingly capable of
sustaining his creative effort.31 As Rideau points out, on Teilhard's account "God can
create and wishes to create only beings that exist in history and in time, freely
endowed by him with the desire to be united to him, and situated within a history
(cosmic and human) that is itself also freely endowed with the desire progressively to
37
unify itself in order to be united with God and coincide with its end." Teilhard goes
further; not only is it the case that God is incapable of creating individual entities33,
he also never intended to. Instead, God willed Christ, and the existence of all other
entities is the integral forerunner to the final culmination ofChrist.34
2b Donald P. Gray, The One and the Many: Teilhard de Chardin's Vision ofUnity (London: Bums and
Oates, 1969), 18
29
CE, 23. Rideau takes this notion of divine action to be in line with Teilhard's thomist training.
(Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin , 159)
30
CE, 28, 32, 179 and VP, 154. It is therefore certainly difficult to argue, as does Donald P. Gray, that
for Teilhard the multiple has no intrinsic capacity for unity. (Gray, The One and theMany, 30)
31
CE, 32, n4 and CE, 83
32
Rideau, Teilhard de Chardin, 156. Charlton suggests tentatively that Teilhard may in fact view an
evolutionary principle as necessary to any created order, but acknowledges that this would explicitly




SC, 79. We should add that this makes the Incarnation essential to the concept of creative union,
just as it will be later shown to be in Teilhard's understanding of evolution itself. (AE, 262-3; TF, 196,
198 and CE, 83)
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The difficulty with this position is that if we do away with the concept of creation ex
nihilo, then the multiple (and so all that is founded on it) must be understood as a
threat to God's sovereignty. This would be an appropriate interpretation based on the
rather attenuated understanding of divine action that Teilhard implies. It is highly
consonant with a competitive view of the God-world relationship. If this is
reasonable, then the multiple is no longer a creature, it is divine, or divinised. It is
clear that Teilhard would never advocate this conception deliberately, at least in an
explicitly pantheistic form. However, he seems willing on occasion to advocate
something more akin to Manichaeism. On more than one occasion, and from his
earliest developed work, Teilhard identifies the multiple with evil.
(iv) Teilhard's position on the nature of evil is that it is unavoidable and inevitable
within the cosmos. This is because Teilhard often equates evil with suffering. In turn,
suffering is not something extrinsic and foreign to the universe; it is the consequence
of evolutionary mistakes.35 Evil is therefore an integral aspect, indeed a by-product,
of a cosmos in evolution, of a multiple experiencing rearrangement.36 Death,
suffering and evil are the price that has to be paid for progress, for increasing unity
and complexity.37 Teilhard seems to suggest that all matter, precisely because it is
not yet fully united at and with Omega, is intrinsically dangerous;
New being, launched into existence and not yet completely assimilated into
unity, is a dangerous thing, bringing with it pain and oddity.™
In using such a concept of evil and its origin, Teilhard seems to imply that it is the
consequences of the multiple that make it evil; for instance, he argues that the
39





CE, 41. C.f. TF, 197




Elsewhere he attributes this to its transience.40 In other words, it is the intrinsic
properties of the foundation of the cosmos upon the multiple that is the origin of evil;
In an evolving cosmos, created being as such has not yet achieved the state
of integrity.41
Hence, he can argue that it is the limitations that matter places upon the divine
activity that explain the presence of evil. God cannot but create evil, even with the
formation of the first atom.42 Creation cannot move towards unity without
occasionally engendering evil.43 Redemption then is a compensation for statistical
disorder.44 The language of redemption is appropriate for Teilhard's purposes
because he also wishes to describe this evil in terms of sin and original sin. Indeed,
he wishes to assert the temporal and spatial pervasion of sin throughout the cosmos.45
This is so extensive that sinlessness and creature must be mutually exclusive terms.46
But how can one universalise sin and original sin without a first Adam?47 The
solution is to see evil as the inevitable companion to participated being. It is the
40
shadow of it. As we have said, on occasion Teilhard's language suggests that it is
the consequences of the existence of disunity that are to be understood as sin and
evil. Where this is the case, Teilhard would appear to be referring to physical evil.
40 Ibid. 57. Hence, Teilhard can argue that life, although it is an axis of universal progression, must
still proceed by groping, precisely because it is founded on the multiple. (TF, 170)
41 John F. Haught, 'In Search of a God for Evolution: Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin',
Zygon, 37:3 (2002), 539-553, (citation, 546)
42
CE, 33. As Gray argues;
"If there is any cause for evil in general, it is God who decided to create by uniting
multiplicity." (Gray, The One and the Many, 64-5)
43
TF, 198. One cannot make a unified omelette without breaking multiple eggs.
44 Ibid. 198, n38. However, as Mooney points out, this means that Christ is the Redeemer precisely as
Omega, as the one who ensures that matter evolves. This does not suggest an intrinsic goodness in





48 Ibid. 40. "Thus, original sin for Teilhard is a negative and inevitable and structural element in an
evolving universe, a universal condition of existence in a progressively converging world." (Robert L.
Faricy, S.J., 'Teilhard dc Chardin's Theology of Redemption', Theological Studies, 27 (1966), 553-
579, (citation, 567). On a similar note, many years ago, George Frederick Wright could argue that the
concept of "heredity as maintained by modern evolutionists is closely akin to the Calvinistic doctrine
of original sin." (George Frederick Wright, 'Calvinism and Darwinism', Bibliotecha Sacra, 66 (1909),
685-691, (citation, 687)
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This is unwilled, and unintended suffering caused simply by existing within the
cosmos.
(v) Teilhard then can refer to sin and evil in terms of the passive presence of
suffering and disorder within the cosmos. But this is by no means a consistent
position. In fact, there are numerous occasions where Teilhard lapses into an
apparent connection between the multiple and moral evil, as if it were the intended
consequence of an agent's actions. On these occasions, the multiple itself is evil.
Hence, we find Teilhard arguing that absolute multiplicity is absolute evil.49 Again,
there is only one evil, and that is disunity. Or, as Teilhard puts it elsewhere, at the
beginning was the multiple, already rising towards unity and the Spirit, but painfully
slowly due to its evil nature.50 Now, it is arguable that such language refers to evil
understood as suffering. But this does not account for Teilhard's use of the language
of struggle against the multitude, of warfare between unity and multiplicity. The
Incarnation involves hand to hand struggle against the multiple51, an attack on the
multiple in the form of a war between God and evil.52 Also, every new act of unity is
a victory over the multiple.53 This has led Claude Tresmontant to liken Teilhard's
position to that of Babylonian cosmologies, such that in Teilhard we find "what
amounts to a metaphysical mythology".54 In terms of the language of sin, original sin
is to be understood as "the essential reaction of the finite to the creative act."55 By the
very act ofcreating, God commits himself to a combating of evil, and indeed to some
form of redemptive action.56 Note the close link between creation and redemption
here; redemption is the counterpart of creation.57 Creation, fall, incarnation and
redemption must be seen as elements of one and the same divine action.58 The
49







54 Claude Tresmontant, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: His Thought (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1959),
91, quoted in Gray, The One and the Many, 24
55
CE, 40. My italics
56 Ibid. 40 and 84
57 Ibid. 51-2 and 84. C.f. SC, 80, nl5
58
CE, 53. C.f. Gray, The One and the Many, 66 where he notes this connectivity between creation and
redemption but does not accept the notion of an inherently evil multiple.
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multiple must be saved.59 Coupled with the language of active evil, this view of
redemption suggests more than a mere restoration of statistical order. How are we to
interpret this language? It is our contention that we are witnessing the consequences
of failing to maintain a concept of createdness; the multiple here seems to be an
agent and to have actual powers.60 This is particularly confusing if one considers the
fact that the multiple is supposedly non-existent! The multiple has lost its creaturely
status, and has therefore taken on divine attributes, including apparently being eternal
and necessary. As such, for Teilhard it is a threat to God's own sovereignty, and even
God's purposes.61 This situation is compounded by Teilhard's ambiguity over the
necessity of the created order for God's purposes. Teilhard can sometimes suggest
that the new degree of unity that Omega represents is in fact necessary for God's
own being. The co-existence of created and uncreated is essential to both in order to
£G)
obtain this highest degree of unification. God may be self-sufficient, but the
universe contributes something vitally necessary to him. It contributes to the
pleromization of God.63
(vi) Let us recap. So far we have argued that Teilhard fails to safeguard the
createdness of the multiple. This applies both to the contingency and the intrinsic
goodness of the original creation. It would appear that both of these omissions stem
from Teilhard's understanding of the intrinsic value of unity, and in particular
Omega, both in its own right and for God's own being. Teilhard overvalues unity,
undervalues multiplicity, and in short fails to acknowledge the inherent value in the
59 Ina Bergeron and Anne-Marie Ernst, Le Christ Universel et 1'Evolution selon Teilhard de Chardin
(Paris: CERF, 1986), 122. God saves the creation by completing its evolution. (Stewart, Nature in
Grace, 200)
60 See the comment on this agential aspect of the multitude in Stewart, Nature in Grace, 241
61 Smith seems to have noted this possible interpretation of Teilhard's thought, but he relates this to a
concept of divine self-limitation. Very much in line with Moltmann's concept of zimsum, he argues
that God must limit himself to pose a nothingness in which creation can occur. What Smith then
claims, but fails to account for, is the presence of the image of the Trinity (i.e. umfiabihty) withm this
nothingness. (Smith, 'God and Evolutive Creation', 52) Not only is this image of the Trinity within
the nothingness inexplicable, it is very difficult to find solid references to a conception of divine self-
limitation within Teilhard's thought. What Smith has noticed is the fact that Teilhard's language is
consistent with a limitation on God's part. At most he can impose some form of order on the multiple.
Therefore, God is not limiting himself for the sake of the multiple; it is rather that Teilhard envisages





whole created order. Redemption must then be understood as the overcoming of the
evil which is multiplicity, as "a gradual coordination of elements" 4, and becomes
integral to the divine creative act. Such a scheme cannot account for the presence of
evil within the initial creation, except as some form of pre-cosmic Fall.65 Even this is
inconceivable because Teilhard finds difficulty in affirming an original creation.
Teilhard cannot affirm the creation of the multiple, and it comes to be regarded as
evil, because it is in competition with God. Hence, we find the language of active
evil. If the multiple cannot be affirmed in its createdness, then Teilhard is
inadequately distinguishing his position from one of a dualistic metaphysics in which
God is eternally confronted by an opposite pole of being.
(B) Evolution and the Presence ofChrist
Because Christology and evolutionary theology are closely linked in Teilhard's
thought, our first foray into his theology proper must begin with the question cur
Deus homo? Why was there an Incarnation? For Teilhard, the answer appears to be
twofold; the Incarnation is essential for the redemption wrought by the whole life of
Jesus Christ, but there are suggestions that the Incarnation would have occurred even
without the presence of sin in the world.66 Teilhard explicitly refers to Scotus, and
f\1
argues that there had to be an Incarnation if Omega is to function properly. In other
words, Omega simply cannot occur if Christ is not a part of the preceding
evolutionary process. Moreover, Omega represents the perfection of the natural
order. Therefore, for Teilhard and Gunton, Christology embraces eschatological and
soteriological theological motifs. For Teilhard, evolution is essential to both types of
motifs.
64
H. A. Blair, 'Progress', in Hanson, Teilhard Reassessed, 79-100, (citation, 92)
65 Ibid. 98
66 The question as to whether sin and evil are unavoidable is at best a moot point, as we noted in the
previous chapter.
67
AE, 150. C.f. Bravo, Christ in the Thought ofTeilhard de Chardin, 38
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(i) For Teilhard, Omega is an eschatological and a redemptive achievement. We
noted in the last subsection that redemption is to be understood in terms of
thermodynamics, as the attainment of order and unity. This seems particularly clear
because Teilhard suggests that it is Omega itself that is the culmination of
redemption;
Is the kingdom of God a big family? Yes, in a sense it is. But in another
sense it is a prodigious biological operation - that of the Redeeming
Incarnation.68
In other words, the physical (and perhaps moral) evil of disunity is to be overcome
through a final and complete organic unification of the world with God. This union is
so intense and intimate, that Teilhard envisages this as a kind of Pantheism; God all
in all. Now this is an essential point in Teilhard's thought. It is so prominent and
consistent that our critique at the end of the last chapter was based around reflexive
Pantheism in Teilhard's metaphysics. Hence, for Teilhard, this is not a Pantheism
where God becomes all, or is identified directly with evolution. God is all in
everyone, by the differentiating and communicating action of love.69 Unity with the
divine does not come at the cost of consciousness or identity.70 As Gabriel Dussault
puts it;
First of all, although God is really all in everything at the end of the world or
in the world's future and already currently "hoped for" yet questionable, it in
no way follows that God destroys the inherent personality of the elements
which he unifies in himself; he does not annihilate us when he invades us.71
Omega maintains the identity of both divine and creaturely elements. Indeed, as de
Lubac has pointed out, Teilhard is opposed to Pantheism precisely because it
depersonalises God.72 He is also opposed to the pantheistic annihilation of the
68
PH, 321
69 Ibid. 338. This is God's eschatological immanence in the world. Dussault, 'Le Dieu que Notre
Siecle Attend', 59. Teilhard refers to his views on pantheism throughout his work.
70
MD, 104. "The pagan holds that man divinises himself by closing in upon himself; the final act of
human evolution is when the individual, or the totality, constitutes itself within itself. The Christian
sees his divinisation only in the assimilation by an 'Other' of his achievement: the culmination of life,
in his eyes, is death in union." (Ibid. 107) C.f. Ibid. 120; WW, 29 and SC, 107
71
Dussault, 'Le Dieu que Notre Siecle Attend', 42-3
72 Henri de Lubac, The Faith of Teilhard de Chardin (tr. Rene Hague) (London: Burns & Oates,
1965), 23
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identity of the creature. God is the name of consummated being, not in the sense of
dissolution, but in the sense of fulfilled personhood.7"1
(ii) If the goal of creation in ultimate unity is itself redemptive, then redemption
traditionally understood as a response to sin must also be reinterpreted in this light.
As Mooney rightly points out, Teilhard never associates redemption with a payment
for human sin.74 It is always understood as a creative enabling of further evolution,
and more specifically human evolution. Therefore, precisely because human
evolution is at the forefront of cosmic development, any threat to human evolution is
a threat to Omega, and the fulfilment of all creation.75 Human sin is the great threat
to human unification. Without the Incarnation, sin would return everything to the
multiple.76 Good and evil are therefore to be understood in eschatological terms. That
which moves towards synthesis and unity is good.77 On the other hand, evil should
be understood strictly speaking not as a reality but as "a residue of the good, a
relapse towards non-being."78 As Teilhard puts it, "through Christ, the bundle of all
created matter that was in danger of falling back and disintegrating is re-formed in a
higher, terminal, unity, balancing the lower, radical, unity drawn from incorporation
in one and the same matter."79 The Incarnation is therefore God's way of ensuring
evolutionary progress by addressing us through Christ, who becomes immanent
within the process;
If the universe is rising progressively higher towards unity, it is therefore not
only under the influence of some external force, but because in that unity the
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Bravo, Christ in the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin, 64. For an earlier, and presumably





Stewart, Nature in Grace, 195
78 Ibid. 196. To this end Stewart can argue against a Manichaeian interpretation of Teilhard's thought.
(Ibid, pi98) We would heartily agree that any Manichaeism in Teilhard is not deliberate, but






Note the significance that Teilhard attributes to evolution in this scheme. Evolution is
of course vital for redemption, insofar as it is necessary if there is to be an evolved
81
humanity and so a locus for the Incarnation. But we have already noted that there
would have been an Incarnation irrespective of the presence of human sin within the
world. This is because of the recurring motif that Omega cannot be achieved
otherwise.
(iii) For Teilhard the goal of Omega cannot be achieved without a continuing and
89
evolving presence of Christ within the evolutionary process. " As such Christ is the
presence of Omega within the evolutionary process "in the form of a leader element
(the Christie centre), appearing phyletically in the noosphere and gradually
subordinating all the other centres."83 Therefore in Teilhard's thinking we find a
parallelism with Gunton's thinking. Teilhard too wishes to see the Incarnation as an
event that gains its shape from the need to ensure that the cosmos can follow the path
to eschatological perfection. This perfection is of course to be understood in terms of
the final unification of humanity with Christ-Omega;
By partially immersing himself in things, by becoming 'element', and then,
from this point of vantage in the heart of matter, assuming the control and
leadership of what we now call evolution. Christ...aggregates to himself the
total psychism of the earth. And when he has gathered everything together
and transformed everything, he will close in upon himself and his conquests,
thereby rejoining, in a final gesture, the divine focus he has never left.84
The cosmos is then one in which "a divine involution steps down to combine with
the mounting evolution of the cosmos..."85 Therefore "it was in order that he might
become omega" that Christ became incarnate and so conquer and animate the
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and fulfilled." (Fernando, 'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin', 37). Note how the Incarnation is therefore
proleptic; it is the presence of the future and future conditions within the present. The absence of any




universe.86 God creates for the sake of the Incarnation,87 and Omega. As we noted at
the beginning of this chapter, for Teilhard, the convergent universe must have only
one head, and this is Christ. Therefore we can say that evolution has no natural goal,
the goal is Christ-Omega.88 The purpose of the Incarnation is redemptive therefore
not only in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, but also in the manner in which
it establishes the evolutionary path towards Omega through a continuing presence of
Christ within evolution. Evolution is therefore vital to both the redemption and
OQ
perfection of the cosmos.
(iv) We need to look now at how Teilhard correlates the Incarnation with this
continuing presence of Christ. In order to do this we must first have a clearer
understanding of how Teilhard understands the connection between the Incarnation
and the God-world relationship. Teilhard's vision of the Incarnation is one of an
expression of divine immanence, such that his position allows him to posit the
presence of Christ within the evolutionary process both before and after the
Incarnation. Teilhard's immanentism is by no means a merely rational theological
position. It is rather an aspect of a highly moving and powerful mystical vision. For
Teilhard, the presence of God within the world must be understood as the divine
milieu, or the omnipresence and immensity of God;
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SC, 54. My italics
87 Journal, entry 27.1.919, quoted in Charlton, The Incarnation, 140. Deitz argues rightly then that for
Teilhard "[cjreation, Incarnation, and evolution all have the same purpose: perfect union of matter
with God." (Margaret Mary C. Deitz, 'The Theology of the Redemption of Duns Scotus and Teilhard
de Chardin' (PhD Dissertation, St. Mary's University and Seminary, Baltimore, 1975), 97)
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WW, 59
89 There is a striking parallel between Teilhard's thought on the eschatological and soteriological
evolutionary significance of the Incarnation and an earlier argument by E. Griffith Jones (The Ascent
Through Christ: A Study of the Doctrine of Redemption in the Light of the Theory of Evolution
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1902)). Here Griffith-Jones argues for a cessation of organic
evolution at the human threshold (Ibid. 51), the present use of social instincts for a form of spiritual
evolution, its inhibition and regression by sin, and the redemptive role of the Incarnation as that which
reverses this backwards evolutionary trend (Ibid. 53). Most strikingly, Griffith-Jones, makes the wider
connection between the Incarnation as that which "not only aims at the restoration of Man to his
primal position, but at a complete and perfect development of all his spiritual possibilities." (Ibid.
282). However, he goes further than Teilhard and argues that the resurrection body is the fulfilment of
evolutionary development. (Ibid. 349)
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By means of all created things, without exception, the divine assails us,
penetrates us and moulds us. We imagined it as distant and inaccessible,
whereas in fact we live steeped in its burning layers.90
In this vision, as with all his thoughts on the God-world relationship both at present
and at Omega, Teilhard strives constantly to ward off any suggestion of Pantheism,
understood as an identification of God and creature. For him, the divine milieu is an
ocean that sustains and sur-animates all things, and yet is nevertheless a concrete
transcendence that brings all things into God's personal unity, without confusion.91
God can reveal himself as the universal milieu only because he is already the
ultimate point of convergent reality92, and God can unite all things only because he is
the centre of centres.93 This scheme is of course reminiscent of Teilhard's purely
phenomenological extrapolation of the nature of Omega. In fact, Teilhard argues that
because God is the centre of centres, he coincides perfectly with Omega.94
(v) This connection between immanence and Omega returns us to the Incarnation.
Omega is more precisely Christ, and the manifestation of the divine immanence
within the created order is therefore the Incarnate Lord.95 Hence it is that the
Incarnation is a partial immersion; the body of Christ is only a spatial point and
temporal moment ofGod's insertion into the world. The Incarnation itself is not to be
perceived as a strictly localised event; because Christ's body is in fundamental unity
with all matter, "what the Word really assumed is the whole universe; and he
assumed it in a unique fashion, for he himself had already been assumed by it."96 The
point then is to see the Incarnation as the highest expression of an ongoing process.
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MD, 99. C.f. WW, 47. Nonetheless, he argues explicitly for a theology that affirms divine
immanence. (AE, 262)
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MD, 100. A number of commentators have been keen to stress this transcendent basis for divine
immanence in Teilhard's thought, and so head off an immanentist interpretation of his thought. For
instance, de Lubac, The Faith ofTeilhard de Chardin, 27 and Charlton, The Incarnation, 102
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MD, 101. In this work he can argue that in the light of this divine milieu all cosmic elements are but
cones of reality converging upon God. (Ibid. 101) Teilhard is enamoured of the imagery of cones for
describing evolutionary convergence, and we shall come upon them again.
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MD, 110. C.f. Ibid. 104-5 and SC, 59, n5. Teilhard argues for a position parallel to the
understanding of Omega as Christ; the mystical Christ is without significance except as an expansion
of the historical Jesus of Nazareth. (MD, 105)
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Bravo, Christ in the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin, 52
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The Incarnation "is not a process which exhausts itself in a single and unique
historical person. It is a process of transformation which aims at the divinisation of
man. But, in man, it transforms the universe."97 As Teilhard puts it, the first
Christmas was not devoid of Christ, it was rather imbued by an influx of his power.98
We must understand the presence of Christ at the widest scale of existence, and this
in Teilhard's peculiarly retroactive language;
When Christ first appeared before men in the arms of Mary he had already
stirred up the world.99
Therefore the Incarnation is the link between immanence and evolution because
"God himself' rises up in this world and "the organic form of the universe thus
divinised is Christ Jesus".100 For Teilhard, the Incarnation represents an increasing
revelation or clarity of this ongoing christological immanence within matter.
However, there is some ambiguity as to the typical creaturely status of this matter.
Teilhard argues that the Incarnation required the creation by God of the Virgin Mary,
"a purity so great that, within this transparency, He would concentrate Himself to the
point of appearing as a child."101 Teilhard seems to suggest that Christ does not
become incarnate in matter per se, it is rather rarefied or purified matter. Hence, he
can refer to matter ascending to Mary and then Christ, and then on to the body of
107Christ. This is suggestive of the moral ambiguity of the multiple. Irrespective of
these issues, it is clear that for Teilhard the Incarnation is a necessary implication of
the created order. God may freely create the universe, but he must be incarnate if it is
97
EB, 218. The Incarnation is therefore not simply the moment of the incarnation of the Word in Jesus
Christ, it is rather "the ongoing process of God's self-immersion in the world in order that everything
might become united to God." (Charlton, The Incarnation, 1)
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HU, 76
99 Ibid. 77. C.f. SC, 60-1 and WW, 253-4. Bravo describes this well;
"In God's decision and creative work as well as in the conscious or unconscious
expectation of the universe, Christ-Omega was present as a universal undercurrent
and common aspiration throughout the centuries." (Bravo, Christ in the Thought of








to reach Omega.103 The Incarnation is the fulfilment of being.104 It is shaped by the
needs of evolution and of redemption.
(vi) So far we have briefly referred to Teilhard's arguments for the evolutionary
development of Christ's mystical body (and the Incarnation therein), and to the
(eschatological) identification of the risen Christ with Omega. We have also noted
the fact that Christ is now ever present within the evolutionary process to ensure that
the fulfilment of being and redemption, which is Omega, can be reached. Moreover,
we have begun to see how Teilhard places the Incarnation and this ongoing presence
of Christ within the context of his understanding of divine immanence. But this is by
no means the end of the story. The presence of Christ within the cosmos is of a
radically different nature after the Incarnation. This is reflected in the new intimacy
between God and evolution which leads to Teilhard's vision of the evolutionary
formation of the mystical body of Christ. In the next chapter, we can begin to address
this co-evolution of cosmos and Christ, but we must first turn to one of Teilhard's
most confusing and yet most important concepts. How are to we to describe the
presence of Christ post-Incarnation, and how does this relate to evolution?
(C) Critique
In Teilhard's vision of creation and the christic presence within evolution, we find a
great deal of similarity and dissimilarity to the motifs in our grammar of createdness.
It is clear that in Teilhard's thought the natural order is always to be perceived from
an eschatological perspective, as something with an intrinsic destiny. Moreover, we
can see how, as in Gunton's theology, this eschatological perspective has permeated
into other areas of theology, giving the doctrines of creation, the Incarnation, the
Atonement and Hamartiology a shape that is governed by this eschatological nature
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Bravo, Christ in the Thought of Teilhard de Chardin, 52. C.f. Stewart, Nature in Grace, 184
1(14 "All matter wants to live, all life wants to become man, and in man, it wants to join man's goal,
which is God. Incarnation is the aim of God, the aim of his self - unfolding and self - realization."
(EB, 219)
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of the created order. Nonetheless, Teilhard's theology also has some distinct
differences from our grammar of createdness, some of which develop the theological
characteristics we noted in the previous chapter. Overall, the difficulties in Teilhard's
theology centre on the idea of how the Eschaton is to be reached, because this has
effects on the createdness of evolution and created entities that are evolving, as well
as the nature of divine action and the God-world relationship.
(i) The basic premise of Teilhard's unire metaphysics, creative union, is not in and of
itself a concept hostile to the createdness of the natural order. Indeed, insofar as it
insists on the continuity between inanimate and animate, conscious and unconscious,
and human and non-human matter, then it can help us to avoid any concept of a chain
of being, and so degrees of createdness. Moreover, if the multiple is taken to
represent perhaps undifferentiated matter or even energy itself, then to perceive it as
coalescing into organised or united mass/matter could be very helpful. Finally,
because this creaturely unire mirrors the divine unire, then we have a hint of the
transcendentals that are integral to Gunton's work. However, the analogy breaks
down when we focus on the creative aspect of both creaturely and divine being.
Whilst we do not wish to contend with the idea that God's being is in his act
(whether this be in the Thomist esse or Gunton's being-as-communion) we are
concerned that in Teilhard's thought God is uniting himself, and because uniting =
being, then God is even in some sense creating himself. It may be this self-creating
divine action that leads Teilhard to associate Trinitization with the formation of the
multiple.
What we would normally consider as an act of creative will becomes for Teilhard
associated with the divine being. As such, creation is no longer the contingent result
of a willing act but is instead necessary to the divine being. Teilhard has of course
grasped this consequence of his vision of creation and seeks to head it off by arguing
that the multiple is non-existent. However, this is not sufficient to rescue the doctrine
of creation ex nihilo. First, because Teilhard's moral language in relation to the
multiple implies that it has properties, which the non-existent cannot, and second
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because Teilhard himself seems unwilling to advocate this doctrine, preferring to
trace lower degrees of unity back into an infinite regress. As such, Gray's argument
that the multiple is a limit concept for Teilhard is irrelevant. The multiple appears not
to have a beginning; it either emanates from the uniting of the divine being or it is
eternal. In either case it is necessary. Another immediate theological consequence of
Teilhard's concept of creative union is his view of divine action. His view is very
similar to that ofWiles in that there is a difficulty in affirming specific divine acts.
Instead, there is one single conserving action, which conflates creation and
Providence. This latter consequence ties in nicely with the eternal and necessary
nature of the multiple which we have argued for. For Teilhard, there are apparently a
number of constraints upon divine action, in particular the fact that God cannot
create wholes or individual entities. God can only create through a unifying action in
historical process, not because this is a contingent choice, but because this is a
necessary limitation. This seems to imply that the God-world relationship has some
contrastive properties, where this necessary divine limitation would agree with the
consequences of panpsychism as we noted in the previous chapter, and with some of
the properties of the multiple.
(ii) On a contrastive understanding of God and the world, an attenuated, de-divinised
understanding of the divine nature or divine action is accompanied by a divinised
world process, and there are certainly hints of this in Teilhard's deliberations on the
evil associated with the multiple. We have already noted that Teilhard may well not
have intentionally imbued the multiple with the characteristics of moral evil, but
rather simply identified it as the source of physical evil. If this is the case then this
explains why physical evil is unavoidable within the natural order, because the
multiple is uncreated and because God can only create through degrees of
unification. Regardless, there are definite symptoms of moral evil within the natural
order, namely the necessary link between creation and redemption and the language
of active struggle between God and the multiple. Where does this language stem
from? It is a consequence of Teilhard's contrastive scheme in that his failure to
secure the divine sovereignty, and so the contingent and created nature of the
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multiple, means that a weakened God is confronted by a Herculean multiple. The
multiple having been granted semi-divine power, it is capable of resisting the
attenuated divine will, and as such is capable of evil. Unsurprisingly, this means that
perforce one looks askance on matter, and so unconscious matter must be jettisoned
at the Eschaton. More importantly, it also explains the orthogenetic and yet groping
nature of evolution in Teilhard's thought. If his scheme is contrastive, and so
exhibiting the symptoms of reflexive pantheism then this apparently contradictory
scheme actually makes more sense. Only that which we regard as orthogenesis is
evolution or progress towards greater unification, and groping is the morally dubious
(un)conscious struggle against evolution and progress. In turn, this latter tendency
can only arise because radial energy represents the power to resist the attenuated
divine lure of Omega. If this interpretation is accurate, then evolution is more than a
biological process; it is the movement towards the good, towards unity and the divine
unity. In summary, then, evolution is the flight from evil towards divine unity;
evolution is the redemption of the multiple.
(iii) Although Teilhard has much to say on the metaphysics of creation and the idea
of God as Creator, it is clear that Teilhard's focus is very much on Christ, and in
particular on the ever-greater Christ. This comes out loud and clear in his answer to
the question of cur Deus homo? Teilhard's scheme is very close to our grammar of
createdness in the manner in which he reinterprets Christology, Soteriology and
Hamartiology from an eschatological perspective. Like Gunton, Teilhard views sin
as that which derails the eschatology and ultimate perfection of the natural order.
Therefore, redemption must represent that which enables that perfection to occur.
Sin, or moral evil, is that which fights against this eschatology. Furthermore, both
Teilhard and Gunton affirm the Scotist argument that the Incarnation would occur
even without the need for redemption. As an accompanying motif to this point, both
Teilhard and Gunton strenuously avoid any suggestion of an interventionist
Incarnation. Both see this as an intensified and particular presence, or enfleshment,
of the Word of God within the natural order. However, there are some differences,
and these centre on three different points. First, we have a differing perception of
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what sin and moral evil consists of, second, the connection between Atonement and
redemption and third, specific views of how the eschatological perfection of the
natural order is to be achieved. Let us deal with these in turn.
Teilhard seems to regard evil and suffering as integral to the natural order, as a
consequence of incomplete unity. Therefore, a non-redemptive Incarnation would
seem unlikely. Gunton on the other hand is more concerned to link pain, dissolution
and death to the false eschatology which sin introduces into the world. In other
words, he is concerned to avoid conflating creation and Fall. Second, although both
authors are keen to understand the Incarnation in an Irenaean fashion - as integral to
eschatology - there is a difference in how they perceive redemption to occur.
Teilhard never refers to the Incarnation as a substitutionary Atonement for human
sin. Redemption is not restorative in relation to human life. It is rather a re-enabling,
or perhaps merely a guarantee of evolutionary progress.105 In fact, it seems that the
life of Christ is only related to humanity in an exemplary sense. The earthly life of
Christ essentially quells the human disbelief in our contribution to evolution. Christ
represents a proleptic albeit less evolved form of the unity of Omega. Third and most
significantly, for Teilhard the Incarnation and the eschatological perfection of the
created order are evolutionary possibilities and evolutionary goals. This is most
certainly not the case for Gunton. The difference here is fundamentally one of divine
action and creaturely possibility. For Gunton, both the Incarnation and the Eschaton
are creaturely possibilities, but only through a divine initiative. This sense of divine
initiative, and indeed divine action as a whole, seems attenuated and often absent in
Teilhard's thought. For Teilhard the Incarnation is an evolutionary possibility;
understood in eschatological terms, this worryingly means that evolution has no
natural end, but only a divine one. Its goal is Christ-Omega. The created process of
evolution now has the divine capacity to bring about the personal presence of the
divine, and the perfection of the natural order.
105 Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, 'Irenaeus of Lyons and Teilhard de Chardin: A Comparative Study of
"Recapitulation" and "Omega Journal ofEcumenical Studies, 13:1 (1976), 69-93, (citation, 90-91)
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(iv) To clarify the significance of this third point, let us backtrack and say a little
more about the second point. It seems clear that Teilhard is insistent on the necessity
of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ, if the Incarnation is to
be at all redemptive. The reason for this lies in the exemplary nature of the life of
Christ, and the continuing Christie presence within evolution as a goad and
inspiration for human evolution. But there is a real sense in which it appears that this
Christie presence is indeed all that is required. It must be remembered that the life of
Christ in Gunton's theology, as in most traditional christologies, involves the
language of struggle, against the powers of evil, temptation and human frailty. This
seems to be missing in Teilhard's theology. The language of struggle occurs it seems
only in relation to the overcoming of the multiple, and we have already had occasion
to mention the difficulties associated in taking this seriously. The emphasis on the
divine nature of Christ is therefore seemingly biased towards the divine affinity for
increased unity and mediation, rather than on overcoming the capacity for human sin
to impede evolution. The Second Person of the Trinity does not have to act to enable
evolution, but instead only be present. We might go further and argue that not only is
Christ not actively redemptive but he could not be so. He must simply stimulate
secondary (i.e. human) causality through his example. Now, the difficulty which
Teilhard's scheme then presents is to understand the relationship between the evil of
the multiple and the goodness of evolutionary unification. If, as appears to be the
case, there is very little divine action within redemption, then evolution would appear
to be the seZ/Tedeeming function of the multiple when confronted and inspired by the
goodness and unity ofGod. Redemption is the work of evolution and not God.
(v) Redemption is of course only one aspect of Teilhard's thought on the Incarnation.
One of the most profound aspects of his theology is his vision of the Incarnation as a
sign of the constant presence of the divine within world process. His vision is one of
the strongest rebuttals of Deism that one can imagine, and has much to contribute to
theological comments on ecology and environmental awareness. It is also
strengthened by founding the possibility of this divine presence in the divine
transcendence. However, we would argue that Teilhard's treatment of the divine
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presence is more akin to a panentheistic impersonal presence, with the consequence
that the Incarnation is an intensification of just such an impersonal presence. As
Gunton has shown, this detracts from the particularity of the Incarnation as this man
Jesus Christ born at this time to this mother. There is no coincidence that Gunton can
only affirm this particularity through the sovereign divine initiative and action that
brings about the Incarnation. There are signs of this in Teilhard's theology to be sure,
but the lack of particularity can be traced back to a lack of divine initiative in the
Incarnation. Teilhard's description of the Incarnation as a partial immersion, and the
body of Christ as a spatial and temporal point of divine presence might appear to
suggest something akin to the extra Calvinisticum, but is in reality more like the
price to be paid for a lack of particularity. It is not that we are to understand the
Incarnation as a partial event, but to understand its bodily aspect as Jesus ofNazareth
as a partial event. The body of Christ is co-extensive with all matter. The Incarnation
"is not a process which exhausts itself in a single and unique historical person."106
More to the point, it is of course ongoing and in so doing, it divinises the world.
There is a danger here of such a generalised christic presence that outright Pantheism
threatens. Within the grammar of createdness, this is avoided by emphasising the
divine initiative in the Incarnation, and also the delimiting action of the Spirit to
maintain borders, including those between God and humanity in the Incarnation.
(vi) Teilhard's vision of the Incarnation lacks particularity, because it lacks divine
action. This is founded on the evolutionary nature of the Incarnation. Teilhard rightly
affirms that there must be a degree of preparedness within the cosmos for the
Incarnation, namely the existence of Homo sapiens sapiens, and in terms of the
formation of Mary. This accords with the concept of the naturalness of the
Incarnation as we find it in the grammar of createdness, which motif prevents an
interventionist or deist interpretation of the Incarnation. However, in our grammar
this preparedness is itself the result of a sovereign enabling divine action-in-relation
and the Incarnation requires a divine initiative in order to occur. In Teilhard's
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EB, 218. The Incarnation is therefore not simply the moment of the incarnation of the Word in
Jesus Christ, it is rather "the ongoing process of God's self-immersion in the world in order that
everything might become united to God." (Charlton, The Incarnation, 1)
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scheme, the existence of the human species etc. cannot really be regarded as the
result of divine action and it also appears to be a sufficient condition for the
Incarnation. This is not to say that Teilhard cannot affirm either the divinity or
humanity of Christ in this scheme, as this is a constant theme in his work. But on the
other hand, the consequence of Teilhard's scheme is that evolution is thereby gifted
with the capacity to produce an incarnate divine presence in the world. This suggests
both an essentially passive divinity within the evolutionary process, and
consequently the enhanced agency of the evolutionary process to the extent that it
now contains the initiative required for the Incarnation.
The only sense in which Teilhard's seems to accept a divine initiative in preparing
the way for the Incarnation lies in the Immaculate Conception. This provides an
interesting paradox; Teilhard seems quite comfortable to ignore divine initiative and
divine action with regard to the Incarnation and yet God must act to 'purify' matter
of its moral ambiguity in the form of the Virgin Mary if the Incarnation is to become
'visible'. Leaving aside this rather abrupt, almost deistic, creative input at this
juncture, Teilhard's views of matter here are problematic on two counts. First, the
possibility of the Incarnation seems to rest solely in the improvement of the
revelatory power of matter, as if it is merely its recalcitrance that prevents it from
bringing about the Incarnation. Note that there is no divine initiative once purified
matter takes the form ofMary. This purified matter engenders the Incarnation, and so
the particularity of the Incarnation rests not on a divine initiative in the conception of
Jesus Christ, but rather in the Immaculate Conception. For those who do not hold to
this doctrine, because of the suggestion that the humanity of Jesus must ultimately
represent a break with the creaturely, then Teilhard's scheme loses all sense of
particularity and divine control.
(vii) We might be precise in what we mean by a lack of divine initiative in the
Incarnation. Because Teilhard does not perhaps sufficiently affirm the divine
initiative for the Incarnation, it comes as no surprise that his scheme is in this regard
insufficiently trinitarian. It is to be remembered that in Gunton's thought the
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Incarnation is willed by the Father, and enabled by the Spirit. For Teilhard, there is
very little suggestion of the presence of the Spirit within the earthly ministry of
Christ, and certainly even less suggestion of pneumatological action in his
conception. Moreover, we have just seen that the extent to which it can be said that
the Father actively wills the specific conditions needed for the Incarnation of his Son
is greatly diminished. On such an understanding binitarianism beckons. One of the
other consequences of a more trinitarian scheme has some particular bearing on the
capacity for evolutionary process to bring about the Incarnation. According to
Gunton, an emphasis on specifically pneumatological action within the Incarnation is
to safeguard against a Pantheism in which the divine nature of Christ can be affirmed
without threatening to obliterate the humanity of Christ. In other words, there is a
delimiting action. Is there an equivalent need in Teilhard's? No, in fact the opposite
is required. Teilhard wants to affirm the true divinity and humanity of Christ, but
how can one determine the degree of divinity which evolution can reveal? Teilhard's
language suggests that he is aware of this issue, and so he affirms the requisite divine
formation of the purity of Mary if evolution is to bring forth the Christ. But if
Teilhard is consistent in maintaining that God does not actively influence secondary
causality, then both the required purity of Mary and the Incarnation itself must be a
result of evolution. The point is that Teilhard seems aware of the potential of his
scheme for lessening divine input into the Incarnation, but his scheme as it stands
does not allow him to consistently counter this. Furthermore, the fact that what is
required in terms of divine action for the Incarnation is a purity, is suggestive of the
devaluing of the created order which we noted in his metaphysics. The evil that is
disunity must somehow be countered if the essential goodness of divine unity is to




What can we say in conclusion to our critique of Teilhard in this chapter? The most
significant observation to be made is that the suspicion of reflexive Pantheism that
we noted in the previous chapter has only been confirmed by what we have found
here. Divine action has become so attenuated that the divine purposes can be
thwarted by the multiple as well as by the more centred aspects of the natural order.
This requires that the multiple be redeemed through unification. This is apparently
the major function of the Incarnation, which is in turn brought about naturally
through evolutionary unification of the multiple. Coupled with Teilhard's view that a
fulfilled evolution represents a fulfilled cosmic destiny, then the evolutionary process
begins to take on the role normally attributed to divine action. Evolutionary
development is required and sufficient for the Incarnation, and for the attainment of
the destiny of the natural order. Finally, because both of these are redemptive, then
we can say that evolution is the self-redeeming activity of the multiple, both in
attaining degrees of unity/purity such as the Immaculate Conception, and in bringing
about the Incarnation.
Chapter 7
Chapter 7: Evolution and Theology (II)
Presence of Christ
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- Evolution and the Continuing
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we noted that for Teilhard the Incarnation is to be understood
in terms of a concentration or intensifying of an ongoing christological immanence.
Now we must move on to map out Teilhard's understanding of this immanence as it
heads towards Omega through evolution. Indeed, he argues that the presence of
Christ in the present stage of evolution can only be conceived of in light of its
consummation at Omega.1 The point is this; Christ will eventually, through
evolution, become Omega, the centre of evolution's convergence. But Christ cannot
be the final centre of evolutionary convergence if he is not already the present centre
of evolutionary convergence. It is this realisation that shapes Teilhard's
understanding of the continuing presence of Christ within the evolutionary process.
We also noted in the last chapter that Teilhard's evolutionary Christology lacked
particularity and that overall the createdness of evolution was threatened by the
capacity of the process for generating the Incarnation and the Eschaton. As the extent
of this christic presence and its relationship with evolution becomes clearer, we must
see whether these theological difficulties remain.
(A) Christ as the Centre ofEvolution
(i) Teilhard's concern to position Christ at the very heart of the evolutionary process
leads to a breathtakingly beautiful, but also highly complex vision; Christ is not only
present in evolution, he is omnipresent. If Christ is to be the nexus of divine-
creaturely union at Omega, he must already be the universal centre of evolution.
This is the Universal Christ, "Christ the organic centre of the entire universe."3 Christ
'
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is the centre on which every natural development is ultimately physically dependent.4
But how does Christ become this living cosmic centre? He becomes so through the
resurrection. The resurrection becomes a truly cosmic event;
It marks Christ's effective assumption of his function as the universal centre.
Until that time, he was present in all things as a soul that is painfully
gathering together its embryonic elements. Now he radiates over the whole
universe as a consciousness and activity fully in control of themselves. After
being baptised into the world, he has risen up from it.5
Just as a cell in a living organism can become preponderant in that organism, so can
the humanity of Christ, at the resurrection, acquire "a universal morphological
function."6 Teilhard also sees the universal centrality of Christ in a more
anthropological fashion, in terms of pyschism. If humanity were the point of
precipitation of the world's conscious power, then Christ as the head of humanity
would be universal as the psychic pole of creation. Christ becomes integral to, and
integrated into, the evolutionary process.7 From these foundations a number of other
important ideas in Teilhard's scheme can be seen to be derived. Let us briefly
address some of these as they relate to evolution.
(ii) The Universal Christ is a key motif in Teilhard's thought, but it is always to be
understood in the context of the progress of evolution. This signifies a relationship
with the concept of divine action. For Teilhard, the divine omnipresence within
evolution must be understood as an omnipresence of action; God's preserving and
creating action. There is a connection here with Omega, because Omega represents
the (eschatological) universality of Christ. Therefore, Christ's present action must be
seen as an "omnipresence of transformation."9 But how is it that the resurrection





7 Ibid. 42. Teilhard is not always consistent with this terminology. Occasionally he equates the
Universal Christ not with the nature of Christ as a universal element, but as the culmination of this
universality at Omega. In other words, the Universal Christ is the final consummation of the divine
presence within evolution, (e.g. HM, 95 and CE, 71)
*
MD, 111. Creative divine action is of course uniting divine action; this is an important point as this
is not necessarily an active role despite Teilhard's language at this point.
9HM, 94
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body of Christ can influence and transform the entire cosmos? This entails the
cosmic extent of the Incarnation - indeed the whole point of the concept of the
Universal Christ is to show that "the Incarnation is an act co-extensive with the
duration of the world."10 For Teilhard, this is demonstrated in the Eucharist, whereby
the power of Christ is transmitted to a cosmic extent11, and of which the Eucharist is
a sign.12 However, the Eucharist reveals not a static divine presence, but a process of
universal transubstantiation.13 For Teilhard, "the matter of the sacrament is the
world, throughout which there spreads, so to complete itself, the superhuman
presence of the universal Christ."14 The Mass therefore represents the process of
evolution.15 Evolution is therefore the means by which "the whole of nature is slowly
and irresistibly undergoing the supreme consecration."16 Teilhard makes a distinction
between the Universal Christ, as a cosmic element within evolution, and the Super
Christ, and Christ the Evolver, as this power behind evolution.17 The presence of
Christ in evolution is therefore cosmic, transformative and evolving. This equates
with the forward axis of evolution. The divine omnipresence is therefore an
omnipresence of christification.18 As such, the Incarnation is both redemptive and
also integral to evolutionary progress and the attainment of Omega.19
(iii) Teilhard sees this Christological model as the only viable alternative to a
juridical model, where the Incarnation occurs simply for redemptive reasons. Instead,













CE, 74. Young sees this as a sign of the intrinsic value of the created order and of matter itself.
(Stewart, Nature in Grace, 193). However, as the world is itself converted into the divine milieu
through the Eucharist, this says little of the value of its pre-transfonned state.
17
SC, 165-7. There are again some ambiguities. Teilhard can also describe the Universal Christ as the
Christ of Evolution. (CE, 95) This is to be expected, in one sense. There is after all only one Christ,
and Christ the Evolver must be the Universal Christ. As Teilhard puts it, the Super Christ is one and
the same Christ. (SC, 164)
18
MD, 112. C.f. Bravo, Christ in the Thought ofTeilhard de Chardin, 45
19
CE, 146-7. This is the work of Christ the Evolver. (Ibid. 147) It is worth noting again that Teilhard
is unable to remove redemptive terminology from this ongoing development of the created order. The
threat of the multiple is still very real.
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attainment of Omega. In this universe "[G]od cannot appear as prime mover (ahead)
without first becoming incarnate and without redeeming".20 Teilhard's Scotist
position is therefore intimately connected with his doctrine of creation. God cannot
create an evolved whole, and so Christ-Omega must be subjected to an evolutionary
intensification and unification if it is to be achieved.21 Redemption then becomes the
justification of humanity in the same act of super-creating the universe through the
22
evolutionary process. The juridical model quite simply ignores the Universal
Christ,23 who is essential for Omega.24 But the juridical model also has what we
might call a moral weakness for Teilhard, and this again seems to stem from a
perceived weakness in its articulation of the concept of the Universal Christ. If the
Universal Christ is the presence of Christ-Omega, then Christ is already in a sense
Omega. More specifically his kingship is already manifest and real. He is not just
proclaimed king; he already is king.25 Christ, as the Universal Christ, is king.26
(iv) The point is quite simply that the juridical model cannot affirm the kingship of
Christ because it is essentially an extrinsicist position. In the same vein, this is why
Teilhard can refer the mediatorial role of Christ to the Universal Christ.27 Christ is
yet still the mediator between God and creation. But as Christ's presence is cosmic in
extent it must be extended throughout cosmic history. Christ must always be viewed
from and as Omega. However, it is important to note that for Teilhard this vision can
never be allowed to render the man Jesus Christ superfluous. Indeed, the Universal
Christ is an expansion of the heart of Christ.28 This vision needs the human Jesus;
20
AE, 163
21 If Christ is to be universal (i.e. universalised, as Omega), he must finally and gradually be
consummated from all being. (SC, 16)
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AE, 264. This Christie energy amorizes the cosmos, signifying an identification of roles between
Omega and Christ. (AE, 266)
23
SC, 19
24 Ibid. 166, HE, 91 and CE, 15
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CE, 179. This is a developed position. In his early work Teilhard simply identifies Christ as the




If it is indeed true that it is through Christ-Omega that the universe in
movement holds together, then, correspondingly, it is from his concrete
germ, the Man of Nazareth, that Christ-Omega (both theoretically and
historically) derives his whole consistence, as a hard experiential fact.29
Therefore the entire christological vision must incorporate the whole of Christ, from
his pre-incarnate immanence, through his redeeming life, death and resurrection, to
his assumption of the position of Universal Christ, his present immanence and action
as the Super Christ (Christ the Evolver) and finally through the development of his
mystical body until we reach the eminence of Christ-Omega. This is all one Christ,
30
one simultaneous vision and movement - this is the total Christ. Overall, the point
is quite clear. To understand the world from the perspective of Christ-Omega is to
escape the juridical imagery that Teilhard is so opposed to. If Christ is Omega, then
he literally and physically fills and consummates all things, and so everything is
31
stamped with his character and animated towards his direction. We can now move
on to discuss how this presence of Christ evolves and itself causes evolution, through
a transformative divine action.
(B) Evolution and the Evolving Presence ofChrist
In the previous subsection we noted that Teilhard insists that in his cosmic
evolutionary vision Christ is still firmly and intimately involved within convergent
evolution. Indeed, he is now a leader element guiding human evolution towards
Omega and the fulfilment of the Incarnation. Human evolution must be guided in this
way partly because of sin, but also because the Incarnation is intrinsic to the
evolutionary created order. It is vital for Omega and the culmination of being. This
dual emphasis on culminating and current christological presence leads to what
Teilhard describes as christification, or the intensifying presence of Christ within
evolution and the cosmos.
29
CE, 181




(i) In the light of the nature of Christ as Omega, christification becomes much more
specific. To understand this properly, let us look at Teilhard's threefold conception
of this evolution;
1. Tangibility in the experiential order, as the result of Christ Jesus's
historical entry (by his birth) into the very process of Evolution.
2. Expansibility in the cosmic order, conferred on the Christie Centre by the
operative power of 'resurrection'.
3. And finally, assimilative power, in the organic order, potentially
integrating the totality of the human race in the unity of a single 'body'.32
It is the second and third parts of this scheme that concern us here. Teilhard's point is
that the culmination of evolution is the meeting place between God (as Christ)
become truly cosmic and evolution (as ultra-evolution) become truly personal.
However, these points are connected and indeed identical, because since the
resurrection, evolution has become the evolution of the mystical body of Christ.
(ii) At the heart of Teilhard's position is the naturalness of this christological
evolution. Because Christ is attaining the true universality of Omega, then all action
throughout the cosmos contributes to the building up of his body/4 As such, this is
the only action occurring in the cosmos today.35 The growth of Christ is the
interpretation of evolution in the language of the mystical body. The evolutionary
process must always be seen from the double perspective of cosmic convergence and
Christie emergence.37 Teilhard eventually derives the term christogenesis to describe
the second part of this co-evolution, although the concept occurs from the very
beginning of his work. For Teilhard, "creation is a process which reaches completion






SC, 67 and HU, 81. This is further evidence for our contention that Teilhard identifies evolution
with orthogenesis; i.e. with progression itself.
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CE, 32 and CE, 74
36
WW, 174. In his early work Teilhard can describe this body in specifically organic terms, and
indeed as the mother of organisms. (WW, 51) In WW it is specifically the incorporation of the faithful





transformed into Christogenesis."38 Teilhard described his vision very early on as one
where "everything is animated so as to become the divino-human organised action of
the incarnate Christ."39 In fact this identification between cosmogenesis and
christogenesis is such that Teilhard can rather worryingly refer to evolution as holy,
sacred and even as divinity.40 Indeed we must love evolution, precisely because
cosmogenesis, as christogenesis, is leading to the formation of a person.41 Christ is
not yet fully complete, and requires evolution for this.42
(iii) Convergent evolution is therefore a cosmogenesis, manifest as the progression
from biogenesis to noogenesis and finally christogenesis.43 Each of these is a natural
term, as Teilhard puts it. Christogenesis is the sublimation of cosmogenesis.44 The
Incarnation and its evolutionary fulfilment are part of the order of things 45 As Bravo
puts it, christogenesis and genesis of the ultrahuman are virtually interchangeable.46
In other words;
Until the Word became incarnate, what was constructed was that which
could be divinized; since then, through the joint action of Christ and the
world, what is divine is being built up.47
Not only does Christ gain from this mutual and indeed identical development;
Teilhard can go so far as to say that through his ceaseless animation of these
processes, Christ is actually nourished by these world processes as he divinises
them.48 It is precisely this then that makes the fulfilment of Christ and the world
mutual,49
38
Lyons, The Cosmic Christ, 177-8
39
Journal, entry 17.8.1916, 213
40
HU, 133, WW, 17 and p78. Thus it is that Teilhard can argue that evolution, as the means of escape
from multiplicity, is "the hand ofGod gathering us back to himself." (SC, 213)
41
CE, 184. C.f. TF, 159
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43 For Teilhard "the genesis of the kingdom of God, the incarnation, will not occur as the sudden
irruption of something supernatural into a degraded world ruled by demons. It will rather be the ascent
of the earth and its metamorphosis into a reality which has hitherto hardly been recognized." (EB,
218)
46







(iv) Currently, evolution of course takes the form of human cultural evolution
through love-energy, and so we find that it is our evolution that is contributing to the
formation of the mystical body of Christ.50 Our contribution to evolution is therefore
coterminous with our contribution to Christ-Omega;
The greater man becomes, the more humanity becomes united, with
consciousness of, and mastery of, its potentialities, the more beautiful
creation will be, the more perfect adoration will become, and the more Christ
will find, for mystical extensions, a body worthy of resurrection.51
Teilhard sees the human contribution to evolution in all sources of human
unification. Here we can only briefly mention one of these - religion. For Teilhard,
all religions have an evolutionary significance.52 Indeed, the measure of a religion is
determined by its contribution to evolutionary activation.53 Specifically religions
contribute to phylogenesis, the further collectivisation of humanity which evolution
demands.54 Religion achieves this by giving a form to "the free psychic energy of the
world."55 This is congruent with Teilhard's reflections on the nature of Omega;
humanity must believe that a future is possible if evolution is to proceed. However,
Teilhard gives priority to that form of religious collectivisation that is most closely
associated with Christ-Omega; the Church.56 Therefore, to be precise, human
evolution cannot occur unless we can place the face of Christ upon Omega. It is
important to remember that for Teilhard, evolution is now contingent upon human
perception insofar as this affects our willingness to evolve. It is faith in our own
50
MD, 136. Therefore the threefold pattern of cosmogenesis must be elaborated upon with the strictly
human contribution;
"Cosmos = cosmogenesis = biogenesis = individual = anthropogenesis = collective
anthropogenesis = Christogenesis." (TF, 156, n4)
51
MD, 151. "It is through the collaboration which He stimulates in us that Christ, starting from all









For instance, Christian morality becomes significant precisely because under these circumstances it
is a reinforcer of evolution. (CE, 92). C.f. Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin, 151. This concept of the
evolutionary significance of Christian practice or doctrine is not unique to Teilhard. For instance,
Alfred Barry argues that Christian doctrine is an extension of evolution because of its references to the
final defeat of evil and a future post mortem existence. (Alfred Barry, Some Lights ofScience on the
Faith (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1892), 128)
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vigour, as well as the transcendence of God, that enables us to combat chance and
impose our own order.57 The concepts of the Super Christ and the Universal Christ
are the requisite spurs for the human belief that fuels evolution.58 Nonetheless, in
both cases the context appears to be a belief not only in the existence of Omega as
Christ, but also in the current presence and formation of the (body of) Christ within
the evolutionary process. The Church is at the forefront of biogenesis, then, because
there is an awareness or consciousness of a relationship with the transcendent pole of
convergence.59 The Church is the very heart of human socialisation; it is an ultra-
socialisation that animates the energies of the noosphere.60 Teilhard likens the
evolutionary role or position of the Church as the middle layer of the evolutionary
cone, between the transcendent God and generic human/cosmic co-evolution.61 The
Church is "the central axis of universal convergence, and the exact meeting-point
62that springs up between the universe and Omega Point." Christ is the physical
centre for the world because he is the physical centre for the Church.63 We might go
so far as to say that this is christogenesis.64 As such, the Church is "the reflexively
Christified portion of this world".65
(v) Through evolution Christ's mystical body becomes truly cosmic. Indeed, this
occurs to such an extent that Teilhard can argue that in Christ we see not only the
divine and human natures, but also a third nature — the cosmic.66 The logic behind




CE, 155 and SC, 164 respectively. Christ comes to show us that the effort required for future
evolution is worth the price. (Stewart, Nature in Grace, 200)
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PH, 326. C.f. CE, 16 and 153, and Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin, 157. The notion of Christianity as
the centre of evolution is not unique to Teilhard, and indeed occurs repeatedly in 19th Century
discussion of evolution and theology. See for example George Henslow, The Theory ofEvolution and






TF, 192. At this point we should mention that Teilhard is referring specifically to the Roman
Catholic Church when he refers to the Church in this manner. As Teilhard puts it, through Rome runs










within, but this is cosmic in extent. Therefore Christ must have not only his divine
nature, (otherwise he could not lead evolution), nor only a human nature (otherwise
he could not be in evolution to lead it) but also a cosmic nature because of what the
leadership of evolution entails.67 Again this is something the juridical model fails to
account for.68 For Teilhard, this cosmic nature evolves as the mystical Christ
evolves;69
The mystical Christ has not yet attained to his full growth; and therefore the
same is true of the cosmic Christ.70
Moreover, as Lyons has argued, it is through his third nature that Christ acts as the
mediator of creation.71 As we noted earlier, for evolutionary unity to be completed,
there must be an Incarnation.72 Furthermore, for Teilhard, Christ is, and must be
Omega, because only Christ can be the fulfilment of the created order. Only this can
satisfy Teilhard's vision of Christian eschatology in an evolutionary context. Omega,
the fulfilment of the body of Christ, requires an evolutionary perfection of the
created order.73 The Incarnation is the expression of God's desire (and need for?) his
Son to be both God and man. But, according to Christian eschatology, Christ must be
able to offer the perfected, evolved, world back to the Father, and so Christ must
become Omega.74 But, we have seen that Christ can only evolve into Omega.
Therefore between the Incarnation and Omega, if Christ is to be understood to be
central to the Christian faith, he must offer himself for worship and adoration now, as
7S










Lyons, 199. Teilhard sees Christ-Omega as the mediating point for convergent evolution. (AE, 149)
The third nature in Christ is that which evolves, therefore it is this third nature that gives Christ his
mediating position between God and creation. For vigorous criticism of this see Mooney, Teilhard de
Chardin, 179
72




Smith, 'God and Evolutive Creation', 48
75 de Lubac, The Faith of Teilhard de Chardin, 36-7. It seems, then, that the Universal Christ is Christ
understood as a cosmic element, the Super Christ/Christ the Evolver is Christ as an active agent within
evolution, and the Cosmic Christ is Christ understood as the one whose body is now being formed and
as the one who is the final summit of this evolution (i.e. Omega.)
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(vi) We can now finish off our description of Teilhard's evolutionary and
christological scheme by discussing the culmination of evolution at Omega. For
Teilhard, the cosmos and evolution culminate in the cosmic and mystical body of
Christ.76 It is at this point, when everything within the evolutionary process
77
(including Christ) is completed, that we find the Parousia, the return of Christ. The
78Parousia will occur at the time of a cosmic capacity for total unity. This is
7Q
coincident with the final point of human maturation. Just as the Incarnation was
contingent upon a certain degree of human cultural and biological evolution, so is the
Parousia contingent upon the attainment of a certain threshold of human
unification.80 The supernatural requires the ultrahuman as preparation.81 Therefore if
we use language which is slightly more redolent of Omega, the Christie ego is the
point towards which egos converge and find their fulfilment, and in so doing
consummate the Christie ego.82 This leads Teilhard to use rather unfortunate
language in which he can argue that not only is Christ the Saviour, but he is also
oo
saved by evolution. The point is simply to emphasise the dual nature of evolution
as cosmic/anthropic and Christie. Indeed we must not forget how these converge on
one another; the christic fulfilment of evolution is in fact a magnification of human
convergence.84 After all, the universe can only have one head.85 Evolution has no
strictly natural (i.e. created) end. This could only be achieved through tangential








TF, 191. "La Parousie ne saurait se lever que sur une Humanite plus unie et plus consciente que
celle qui nous entoure." (CiB, 43)
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TF, 154-155. C.f. AE, 279. Note this is the Parousia of the one Christ. Hence Teilhard can refer to










Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin, 76
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(vii) Christ is the constant within both cosmogenesis and christogenesis. The end
result is what Teilhard refers to as the mysterious compound formed from Christ and
the universe.87 Hence, Christ is a synthesis of cosmos and creator.88 At this point,
Christ will "consummate universal unification by giving himself, in his complete and
adult Body, with a finally satisfied capacity for union, to the embrace of the
Godhead."89 Just as the world came from God, so it shall return enriched, purified
and perfected to God.90 Finally, then, we have the very last stage of evolution and
unification; the Pleroma (lit. fullness) - "the organic complex of God and world."91
The Pleroma is supreme consciousness and complexity, and Christ is its organic
principle and centre.92 Teilhard realises the potential for pantheistic interpretations of
his conception, and he is eager to head these off. The Pleroma is a fullness in which
there is unity and fusion without confusion. Moreover, the Pleroma adds nothing
93essential to God, although it will be "a sort of triumph and generalisation of being."
It is important to understand the centrality of Christ within this process. In his
mystical language, Teilhard can argue that Christ is to be the fullness of created
being, personal being and finally all being, within his mystical body.94 For Teilhard,




HM, 201. Teilhard identifies this synthesis more precisely as the Universal Christ, understood






SC, 85. TF, 97. Here Teilhard can also refer rather confusingly to the Pleroma itself as the synthesis
of God and cosmos. The solution would seem to lie in the persistence of Christ as the centre of the
Pleroma, just as he is the universal centre.
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SC, 166 and CE, 16
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MD, 111. C.f. WW, 297. Teilhard can also perceive the Pleroma to be making a vitally necessary
contribution to God. Mooney argues that this apparent vacillation is an attempt to get away from the
idea of the absolute gratuity of the created order, and the act of creation. (Mooney, Teilhard de
Chardin, 175) For a similar position, see Charlton, 'The Incarnation', 97. Charlton makes the
interesting observation that perhaps Teilhard is arguing for parallels between Trinitization (and so








(i) Whilst it is true that Teilhard's vision of the christic presence within evolution
seems to lose the identity of Jesus of Nazareth, the complexity of this presence
cannot be doubted. The heart of this vision is the Universal Christ, who is the Risen
Christ in the form of a cosmic organic centricity. However, precisely because the
Universal Christ is the Risen Christ, then it would appear that Teilhard eschews the
doctrine of the Ascension. After the Resurrection we find that any particularity
within the Incarnation is lost within the vision of Christ as the Universal Centre and
the Super-Christ. The incarnate one has become the immanent one.96 The
Resurrection has brought about an evolutionary shift that has broken the
spatiotemporal boundaries of Jesus of Nazareth, and apparently the boundaries
between God and creation.97 Using language reminiscent of Panentheism, the
Resurrection seems to have enabled Christ to become the mind of the world, by
overcoming his bodily limitations. Evolution will now make the world into Christ's
body. Why then would Teilhard so vigorously eschew the Ascension? The answer
lies in Farrow's observation that Teilhard's theology is effectively unitarian.98
In the Church's affirmation of the bodily withdrawal of the Risen Christ at the
Ascension, there has been a concomitant affirmation of Pentecost, the work of the
Spirit. The Spirit is the divine Person who relates us to Christ and for Gunton is
primarily the agent of present tense action-in-relation and the perfecting of the
natural order. Teilhard is concerned, as Gunton is, to found the perfecting of the
world in Christ, but Teilhard is unable to affirm the role of the Spirit in the perfection
of the creature. Hence, in order to derive the notion of a current and all-pervasive
perfecting of the created order, Teilhard must argue that Christ must still be bodily
(omni)present, as a cosmic centre and active through this omnipresence. Therefore
Teilhard is replacing Pneumatology with Christology. We might say that the Super-
Christ replaces the action, and the Universal Christ replaces the relation in
96
Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia, 205
97 Farrow argues that Teilhard's view of the Ascension is a spatial and temporal shift; spatially he has
become ubiquitous and temporally he has achieved an advance into the future. (Ibid. 204-205)
98 Ibid. 206
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pneumatological action-in-relation. Without a delimiting and particularising action of
the Spirit, the Incarnation loses its boundaries as well as divine initiative.
(ii) What are the consequences of the ongoing and increasing presence within
evolution, for the createdness of the process? If Teilhard's understanding of the
Eucharist is representative, then the signs are not favourable. The difficulty lies in the
fact that the Roman Catholic concept of Eucharist involves transubstantiation, which
is a transformation of the substantial nature or essence of the elements into the body
and blood of Christ. The problem then for a global or universal transformation is that
the universe would be replaced with the divine. Is this really what Teilhard wants to
say? He certainly seems to suggest so when he argues that our struggle for
evolutionary convergence (which is a transubstantiation) is a struggle towards our
"point of annihilation".99 This is also a conclusion to which we shall be drawn by our
examination of other aspects of Teilhard's theology from this chapter. Nonetheless,
Teilhard is consistent in his rebuttal of such Pantheism. One way of interpreting this
would be to remember that for Teilhard, an increase in unity is an increase in reality,
and so it is possible that he is interpreting christification not as a replacement of
creaturely reality, but instead as an attainment of some reality, i.e. Christie reality.
That which is evolving is therefore only real insofar as it converges gradually on
Omega, and attains new levels of christification.100 The other alternative, and perhaps
Teilhard would be rather loath to accept this, is a fonn of universal consubstantiation,
or the presence of Christ in, with and under the matter of the world. However, here
we would still be confronted with a process (in the form of human evolution) which
is capable of bringing about the divine presence in the Incarnation, and can now
increase it through Christification. None of these three possible interpretations
protects the createdness of evolution.
99
FM, 56, quoted from Farrow, Ascension and Ecclesia, 213, n215
100 Because this would also imply that the multiple would only be redeemed through its annihilation,
this is unlikely to be Teilhard's intention, as unification involves the preservation of the multiple
within new degrees of unity.
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(iii) Teilhard's concept of a juridical model of redemption and the God-world
relationship is disavowed by himself and by Gunton. For both authors, the
Incarnation is redemptive but also occurs as part of the perfection of the created
order. Flowever, as commentators on Teilhard have pointed out, he does not hold
both aspects of the purpose of Incarnation together. On his understanding,
redemption is not in any sense reparation for sin, but is rather a remedy for a malady
that is inherent in matter from the very beginning, and so the Incarnation is
effectively reduced to its evolutionary significance. The Incarnation and redemption
are ongoing, as both are reliant upon the progress and fulfilment of evolution. God is
incarnate for the sake of Omega, and is incarnate through evolution not through
choice but because God cannot create wholes. Because Omega requires the
Incarnation, Omega requires evolution.
Teilhard is quite right to point out the potential for Deism if Christ is not seen in a
Scotist framework, or if at least the preincarnate divine immanence is ignored.
Nonetheless, as he defines the Incarnation simply as evolutionary intensification of
this immanence, and as he perceives this intensification to be a natural product of
evolution, then he is veering towards a Pantheism brought about by the natural order
itself. We see this in Teilhard's affirmation of the Universal Christ as the mediator
between God and the world. Instead of seeing this mediator as the Risen and
Ascended Christ who is also in some mysterious sense the Pauline Cosmic Christ,
Teilhard views the mediator as the one who is a divine Person rendered through a
creaturely process. As such, it is insufficient to point out that Teilhard is insistent on
the 'origins' of his vision of the ongoing Christ in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.
Such particularity as Teilhard's understanding of the Incarnation can muster is quite
simply lost in the Total Christ.
(iv) Christification is occurring in and through current human evolution. The locus
for the most intensive evolutionary advance is the Church, which is the true axis of
evolution as it is 'closest' to the Christie element, and has the clearest idea of the
goal of evolution at Omega. Teilhard's vision of the Church as the locus of the
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greatest evolutionary progress and Christification is very reminiscent of Gunton's
position on the Church as the eschatological community. For Gunton, the very
existence of the Church and her worshipping and serving actions represent a
prolepsis of the future condition of the natural order in the present. The difference of
course lies in how Teilhard and Gunton view the divine contribution to this human
community and action. For Teilhard, divine action as it is understood here is of a
much more attenuated nature than the concept of the Super Christ would at first
suggest. Teilhard's discussion of the nature of religion, in conjunction with the
necessity of the irreversibility of evolution which Omega provides, suggests that the
Universal Christ has rather more of an inspirational than an active role. Essentially,
the Universal Christ, perceived to be the proleptic or incompletely evolved presence
of Omega within evolution, seems to function in no other way than by evoking
human responses of increased radial energy as love. Here, human awareness of
Omega, coupled with the example of the presence of the unity of Christ within
evolution, is sufficient to support our drive for further collectivisation. The central
triune core at the heart of the evolutionary cone is passive and activity resides in the
christic-ecclesial cone and to a lesser extent in the outer humano-cosmic cone.
Why is it that the active 'aspect' of the Total Christ, the Super Christ, seems to have
so little influence within evolution? The answer seems to be that the Super Christ is
active only redemptively, and we have seen that this requires active language only in
light of Teilhard's description of the nature of the multiple. In other words, the divine
christic immanence is active only if by its very nature it is a struggle against an
active multiple. The second reason as to why human evolution is described in such
active terms is the mirror image of this first reason; the language of agency, of the
ascent towards Omega, must be transferred to the creature, if it is not applicable to
the Creator. Hence, it is (primarily redeemed) human collectivisation that contributes
to the formation of the mystical body of Christ. It should be noted that the
transference of language is quite specific - the created order and especially the
Church takes on pneumatological functions and language. It is the inspiration of
Christ-Omega, and not the Spirit that unites and enables the Church, and it is
primarily ecclesial human collectivisation and not the Spirit that contributes to the
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evolutionary perfection of the cosmos. There is also something of this in Teilhard's
identification of christogenesis and cosmogenesis. It should be recalled that although
Teilhard in fact identifies cosmogenesis and christogenesis, neither of these refers to
the whole of the cosmos. Only those elements within the cosmos that can undergo
ultra-evolution are contributing. Therefore only these are contributing to an increase
in reality and value in the cosmos. This sounds very reminiscent of Gunton's concept
of election, as a pneumatological enabling of individuals for a given task as this
contributes to the divine perfecting of the created order. In this instance, those who
are sufficiently complex carry out the perfecting, and evolution and not the Spirit has
selected them. In summary, the created process of evolution has taken on both
redemptive and perfective functions, as christological action is attenuated, and
pneumatological action is absent entirely.
(v) Both Gunton and Teilhard are concerned to emphasise the retrospective presence
of Christ in the world, in order to emphasise the naturalness of the Incarnation.
However, in Teilhard's thought this naturalness is overemphasised to the extent that
there is a complete identification of cosmogenesis and christogenesis. We see this in
his troubling view of evolution as holy. If Teilhard's point were simply that
evolution is that process which renders the world as the body of Christ, and which
brings about the final subjection of all things under Christ, then this would be rather
attenuated divine action, but that would be the sum of the problem. However,
Teilhard goes further; evolution not only increases the influence and unity of Christ
within the world, but also increases his presence. Evolution is a divinisation of the
world, and a nourishing of Christ, and as such can only be distinguished with
difficulty from the destruction of the world as a relatively autonomous creature.
What is being formed through current evolution? The answer seems to be the third,
cosmic, nature of Christ. The function of this motif then becomes clear in that both
the divine and human natures ofChrist would lose their identities if either were to be
perceived to undergo evolution. Therefore there must be another, evolvable, aspect to
the being and person of Jesus Christ. Apart from the lack of scriptural or theological
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warrant for this proposal, there is the further problem of identifying what this cosmic
nature actually is. The difficulty with this proposal is that even if this third nature is
not something divine, then it is not precisely biological either. It is inimical to the
createdness of evolution to argue that it can produce a divine result solely by its
native energies. Teilhard seems to be aware of this and so both overplays the
naturalness of christogenesis and attacks a juridical model of the Incarnation in order
to maintain the implicit createdness of evolution. But in what way is the mystical
body of Christ to be understood to be a genuine product of evolution? It is certainly
not an organism. Is it perhaps the result of cultural evolution? This is feasible,
especially as we have argued that it is the inspiration of Omega that draws human
evolution onwards. But this does not explain how something is actually formed
within this cultural process. Cultural evolution is to be understood in terms of
cultural artefacts and perhaps memes. Neither of these is applicable to what Teilhard
envisages to be the product of current human evolution, insofar as this would appear
to be a living reality.
(vi) The evolutionary perfection of the natural order ends of course at Omega Point.
The final act of the Cosmic Christ is the attainment of the Pleroma, or the fullness of
evolution and the cosmos through an organic complex with God. There are some
very helpful aspects to this theology, and we should take some time to point these
out. The first of these is that the notion of Omega at the very least emphasises the
perfectibility of the natural order. As Gunton points out, the gradual perfection of the
created order must be the affirmation of its innate identity and not its annihilation. A
second important feature of Teilhard's theology at this point is the strong disavowal
of Pantheism that we find throughout his description of current evolution and
especially at Omega. The notion of an organic unity between God and the perfected
cosmos sounds rather alarming, but it is clear that as the mediation of Christ is
maintained even at this point, then Pantheism (if not Gnosticism) is again far from
Teilhard's intention. Third, Teilhard seems keen to emphasise an asymmetrical
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eschatological vision.101 Overall, Teilhard's scheme here has resources for
safeguarding the reality of the natural order as purposive in that it possesses a
destiny, and in maintaining its identity once it has reached the Eschaton.
However, there are elements of Teilhard's thought that do militate against the
potentially favourable impression he gives here. First, the Parousia is dependent, or
contingent upon, a humanly derived evolutionary threshold, rather than on explicit
divine will. This is only reinforced by the purely lure-like action of Omega.102
Second, because God seems to gain from Omega, either the divine self-sufficiency or
the createdness of the natural order is at stake. If God gains from the end-state of the
cosmos, then this is necessary to the divine perfection and not contingent. Moreover,
in conjunction with the previous point we are again confronted by a competitive
God-world relationship in which divine self-sufficiency and creaturely identity
cannot be simultaneously maintained. Finally, there is something rather jarring about
Teilhard's vision of Omega as a final escape of mind from matter. Apart from a
devaluing of non-conscious or non-human matter, it contradicts Teilhard's emphasis
on the created order per se, as only the human or conscious portion can be preserved.
It is not too difficult to trace where the impulse towards this idea might stem from.
We have already seen that the multiple is sometimes regarded as intrinsically and
morally evil in Teilhard's thought.103 Teilhard again seems to be suggesting that it is
the unified and not the unifiable which is valuable, and that evolution is orthogenesis
because it refers only to the successes of unification. This is failing to respect the
contingency of the evolutionary process, insofar as the nature of evolution is being
determined a priori. Teilhard must argue for unity and convergence within evolution
because this is in fact all there is, or at least all that is worth mentioning, within the
process.
101
Although it is not difficult to see why Teilhard's difficulties with creation ex nihilo, might lead to
the suggestion that his eschatology is symmetrical, and represents an emanation of the multiple from
God and its ultimate return to God in completed form. (Robert North, 'Teilhard and the Problem of
Creation', Theological Studies, 24 (1963), 577-601, (citation, 598))
102 Colin Sykes, 'Teilhard de Chardin and the Cosmic Christ', Theology, 78 (1975), 467-474, (citation,
471)
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Gray argues that the multiple is good and valuable because it is the matrix for Spirit. In other
words, it is not good in and of itself! (Gray, The One and the Many, 37). Bruno de Solages makes a
similar point by noting that for Teilhard spiritualisation and materialisation are opposite tendencies,




In this chapter we have addressed what is perhaps the most complex and difficult
aspect of Teilhard's thought - the current state of organic and christic evolution until
the Parousia. The strongest aspect of Teilhard's thought with regard to createdness is
his understanding of the Parousia, because here he has the most safeguards for the
integrity and identity of the natural order and also christological particularity. Here
Christ is clearly the mediator between God and the world, and represents the
asymmetrical goal of evolution and eschatology. However, here and elsewhere in
Teilhard's theology in this chapter, there are difficulties for createdness. Whilst we
do not wish to oversimplify the matter, these are traceable to three factors. First,
Teilhard's tendency towards reflexive Pantheism - i.e. the natural order and natural
entities take on divine functions and attributes because they are not explicitly
attributed to the triune God. Second, Teilhard's theology lacks a discussion of the
Ascension and there is a consequent reduction in the particularity of the Incarnation.
Third, Teilhard has no developed (if extant at all) Pneumatology. These latter two
points are of course largely responsible for the first point, but not entirely so. After
all, it is conceivable that one could affirm the intricacies of Teilhard's Total Christ
and simultaneously affirm the reality and sovereignty of christological action.
However, this would be difficult without also affirming pneumatological action.
Overall, the consequences of these difficulties are the collapse of world process into
divine process, a loss of creaturely integrity and divine self-sufficiency. Reflexive
Pantheism threatens at the heart of Teilhard's eschatological thinking, just as it has in
his metaphysics of creation and his understanding of the Incarnation and evolution.
In our third section we must apply our grammar and the lessons we have learned here
from Teilhard's thought to the contemporary treatment of evolution at the interface
with science. Having done so, we can discuss evolution from the perspective of
createdness.
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Summary: The Createdness of Evolution in the Thought of Teilhard de
Chardin
(i) In the last three chapters we have provided an all too brief exposition and critique
of the theology and hyperphysics of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. His thought is
remarkably fecund, and it has been difficult to present such exhilarating ideas in such
a short space. However, despite their attraction, Teilhard's ideas face severe
difficulties from the perspective of our grammar of createdness. The basis of these
difficulties must be attributed to his underdevelopment of his doctrine of God,
certainly in comparison to the richness and complexity of his Christology. First,
although his metaphysics of creation makes mention of Trinitization, otherwise his
conception of God is effectively unitary or binitarian. Moreover, his scheme self-
evidently cannot support a doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, and so cannot support
the motif of the prevenience of God and so the divine capacity for willing and
initiative. Without a doctrine of the Trinity and without safeguards for the divine
prevenience, then Teilhard's understanding of the God-world relationship suffers,
and presents problems for the concept of its mediation and the 'space' for the
integrity of the natural order as a created entity.
(ii) The blurring of the Creator-creature distinction that is signalled by Teilhard's
problematic doctrine of God threatens to turn into full-blown Pantheism in his
doctrine of creation. Here God cannot create the multiple - it arises in opposition to,
rather than from the divine being, but it is nonetheless not the product of the divine
will and action-in-relation. The loss of the explicit createdness of the natural order
plays havoc throughout Teilhard's theology. First and foremost, we have a glaring
example of a contrastive/competitive God-world relationship, because now Teilhard
cannot prevent various divine attributes and powers, which should be aspects of his
doctrine of God, from reappearing in the constitution and capacities of the natural
order. Hence the multiple/disunited can consciously or unconsciously resist the
attenuated divine will. Moreover, this ability to resist signals its morally evil
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character and so Teilhard completes his conflation of creation and Fall that attributes
physical evil to the multiple/disunited. For Gunton, following Irenaeus, the world is
intrinsically good as God's creation, as that which enjoys its own boundaries and
limitations. For Teilhard this is not the case.
(iii) Teilhard's Christology also suffers because of the loss of the createdness of the
natural order. The figure of Christ gains much but loses much more in Teilhard's
scheme. The most serious loss is that of particularity, because the Incarnation is no
longer a specific outcome of the work of the two hands of God, but is instead a
generalised capacity ofmatter and evolution once their moral ambiguity is overcome.
Moreover, Teilhard seems incapable of preventing the presence of Christ from
becoming a generic christic immanence, such that the Incarnation is a temporary
condensation of immanence. We do not deny that Teilhard tries to shore up the
specificity of the Incarnation by basing immanence upon the divine transcendence
and by basing the Cosmic Christ upon the person of Jesus of Nazareth. However,
neither of these is really followed through. The divine transcendence is not
conceptually secured in God's triune freedom, and Teilhard belies his own concern
for Jesus of Nazareth by losing such particularity as there is by ignoring the
Ascension and depersonalising this Christic presence as a number of anonymous
christological roles.
(iv) In terms of Soteriology, redemption no longer involves Atonement. Redemption
is the purely functional task of securing evolutionary progress through a degree of
unification but primarily by providing an exemplar of the worth of continuing our
human evolutionary progress. Note also that because the multiple is evil, then
redemption is the ongoing process of further unification. The incompleteness of
redemption is also due to the attenuated nature of divine action. It cannot be a once-
for-all divine endeavour and so must be an ongoing human one. The fulfilment of
redemption through our amplified, godlike, powers is in effect salvation by works.
Two things are required here - a substitutionary doctrine of the Atonement and a
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doctrine of Pneumatology. Together these make it clear that redemption is brought
about by the two hands of God, and distinguishes (rather than divorces) it from the
perfective eschatology that is again brought about by the Son and Spirit of God.
Teilhard's lack of a rigorous Pneumatology also has profound effects on his wider
theology. Let us compare Gunton's discussion with that of Teilhard. For Gunton, the
Spirit perfects the innertrinitarian love through the particularisation of the
relationships of the divine Persons and by focusing the divine love outwards.
Teilhard does not even seem capable of securing the ad extra nature of divine action.
The Spirit also perfects and particularises the God-world relationship, by delineating
the limits of the created order. On such an understanding, there can be no opposite
'pole' to the divine being from which the multiple emerges on the blurred boundaries
between God and the creation. The Spirit is also responsible for the particularity that
Gunton insists is essential for Christology. The conception of Christ is a divine,
pneumatological, initiative and not a human or creaturely one. The divine and human
natures in Christ are maintained in their particularity (their ontological dualism) and
unity by the power of the Spirit. The Word of God is active in the Incarnation, in
reliance on the power of the Spirit, for instance in the temptations. The redemption
wrought by Christ is an achievement brought about by a specific action or set of
actions by a particular person, Jesus of Nazareth. By comparison, Teilhard's scheme
is christomonist if not unitarian. Thereby it is lacking in particularity, as the
Incarnation is essentially something that happens to God, and because the Cosmic
Christ must be warped into a figure with those christological and pneumatological
functions which have not already been abrogated to evolution itself.
(v) The endangered createdness of the natural order is also apparent in its
evolutionary eschatology. For Gunton, the destiny of the world is not to be confused
with any created eschatology, be it cosmological or evolutionary, whereas in
Teilhard's scheme eschatology is naturalised or 'demythologised'. It is the burden
and eventual achievement of evolution itself. Divine action is reduced to the
inspirational presence of the Cosmic Christ as a spur for further evolution. Not only
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does this threaten the created identity of the world by reinforcing the reflexive
Pantheism we already find in Teilhard's work, but it also places a large question
mark over the nature of what is being formed through this evolutionary eschatology.
Evolution has brought about the Incarnation, it is bringing about Christification (a
cosmic transubstantiation) and it will bring about the final God-creation complex,
Omega. The created can bringforth the divine and is perhaps transforming itself into
the divine. This does not bode well for the intrinsic value of the natural order.
Coupled with Teilhard's argument that Omega will preserve only conscious
elements, we find here another reflection on his negative judgement on matter. What
matters in the long-term is Spirit, not Spirit-matter, and even here only as it
sublimates itself in the formation of a new and higher degree of unity with God.
(vi) So far in this summary we have pointed out the importance of the concept of
createdness for theology, but we must not forget that it is also important for science.
Teilhard's difficulties with createdness have negative consequences for science in
three ways. First, if our grammar of createdness is correct, then the concept of the
Within reflects the reflexive Pantheism that we have seen in Teilhard's theology.
This non-scientific concept is the result of divinising the natural order. This of course
results in the moral and physical evil that Teilhard attributes to the multiple. In turn,
this again has a negative effect on the rational contingency of evolution because
Teilhard redefines evolution as that which escapes from this dangerous multiplicity.
Evolution is defined a priori as orthogenesis, with contradictory moments of
contingency. In other words when created elements (accidentally or deliberately)
respond to the divine lure, then we have evolution proper. When they resist (again
accidentally or deliberately) we have groping, extinctions and stagnation.1 As the
metaphysics of anire makes clear, to evolve is to increase in reality. Third and
finally, the concept of Omega itself demonstrates the lack of both rational
contingency and createdness in Teilhard's scheme. Omega is divine and so is
something beyond the purview of the natural sciences. Indeed, Omega cannot be
identified through the natural sciences unless it is a naturalistic outcome. Teilhard
1
Hence Teilhard can safely ignore insects and plants because they are not undergoing unification and
so are not strictly speaking evolving.
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cannot consistently argue that Omega is both scientific and transcendent.2 To argue
that Omega is divine and also a naturalistic outcome of the evolutionary process
involves non-scientific deduction (an ignoring of the rational contingency of the
natural order) and a divinised evolution (which is no longer created). Therefore, in
the theology and hyperphysics of Teilhard de Chardin we find a confluence of a loss
or disregard of rational contingency and createdness.
2
Jones, Teilhard de Chardin, 52-53
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Section 3: Applying the Grammar of Createdness: Evolution
and the Science-Theology Interface
Introduction: The Boundaries of our Study
(i) Having used the evolutionary thought of Teilhard de Chardin as a test case for the
theological significance of createdness, we can now move on to examine some
contemporary discussion of evolution at the science-theology interface. Although we
shall be closely following Gunton's understanding of the doctrine of Providence and
the God-world relationship, we shall have to forge our own path with respect to
evolution. Gunton's own discussion of this subject is very brief, and centres on a
disavowal of evolutionary Christology and in effect a disavowal of any theological
significance for evolution at all. Although this is essentially the position we shall
take in this section, we must have a more rounded approach if we are to be able to
justify such a conclusion. In short we must discuss the createdness of evolution. But
how can we achieve this?
(ii) If we are to make a contemporary contribution to the subject of evolution from
the perspective of its created status, then we must obviously first consider other
contemporary treatments at the science-theology interface. However, this subject is
vast, ranging from discussions of evolutionary ethics to evolutionary psychology and
human uniqueness, and so we must narrow our focus. To do this we can make a
distinction that is central to our grammar, and which has been verified in Teilhard's
theology - evolution is not to be conflated with Christology or with a perfecting
eschatology. To do either is to conflate science and theology, confer divine attributes
on the process of evolution, and denigrate its createdness. We can therefore ignore
this aspect of contemporary discussion and focus instead on the treatment of motifs
which are central to our grammar. We wish to ask and answer the following
question, how do contemporary treatments of the doctrine of God, the God-world
relationship, the doctrine of creation and divine action affect the createdness of
evolution within these accounts?
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(iii) As we shall see in the next chapter, the issue of evolution has proved to be a
great stimulus for creative work at the interface with science. However, it is fair to
say that evolution is a stimulating concept because in many respects it is considered a
theological problem. To be more specific, at the interface evolution raises issues
about the necessity and desirability of divine action. This latter point is quite
fundamental, because this claim that divine sovereignty over evolution leads to an
unworthy conception of God, often leads to a reworking of the overall concept of
divine sovereignty, divine action and the relationship of God and the world. The
conclusion of such re-workings is the assumption that we do not need to conceive of
God as sovereign over evolution (and it has to be said God is often conceived of as
unable to be sovereign over evolution.) These reworked concepts and their effects on
the createdness of evolution are our particular concern here and we will discuss them
in the light of our grammar and the lessons we have learned from Teilhard's
theology, both positive and negative. Once we have deliberated over the
contemporary state of play with regard to evolution, we can move on to make our
own contribution, again with an eye to our grammar as well as Teilhard's theology.
We might anticipate our later discussion here and make the point that evolution does
not require a specific theological discussion, and indeed the assumption that it does is
greatly responsible for some of the difficulties we will find in the contemporary
discussion. Nonetheless, if we can discuss evolution from the perspective of its
createdness, as a created entity, - as a creature we might say - then we have gone
some way towards demonstrating the importance of createdness as an underlying
motif for a theology in dialogue with science.
Chapter 8
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Introduction
The overall aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of createdness for
theology, and in particular for a theology in interaction with the natural sciences.
Ultimately we have to state our case by providing a very basic outline for a
theological treatment of evolution from the perspective of its createdness. To this
end, we need to learn from Gunton and from Teilhard, because even though the
latter's work contains much that is problematic for the concept of createdness, his
concern for the innate structures of the natural order is an important lesson. However,
before we can make our own contemporary case, we must turn our attention to the
treatment of evolution at the science-theology interface. The reason for doing so is
identical to that for our continuing attention on Gunton and Teilhard - the lessons we
can learn. To be more precise, because we self-evidently cannot survey all treatments
of evolution at the interface, we have focussed on authors or schools of thought for
whom evolution is theologically significant. We will therefore discuss the theology
of several representatives from both the Functional Integrity (FI) and Process thought
schools, as well as that of the noted scientist-theologian Arthur R. Peacocke.
In the introduction to this section we indicated that we were also being selective with
regard to issues of evolutionary Christology/eschatology. As such, we are not
providing exhaustive treatments of our three contemporary specimens (indeed, it
would be impossible to do justice to the complexity and variety of Process thought).
It should be noted then that Peacocke does have an evolutionary Christology, as do
some of the representatives of Process thought whom we shall be investigating.
These concepts are no doubt theologically significant, but we have already
discounted them as hazardous to the createdness of evolution. We have also
dismissed these motifs from our discussion because this chapter is not intended to be
a full-blown contemporary critique of evolution at the interface. To be sure, we will
note any other such hazardous motifs as we proceed, but we are more interested in
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constructive criticism. What lessons, both positive and negative, can we learn at the
interface for our own theological contribution?
(A) Functional Integrity (FI)
Our first port of call is the relatively recent theological phenomenon of FI. This is
becoming an increasingly popular position amongst scientifically articulate
evangelicals as an alternative to both theistic evolution (i.e. providentially guided
evolution) and special creationism. This is particularly so for one of its most
prominent advocates, Howard J. Van Till, but it is also popular amongst other
authors who may or may not be evangelicals, but who wish to explore the theological
ramifications of evolution through FI. This latter category includes George L.
Murphy, William R. Stoeger and Rudolf B. Brun. What makes FI interesting and
important is that there is a concerted focus on the created integrity - the functional
integrity (FI) - of the natural order, which these authors consider to be threatened by
the interventionist accounts of divine action in evolution found in special creationism
and Intelligent Design (ID) theory. This is essentially as far as Van Till takes the
argument, and it is the other authors who expand on the wider theological
significance of this created integrity. Although this position is somewhat of a
newcomer, in many respects it is representative of other theological positions at the
interface, and so we will deal with it in relative detail. We will treat the other two
examples from the interface in more detail only as they differ from this position.
(i) The basic premise of special creationism and ID is that certain features of the
created order (mind, life, humanity, etc.) could not have evolved through natural
processes. Van Till's response is to regard this as almost a slur on the natural order
and its Creator, in that it must be assumed that "by God's choice to withhold certain
form-producing capacities, the economy of this created world must be
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developmentally incomplete."1 Special creationism then is in the unfortunate position
of celebrating the incapacities, rather than the capacities of the natural order.2 Van
Till rightly notes that this form of theology is closely linked to a particular
understanding of divine action, that of the God-of-the-Gaps.3 However, the natural
sciences, working on the robust for/national economyprinciple, assume that there are
no gaps.4 Special creationism and ID often equate this with a deistic proscription of
"temporal divine action of any sort in this world."5 However, Van Till rightly argues
that Christians should in fact expect the world to have a created integrity and a high
FI, because the world's properties are "to be seen as a manifestation of the creativity
and the generosity of the Creator"/' The irony then is that special creationism has a
lower estimate of divine creativity because "it makes God a specialist who simply
can do a few things that no one else can do, instead of God Almighty who actually
does everything that happens in the world, but in a hidden way through concurrence
with natural processes."7
(ii) Van Till's argument is significant because it is based on one of the principles of
the doctrine of creation - the 'relative autonomy' of the created order, wherein "we
mean the self-sufficiency nature possesses by virtue of the fact that God has granted
1 Howard J. Van Till, 'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integrity', S&CB,
8:1 (1996), 21-38, (citation, 25)
2 Ibid. 34
3 Ibid. 25 and Howard J. Van Till, 'Is Special Creationism a Heresy?', Christian Scholar's Review,
22:4 (1993), 380-395, (citation, 384)
4 Howard J. Van Till, 'The Creation: Intelligently Designed or Optimally Equipped', Theology Today,
55:3 (1998), 344-364, (citation, 351)
5 Van Till, 'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integrity', 26
6
Van Till, 'The Creation', 361. Therefore, "each capability that contributes to the Creation's
formational economy is a gift of being that we may celebrate as a manifestation of the Creator's
creativity and generosity." (Howard J. Van Till, 'Is the Universe Capable of Evolving?', in Keith B.
Miller (ed.) Perspectives on an Evolving Creation (Grand Rapids, Ml/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003),
313-334, (citation, 331)
7
George L. Murphy, 'The Third Article in the Science-Theology Dialogue', PSCF, 45:3 (1993), 162-
168 [Online document] http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1993/PSCF9-93Murphv.html. "Those who
yield to the temptation to reserve a point here and there for special divine interposition are apt to
forget that this virtually excludes God from the rest of the process. If God appears periodically, He
disappears periodically." (Drummond, The Ascent ofMan, 427). "Intermittency of operation is no
proof of specially Divine power." (Vernon F. Storr, Development and Divine Purpose (London:
Methuen, 1906), 122)
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it laws of operation".s This autonomy is 'relative' because the creaturely capacities
still require the God-world relationship, and because they are contingent. They are
God-given, "and prepared by God to perform the tasks for which they were called
into being."9 The regular and law like behaviour of the natural order does not then
lead us to a deist position; indeed, it is a sign of the divine faithfulness in sustaining
this creaturely dynamism. For Van Till, 'relative autonomy' is 'functional integrity'.
The world has been gifted with the capacities for evolutionary and cosmological
development without divine intervention.10
Van Till argues further that this confidence in the Fl/relative autonomy of the created
order is missing in special creationism. The difficulty lies in understanding the
meaning of 'relative'. If the natural order and its inherent regularities have only a
'relative', albeit genuine, autonomy, then we must think of them as limited. This of
course entails the necessity of the continuing divine sustaining, but this also entails
the fact that they only have genuine activity "within the limits established by the
Creator at the beginning."11 In other words, Van Till is rightly pointing out that the
laws of nature are contingent in both their existence and their parameters. His point,
however, is that for him the Christian tradition (and here he is thinking of the
contemporary creationist tradition in particular) tends to view these limits not as
aspects of contingence, but as upper limits - i.e. limits on what the natural order and
its law like behaviour can achieve.
(iii) FI does not represent a deist position, and neither does it represent an opposition
to or diminishing of divine action. There is no question that God cannot intervene,
for instance to bring about miracles, but the question must always be whether this is
8 Howard J. Van Till, 'Can The Creationist Tradition Be Recovered? Reflections on 'Creation & the
History of Science' [C. Kaiser]', review of Christopher B. Kaiser, Creation and the History ofScience,
in PSCF, 44:3 (1992), 178-185 [Online document] http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1992/PSCF9-
92VanTill.html. quoting from pi 5 of Kaiser's book.
9 Ibid.
10
Van Till, 'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine ofCreation's Functional Integrity', 29
" Van Till, 'Can The Creationist Tradition Be Recovered?'
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a world in which God needs to act in this way.12 Indeed, because miracles are not
necessary for specific evolutionary and cosmological developments, their
significance can be rediscovered, as they are regarded solely as "voluntary acts of
God freely performed for their special revelatory or redemptive value."13 Van Till
shows that he is sensitive to the potential interpretation of his work in terms of what
Gunton calls reflexive Pantheism. He asks whether FI implies that evolution is itself
imbued with all creativity. The answer is no, because no creature can create as
such.14 Instead, in a manner that is quite common at the interface, he prefers to talk
of an evolutionary exploration of the 'possibility space' of arrangements ofDNA and
so the discovery of "novel forms that are variable in the environment at hand."15 This
exploration arises by chance, implying that chance is part of the design of the
universe and is used by God for "the achievement of his purposes for the formative
history of the created world."16 This is part of the concept of FI, which also argues
that if evolutionary development can occur through explorations of 'possibility
space', then God must have richly provisioned this space with viable structures and
connections between genomes.17 Such viable structures and connections are species,
genera, etc. which represent areas of evolutionary stability within 'possibility space'.
Van Till likens these to the 'strange attractors' of Chaos theory and argues that "the
whole array of genomic attractors could be seen as biological potentialities given to
the Creation by the Creator, and random genetic variability as the capacity given to
DNA to explore that genomic space so that some of those potentialities might be
18discovered in the course of Creation's formative history."
(iv) So how can divine creative action be distinguished or discerned? Van Till uses a
royal metaphor.19 God acts by "calling upon the creation to employ its creaturely
capabilities to bring about a fruitful outcome", and "the fruitful character of
12 Van Till, 'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integrity', 36-37. C.f. Van
Till, 'The Creation', 362
13 Van Till, 'Is Special Creationism a Heresy?', 393
14
Van Till, 'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integrity', 37
15 Ibid. 37
16 Ibid. 37
17 For more on this see Van Till, 'The Creation', 362
ls
'Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation's Functional Integrity', 37, n22
19
Van Till, 'Is Special Creationism a Heresy?', 385
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creation's formational history is the manifestation of that divine calling.'" This is
what we read of in the Genesis account. Here we find 'ministerial creation', wherein
"the Creator calls upon earthly material to do something."21 The Sovereign Creator
speaks and creation responds. Because the world makes an intrinsically real response
to the divine calling, then we must not conceive of this calling as 'magic' and
coercive words. Instead they are "words of royal edict that call upon the earth and
water to use their resident capacities-the gifts of active being already given to them
by the Creator-to produce the plants and animals that the Creator had in mind."22
This is the illustration of a world endowed with functional integrity, wherein there
are no gaps that require divine intervention.22
(v) The other explicit or implicit FI advocates we wish to discuss represent a
development of the basic motifs in Van Till's work. Therefore, in the work of
George L. Murphy, we initially find the same presuppositions. For him, FI means
"God has created a universe which depends continually upon God, but which has
been endowed with the ability to accomplish what God wants it to accomplish
without any "corrections" or "interventions.""24 He rightly connects FI, which after
all reflects the createdness of the natural order, with 'methodological naturalism' -
the fact that the processes of the natural order can be the result of scientific enquiry
"without reference to God."25 The essential difference between Van Till and Murphy
is that whereas the former talks of creation and divine action as a royal edict, the
latter talks of a divine kenosis or self-limitation in creation based on the kenosis of
the Incarnation. Murphy urges that we realise that if "the exalted crucified one is
identified with God", then the self-emptying shown most fully in the cross "gives us
a profound insight into the kind of deity God is."26 More specifically, because the
20
Van Till, 'The Creation', 362. Although Van Till focuses on the divine calling in the origin of the
created order, he does seem to suggest that this divine calling also has a present tense, for example in
response to prayer. (Ibid. 362)
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God revealed in Christ is Creator, then we must expect a similar self-emptying of
God in the divine creative and preserving activity. This leads to what Murphy refers
to as 'chiasmic cosmology'.27 This 'chiasmic' model allows Murphy to distinguish
between different models of divine action. He can confidently reject the 'Classical
(Ruler-Kingdom)' model, not because of inherent difficulties with affirming the
sovereignty of God and divine action, but rather because "the God revealed in Christ
does not act as the absolute and arbitrary dictator of the world, which is what the
Classical view often amounts to."28 The alternative is not Deism, but the 'Neo-
Thomist' model, in which God as the first cause acts through secondary causes.
Here, the divine concursus is affirmed "so that what happens in the world is done by
God (thus the distinction from Deism is clear) and is done also by natural
processes."29 This is a self-limitation of divine power so as to accord with the created
regularities of the natural order, and so "God foregoes the power to act arbitrarily in
the world."30
(vi) A kenotic or chiasmic view of creation and divine action means that the
functional integrity of the natural order represents a hiding or hiddenness of God,
which in turn provides the possibility of 'methodological naturalism'. God is not a
causal complement to the FI of the created order.31 Therefore, in terms of evolution,
God does not guide the process through the imposition of his will, but rather
evolution fulfils the divine plan in that it creates itself freely.32 William R. Stoeger,
27 Based on Justin Martyr's reference to Christ as the one "placed crosswise (echiasen) in the
universe."
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similarly, argues that "[cjreation as such is God's expression of God's self."33 This is
an important point, because Stoeger rightly wishes to affirm that this hiddenness of
God is not to be equated with the absence of God, and is instead consonant with a
strong motif of immanence. There is no need for 'gaps' in the natural order to "make
room" for God, because he is already and always profoundly present and active
throughout it. The (relative) autonomy and FI of the natural order "do not
marginalize God, but rather express God's active presence and God's respect for
creation in the fullest way. Nor do they indicate God's absence or abandonment of
creation, but rather God's full and abiding presence within it, though not in a
determinate way."34
(vii) Murphy also expands on the concept of FI, by making a connection between
evolution and theodicy. For him, traditional apologetics are inadequate because they
do not adequately emphasise the loss and suffering through evolution of which this
beauty is the result.35 Instead, this is compatible only with a theology of the Cross, in
which the God of glory has become hidden in the humiliation of the cross. Indeed, in
Christ, "God has become a participant in the evolutionary process, and has suffered
and died in solidarity with the losers in that process."36 This is why Neo-Darwinism,
which perceives no teleology in evolution is more consonant with a chiasmic
cosmology than Lamarkianism, which favours orthogenesis. Again this is not to say
that God does not act, but rather to argue that God alone is the one who can bring
good out of such disorder and evil. '7 God can bring about the desired good "in spite
of - in defiance of - the lack of any human, any creaturely, possibility."38
33 William R. Stoeger, 'Faith Reflects on The Evolving Universe', in Michael J. Himes and Stephen J.
Pope (eds.) Finding God in All Things (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1996), 162-182, (citation,
176)
34 Ibid. 176. "If God watches the sparrow fall, God must do so from a distance." (Rolston, Science and
Religion, 140)
35
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Whereas FI is a relative newcomer to the interface, the work of Peacocke has been a
mainstay of science-theology work for over thirty years. His contribution represents
perhaps the most developed theology to have arisen here and is a classic example of
what Barbour refers to with the integration model of science-theology interaction.
We find in Peacocke's theology a constant interaction of findings from the biological
(and particularly the evolutionary) sciences, and a deep-seated desire to reinterpret
Christian doctrine in consonance with these findings.
(i) As with FI, Peacocke discusses evolutionary movement in terms of the creative
interplay of chance and law-like behaviour, which allows for a thorough exploration
of the full range or gamut of potentialities within matter for evolution, by random
natural variations in DNA. This does not suggest some mythological or metaphysical
status for chance, because there can be order at higher levels of organisation even
when lower levels are random39, and because mutation is random with respect to any
biological consequences.40 Nonetheless, the interplay of chance and law are
sufficiently creative that "the emergence of life was inevitable but the form it was to
take remained entirely open and unpredictable."41 This represents what Peacocke
refers to as propensities (i.e. phenomena that arise with greater frequency) within
evolutionary history. These are complexity, information-processing/-storage,
capacity for pain and suffering, self-consciousness and language.42
39 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Biological Evolution and Christian Theology - Yesterday and Today', in John
Durant (ed.) Darwinism and Divinity: Essays on Evolution and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1985), 101-130, (citation, 117). Peacocke argues for a very specific understanding of
chance; in this case it is not to be regarded (pace Mackay and Pollard) as the mere ignorance of
parameters. It is instead the intersecting of causally unrelated chains. (Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Chance
and the Life Game1, Zygon, 14:4 (1979), 301-22, (citation, 304-306))
40 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'The Challenge and Stimulus of the Epic of Evolution to Theology', in Steven
Dick (ed.) Many Worlds: The New Universe, Extraterrestrial Life and the Theological Implications
(Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2000), 89-117, (citation, 103)
41 Arthur R. Peacocke, God and the New Biology (London: J. M. Dent, 1986), 63
42 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'The Cost of New Life', in John Polkinghorne (ed.) The Work of Love:
Creation as Kenosis (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans; London: SPCK, 2001), 21-42, (citation,, 29-33).
For an extended treatment of this see Arthur R. Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and
Becoming - Natural, Divine and Human (enlarged edition) (London: SCM, 1993), (citation, 62-69)
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The innate creativity of chance, law and these propensities does not in the least
negate the reality of divine action or divine purpose but it does mean that we can
avoid the notion of "a deterministic plan fixing in advance all the details of the
structure(s) of what eventually emerges with personal qualities."43 Rather than
invoking acts of special creation,44 we can argue that the course of evolution is both
naturalistic and implemented by general providence.43 The point here is that the
'givenness' (contingency?) of these properties of the natural order reflects the fact
that these are God-endowed and so represent a divine "eliciting of the potentialities
that the physical cosmos possessed ab initio."46 As with FI, there is a particular
emphasis on chance here which can be likened to "the search radar of God, sweeping
through all the possible targets available to its probing."47 The creativity of evolution
therefore is what we should expect as the result of continuous divine action,48 which
involves a dynamic sustaining of this world process.49 God acts by "giving
continuous existence to a process that has a built-in creativity".50 This is a doctrine of
creatio continua, wherein we see that "God has been creating all the time through
matter and the 'laws' governing its transformations."51 As such, God is always the
Creator and always creating - he is semper Creator 52
43
Peacocke, 'The Cost ofNew Life', 33.
"To believe in God as creator is to see and read cosmic evolution as God's action, an
expression of divine purpose - along with tracing its naturalistic processes, analysed
by the sciences." (Arthur R. Peacocke and Jack Dominian, From Cosmos to Love:
The Meaning ofHuman Life (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1976), 20-21)
C.f. Arthur R. Peacocke, Creation and the World ofScience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 167;
Peacocke, God and the New Biology, 64, and Peacocke, 'The Cost ofNew Life', 26
44 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Biological Evolution and Christian Theology Today', Theology, 87/715
(1984), 35-43, (citation, 39)
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Science and Christian Theology' Zygon, 8:3-4 (1973), 373-394, (citation, 384)
51 Arthur R. Peacocke, Science and the Christian Experiment (London: Oxford University Press,
1971), 130
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(ii) For Peacocke, the world exhibits an ongoing evolutionary creativity. The world
and worldly interactions are "always in process".53 The God-world relationship
reflects this dynamism, in that it is must involve time,54 and so is one of continuous
and creative divine action.55 Peacocke fleshes out this dynamic understanding of the
God-world relationship in a panentheistic scheme, whereby the divine being
"includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him but
(as against pantheism) that His Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the
universe."56 This does not deny the otherness of God and the world, but rather
reflects the internalism of this relationship.57 In terms of divine action, if God is
within the world then God operates through natural laws.58 Indeed, Peacocke argues
"the natural, causal, creative nexus of events is itself God's creative action."59 The
processes of the natural order, including those to be found within evolution, are
"God-acting-as-Creator, God qua Creator."60 It is important not to confuse this with
a pantheistic position, because here the processes are not God but the action of God,
in particular that of the Holy Spirit.61 In other words, God sustains "a process that
itself brings forth the new: thereby God is creating."62
53
Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 61-62. C.f. Peacocke, Science and the Christian
Experiment, 123
54 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'The Challenge of Science to the Thinking Church', Modern Believing, 36:4
(1995), 15-26, (citation, 19). Interestingly, Murphy also displays a similar nervousness with regard to
creation ex nihilo. (Murphy, 'Chiasmic Cosmology and Creation's Functional Integrity')
55
Peacocke, Science and the Christian Experiment, 124
56 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'A Response to Polkinghorne', S&CB, 7:2 (1995), 109-115, (citation, 109-
110), quoting from F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (eds.) Oxford Dictionary of the Christian
Church (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 1027
57 Arthur R. Peacocke, Intimations ofReality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion (Notre Dame:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1986), 64. C.f. Peacocke, God and the New Biology, 96
53 Arthur R. Peacocke, ' the Molecular Organization of Life', in I. T. Ramsey (ed.) Biology and
Personality: Frontier Problems in Science, Philosophy and Religion (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965),
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(iii) So far Peacocke's work shows a great deal of parallelism with Van Till's basic
FI argument. He moves closer to Murphy's variation when he argues that for the
worldly processes and laws to have intrinsic reality, then we have to conceive of a
divine kenosis, or self-limitation.63 More specifically, the natural sciences point to a
divine self-limitation in omniscience and omnipotence;
God has so made the world that there are certain areas over which he has
chosen not to have power.64
This self-limitation has a dual nature; on the one hand, God limits his action in order
to respect the regularities observed within the natural order.65 On the other hand,
there is a self-limitation of God due to "the nature of the natural order he himself has
created".66 For instance, because God creates a world in which the future does not
exist, then the divine knowledge of future states is inferential, and the divine
omniscience is limited.67 This self-limitation of omniscience is for the sake of the
autonomy of the created order. This is particularly so for humans, because if we are
to be free then "God cannot know certainly what we will decide."68 However, the
whole created order has "a certain autonomy" to develop and progress in a manner
which God chooses not to control in toto69 There is no guarantee for instance of the
realisation of any specific evolutionary goal.70 However, God not only takes the risk
in creation of frustrated goals, but also of a divine suffering, "a self-inflicted
63
Peacocke, Science and the Christian Experiment, 156. C.f. Peacocke, 'The Nature and Purpose of
Man in Science and Christian Theology', 384
64 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Science and God the Creator', in John Marks Templeton (ed.) Evidence of
Purpose: Scientists Discover the Creator {New York: Continuum, 1996), 91-104, (citation, 100)
65 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'The Challenge of Science to Theology and the Church', in D. W. Hardy and
P.H Sedgewick (eds.) The Weight ofGlory: A Vision and Practice for Christian Faith: The Future of
Liberal Theology; Essays for Peter Baelz (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991), 37-53, (citation, 44)
66 Ibid. 44
67 Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Response to Davis', S&CB, 9:2 (1997), 145-147 (citation, 146). C.f.
Peacocke, 'Science and God the Creator', 101; Arthur R. Peacocke, 'Science and God the Creator',
Zygon, 28:4 (1993), 469-484, (citation, 482) and Peacocke, 'The Challenge of Science to the Thinking
Church', 19
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vulnerability to the created processes in order to achieve an overriding purpose: the
emergence of free persons."71
(iv) This 'risky' form of divine action is best modelled through the musical imagery
of improvisation, especially a composer (Bach, it seems for preference)
extemporising a fugue via chance?2 Peacocke also uses musical imagery to discuss
immanence and transcendence. There is no doubting the transcendence of a
73
composer to a piece of music written by that composer. Moreover, when listening
to a piece of music, the composer, qua composer is to be found only in the music
itself. He models such divine action as whole-part constraint. This is divine action
understood to occur at supervening levels of reality, and so God is able to constrain
events within sub-levels of reality without intervening.74 This would be through a
transfer of information,75 rather than a causal divine action, which would require the
input of energy into the universe, and so contravene the second law of
thermodynamics. The rationale for the top-down causation stems from Peacocke's
emergentist monism wherein new forms of matter and organization appear over
time.76 Peacocke then defines these different levels of emergent hierarchy as
different levels of reality.77 Divine action as whole-part constraint would involve
altering the confluence of apparently independent causal chains, through constraints
exerted upon "the whole interconnected and interdependent system of the
78whole Earth in the whole cosmos which is in and present to God". On such an
71 Ibid. 38-40
72
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understanding, God represents the ultimate boundary condition for the whole cosmos
and can therefore shape the occurrence of particular patterns of events.79 Peacocke
uses the mind-body model here but acknowledges that emergent monism is a
problematic analogy.80
(C) Process Theology
In our limited space we cannot hope even to scratch the surface of Process thought as
a whole, and so here we are restricting ourselves to a number of Process-influenced
authors who have written on the subject of divine action and evolution. These
authors are Norman Pittenger, L. Charles Birch, Ian Barbour and John F. Haught. To
be sure these authors have very differing emphases and concerns; Pittenger is noted
for his evolutionary Process Christology, whilst Haught is noted for a consistent
emphasis on evolution and theodicy. Nonetheless we wish to treat the work of these
authors as a whole, because of the underlying commonalities stemming from Process
motifs.
(i) The basic description of the evolutionary process as it is interpreted by Process
thought is very similar to what we have just seen in the work of Arthur Peacocke.
Barbour argues that evolution is only directional in terms of a general increase in
complexity, responsiveness and awareness, and that evolutionary dead ends are
always possible. As such, the process is marked by contingency, i.e. the actualisation
of certain potentials at the cost of others.81 Therefore, evolution involves chance, law
and history. The last point reflects the inheritability of the transient patterns
generated through chance and law. Evolution is the concrete realisation of inherent
79 Ibid. 369. Hence, Peacocke can argue against Teilhard's law of complexity/consciousness on the
grounds that although consciousness does require a certain degree of complexity, the latter exists as
"particular forms". (Arthur R. Peacocke, 'The Kindling of the Divine Flame: Some Reflections on
Natural Becoming, Complexity, and the Humanum', Studies in Science and Theology, 1 (1993), 1 15-
131, (citation, 122))
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worldly potentials, but these only become concrete through time.82 The details of
evolution, however, are more akin to Teilhard's concept of the Within, in that
panpsychism is a basic premise of Process thought;
The universe is a universe of subjects as well as objects.83
The mentalist or ecological model argues that matter always experiences.84 This
leads to a Teilhard-like affirmation of continuity between all levels of reality and all
stages of evolution. As Birch argues, "all are organisms."85 For instance, we must
disavow any absolute distinctions between living and non-living entities or mind and
O/T
matter. For Birch, following Hartshorne, this continuity in experience is the only
way to explain that which limits chance and contingency and so enables evolutionary
87
progress. Fascinatingly, this leads to an explicit affirmation of an implicit aspect of
Teilhard's thought - cultural evolution occurs at every level of reality. This form of
evolution requires the response of evolving entities to divine persuasion, and this
occurs throughout the process down to the simplest entities.88 In summary, evolution
is "the evolution of subjects."89
(ii) Process thought disavows creation ex nihilo90 For Birch, the biblical concept of
creation is to do with dependence and not origins.91 Therefore, we find "no real
distinction between an original creation and continuing creation."92 For Suchocki,
"God is always Creator through call and response."93 God has the priority of status,
82 Charles Birch, 'Religion and Nature', in Kevin J. Sharpe and John M. Ker (eds.) Religion and
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but not an absolute temporal priority. God was never without a universe, and is
constantly presented with (or confronted by) a world with a degree of self-
determination and actualisation. Therefore, God is not to be considered as the sole
actor within evolutionary and cosmic history, and so he is likened to "the leader of a
cosmic community."94 Nonetheless, because God provides each occasion with the
all-decisive initial aim, then every occasion is dependent upon God for its existence
and the range of possibilities it can actualise. Novelty arises through the divine
offering of alternative possibilities and the entities self-determined actualisation or
self-creation.95 This understanding of the doctrine of creation leads in Process
thought to a panentheistic model of the God-world relationship, which posits the
interdependence of God and the world in internal relationships.96 God includes all
beings "or he includes nothing."97 God is operative - immanent - throughout the
created order, but this divine immanence does not exhaust the nature of God.98
Indeed, the divine transcendence can be likened to the manner in which a man
transcends his actions.99 It is the "utter inexhaustibility of the divine love" which
suffices for every occasion.100 The point of affirming both immanence and
transcendence is to affirm that God is involved in time and is therefore affected by
the God-world relationship, and yet is "eternal and unchanging in character and
purpose."101
(iii) Although Process thought eschews the concept of creation ex nihilo, there is still
a marked emphasis on the divine creativity, and the result is very similar to
Teilhard's conclusions. Process understands creativity as the eliciting of a response
from the natural order. Creation is "the concrete realization of what is potentially
possible in the universe,"102 Because this only occurs through the trial and error of
evolution, Birch argues that divine action must therefore take the form of
91
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persuasion.103 God's activity is "more akin to persuasion than compulsion."104 The
divine love is causally effective, in that it can evoke a response from the other
without impinging upon its freedom. Because God's action is the evocation of a
response, then it is most efficacious in those entities with the greatest capacity to
respond - i.e. humans. Correspondingly, divine action becomes less effective for less
responsive entities.105 At these lower levels, especially within the inanimate order,
God's actions consist almost solely in maintaining regularity;
God's purpose for low-level beings is that they be orderly; God's gift is the
structuredness of the possibilities they exemplify.106
Returning to the concept of creativity, this means that God confronts the world with
"the lure of unrealised possibility."107 This is a non-mechanistic (or non-causal, as
Peacocke would say in a slightly different context) divine action, because it is a lure
of value and so a final cause.m Through this luring activity, God persuades
occasions or entities to create or make themselves.109 What is achieved in evolution
is not progress, but "creative advance" or "novelty".110 God 'creates' in that he
evokes new subjects into being and preserves their achievements or arrangements.
We cannot refer to this as design, because this implies a preconceived plan. Instead,
the term purpose is preferred, because nothing is completely determined.111
Regardless of the particular level, or the form of creaturely action, God's influence is
always to be regarded as one amongst many.112 The point of this is that this leaves
room for spontaneous response and creaturely self-determination. God's purpose
within this process is to lure that which is relatively disordered towards new degrees
103 L. Charles Birch, 'Creation and the Creator', Journal ofReligion, 37 (1957), 86-98, (citation, 91).
C.f. Marjorie H. Suchocki, 'Process Theology and Evolution', in Bas Van Irsel (ed.) Evolution and
Faith: Concilium 2000/1 (London: SCM Press, 2000), 53-61, (citation, 55)
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of completeness (or complexity113) and as such evolution can be regarded as "a
fighting frontier of progressive integration."114
(iv) Barbour admits that by the standards of the Western tradition, the power of the
God of Process thought is "severely limited", especially at lower levels of reality
where events are controlled by their past and have a weaker capacity for responding
to the divine lure.115 These characteristics of God "are not voluntary and temporary
but metaphysical and necessary-though they are integral to God's essential nature
and not antecedent or external to it."116 In Process thought, the created order itself
limits God's ability to act.117 We might also add that, as with Peacocke, there is a
general consensus within Process thought to the effect that God has no apprehension
of future events. For Pittenger, this means that God can be surprised, and can
118
experience the joy of genuine novelty. However, some Process advocates do prefer
to talk in terms of kenosis and divine self-limitation.114 John F. Haught argues thusly
because of his concern for evolutionary theodicy, in which the randomness and
120
suffering of evolution would seem to deny the existence of a loving God. Haught's
alternative is to characterise divine love by "its authorizing creation to strive for
genuine independence vis-a-vis its creator."121 Indeed, genuine divine love restrains
itself "precisely in order to give the world the space in which to be and become
something distinct from the creative love that constitutes it as other."122 As such, we
should expect randomness and a lack of direction in a universe in relation to a God of
113
Suchocki, 'Process Theology and Evolution', 55
114
Birch, Nature and God, 99
115 Ian G. Barbour, 'Five Models of God and Evolution', in EMB, 419-442, (citation, 438). This was
one of our suspicions about the multiple in Teilhard's work.
116 Ibid. 440
117
Pittenger, God's Way with Men, 33-34
118 Ibid. 158
119 Norman Pittenger uses the image of God as a loving Father who wishes the best for his children,
but refuses to achieve this by coercion. (Ibid. 102. C.f. 109-110). In a manner similar to Polkinghome,
Pittenger also uses the model of God as a chess player to describe God's self-limited interaction with
the natural order. (Norman Pittenger, The Principles and Practices of the Christian Faith (London:
SCM, 1952), 52). Flowever, in both Pittenger and Haught this self-limitation concept is contradicted
by other references to a necessarily attenuated divine ability or knowledge.
120 John F. Haught, 'Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope', in Ted Peters (ed.) Science and Theology: The
New Consonance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 228-243, (citation, 234-235)
121 Ibid. 234
122 Ibid. 234. My italics
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infinite love. Haught argues that the original creation would have involved a kenosis,
a divine contraction, allowing the cosmos to "stand forth on its own and then to
evolve as a relatively autonomous reality distinct from its creative ground."123 This
same divine self-withdrawal also allows for the ongoing evolutionary creation
(.creatio continua) of the world.124 The evolutionary process does not therefore
represent a plan, but rather God's "letting be." This is the message of the Cross - the
"self-absenting" of God, which message provides a satisfying interpretation of the
125evidence of evolution.
(v) For Haught, an unrestrained divine action or presence would leave no room (or
19 f\
space!) for the world to be itself. God intends the independence and freedom of the
world. The divine kenosis allows for the otherness of the world and so its own
achieving of a new future through its relatively autonomous evolutionary
mechanisms. Haught argues that GPS (or "design space" as he calls it following
Dennett) is derived from the divine generosity that does not insist on immediately
and directly actualising all potential genomes.127 As with advocates of FI, Haught
sees the vastness of Design Space "as the overflowing gift to the world of God's
compassionate concern that the world be given a virtually unrestricted scope and
time to "become itself.""128 Haught rightly points out that a fully deterministic theism
is incoherent because the divine love posits the otherness of the creaturely beloved. If
the world is merely the direct and immediate implementation of a divine plan, then it
is only an emanation. God can only transcend a world that is truly distinct from the
divine being.129
liJ Ibid. 234
124 John F. Haught, 'Darwin's Gift to Theology', in EMB, 393-418, (citation, 398)
l2>
Haught, 'Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope', 235. It is also the "self-abandonment" of God. (Haught,
'Darwin's Gift to Theology', 397). He suggests that we "suppose that "God" is less concerned with
imposing a plan or design on this process [evolution] than with providing it with opportunities to
participate in its own creation." (John F. Haught, God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution
(Boulder, CO/Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 6)
126
Haught, 'Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope', 234. As Birch puts it, for God to have complete control
over the natural order "world would be the same as to annihilate it." (Birch, On Purpose, 93)
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Haught, 'Darwin's Gift to Theology', 406
128 Ibid. 407




Our intention in this chapter has been to provide a very brief summary of some of the
key theological motifs at the interface. Naturally, this has been a very selective
process, as we are particularly concerned with evolution and with those motifs that
are specifically related to the createdness of the process. Similarly, our critique must
be selective, as we are concerned with how well or otherwise createdness is secured
in these positions. Therefore, in this subsection we must focus on whether or not the
motifs here are compatible with our grammar or not, and whether we can use them in
our next chapter when we attempt a theological interpretation of evolution from the
perspective of createdness.
(i) All three positions represented here focus heavily on the inherent creativity of the
evolutionary process, and the natural order in general. The theological rationale for
this conies out most clearly amongst the FI advocates, but it is important for both
Peacocke, Process thought and indeed for Teilhard as well. This creativity
demonstrates the relative autonomy and so the createdness of the natural order. The
importance of this for our purposes is first that it is a functional parallel to Gunton 's
transcendentals. This form of argument to design (natural theology is an argument
from design) makes it clear that a prior belief in a Creator God should lead us to
expect that the natural order is dynamic, relational, particular but also creative. We
can argue in this way by noting Van Till's fascinating conclusion that special
creationism and ID actually reach negative conclusions about divine creativity and
divine action. It is these latter positions that have a potential for reflexive Pantheism
on this issue by arguing that divine and creaturely creativity are somehow mutually
exclusive.
(ii) The notion of inherent creaturely creativity might safeguard against reflexive
Pantheism, but only if we fully emphasise that this is indeed creaturely creativity.
Van Till makes the point through the motif of relative autonomy - the evolutionary
Chapter 8 226
process possesses a gifted capacity for development. Underlying this is the divine
prevenience, which is highlighted primarily by the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
This doctrine seems to cause a certain nervousness for FI advocates other than Van
Till and is rarely affirmed by Peacocke, although without an outright dismissal, but
to its credit Process thought makes its objections to this doctrine clear. However, all
three positions can affirm the next supporting motif for divine prevenience - an
ongoing God-world relationship. Without this there is a deistic route to reflexive
Pantheism. Finally, all three positions make it clear that the creativity of the natural
order is dependent on a (prevenient) divine action. The FI advocates say very little
about this, although they clearly support at the very least a sustaining divine action.
Van Till can emphasise the divine prevenience a little more by not ruling out
miracles and by using a 'royal' model of divine action. Peacocke and Process
thought both have much more helpful comments here by focussing on present tense,
discrete divine actions, which is important because as we saw with Wiles,
'monotone' divine action is indistinguishable from bare God-world relationality. One
final point here is that FI advocates and Peacocke can also affirm the divine
intentionality - and so the intrinsic significance - behind these properties of the
natural order. In fine, we can argue that creaturely creativity is not incompatible with
divine prevenience, and can safely be regarded as a deliberate result of it.
(iii) All three positions discuss divine action and in differing degrees of detail, and
there is a common and ultimately hazardous assumption here that divine action can
be interventionist and that this would be harmful to the intrinsic reality of the created
order. Although we will show that the basis of this argument is incompatible with
createdness, there is still some underlying similarity here with Gunton's motif of the
naturalness of divine action. This can be found in the emphasis on sustaining divine
action, the limitation of miracles to eschatological ends and the search for luring or
non-deterministic whole-part/top-down divine action. No matter the consequences of
such arguments, the concern is to show how divine action contributes to rather than
endangers creaturely reality, and this point is vital to our argument in the next
chapter. There are two other important arguments here against intervention. The first
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is that intervention assumes a deistic God-world relationship that none of these
authors would accept. The second is Van Till's observation that the notion of
constant intervention would again raise the question of the type of world in which
this would have to be the case. Neither of these would protect the createdness of
evolution.
(iv) Just as the notion of 'intervention' as it is used in these positions is a double-
edged sword, so is the evolutionary theodicy that we find in FI, Process and
implicitly in Peacocke. This theodicy takes the form of a motif of divine
suffering/passivity and/or the (self-)limitations on divine action to non-
interventionist or non-deterministic forms. This argument is valuable in that it
focuses attention on the importance of the natural order and the evolutionary process
for God, which is of course the source of the intrinsic value of the natural order.
Furthermore, as with any theodicy, one is constantly brought up against the apparent
contradiction between the sovereign love of God and creaturely suffering. Whether
or not this sensitive issue can ever be resolved adequately or not, we will have to
address the issue of evolutionary theodicy again in a moment as a potential threat to
the createdness of the process.
(v) The three positions we have discussed here all hold in common an affirmation of
the basic principle of FI - it is unnecessary and undesirable to discuss divine action
in evolution as a constant series of interventions into the process. Whilst this is
vitally important, there is a danger here that this position will morph into the
argument that divine action need never occur. This evidential claim for the
superfluity of (deterministic or guiding) divine action is unwarranted by a concern
for createdness or rational contingency, and instead veers towards the metaphysical.
For example, we can see this happening when Van Till is led to conjectures on the
nature of 'possibility space' that are not based on scientific evidence.1'° Indeed, he
seems to threaten the contingent arrangement of this space by arguing that it must
130
For more on metaphysical treatments of 'possibility space' see the next chapter.
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have a richly (albeit divinely) provisioned structure. Significantly, this was also the
result of Teilhard's blurring of the distinction between science and theology in his
hyperphysics. Therefore, we must leave the question of divine interventions in
evolution open.
(vi) What constitutes a divine intervention in the natural order? For FI, this would
involve the bridging of a natural evolutionary 'gap' in the functional economy of the
natural order. For Peacocke and perhaps for Process thought, divine intervention
1 T1
represents an energetic disruption of worldly regularities. However, the problem
here is that the divine prevenience is lost from sight. Gunton talks of a creaturely
'space' and divine action-in-relation as the interaction with, and enabling of created
energies by uncreated divine energies. Thus we can conceive of natural regularities
as the result of the sovereign governing of created energies by uncreated energies. In
other words "[G]od does not alter the energy budget of the world but makes the
132world use its energy in new and unforeseen ways." The point here is quite simple;
even worldly regularities are the outworkings of specific divine acts and the divine
will, and such regularity as we observe is based on the divine faithfulness and
trustworthiness.133
131
'Energetic' in that it would involve a change in the net energy of the cosmos. An interesting
question for further research would be that of whether such an infringement of the second law of
thermodynamics is actually theologically problematic, given that the Ascension (as well as the taking
up of Elijah into heaven) would appear to involve a loss of quantities of mass-energy from the
cosmos.
132 Niels Henrik Gregersen, 'Autopoiesis: Less than Self-Constitution, More than Self-Organization.
Reply to Gilkey, McClelland and Deltete, and Brun\ Zygon, 34:1 (1999), 117-138, (citation, 130). For
the sake of fairness, we should point out that Gregersen comes to this conclusion from a radically
different direction to Gunton, in that he is looking for aspects of creaturely causality in which we can
posit non-interventionist divine action.
133 Denis Alexander describes this well;
"All that exists only continues to do so because of his [God's] continued say-so. The
properties of matter continue to be what they are because God wills that they should
continue to have such properties." (Denis R. Alexander, Rebuilding the Matrix:
Science and Faith in the 21s' Century (Oxford: Lion, 2002), 314. C.f. Ibid. 326)
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(vii) The concept of divine self-limitation is also central to the positions we have
examined here. Murphy et al, Peacocke and Haught et al understand divine action to
be restricted to sustaining action or concursus and non-deterministic forms, whilst
simultaneously playing down the very possibility of miracles. Gunton follows a
slightly more opaque route and argues for a prevenient divine action that enables
creaturely actions through the gifting of the requisite ontological 'space'. This very
definitely leaves room for miracles. The difficulty with divine self-limitation is that
this implies that the God-world relationship is somehow competitive (i.e. divine
prevenience and creaturely integrity are mutually exclusive), and so although
Gunton's position requires some reconstruction it is preferable to a concept of divine
self-limitation.
We are not simply avoiding the concept of divine self-limitation because it is not
consonant with our grammar; rather, it is inherently problematic with regard to
createdness and again seems to have the kind of evidential and metaphysical nature
that is incompatible with science or theology. Therefore, in recent critique of
Peacocke's thought we have the useful observation that the very notion of the forms
that divine action can or cannot take seems based on rationalism rather than on a
consideration of the contingent outworkings of the divine will.134 The difficulty here
is partly the hubris of determining in advance the nature of divine rationality or the
divine character135, but even more seriously a very real danger of reflexive Pantheism
in that there is an apparent conflation of divine and creaturely realities. God is of
course self-limited in that he cannot contradict his own character, but this is not the
case for laws of nature that are "not an irreducible part of God's character, but rather
secondary reflections of it in creation."136 Reducing divine action effectively to the
outworkings of chance and law, in conjunction with the difficulties in distinguishing
divine and creaturely action within Panentheism, leads us to a reflexive Pantheism,
where creaturely processes are substitutes for divine action, as there is now little
134 Whilst it is true that worldly regularity reflects the faithfulness and rationality of God, it is a rather
large leap to move from this to the assumption that divine action that contradicts this regularity would
be inconsistent with God's character. (Doye et al., 'Contemporary Perspectives', 129)
135 Ibid. 132. Such a tendency is also very prominent in Teilhard's work.
136 Ibid. 129, n43
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room for special providence.137 It is perhaps not surprising then that in one early
remark, Peacocke can argue that chance and randomness have become "creative
agents."138 This 'animating' of inanimate or unconscious matter lies at the heart of
Teilhard's notion of the multiple and the Within, but it is also at the heart of the
panpsychism of Process thought. Process thought explicitly disavows creation ex
nihilo and the divine prevenience.134 Ultimately, Process cosmology presents us with
a dualism "in which there are two eternal powers - God, and the power(s) over which
he has no final control."140 This leads to an animation of matter such that Birch can
argue that although the macroprocesses of evolutionary self-organization are perhaps
mechanistic, at the microlevel they are based on patterns generated by the behaviour
of individual and subjective entities.141 Again, as with Teilhard's Within, this degree
of autonomy within the natural order is such that there is in effect a freedom to strive
for or against progression and evolution, such that this freedom represents the
137 Ibid. 129. Moreover, the concept of self-limitation has serious consequences for the nature of
special Providence. For instance, if God does not know the future, then how can he know how much
information - and of what sort - to input into the natural order? (Ibid. 131. C.f. Ernan McMullin,
'Cosmic Purpose and the Contingency of Human Evolution', Theology Today, 55:3 (1998), 389-414,
(citation, 407)). This is only heightened by the improvisational fonn of divine action that accompanies
this restricted divine omniscience. (Doye, et al., 'Contemporary Perspectives', 133). For more on the
intrinsic difficulties with attempts to conceptualise non-interventionist divine action, see Dennis
Biefeldt, 'Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?', Zygon, 36:1 (2001), 153-177,
(citation, 162-173)
138
Peacocke, Creation and the World ofScience, 70. My italics
139
Royce G. Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God: Biblical Faith and the Challenge ofProcess Theism
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1983), 33
140 Ibid. 35. For example, note Pittenger's careful effort to secure both God's intimacy with the world
without this involving a collapse into Pantheism. To do this Pittenger utilises trinitarian (or as he puts
it, Triunitatarian theology) to find a middle path between an absolute divine transcendence and
immanence. He calls this concept the divine concomitance with the creation. (Norman Pittenger, 'God
"The One in Three, The Three in One'", Religion in Life, 48 (1979), 93-100, (citation, 98). The use of
'Triunitarian' rather than 'Trinitarian' is indicative of a wider Process disquiet with the doctrine of the
Trinity. Note the incipient modalism in the trinitarian thought of Lewis Ford. (Lewis Ford, 'Process
Trinitarianism', Journal of The AAR, 43 (1975), 199-213, (citation, 207) C.f. Marjorie Hewitt
Suchocki, 'God, Trinity, Process', dialog 40:3 (2001), 169-174, (citation, 173)) Essentially, we can
see that God is more than the creation and yet at work alongside and within the creation. (Pittenger,
'God "The One in Three, The Three in One'", 98) We can go further; Lewis Ford argues that in fact
the world transcends God "in the sense that each achieved actuality is something for itself alone and
also something upon which the divine experience depends." (Lewis Ford, 'Contingent Trinitarianism',
in Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, (eds.) Trinity in Process: A Relational
Theology of God (New York: Continuum, 1997), 41-68, (citation, 45)) The God-world relationship on
such an understanding loses any sense of divine sovereignty; it is a symbiosis in which the world
requires God for order, and God requires the world for experience. (Ford, 'Contingent Trinitarianism',
48) Ford can go so far as to criticise a social doctrine of the Trinity precisely because it affirms that as
triune God does not need the world, as the divine Persons enjoy a rich relationality between
themselves! (Ibid. 50)
141
Haught, 'Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope', 238
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possibility of failure and disorder, and so "[actualized creation and 'estranged
creation' are identical."142 Therefore, the concept of divine self-limitation must be
avoided as it opens the door to reflexive Pantheism.
(viii) We have already argued that the sensitive issue of theodicy makes evolutionary
theodicy a potentially vital component of our argument, and indeed it is insofar as it
posits the value of the natural order to God. However, the problem here is that we are
again dealing with a metaphysical argument because it must use the findings of
natural science in an evidential role for what is nominally a theological endeavour.
Such value judgements on evolution or any natural process cannot be required of
theologians by the findings of the natural sciences.143 They are quite simply
unscientific.144 Consequently, we cannot affirm the createdness of evolution by
denying the compatibility of the process with prevenient divine action. Furthermore,
if divine action as a sovereign directing agency is effectively unnecessary or even
undesirable, then can we affirm divine intentionality behind any evolutionary event
or outcome? It is certainly the case that the divine intentionality is minimised in
Process Theology, as we saw in our exposition. For the other positions we can
certainly affirm that the autonomy and creativity of the natural order is divinely
intended. However, we can only affirm divine intentionality behind specific
evolutionary events or outcomes if we minimise the 'contingent' aspects of
evolution, i.e. if we adopt a gradualist perspective and/or interpret evolution literally
as an unfolding of the latent potentialities ofmatter. If, on the other hand, we affirm
the role of chance, contingent events, and a wider range of possible outcomes, then
the divine intentionality becomes less clear, unless we affirm a divine perception of
the whole of spacetime.145 Because Peacocke and FI seem to emphasise chance and
I4~
Birch, Nature and God, 104
143
We should argue for the consonance of divine action and evolution "despite its contingency".
(McMullin, 'Cosmic Purpose', 400. My italics)
144
Rolston, Science and Religion, 133
14' Donald H. Wacome, 'Theism, Christianity and the Grand Evolutionary Story', in Jitse M. van der
Meer (ed.) Facets of Faith and Science, 4: Interpreting God's Action in the World (Lanham:
University Press of America; Ancaster: Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies on Faith and Science,
1996), 143-154, (citation, 145). The strategy of using the law of averages, or arguing that in a
sufficiently vast universe all required chance outcomes will be actualised, is still no guarantee that any
outcome desired by God will be met. (McMullin, 'Cosmic Purpose', 402)
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contingency, then we must raise a question mark over divine intentionality. It is
perhaps even conceivable that any or all evolutionary features are unwilled, or even
contrary to the divine will. This would imply the divinisation of evolution and those
elements that do not concur with the divine will, as this would potentially place them
in opposition to God.
Conclusion
Evolution illustrates the intrinsic and gifted creativity of the natural order. God has
created a process with the potential to evolve through time without the need to posit
evolutionary 'gaps' that must be bridged by intervening divine action. Such an
assumption about the nature of this process is actually inimical to our conceptions of
the nature of God and the nature of the Creator. These are all important lessons from
the interface with science. However, the finer details of these lessons are slightly
more problematic. The first is the correlation of creaturely creativity with divine
(self) limitation, which implies that there is competitiveness between divine action
and creaturely reality. Underlying this correlation is the notion of 'interventionist'
divine action. Theology at the interface rightly notes that divine 'intervention'
suggests divine absence is the norm within the God-world relationship. This is why
special creationism and ID are particularly difficult concepts for divine action and
createdness. However, the real problem with the notion of 'intervention', and one
that affects these contemporary positions at the interface as well, is that this fails to
account for the divine prevenience. It assumes that God is not governing the process
of evolution except through intervention. This is inimical to createdness because the
divine prevenience is the sole guarantee of the continuing existence and creativity of
the natural order. When this is realised we can see why it is that even miracles are
not interventionist, because they reflect the divine prevenience over the created
order. Along with our grammar and the lessons we learnt from Teilhard's work, these
are the important pointers we must take into our next and final chapter.
Chapter 9
Chapter 9: Evolution from the Perspective of Createdness
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Introduction
In the previous chapter, we argued that amongst the fruitful material emerging from
the science-theology interface, there were a number of recurring motifs that
threatened the createdness of the evolutionary process and the natural order as a
whole. However, this conclusion in isolation merely reiterates the point that
createdness is significant for theology, and does not reveal whether or not a threat to
createdness is also a threat to rational contingency, which is our basic premise as
outlined in the introduction to the thesis. To make the case for the link between
createdness and rational contingency, we shall examine some material from popular
science that comes to very similar conclusions about the nature of evolution as we
found it at the interface. Here we shall find that these examples of popular science
are relying on a number of metaphysical assumptions about the range of creaturely
capacities inherent within the evolutionary process. In other words, rational
contingency is abandoned in favour of metaphysics. More importantly, we shall point
out that these same metaphysical assumptions are present in the material we have
examined at the interface, and so conclude that in this instance metaphysics has
replaced createdness. In both the science-theology material and examples of popular
science, the createdness and so the rational contingency of the natural order are
threatened.
Once we have established that theology and the natural science can only be
coherently related to one another through the concept of createdness, then we must
ask about the form that a theology must take if it respects createdness and is in
genuine dialogue with science. We have already argued that although such a
theology is distinct in many respects, we must focus on the doctrine of Providence if
we are to highlight its distinctive attributes. This involves first an identification of
those motifs that are pertinent to our discussion, including some final deliberations
on evolutionary Christology, eschatology and theodicy. Second, we have a
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discussion of divine action-in-relation that incorporates both the essential motifs
from the grammar (which we summarised at the end of the first section) and helpful
motifs from Teilhard and the interface material. Third and finally, we provide a very
simple model for divine action-in-relation in evolution. More specifically, we wish to
discuss this divine action through one established scientific model for the process -
GPS (Genetic Phase Space). By discussing divine action-in-relation as the work of
the Son and Spirit in GPS, we can describe evolution as a creature governed by
sovereign and prevenient divine action and as a process with its own created
integrity.
(A) Popular Science, Metaphysics, andEvolution
It has been the contention of our thesis that createdness is a theological linchpin, and
without it the interaction between science and theology cannot do justice to either. In
our discussion of Teilhard we noted that the absence of createdness tends to result in
a scheme in which metaphysics is more prominent than either of these two
disciplines. The situation is obviously less acute in material at the interface (although
Process thought by its very nature bids fair to approach such a point) because of a
more considered approach to the relationship between disciplines and simply because
contemporary authors have more opportunity for criticism than Teilhard could enjoy.
Nonetheless, we noted some symptoms of an incipient threat to the createdness of
natural processes through a common emphasis on what we might call the superfluity
and undesirability of divine action, at least in sovereign, governing or deterministic
form. This dual emphasis obviously has a drastic effect on createdness because it
impinges upon the notion of the divine prevenience and also has an effect on the
natural sciences. Such an effect is rarely noticeable at the interface, because the
conceptual traffic between science and theology is mostly one-way. It is, however,
noticeable in some material from popular science that works from broadly similar
perspectives on the extent and moral status of sovereign divine action, especially
with respect to evolution. Therefore, in this first subsection we turn to examine the
consequences of such thinking for the findings and methodology of the natural
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sciences. In an important essay David L. Wilcox has argued that such assumptions
about the absence of divine action in the works of Richard Dawkins and the late
Stephen Jay Gould, both respected scientists and contributors to popular science, are
based on a number of metaphysical and not scientific assumptions. In particular,
Wilcox notes that assumptions are being made about the structure of Genetic Phase
Space (GPS) - or "design space" as Haught and Van Till refer to it - which must be
made in order to assume that divine action is unnecessary.1
(i) In The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins argues for the efficacy of a neo-Darwinian, or
more precisely, a gradualist2 neo-Darwinian interpretation of evolution in order to
explain the existence of biological complexity within the natural order. Dawkins
argues that natural selection 'favours' small mutations, because they are more likely
to occur3 and are less likely to be harmful.4 When such small changes are then
filtered through non-random natural selection5, and coupled to the cumulative
process of reproduction (wherein changes can be 'remembered' from one generation
to another)6, they can account for extensive evolutionary change over relatively short
periods of time.7 To illustrate his point, Dawkins uses a computer program,
Biomorphs, which mimics the essential features of the evolution of artificial
1 GPS is the name given to a conceptual multidimensional array of all the possible and actual genomes
(specific DNA 'recipes' for organisms) that are available to evolution through mechanisms of genetic
change. This array is multidimensional because all genomes are to be considered to be arranged so
that immediate neighbours are arranged one single mutation away from each other. The next step
away is two mutations away, and so on. Mutation actualises genomes as organisms reproduce and
produce mutants, thus bringing into being a specific genome that might until then only have been a
possibility. Therefore, each and every evolutionary track or history "consists of a particular pathway,
or trajectory, through genetic space [GPS]." (Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London:
Penguin, 1988), 67). There have been some refinements of this idea over recent years, including one
variation in which GPS increases over evolutionary time. On such an understanding, GPS consists
solely of actual genomes.
2 If we distinguish Dawkins and Gould by referring to the former as an advocate of gradualism and the
latter as an advocate of punctuated equilibrium, we are not assuming any form of antagonism or
incompatibility between these two concepts. As Dawkins rightly points out, Gould, Eldridge and other
punctuationists are themselves gradualist, but assume that gradual mutations occur in bursts and at a
relatively accelerated rate. (Ibid. 243). Therefore, we use these terms advisedly, and we retain them







'Biomorphs'. The program mimics the existence of mutation and genes by coding for
individual Biomorphs with a nine-digit variable 'genome'. There is also an analogue
of embryonic development (where mutations must arise if they are to be inheritable),
in the form of the coded branching of Biomorph structure. Reproduction is mimicked
by giving any particular Biomorph a set of 'offspring' whose genomes are separated
from the 'parent' by one mutation. Finally, there is a form of natural selection, in that
the program user determines which Biomorph will go on to breed.8 Dawkins uses
this model to demonstrate how a wide variety of Biomorphs can be generated with
only a few iterations of the program. In turn, he presents this as evidence that
cumulative selection is an efficient, or perhaps the most efficient search mechanism
through Biomorph GPS.9
Wilcox notes four areas of divergence between the Biomorph programme and the
evolutionary process, all of which militate against the success of the programme. The
first of these is the size of the probability space involved. The Biomorph genome is
only nine digits and so has only 109 permutations to search through.10 The
mammalian genome on the other hand consists of 2.5 billion base pairs (digits),
giving approximately jo1'000'000'000 permutations.11 Second, Biomorphs are able to
'search' a much wider proportion of their probability spaces than real organisms.
Biomorphs show all possible offspring (which means that all accessible genomes are
actualised), whilst the most fecund real organisms can only generate a vanishingly
small fraction of possible offspring and their requisite genetic permutations. As such,
it seems likely that finding the 'next step' in Biomorph evolution is significantly
easier than it is for a real organism. Third, the viability of Biomorphs is significantly
greater than reality. No Biomorph has to die without reproducing, and so no
trajectory through Biomorph possibility space is impossible. However, most mutant
organisms do die, and so there are such things as impossible trajectories in GPS.
What makes Wilcox' argument particularly interesting is his account of the
8 Ibid. 5Off
9 Ibid. 66
10 Wilcox for some reason states that Dawkins argues for 16 digits and so derives a value for the
number of permutations of 1016. We have used 9 in both instances.
11
However, not every DNA base has an equal chance ofmutating, as there are biological mechanisms
to prevent or inhibit mutation in DNA sequences (such as genes) that are essential to life.
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assumptions which Dawkins must make about GPS, and which account for these
three difficulties in his argument. He must assume the existence and likelihood of
viable trajectories, and also a preponderance or high probability of those trajectories
that are dependent upon minor sequence changes. However, how do we know that
there are no isolated spots that could only be actualised by so many simultaneous
point mutations that their actualisation through divine action is the simplest
explanation? Quite simply, how would we able to tell that an organism had not
originated in such a manner? Fourth and finally, the rules governing Biomorph
morphology are exterior to the program's internal environment. A particular
sequence of numbers means a specific Biomorph due to these external programming
instructions. Whilst DNA sequences also have such defined meanings, these
definitions are "themselves encoded on the genome, and thus also part of GPS."12
Therefore, according to gradualist naturalism, these biological definitions are to be
explained only by the same formal causes (the search mechanisms of chance and
law) as the sequences they define. But how can searching GPS give us any clue as to
how that matrix was constructed? As Wilcox succinctly puts it;
Understanding morphogenesis means to explain the rules, not what they
govern.13
Biomorphs therefore ably demonstrate the evolutionary power of neo-Darwinian
mechanisms if they are governed by an external and intelligent formal cause. The
aim of the program is of course to go further and "demonstrate that both formal and
material causes are adequate in the absence of intelligence."14 To determine this, we
would have to know the probabilities involved in traversing GPS.1" This cannot be
done by simply investigating observed patterns of genetic change, because we cannot
12 David Wilcox, 'How Blind the Watchmaker?', in John Marks Templeton (ed.) Evidence of
Purpose: Scientists Discover the Creator (New York: Continuum, 1996), 168-181, (citation, 174)
13 Ibid. 175
14 Ibid. 175. For more on this criticism see Neil Broom, How Blind the Watchmaker? Theism or
Atheism: Should Science Decide? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 144, and Michael Poole, 'A Critique of
Aspects of the Philosophy and Theology of Richard Dawkins', S&CB, 6:1 (1994), 41-59, (citation,
53)
Daniel C. Dennett acknowledges that certain assumptions must be made about GPS (or Design
Space, or the Library of Mendel as he refers to it). For him, and for Dawkins, the assumption must be
that "nothing stops us from going down any of the pathways that are open so far as physics is
concerned." (Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life
(London: Penguin, 1996), 120, nl 1. My italics)
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simultaneously determine the two different probabilities - the probability of an
outcome if not directed, and the probability of its being directed - which this
demonstration would require. The point of this is quite simple; if we knew the
topology of GPS (which as we have already noted we do not), then we could identify
probable trajectories for fossil history, and thus determine the likelihood of divine
guidance. However, the structure of GPS is unknown; therefore to claim that divine
action does not occur here is to discuss metaphysics and not science;
If we reject intelligent cause, we assume GPS is rich in linked viable
probabilities. If we hold to intelligent cause, we realize that the GPS might
be much poorer. The statement that GPS must have a structure that would
allow gradual and undirected emergence is based on worldview assumptions,
not on observations. The GPS becomes our "field of dreams," its contours a
projection of our metaphysics.16
It is interesting that we have again happened upon the rationalist 'must' that we
found in Teilhard's writings, and which is the enemy of rational contingency and so
the basis of the scientific enterprise.
(ii) Stephen Jay Gould comes to a similar conclusion on divine action, whilst
pursuing an apparently opposing course to Dawkins, due to his emphasis on
evolutionary contingency. In his book Wonderful Life, Gould argues that the
paleontological findings of the Burgess Shales demonstrate the importance of
'history' or contingent events for understanding the nature of evolution. His concern
is to refute any sense of evolution as progress, whether in terms of increasing
complexity or diversity.17 To demonstrate his point he argues for a thought-
experiment which he calls "replaying life's tape." If evolution is in any way
orthogenetic, then the same evolutionary path and outcomes will arise if the history
tape of evolution is rewound and replayed;
16
Wilcox, 'How Blind the Watchmaker?', 175
17
Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature ofHistory (Hannondsworth:
Penguin, 1989), 29-48
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Rewind the tape back into the neck of time, and you will always obtain the
same prototypes, constrained to rise in the same general direction.18
However, if 'luck' or other non-Darwinian causes (such as meteor strikes) dictate
survival, then a different result is likely to occur in evolution. This is not to advocate
the sovereignty of pure chance, but rather a lack of predictability.19 Gould insists that
every step proceeds through some cause, but no particular step would ever occur in
the same way twice, "because any pathway proceeds through thousands of
improbable stages."20 More precisely, the world will not turn out the same if there
21
are "untold multitudes of low-probability outcomes, and there is no guidance
Wilcox points out the assumptions about GPS that Gould must also make. For Gould,
GPS must have a richly branched (and highly accessible) structure, whereas if
evolutionary history has in fact been guided, then GPS may actually be otherwise
empty. As Wilcox puts it, the assumptions made about the qualities of GPS are of an
"essentially religious nature".22 We are not assuming here that neo-Darwinism and
18 Ibid. 50
19 Ibid. 50. This is because he is advocating history or contingency, and not "the titration of
determinism by randomness." (Ibid. 51). This would be more akin to Jacques Monod's position. He
argues that "chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere."
(Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy ofModern Biology (tr.
Austryn Wainhouse) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997), 112) Of course, such chance is then subjected
to the regularities of natural selection, to "the most implacable certainties." (Monod, Chance and
Necessity, 118). His conclusion is the same, and equally metaphysical;
"A totally blind process can by definition lead to anything; it can even lead to
vision." (Ibid. 98)
This is metaphysical because this is one step beyond methodological naturalism.
20
Gould, Wonderful Life, 51
21
Wilcox, 'How Blind the Watchmaker?', 179. My italics
22 Ibid. 179. More recently, Steven L. Peck has made similar criticisms of Dawkins' use of another
evolutionary model, that of the adaptive landscape. Unfortunately, Peck has made the same error as
Dawkins in underplaying the significance of contingent starting conditions in the use of this model.
(Steven L. Peck, 'Randomness, Contingency, and Faith: Is there a Science of Subjectivity?', Zygon,
38:1 (2003), 5-23, (citation, 15-16)). Similarly, Dawkins recommends a model for the evolution of the
eye that only registers favourable mutations. Therefore, he is forced "to introduce a profoundly
purposeful dimension." (Neil Broom, 'Atheistic Science: A Broth of Contradictions', in L. R. B.
Mann (ed.) Science and Christianity: Festschrift in Honour ofHarold Turner and John Morton being
the Papers and Discussion from a Symposium held in Auckland New Zealand April 21 2001, 87-103,
(citation, 95)). It is argued in Dawkins' defence that the model simply demonstrates the effects of
natural selection, and so only reproduces positive mutations. (Ibid. 100-101, 102) However, as this
fails to account for the potential numbers of neutral or harmful mutations (and these cannot of course
be calculated), then the model simply demonstrates that the evolution of the eye is feasible given
infinite time. We are not denying the evolution of the eye, nor are we advocating the need for divine
intervention, but we are making the point that Dawkins seems to ignore contingency in favour of
rationality.
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neo-Darwinian mechanisms are insufficient for explaining evolution and
evolutionary history.23 Nor are we trying to reiterate Gunton's point that bad science
and bad theology are connected.24 Rather, we are pointing out that the natural
sciences do not force us to disavow a governing divine action working
(predominantly) through secondary causes in evolution. Therefore, in the thought of
Peacocke and Process or FI advocates, we encounter a theological and not a
scientific argument against controlling divine action in evolution. Why then would
this argument be attractive? To discuss this, we must move on to discuss motives.
(iii) If the argument for a luring, informing, or perhaps merely conserving divine
action in evolution is not a scientific argument, but a theological one, then we must
evaluate the rationale for such an argument on its own theological merits. To do this
we can critique a parallel argument, known as "the argument from imperfection",
which is used by Dawkins and others to claim that the evidence of evolution points
towards atheism or Deism. The heart of this argument lies in the assumption that
God, a rational creator, would not act in such a manner as to result in the
evolutionary process. For Stephen Jay Gould, "the proof that evolution, and not the
fiat of a rational agent, has built organs lies in the imperfections that record a history
or descent and refute creation from nothing."25 If God were perfect in wisdom and
ability, then "he would create only optimal or perfect designs".26 Basing his
argument on that of Gould, Paul Nelson constructs the following scheme;
23
For evidence of this in Wilcox' work, see David L. Wilcox, 'A Blindfolded Watchmaker: The
Arrival of the Fittest', in Jon Buell and Virginia Hearn (eds.) Dwwinism: Science or Philosophy?
(Richardson, TX: Foundation for Thought & Ethics, 1994), chapter 13 [Online Document]
http://www.leaderu.com/orgs/fte/darwinism/chapterl3.html
21
For instance Dawkins makes the explicitly theological claim that divine action working through
secondary causality is a superfluous notion. (Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 316) The absence of
reference to God in the findings and theories of natural science does not make God superfluous, and is
indeed to be expected as we noted in the introduction to this thesis.
23
Gould, Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes, 160. C.f. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 91
26 Paul A. Nelson, 'A Sensible God: The Bearing of Theology on Evolutionary Explanation', in Jitse
M. van der Meer (ed.) Facets of Faith and Science, 3: The Role of Beliefs in the Natural Sciences
(Lanham: University Press of America; Ancaster: Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies on Faith and
Science, 1996), 169-197, (citation, 171)
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Premise 1. Ifp is an instance of organic design, then p was produced either
by a wise creator, or by descent with modification (evolution).
Premise 2. If p (an instance of organic design) was produced by a wise
creator, thenp should be perfect (or should exhibit no imperfections).
Premise 3. Organic design p is not perfect (or exhibits imperfections).27
As Nelson points out, however, these premises are not scientific, they are
theological; this is particularly so for the third premise, which refers to perfection
and our capacity to identify it.2s The argument for imperfection generally recognises
two forms of imperfection. The first centres on the contingent or constrained nature
of descent with modification (i.e. the use of extant organs or adaptations or traits for
further development), and is deemed to conflict with God's perfect freedom to
create. The second focuses on descent with degeneration, e.g. the existence of
vestigial organs such as the appendix, which conflicts with the perfect divine
wisdom.29 We can now move on to discuss the weaknesses in these three premises,
and also some counterarguments based on similar propositions to those put forward
by our three examples.
(iv) Premise 1, ironically enough, is consistent with a creationist perspective, in that
it makes for a sharp distinction between the action of an intelligent designer and the
action of natural processes. The optimality or otherwise of biological design could
then only be ascertained by filtering out the effects of mutation and/or natural
selection. '0 However, if God is understood to work through the secondary causes
known as chance and law, as we find in Peacocke and FI, then we might well expect
apparent imperfections in the natural order.31 Premise 2 fails because there is no
necessary connection between a perfectly wise creator and a biologically perfect
creature. For instance, it is possible to conceive of a benevolent but not omnipotent






Timothy Shanahan, 'Darwinian Naturalism, Theism, and Biological Design', PSCF, 49:3 (1997),
170-171 [Online document] http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1997/PSCF9-97Shanahan.html. This is
still unfortunately denying divine sovereignty for the sake of a faulty premise.
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for the further shaping of creatures once they had been created. Therefore, it is
possible to affirm that the natural order is created, and also that creatures are
"necessarily limited and imperfect" as a result of being created. Imperfection would
not then require a specific explanation. Premise 3 is concerned with our ability to
determine the nature of a perfect organism, and so most clearly shows the alleged
consequences for divine wisdom and freedom This premise is concerned with what
can be created rather than with what can evolve. But if the only limit we pose on
such a concept is logical consistency, then it rapidly becomes mere fantasy to posit or
anticipate what such creativity might result in.34 Nelson demonstrates that any such
constraints we impose on the divine wisdom are in fact arbitrary rationalist
deductions;
If we allow that the creator need only "act reasonably," that is, create organic
designs which meet some specific criteria for optimality, then we must be
able to say what those criteria are, and why they obtain, if our claims of
suboptimality or imperfection are to have any evidential force.3"
This same arbitrary rationalism is in evidence when it is assumed that the divine
creativity must be accompanied by an absolute freedom of divine action. Here, the
presence of conserved patterns or sequences, which might equate with a plan for the
natural order, is conflated with limitation and a "slavish repetition of structures along
the lines of some predetermined pattern."36 Finally, there is a fundamental difficulty
in recognising biological perfection or its absence. Perfection can only realistically
be defined as a trait or adaptation whose improvement is virtually inconceivable.
However, even here we can only affirm this for one trait or adaptation;
32
Nelson, 'A Sensible God', 178. This seems to be Teilhard's contention, and again has disastrous
consequences for divine sovereignty.
33 Shanahan, 'Darwinian Naturalism, Theism, and Biological Design'. The danger here is not only that
we are still giving credence to the concept of imperfection, but also we are in danger of conflating
creation and Fall.
34




Using standard measures of adaptedness, we would have to say that a perfect
organism is one that lives forever, converts all of its energy consumption
into reproductive activities, produces viable offspring at an infinite rate,
moves through the environment with zero friction, is impervious to enemies
or predators, can hear all frequencies of sound waves, see all wavelengths of
electromagnetic radiation, etc.37
This is an absurd, impossible organism, and as we predict the effects of such an
organism on biodiversity or the environment, then we cannot affirm that imperfect
organisms are incongruent with a perfect intelligent designer.38
(v) Perhaps the most telling weakness of the argument from imperfection is that it
also involves assumptions about the nature of GPS. We see this in Dawkins' use of
the example of the evolution of flatfish to argue against divine action. Cartilaginous
fish such as skates and rays have evolved into flatfish through a flattening out of their
TQ
body surface. Bony flatfish such as plaice and sole have adapted to living on or
near the seabed through a different process. For the ancestors of these fish, which
would have been vertically flattened like other bony fish, it would have been natural
to lie on one side and so adapt to living on the seabed. Unfortunately, this would
result in one eye pointing uselessly downwards. Such pressures favoured and
maintained an evolutionary shift that brought this useless eye up onto the upper
surface of the fish. To bring both eyes onto the upper surface of the skull requires a
twisting of the skull which immature bony flatfish must undergo as they develop.
Such twisting and distortion, such imperfection, is evidence of its evolutionary
heritage;
No sensible designer would have conceived such a monstrosity if given a
free hand to create a flatfish on a clean drawing board.40
More precisely, it is evidence of the contingency of its evolutionary heritage, in that
these flatfish have not achieved a new adaptation from a clean slate, but have simply
adapted those features that are already present. Assuming that it would be possible
37
Shanahan, 'Darwinian Naturalism, Theism, and Biological Design'
38 Ibid.
39
Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, 91
40 Ibid. 92
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for ancestral bony fish to flatten out horizontally just as the ancestors of the
cartilaginous flatfish did, why then would such a convoluted and perhaps
energetically expensive form of evolutionary adaptation be pursued? Dawkins makes
the (reasonable) assumption that the evolutionary intermediates from bony fish to
bony twisted-skull flatfish must have been more successful in the short term than the
intermediates from bony fish to bony horizontally flattened out flatfish.41 Dawkins
argues that therefore there must be a smooth trajectory in GPS between ancestral
bony flatfish and these more successful forms of descendants, although as some bony
fish have evolved flatness through horizontal flattening, this cannot be the whole
case.42 As Shanahan points out, here Dawkins has moved into pure conjecture.43 It is
after all possible to take Wilcox' line and argue that the probability of bony flatfish
arising from an unguided traversal of GPS might have been vanishingly small.
However, this would be equally conjectural. Our point is that the imperfection of
biological design, or the flawed and contingent nature of evolution, is a surmise
based on conjecture (the structure of GPS) and not on science;
Ultimately, therefore, the Darwinian naturalist can only appeal to unknown,
but possible, contingent events to explain why certain coordinates in design
space have been occupied, while others remain vacant.44
The point of our discussion of popular science is not to argue that the failure of
arguments that deny divine action in evolution should lead us back to a God-of-the-
gaps theology, such as we find in Intelligent Design (ID) theory. Rather, we are
pointing out that the arguments against divine action in evolution that are based on
the 'messy', or contingent aspects of the process are not required of theologians by
the natural sciences.45 This is because we are not dealing with the findings of the
natural sciences, but rather with a set of value judgements on evolution, and any such
judgements on evolution are not scientific.46 Any a priori discussion of what God
41 Ibid. 92-93. This does not in and of itself suggest the cause of that success.
42 Ibid. 93
43
Shanahan, 'Darwinian Naturalism, Theism, and Biological Design'
44 Ibid.
43
As Eman McMullin puts it we should argue for the consonance of divine action and evolution
"despite its contingency". (McMullin, 'Cosmic Purpose', 400. My italics)
46
Rolston, Science and Religion, 133. David Fergusson argues correctly that "[t]o argue from the
explanatory power of evolutionary biology to the redundancy of metaphysical explanation is to
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should or should not do is "a method that can too easily be grounded in
subjectivity."47
(vi) What is the significance of the fact that the motifs of the undesirability and
superfluity of divine action have disastrous consequences for both theology and the
natural sciences? We are going too far ifwe argue that the illicit import of a common
metaphysic into both disciplines is itself evidence of their connectedness. It is the
nature of this metaphysic that is important, insofar as it is inimical to the createdness
of the natural order. Therefore, to endanger createdness has consequences for both
itself and the concept of rational contingency and it is this that suggests the
connection between these two concepts. We can go a little further, and point out that
although the theological contributions we have examined do not explicitly address
the subject, they are also making assumptions about the nature of GPS. The FI school
argue that interventionist divine action is unnecessary and so must argue for the
richness and complexity of connections in GPS, or that if the array is sparsely
populated, then there has been a very high frequency of improbable events in
evolutionary history. Peacocke's discussion of evolutionary propensities and
potentiality suggests that for him GPS would exhibit richness and complexity, and
the focus on novelty in Process thought might well suggest that improbable events
are occurring frequently. Theologically, and scientifically we cannot make such
assumptions, even though either or both options might be true, and indeed for
theology neither option is significant. This is because a theology that is concerned
with createdness does not need evidence to diminish either divine action, as we find
in this metaphysics, or creaturely action, as we find in creationism and ID.
commit a non sequitur." (David A. S. Fergusson, The Cosmos and the Creator: An Introduction to the
Theology ofCreation (London: SPCK, 1998), 59)
47 Dennis Jansen, 'Pain, Pleasure and Evolution: An Analysis of Paul Draper's Critique of Theism',
PSCF, 51:1 (1999), 40-46 [online document] http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1999/PSCF3-
99Jensen.html
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We have attempted to establish the significance of createdness for both theology and
the natural sciences, by demonstrating the effects of negating this concept on the
createdness of the evolutionary process. Now, we can move on to discuss the features
of a theology that does safeguard createdness. We do this by investigating both the
negative features of such a theology in this subsection, and its positive features in the
third and final subsection. To be more precise, we are investigating how such a
theology describes and interprets the evolutionary process, the better to provide
contrast and comparison with Teilhard's thought, and the material at the interface. In
order to protect the createdness of evolution theologically, we must state an apparent
truism and argue that evolution must be described as a creature. However, our point
is that evolution must be described as one creature amongst all others. It is the
conviction of the present author that the pitfalls faced by the theological and
scientific contributions we have examined so far are largely the result of assuming
that evolution has an intrinsic theological significance, which consequently requires a
revision of divine action and other theological doctrines. Evolution has no
theological significance above and beyond that of any creature, and so as we move
on to discuss the createdness of evolution, we are in fact discussing the createdness
of any non-personal aspect of the natural order.
(i) The most obvious negative feature of a theology concerned with createdness, is
the disavowal of evolutionary christologies and eschatologies. Gunton disavows
evolutionary Christology because it is symptomatic of a competitive God-world
relationship in that a natural process can bring about the Incarnation. There are two
symptoms; first, there is a degree of Pantheism, in that a natural process can bring
about the divine. Second, precisely because the Incarnation results in the Word made
flesh, then it is normally considered to require a divine initiative. Therefore, if
evolution brings about the Incarnation, then this divine initiative is lost and
transferred to evolution. The Godman Jesus Christ is then the result of an
(un)conscious evolutionary initiative. The same is broadly true of evolutionary
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eschatology, in that this assumes that the world can perfect itself, rather than being
reliant on divine action. Nonetheless, there is no denying that through the
Incarnation, the Second Person of the Trinity has entered the evolutionary process,
4o
through his inheriting of genetic material from his mother. The sole (but
overwhelmingly important!) significance of this point is that the Son of God entered
into precisely our way of living, taking on our (genetic) weaknesses, infirmities and
characteristics.
We found a conflation of evolution with eschatology and Christology in Teilhard's
theology. The very notion of evolutionary 'progress' and the fact that evolution is the
manner in which Omega Point is reached, indicates that evolution is in fact a
description of the gradual perfection of the natural order, and that the process has
then taken on the divine characteristic of bringing about the Eschaton. This
impression is only reinforced by the concept of the 'Within' as the driving force of
Lamarckian psychic selection. It is therefore impossible to argue that God is even
directing the cosmos towards progress through evolution, because the 'Within' can
ignore or react to the divine 'lure'. Teilhard's evolutionary Christology is of course
extraordinarily rich, complex and subtle, but does not allow us to avoid the
conclusion that the process of evolution is effectively divinised. Teilhard cannot
consistently maintain that the Incarnation is a divine initiative, and even when he
does so, it is the Immaculate Conception ofMary that he appears to have in mind as
the locus of divine action. The consequences of this are twofold. First, the
Incarnation and the continuing presence of Christ are never understood to have a
substitutionary significance. Christ has a solely exemplary function that goads human
evolution. Second, because Teilhard lacks a Pneumatology and a doctrine of the
Ascension, he cannot prevent the post-Resurrection presence of Christ from
degrading into a departicularised immanence. The Body of Christ becomes co¬
extensive with all matter. Most alarming of all, and here Teilhard links eschatology
and Christology, evolution has no natural end - its destiny is union with God through
48
We are assuming that Jesus' genome was diploid, i.e. carrying two copies of every chromosome as
is normal in humans, but ignore the question as to whether he inherited two copies from Mary or one
complete set was created by God at his conception. For more on this see R. J. Berry, 'The Virgin Birth
ofChrist', S&CB, 8:2 (1996), 101-110, (citation, 106-109)
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the ongoing evolution of Christ. Hence, evolution involves transubstantiation or an
annihilation ofmatter, and so Teilhard can describe the process as holy.
(ii) Evolution does not require a specific theological interpretation - this very fact
means that we can also eschew divine theodicy, the apparent significance of which is
one of the main rationales for the undesirability of sovereign or guiding divine action
in evolution. It is in fact possible to understand these concerns of theodicy as rather
overblown. Denis R. Alexander makes the point clear when he asks why an all-
powerful and loving God would choose to create all biological diversity through the
'messy' process of evolution "during which process an estimated two billion species
have become extinct?"49 This extinction represents roughly ninety six percent of all
species that have ever existed, and seems to be a vast wastage of life. However, as
Alexander rightly points out, what are we to measure this concept of waste against?
Waste only makes sense in terms of limited resources, but instead we have the
extraordinary God-created abundance of these two billion species.50 Evolution is in
fact a sign of divine creativity and a not a cause for theological concern. He can
therefore ask in bullish tone;
Cats continue to play with mice. Killer whales continue to throw seals
around in the air before devouring them. Does it matter?51
The answer to this is a resounding 'no'. As such, we do not need to shy away from
claiming the divine sovereignty over the process or those aspects of it where we
might be tempted to look askance. Therefore, we must claim, with scriptural warrant,
the sovereign divine control over the food chain and predation (Job 38.39-41; 39.26-
49 Denis R. Alexander, 'Does Evolution have any Religious Significance?' Christians in Science
Public Lecture, given on Monday, 2nd March, 1998, 6:30 p.m. Winstanley Lecture Hall, Trinity
College, University of Cambridge, UK [Online Document]
http://www.cis.org.uk/articles/evolution relig signif/alexander 01.htm
50 Ibid. C.f. TTC, 189
51 Denis R. Alexander, Rebuilding the Matrix: Science and Faith in the 21s' Century (Oxford: Lion,
2001), 352. Whilst discussing (the peculiarly British) sentimentality towards animals, he can ask
somewhat tongue in cheek;
"How, then, could God make such a cruel world in which cuddly animals engage in
titanic straggles to kill each other for food." (Ibid. 355)
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27; Psalm 104.21; 147.9).52 Even genetic mutation does not require either a specific
theodicy or an attenuation of divine action-in-relation. On the contrary, mutation
contributes to the variation we find in biodiversity, and is indeed "a reminder of our
individual uniqueness in God's sight."''2 The point is, it is just as possible to
acknowledge the contingent or 'messy' aspects of evolutionary history, but to still
regard the process overall as a positive thing. Jansen rightly points out that God
might use a non goal-directed mechanism like natural selection and mutation to
further the (good) overall aim of achieving human and non-human creatures. Non-
goal directed phenomena such as pleasure and pain can then be seen merely as
necessary survival mechanisms. Of course, the response to this is the question as to
why there must be so much pain. Jansen argues that we cannot be assured that non-
human organisms have sufficient sentience to experience pain for anything other than
its promotion of survival, which survival is required for our eventual emergence.
However, he is concerned to connect this with some sense of 'compensation' for
non-human suffering, because we can never fully rationalise the existence of
suffering in evolution.54 Robin Attfield makes a positive evaluation of evolution and
evolutionary mechanisms based on the argument that the alternatives are a lifeless
(and so valueless) world or a world whose present condition would require so many
historical special divine interventions so as to make science impossible.55 Because, in
our opinion, we do not require an evolutionary Christology, or eschatology, or
theodicy, and because evolution is governed by divine action-in-relation just like any
other creature, then we can concur with Alexander when he asks about the religious
significance of evolution, and answers "not a lot". Evolution is the cause for the
biological diversity we observe in the world, and it is God's way of bringing that
diversity into being.56
52 Denis R. Alexander, 'Why Some Evangelicals Believe in Evolution', Evangelicals Now, October
(1997), 18. C.f. Denis R. Alexander, 'Is Evolution Atheistic?', Evangelicals Now, January (2003), 16.
53
Alexander, 'Is Evolution Atheistic?', 16
34 Dennis Jansen, 'Pain, Pleasure and Evolution'
53 Robin Attfield, 'Evolution, Theodicy and Value', Heythrop Journal, 41:3 (2000), 281-296,
(citation, 293)
56 Denis R. Alexander, 'Does Evolution have any Religious Significance?'
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In this final subsection we move on to discuss the createdness of evolution in detail.
This requires us to first develop our theology of divine action-in-relation utilising our
grammar of createdness and insights from Teilhard and the interface, and then apply
this to evolution through a basic model of divine action in this process. Jesus Christ
is not an evolutionary product or emergent, but nor should we assert a deist
understanding of the Incarnation. As with all aspects of the world, evolution has been
governed and directed by sovereign divine action-in-relation through the Son and
Spirit. But how is this specifically related to evolution? In one sense, our answer is
simple; evolution does not require a specific understanding of divine action-in-
relation, insofar as it is one creature amongst others. Nonetheless, because evolution
involves certain creaturely processes, such as genetic mutation and the various
phenomena underlying natural selection, and because these are the subjects and
results of specific divine acts, then evolution can be said to be governed by specific
divine action. In order to be explicitly trinitarian, the latter requires reference to the
work of both hands of the Father. In order to secure the concept of createdness, it
must also refer to at least some processes involved in evolution. As this model is
only a skeleton outline, we are restricting reference to a concept that we have already
found to be misused by authors we have discussed. This is the concept of GPS. Such
a model relies on the fact of divine action in creaturely processes, but of course
cannot describe the how. Instead, modelling divine action through GPS allows us to
maintain the paradox of divine sovereignty and genuine creaturely integrity.
(i) Although our concern in this subsection lies with divine action-in-relation, to
understand this concept we must relate it to the other relevant aspects of our
grammar. This is important because this concept is linked to other motifs and
doctrines, or is at least informed by them. It is also important to remember that the
concept of createdness - the Creator-creature distinction - is recurrent throughout
our discussion. The first motif we must contend with is that of the prevenience of
God. If we cannot conceive of God as prior, then we cannot avoid a competitive
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understanding of God and the world. Gunton's Irenaean hermeneutic, in which
anything that competes with God is itself divine, makes this clear. Prevenience is
itself secured by a number of important motifs. The first is that God is transcendent;
he is the holy and wholly other. He relates in and towards the world, and becomes
immanent because he is first of all transcendent. This is why Gunton reinterprets
transcendence and immanence with otherness and relation. Second, God does not
need the world, as the doctrine of the Immanent Trinity makes clear. The natural
order is not a necessary product of his being, but is a contingent product of his will.
This is the function of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Third, whilst it is not
necessary for God to create, neither is it a foreign imposition upon the divine nature.
Gunton argues that the nature of the God-world relationship reflects the divine nature
- the trinitarian Persons gift each other with personal space, and the prevenient and
transcendent God gifts the world with the ontological space in which it exists
authentically as itself, the creature of God.
(ii) So far, the point is to make clear that the God-world relationship is initiated and
begun by God. It is also continued and mediated by God. There is no deistic isolation
between God and the world, and there is no pan(en)theistic confusion of created
entities with the two mediating hands of the Father, the Son and Spirit. This is to
make the point that this relationship is tensed, in that there is a past tense beginning
in the act of creation and a present tense continuation in divine action-in-relation.
Hence, Gunton distinguishes creation and Providence. The third and future tense
reflects one aspect of the intrinsic nature of the created order - it is a project,
destined for perfection. Moreover, it is destined for perfection in time. This makes it
clear that the Eschaton does indeed represent the completion and perfection of
creaturely structures such as time and space, rather than their annihilation, but it also
makes clear that time and space are neither to be identified nor contrasted with divine
eternity and infinity. Nonetheless, in the same way that the God-world relationship
reflects the divine nature, so the natural order exhibits those properties,
transcendentals such as relationality, particularity and dynamism, which also reflect
the divine nature. Hence all created entities possess a particular and yet relational
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being and possess their own ontological content in a network of horizontal
relationships and a vertical relationship with God.
(iii) The world is a creature with genuine intrinsic reality, and is being led towards
perfection by the two hands of the Father through divine action-in-relation. All
divine action leads towards this perfection, hence the Incarnation and the Atonement
represent the fulfilment rather than simply the repair of the created order. The life of
Jesus Christ from Virgin Birth to Ascension reinaugurates the eschatology of the
natural order. Similarly, Gunton argues that pneumatological action perfects by
particularising the inner-trinitarian relationships, the God-world relationship, and
creatures and their relationships. The Spirit therefore enables eschatological forms of
existence (such as the Church and inspired culture) to occur anticipatorily in the
present. Gunton argues that all christological action is instituting (although not all
past tense as Gunton seems unable to avoid) and all pneumatological action is
constituting.
(iv) Gunton argues that we cannot and should not claim decisively for divine
temporality or atemporality. Nor does he make clear the actual nature of creaturely
existence in time, although there are suggestions that he disavows the 'block
universe' view of time. However, using the model of the poet or playwright, he does
make it clear that for him God does have a perception of the whole of spacetime
simultaneously, a point which we have argued is in line with his Irenaean
hermeneutic. Furthermore, this perception does not conflict with creaturely freedom,
but is instead its guarantee, as is the case even with apparently deterministic divine
action such as miracles or election. The point here is that divine action-in-relation
always has an eschatological function or goal and so even deterministic divine action
is in fact enabling the world to become what it was created to be.
Chapter 9 253
(v) The concept of divine action-in-relation needs further unpacking. The most
pressing concern is to clarify the relationship between Gunton's concept of the gifted
ontological 'space' of the natural order and what Austin Farrer refers to as the
'causal joint', the meeting point of divine and creaturely causality. At first glance,
this issue actually seems to be irrelevant to Gunton. One advantage of his
occasionally intemperate attitude is that he makes it abundantly clear those doctrines
he agrees and disagrees with, and this issue never arises. The closest concern would
be his unfortunately brief dismissal of the language of primary and secondary
causality, wherein he seems more interested in the co-ordination of divine and
creaturely realities that this language implies, as evinced by his preference for the
language of the mediation of the divine and creaturely realities. Gunton's disavowal
of this form of language makes it clear that he is avoiding concepts such as double
agency and concursus, and his language of 'space' implies that he is also
unconcerned to find physical loci for divine action, as is more common in theologies
at the interface with science. Therefore, Gunton seems to be steering a course away
from the issue of the causal joint and towards a concept of divine action-in-relation
as the context for creaturely action.
It is hopefully clear that this does not mean that action-in-relation and the God-world
relationship simply provides an environment in which creaturely reality exists and
creaturely actions occur. Indeed, Gunton makes it clear that divine action-in-relation
consists of a continuous 'series' of discrete acts, including the act of relating itself.
The question is of course what these acts are. The most obvious answer is acts of
conservation - without divine action-in-relation there would be no created order.
Difficulties arise when we consider the doctrine of concurrence or concursus. This
doctrine argues that all examples of creaturely causality occur only through the
divine causality concurring with each and every event. The advantage to this is that it
makes clear that God's sovereign governance extends to every detail of reality, but
the disadvantage is the implication of a co-ordination of divine and creaturely action.
Gunton's emphasis on divine prevenience demonstrates his support for the first of
these points, but his emphasis on 'space' seems to cast doubt on the second point.
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For instance, on the one hand Gunton explicitly argues for the divine ordering of all
events, but on the other hand argues that this occurs without determinism. For him,
the Son provides the structuring (or instituting?) of creaturely existence, and the
Spirit provides the 'space' (or constituting?) for the creature to exist within that
structuring. This appears to be a divine conditioning of the creature, whereby its
nature and the forms of action it can undertake are posited by God, and the creature
is then divinely enabled to do so in a genuinely creaturely manner. This is in full
agreement with concursus as to the sovereignty of God, and the necessity of the
divine permission for any creaturely event to occur. However, it does not posit a
separate act of God in every creaturely action. What we have is a gifted naturalism —
the world has a genuine existence as the created order, which is reflected in the fact
that the sciences work on the presupposition of natural causation for events within
the natural order. Nonetheless, this naturalism only exists in the context of a divine
ordering and enabling.
(vi) To describe evolution theologically, we must first begin by discussing the nature
of the process. The simplest definition of evolution is that of changes in relative gene
frequencies. It is not an entity, nor is it a force in history. To think of divine action in
evolution, is to think of the divine governance of all of the inter-related processes
that bring about the changes that we identify as evolution. For instance, there are a
number of mechanisms whereby genetic variation occurs, such as errors in DNA
copying systems, mutations brought about by radiation or mutagenic chemicals,
random drift etc. These mutations may or may not affect the reproductive success of
the organism in whose genome they have occurred. The same is true, as we have just
seen, for natural selection. Moreover, mutations and their consequences only take on
an evolutionary significance if they are inheritable - and indeed inherited - and so
divine action in evolution really involves divine action in all the processes required
for a mutation to be inheritable and inherited, everything from the binary fission of
amoebae to the courtship of humans.57 This is not to suggest that evolution is all-
57 Hence the drive to identify divine action in certain aspects of the natural order, such as quantum
effects on genetic mutation, is overly-simplistic. For an example see Robert John Russell, 'Special
Providence and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution', in EMB, 191-223
Chapter 9 255
pervasive, as a great deal of popular science seems to suggest, but rather that the vast
majority of the processes involved relate also to other aspects of the natural order,
and can be examined from that perspective. Therefore, God governs evolution by
governing the natural order.
(vii) The process of evolution reflects its gifted naturalism by exhibiting properties in
accord with the transcendentals. He argues that the natural order exhibits
particularity, relationality, dynamism and substantiality and that all of these reflect
the existence of the natural order and the behaviour of entities within it, within the
context of divine action-in-relation. In terms of evolution, this means that we too can
confidently affirm the creative potential of the interaction of chance and law as long
as this is understood to be a result of divine action as opposed to its self-limitation.
The process exhibits particularity and substantiality for the simple reason that we are
dealing with discrete entities such as individual organisms and ultimately species.
Natural selection, the effect of the environment on an organism's reproductive
success is the sum total of all its interactions with prey, predators, competitors, mates
etc. As such, we find strong traces of relationality within the process. Finally,
because the process occurs over time, and there is at least the potential for increased
complexity over time, then we have suggestions of dynamism. These features of
evolution are of course very similar to those found in Teilhard as well as the science-
theology contributors, and reinforces the fact that the problems with these authors
does not always lie in their descriptions of evolution but in their conclusions about
divine action-in-relation based on these descriptions. Teilhard of course provides the
most comprehensive discussion of evolutionary dynamism - to the extent that he
conflates it with eschatology - and attempts to correlate this dynamism with a
constant interaction with God. The same is true of Peacocke and FI, and perhaps
even in Process thought to some extent, but here the grave problem is that at least for
the first two this dynamism and also the creativity of evolution results from an
unfolding of God-given potential, rather than as a consequence of ongoing divine
action-in-relation. This is a pity because Peacocke and FI both capture well the
contingency of this evolutionary creativity. Evolution is a dynamic and fruitful
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process, whether by an unfolding of potentials or a development of genuine novelty
as Process theologians would put it, and these properties are truly God-given.
However, to be God-given does not restrict divine action in the present to a mere
sustaining or carelaking role, but involves the sovereign lordship and guidance of
God over the process.
(viii) If God is sovereign over the process of evolution, then we must consider the
ramifications of our Irenaean hermeneutic for the process. First, if God has a
perception of the past, present and the future, then he has such a perception over the
process of evolution, from beginning to end. There are no surprise mutations or
species or extinctions. Moreover, in conjunction with the fact that evolution is not a
discrete entity and is not to be confused with eschatology, then the process has no
'end' or 'goal'. It is not simply the case that the goal or telos of evolution is
imperceptible to the natural sciences. Hence evolution is to be discussed within the
doctrine of Providence, or present tense action-in-relation. This is not contradicted by
the fact that the process has a purpose, insofar as it describes the manner in which
fO
God brings non-human organisms and the human race into existence. Nor is this
contradicted by the fact that evolution has value either as a creature in its own right,
or as a representation of a number of created entities and processes. In either
instance, it is perceived as good by God, contra evolutionary theodicy. We must also
counter evolutionary theodicy by reinforcing the point that all of the events that come
under the rubric of evolution - every mutation, every prey-predator interaction, every
extinction - is governed by God, as Alexander makes clear. This avoids the
reductionist (not to mention misleadingly simplistic) assumption that evolution
represents blind chance filtered through law-like natural selection. Natural selection
is no more a singular entity than is evolution, and God is sovereign over the whole
set of organism-environment interactions that make up natural selection. Finally, if
God governs evolution, then miracles are not to be discounted. As the advocates of
FI rightly point out, we must not attempt to identify loci for miraculous divine
action-in-relation within evolutionary history, as this reflects negatively on the
We are not claiming that evolution has now fulfilled its purpose through the arrival of the human
species. The process is ongoing at the biological and perhaps also the cultural level.
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creaturely capacities of the natural order. On the other hand, to deny the occurrence
of miracles is to make unwarranted metaphysical claims about the evolutionary
capacities of the natural order. The real question concerning miracles or intervention
and evolution is that of the purpose of such actions.59 Miracles have an
eschatological purpose, either bringing about future conditions in the present or
enabling creatures and created entities to be what they are intended to be. Therefore,
divine intervention in evolution is not an evidential matter of searching for creaturely
structures that apparently could not have evolved unaided. It is rather a commitment
to the more minimalist belief that any and all creaturely structures could and
probably did evolve within the government of general Providence, but have perhaps
been the subject of special Providence. As this argument does not conflict with
methodological naturalism, or with the theological insistence on the prevenience of
God and the relative autonomy of the natural order, then this satisfies both the
rational contingency and createdness of the world.
(ix) As we turn at last to our model for divine action-in-relation with respect to
evolution, we must bear in mind the simple point that this divine action encompasses
the entirety of the natural order, in general and special Providence. As such, it would
be impossible to represent the divine government of all such processes! Moreover,
we are searching for a model that enables us to consider one other point - the fully
trinitarian nature of divine action-in-relation. The two hands of the Father govern and
direct evolution in transcendence and immanence. We therefore require a model that
allows us to consider all of these points, and to do so we use the concept of GPS. We
have already addressed GPS, in order to demonstrate that both theology and popular
science can resort to metaphysical speculations about its constitution, if divine
action-in-relation and creaturely reality are not adequately articulated and
safeguarded. Consequently, we are not concerned to elucidate or speculate on the
59 Miracles do not have a purely functional role. Indeed, Leonid Borodin has argued that "[a] miracle
is really a moral concept." (Leonid Borodin, The Year ofMiracle and Grief (tr. J. Bradshaw) (Quartet
Books, 1988), 3-4, quoted in Michael Fuller, 'Truths from Strange Times', Theology, 107/837 (2004),
195-203, (citation, 203) Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of miracles in evolution.
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structure of GPS, but rather we aim to describe the various physical processes it
represents in terms of divine action-in-relation.
(x) GPS is a representation of micro- and macroevolution in terms of a grid-like
array of genomes arranged in terms of similarity of genetic coding. Therefore those
genomes that are most similar to each other, i.e. differing at one base, will be closest
in the grid. There are also competing views of GPS on the issue of whether it
represents all theoretically possible genomes, or simply those that are at present
actualised. Given that evolution can be described as changes in relative gene
frequencies, then on the former view, GPS varies insofar as the ratio of actualised to
potential genomes alters through evolutionary history. If the latter is the case, then
the size of GPS increases and decreases over time.60 For our purposes we are using
the former definition because our interest does not lie in the arrangement of genomes
but in the relationship between those that are actualised and those that are potential.
Put simply we wish to discuss divine action in terms of the conversion of potential to
actualised and indeed actualised to potential genomes. We can do this because GPS
is a relatively simple model (except that the arrangement of genomes requires more
than three dimensions!) and yet it represents a whole range of processes. If we
consider one evolutionary path, say from primitive hominids to Homo sapiens
sapiens, then this path describes a thread or movement in GPS as new genomes are
actualised through genetic mutations (and the combining of different genomes in
sexual reproduction) and already extant genomes become merely potential as deaths
and extinctions occur. Moreover, the actualisation of any particular genome also
represents the life history of the organism or organisms that carry that genome, from
embryogenesis to reproduction. This is because, as we have already intimated, if
mutations are to have evolutionary significance, then they must occur during
embryogenesis and be both inheritable and inherited. Following Gunton and
Alexander, we understand all of these various events and processes to be governed
by the sovereign will and action-in-relation of God. This leads to the next issue; if
60 For instance, the size of GPS would have decreased dramatically as an immediate and long-term
consequence of the meteor strike which led to the extinction of the dinosaurs and approximately 96%
of all other species.
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divine action-in-relation must be articulated in trinitarian terms, then how do we
discuss the events represented by GPS as the work of the two hands of God?
(xi) It is probably fair to say that Gunton is in full agreement with the theological
concept of opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa - the external operations of the
Trinity are undivided, indeed united. Nonetheless, he is concerned not to let the
attribution of certain actions or forms of action to the divine Persons to become an
arbitrary modalism. Thus, he carefully argues for distinct and yet undivided roles for
the two hands of the Father (instituting and constituting), and contextualises this
discussion in terms of differences in transcendence and immanence for the Word and
Spirit. The work of the Word is more associated with identity and immanence,
although not Pantheism. The Word works from within the world as its rational
principle. The work of the Spirit is more associated with otherness and
transcendence. The Spirit works over and against the natural order, particularising
and perfecting it. Taken together, these different motifs allow us to attribute different
processes and events, as they are represented by GPS, to the Son and the Spirit
respectively without denying the fundamental unity of God's actions.
(xii) Evolutionary change is represented in GPS in two ways. First, we have the
movement from one genome to another, as the latter becomes actualised. The former
may remain or may become potential. Second, we have the instantiation of genomes
as they become actualised. Although, as have already noted, these two features
represent in many respects a common pool of processes and events, nonetheless we
wish to model the movement as the constituting work of the Spirit, and the
instantiation as the work of the Word or Logos of God. To model the work of the two
hands of God in this fashion is not to argue that the Spirit is specifically or solely
responsible for the genetic variation that underlies the movement from one genome
to another, nor is it to argue that the Logos is equally narrowly responsible for the
processes of development whereby such mutations can be incorporated within the
development of living organisms. Flowever, these processes can loosely be described
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in terms of structure and institution, or dynamism and constitution. For instance, the
Word, as rational principle, has an instituting role related to the coherence and
specificity of individual organisms. This includes the stability and physical
coherence of a genome and organism, plus the informational content of the genome
and the coherence of those processes required for a genome to become a blueprint
(genotype) for a living organism, and its expression as the physical makeup
(phenotype) of a living organism. This of course occurs in the form of present tense
divine action-in-relation. The Spirit can be related to those dynamic and constitutive
processes which bring about life and new life, such as conception, embryogenesis,
metabolism, mental and physical maturation, reproduction and of course various
physical processes both within an organism and external to it, which are responsible
for bringing about genetic variation. These lists are of course not exhaustive, and do
not even cover the role of Word and Spirit in natural selection. Most importantly,
given our concern to argue that evolution does not require a specific theological
treatment, it should be noted that not all movements and instantiations within GPS
have an evolutionary significance. A good example of this is the existence of
isozymes. This refers to the fact that an enzyme can exist in different forms with
slightly different chemical and structural composition, whilst remaining functionally
equivalent. These differences do not affect the efficiency of the enzyme and so are
not factors in natural selection and evolution. The same is true of vestigial organs
such as the appendix, or junk DNA. In summary, we can model divine action-in-
relation with respect to evolution, but really we are modelling a subset of the
countless ways in which God governs his creation in sovereign freedom.
Conclusion
This final chapter of our thesis was intended to demonstrate the fact that evolution
does not require a specific theological treatment. In the previous chapter this was
done by showing how the concerns of evolutionary theodicy and the apparent
superfluity of divine action ran the risk of losing sight of the createdness of the
process. Here, we began by arguing that a specific theological treatment of evolution
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is also not warranted by the natural sciences. Indeed, to argue that evolution tells us
anything about divine action at all is a metaphysical stance that does not do justice to
science or theology. What appears to be happening in both theology at the interface
and this form of popular science is an unwarranted favouring of the findings of the
natural sciences over theological doctrine as we suggested in the introduction to our
thesis. To deny the sovereignty of divine action-in-relation over evolution (or any
other created entity or process) is to endanger its createdness and so the rational
contingency of evolution. We were also concerned in this chapter to provide some
context for discussing the conceptual linkage between the sovereign work of God
and the genuine reality of the natural order. However, in keeping with the tenor of
our first aim, it is equally important here to keep in mind that evolution is not
theologically significant. The processes underlying evolution are also those involved
in other creaturely events such as basic metabolism, and because we are not
concerned with identifying the causal joint for divine action in the natural order, then
we cannot argue that the divine action involved in evolution is itself somehow
unique. Let us finish by reiterating our main point with respect to evolution: it should
be understood theologically simply as a creature or as the result of various created
entities and processes. It has no other significance.
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Summary: Evolution, the Science-Theology Interface and the Grammar
of Createdness
In this section we were concerned to put our grammar of createdness into action. To
do this we maintained our focus on evolution from the previous section, and
addressed the arguments of three different and significant perspectives on evolution
at the science-theology interface. To be more precise, we first of all argued that the
lessons we learned from Teilhard taught us to focus on divine action-in-relation, and
so we looked at three approaches to divine action and evolution. Despite the
fascinating variety which these three - Arthur Peacocke, Process thought and FI -
demonstrated, we did note some underlying similarities, namely a potential risk for
the createdness of the evolutionary process because the sovereign divine governance
of the process in all aspects could not be thoroughly articulated. The problem is
merely incipient for Peacocke and FI, but in Process thought we find a competitive
God-world relationship and so a full-blown reflexive Pantheism. The dangers for all
three positions manifested itself in a general position on divine action that rendered it
in many causes superfluous or even ethically suspect. We then moved on to discuss
whether there was any outstanding scientific warrant for these theologically
hazardous conclusions. The answer was clearly negative, and in fact demonstrated
that these conclusions were based on metaphysics and not on the createdness and
rational contingency of evolution. Indeed, in considering the createdness of evolution
it also became clear that evolution did not warrant a specific theological treatment
and thus the need for such a metaphysics and these specific conclusions on divine
action was obviated. The final task of this section was to outline a model for
trinitarian action-in-relation with respect to evolution. Given that the process itself
does not warrant unique forms or degrees of divine action, then our model of GPS
has the sole function of conceptualising the sovereign nature of divine action in all
aspects of the natural order as they pertain to the process.
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Conclusion: Createdness as an Essential Aspect of Theology
at the Science-Theology Interface
(A) Retrospective: The Findings ofthis Thesis
In this thesis we have attempted to provide an argument for the importance of
createdness as a theological concept by considering the theological consequences of
distorting or losing this concept in discussions of evolution at the science-theology
interface. We began with the central affirmation that the natural order and all entities
within it exhibit rational contingency and are created. Both are properties of the
creature viewed from the two perspectives of science and theology. Indeed, these are
the two parameters of science and theology respectively, and genuine science and
theology does not threaten its own parameters or those of the other discipline. Our
concern was that this interdisciplinary distinction should not be lost sight of at the
science-theology interface, irrespective of whether theology and science interact in
terms of dialogue or integration. Our argument was threefold. We generated a
grammar of createdness, based on the work of Colin E. Gunton, which we then tested
against the theology of Teilhard de Chardin, and then applied to the problem of
divine action in evolution, as it is dealt with by a number of significant contributors
at the science-theology interface and within popular science. Before we move on to
discuss our overall findings in more detail we should make it clear that our
discussion is likely to cause some controversy for three distinct reasons. First, it is
somewhat divergent from what appears to be a major orientation in contemporary
science-theology dialogue, second, it is heavily critical of Teilhard who appears to
invite hagiography as a matter of course and finally it is reliant on the work of
Gunton whose trenchant theological style has ruffled many a theological feather.
(i) It would be unjust to generalize with regard to the authors whose arguments we
have discussed, let alone with regard to the science-theology interface as a whole, but
we would nonetheless argue that we have found consistent emphases within the
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material we engaged with that are inimical to the concept of createdness. At the heart
of the difficulties is the assumption that without divine self-limitation, the reality of
the natural order - especially the integrity of its causality - is threatened.
Unfortunately, the opposite effect is achieved, as this is in fact the logic of a
competitive God-world relationship, insofar as it assumes that divine and creaturely
reality are somehow mutually exclusive. In examining this question with respect to
evolution in particular, we found an equivalent argument in popular science that was
demonstrably metaphysical in nature, and we feel justified in arguing that the same is
true of the theological positions we examined. As such, we would argue that
theology at the interface is not interacting with the findings of the natural sciences,
but is in fact interacting with a form of rationalistic ontological naturalism. We
would suggest that the basic issue here is, as Nicholas Lash suggests, that the
interaction between theology and science appears to work most smoothly when
theology takes on the form of empiricism.1 To be sure, this is not always done
consciously, but whereas "for some the ideal of consonance seems to mean harmony
and full accord, for others it is theology constrained by scientific research."2 In short,
the theological contribution to the interface is not free to present its case unfettered,
whereas no such prior conditioning is evident for contributors from natural sciences.3
This benefits neither science nor theology, because without a treatment of evolution
based scientifically on rational contingency and theologically on createdness, we are
not truly discussing evolution. The semi-divinised process that is interpreted in terms
of the selfish gene or as a result of agential chance and law is illusory. Evolution is
only real as a creature.
1 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End ofReligion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 92
2 Ibid. 14
3 We also note such a tendency in the thought of Willem Drees, who argues that theology must,
amongst other things, "develop a view of creation and providence which does not conflict with the
evolution of species and our knowledge of physical processes." (Drees, Religion, Science and
Naturalism, 4) This would appear reasonable, except that this limitation is one-way traffic. For
instance, William Alston argues that because the methodology of natural sciences relies on induction,
then there is a potential for the occurrence of miracles within the natural order in any unexplored or
unsupervised aspect of reality. Drees appears to take great offence at this suggestion, describing it as
"undermining scientific reasoning" although he admits it does not conflict with any observations. In
fact, it "undermines the integrity of science, both that of its methods and that of its results." Therefore,
the only unproblematic theological approaches are those that "seek to respect and interpret the
understanding of reality delivered by the natural sciences." (Ibid. 94-95)
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(ii) This leads onto our treatment of Teilhard, whose astonishing vision of a world in
evolutionary christic development lead him to overlook ultimately the createdness
and rational contingency of evolution. For Teilhard the significance of the end far
outweighs that of the beginning, and the significance of unity far outweighs that of
the disunited or disunity itself. Ultimately, evolution loses its createdness in
Teilhard's vision as radial energy resolves itself into a christogenic force. Evolution
is the redemption of the multiple which has for all time confronted God with disunity
and evil. This virtually otiose God can only act to encourage this escape, by making
himself known in history as Jesus Christ, the redeemer from multiplicity, and then by
becoming an explicit element of evolution. Evolution is a Christ-inspired salvation
by works.
(iii) In this thesis we have hopefully illustrated the constructive potential of Gunton's
theology to some extent. At least for our purposes, the basis of its value is in his
recurring emphasis on createdness, and how theological motifs can influence this.
We do not need to repeat our exposition and critique of Gunton's theology, but we
must highlight its basic framework for its value for the science-theology dialogue.
The heart of this theology is the divine prevenience, understood not as a rationalist
principle but as the trinitarian freedom of God. God as Immanent Trinity is free,
triune, transcendent, self-sufficient, the Lord. The creature exists within a given
space where it nevertheless has a true and intrinsic reality through an ongoing
relationship with the Creator. In this uniquely dualist relationship, the creature is
particularised by the Spirit of God as the bounded and finite creature, and finds its
own space where it is not pantheistically consumed by God nor reaches beyond its
own limits and arrogates to itself divine boundaries or properties. The absolute
limitation or boundary of the creature is of course its dependency upon God for
existence and continued existence. The creature is not self-caused, nor does it derive
its own destiny. It is the result of a divine act of will through the Son and Spirit, and
its continued existence in relative autonomy is the result of continuing divine action-
in-relation.
Conclusion
(B) Prospective: Suggestions for Further Research
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As with any thesis, we must make an attempt at foresight and point to the potential
for further study in the subjects we have been addressing. These fall into four broad
categories. First, Foster's argument needs to be supported with concrete historical
examples of the importance for creation theology and voluntarist theology for early
scientists. Moreover, if we are to be able to claim that explicit or implicit theological
presuppositions underlie the scientific undertaking, then Foster's treatment of Greek
science also needs a concrete basis. Apart from this, there are three other areas that
would benefit from further development, (i) Further treatment and critique of
Gunton's theology, (ii) A similar treatment of Teilhard, with particular emphasis on
createdness. (iii) Reappraisal of methodology at the science-theology interface.
(i) Gunton's theology is in urgent need of detailed scholarly appraisal. Although we
have attempted a broad exposition of the major tenets of his work, anyone familiar
with his work will be aware that we have bypassed his discussion of metaphor, and
hardly touched upon the idea of transcendentals. Moreover, our critique of his work
only addresses those aspects of his work that we presented. As his work undergoes
more detailed and critical analysis, not only our shortcomings but also his own will
become more apparent, but we can highlight those difficulties which we encountered.
The most basic and most critical weakness of Gunton's theology is his dismissive
approach to evidence. Irrespective of how accurate his reading of friend or foe
happens to be, his arguments are always vulnerable to the charge that he is
demonising his opposition and practicing hagiography on those who he follows.
This is a great shame, not only because we have hopefully shown that he has a great
many fruitful ideas, but also because as Ayres points out, there is a danger that in
regarding his opponents as beyond the pale, he is missing out on that which is fruitful
in their thought. In particular, his reading of the Cappadocians needs reviewing, and
there must be an endeavour to rehabilitate Augustine into his wider theology.
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In terms of his theology, there is a great danger that Gunton's necessary
strengthening of Pneumatology becomes a threat to an adequate Christology. Put
simply, he has reduced Christology to past tense, instituting divine action, and
reserves seemingly all present tense action to the Spirit. This ignores the role of the
divine Logos in maintaining and guaranteeing creaturely rationality. Moreover,
whilst some ofMolnar's complaints against Gunton's doctrine of the Incarnation do
not hold up under scrutiny, there is room for a re-articulation of the fact that the
ministry of Christ is a human endeavour carried out by the Word of God incarnate.
Gunton seems occasionally to forget his own emphasis on anhypostasis/enhypostasis,
and implies that there is an independent human personhood within the Incarnation.
Another dangerous aspect of Gunton's Pneumatology is the motif of the
pneumatological perfecting of God. It is important to prevent the Spirit's role as the
love between Father and Son from becoming mere introspection, and it is also
important to emphasise the naturalness of the act of creation to prevent any
suggestion of external constraints. However, if the love of God is orientated naturally
to the other, then this might be perceived to conflict with the gratuity of the act of
creation. Gunton also emphasises the role of the Spirit in eschatological (proleptic)
divine action, but we never receive any indication as to what form divine action that
brings about the Eschaton actually takes, or how the world is being changed through
this action. This is part and parcel of a wider difficulty in Gunton's doctrine of
Providence. To be fair, this doctrine only received extensive treatment by Gunton in
the last five or six years, but we still had to reconstruct a great deal of his doctrine
from partial evidence. Some further clarification on the relationship between divine
and creaturely action in this regard would be welcome.
(ii) As the continuing research into Teilhard's theology seems unabated, we can hope
that the scientific credentials of his work will become clearer over time, both
positively and negatively. Moreover, there is room for his advocates to respond to
our challenge and adapt his work towards an emphasis on createdness. This will
require a thorough overhaul of his metaphysics, especially his suspicions of the
multiple and his devaluing of creation ex nihilo. With regard to his evolutionary
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Christology, there needs to be a re-emphasising of the particularity of Christ, through
an affirmation of the doctrine of the Ascension, and through a pneumatological
counterbalance to his almost total focus on Christology. In this way, an emphasis on
present tense divine action would mitigate against the need for the concept of the
Within and the subsequent divinising of evolutionary change. Responsibility for
evolutionary movement must be firmly attributed to the Son and Spirit and involve
more than a mere goad for human action. Lastly, there needs to be a greater
distinction between evolution and eschatology, such that the divine intention and
action behind the latter can come to the fore.
(iii) The science-theology interface represents a vast edifice of scholarship, and to
make general statements about further research here would be foolhardy. However,
we can say that an emphasis on the createdness will be of significance whenever
theology must comment on the natural order. It is not just important for theologians
to ensure that their work is faithful to the reality of the world, but it is also important
for critiquing the material within popular science and the scientific contributions to
the dialogue. The concept of createdness and rational contingency allows for a
critical analysis of theology and science, which ensures that we are truly dealing with
the dialogue model. Of course not all theologians wish to remain with a dialogue
model, and many wish to move towards an integration model. We see this in
Peacocke's theology of nature, and in Gunton's transcendentals. There is no reason
why this cannot also remain faithful to createdness, provided the divine sovereignty
in both divine action and relationality with the world. This is hardly a novel
suggestion, but it does seem to be an unpopular or unimportant motif at the interface,
where the emphasis appears to be on attenuating divine action-in-relation for the sake
of avoiding any suggestion of divine intervention. More to the point, the particular
concern with evolution that prompts a good deal of this reinterpretation of divine
sovereignty and action-in-relation is perhaps unjustified in the first place. Any aspect
of the natural order, including evolution, is only a fitting subject for theology and the
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